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This thesis examines the influence of non-state actors on Polish-German relations by 
considering foreign policy-making towards Poland in Germany and vice versa. The 
approach chosen for this thesis is interdisciplinary and takes into consideration 
literature from domestic politics (Area Studies), Foreign Policy Analysis and 
International Relations (IR). The thesis argues that IR, by purely looking into the 
quality of inter-state relations, too often treats these relations as a result of policies 
emanating from the relevant governments, without considering the policies’ 
background. Therefore, the thesis argues that it is necessary to engage with the 
domestic factors which might explain where foreign policies come from. It points out 
that non-state actors influence governments’ choices by supplying resources, and by 
cooperating or competing with the government on an issue at stake. In order to 
determine the degree of influence that non-state actors can have on foreign policy-
making two variables are examined: the institutionalisation of the state relations in 
question; and the domestic structures of the relevant states. Specifically, the thesis 
examines the institutionalisation of Polish-German relations, and examines 
Germany’s and Poland’s domestic structures and their effect on the two states’ 
foreign policy-making in general. Thereafter, the thesis uses case studies in order to 
unravel the influence of non-state actors on specific foreign policies. Three case 
studies are examined in detail: (i) Poland’s EU accession negotiations with regard to 
the free movement of capital chapter of the acquis communautaire; (ii) Germany’s 
EU 2004 Eastern Enlargement negotiations with regard to the free movement of 
workers chapter of the acquis communautaire; and (iii) Germany’s decision to 
establsh a permanent exhibition in Berlin that will depict the expulsions of millions of 
Germans from the East following WWII. 
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This thesis addresses the question: what is the influence of non-state actors in 
Germany on foreign policy-making towards Poland and vice versa? This chapter has 
five sections. Section I explains why Polish-German relations matter. Section II 
reviews the literature on Polish-German relations and identifies the gap that this thesis 
seeks to fill. Since this thesis uses approaches from Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
and International Relations (IR), in Section III these disciplines are introduced and 
their key concepts, used here, elaborated. Section IV introduces the research design of 
the thesis, research questions, hypotheses and their testing; explains and justifies the 
methodologies employed. Section V outlines the structure of the thesis.       
 
I.	  Empirical	  Interest	  –	  Why	  are	  Polish-­‐German	  relations	  important?	  
 
It could be argued that Polish-German relations are of minor interest since the two 
countries are friendly neighbours and co-operate as part of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) at the military and defence level and the European Union (EU) 
at the economic and other levels. Germany recognised the Oder-Neisse border by 
signing the Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation Treaty in June 
1991 and Poland did not object to Germany’s re-unification (as discussed in Chapter 
III). Therefore, judging from the perspective of the international structure, and 
particularly from the events of the 1990s when Germany supported Poland’s 
accession to the EU and NATO, one could argue that Polish-German relations are not 
contentious enough to arouse any interest. But such an assessment does not take 
account of the events of the new millennium. Despite common membership of the EU 
and NATO, and that World War II ended over sixty years ago, the past still shapes 
Polish-German relations. At the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in 2007  
negotiating the Lisbon Treaty, intended to reform the EU, newly enlarged to 27-
member states, Poland’s delegation, led by Law and Justice,1 demanded an altered 
assignation of votes in the EU Council. Jarosław Kaczyński, the then Polish Prime 
                                                 
1 The centre-right party Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość/ PiS) was established in 2001 by the 
Kaczyński twins and won the 2005 Polish parliamentary elections with 27 % of the votes cast. PiS 
eventually formed a coalition government with the radical Samoobrana (Self Defence) and the 
conservative Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR, League of Polish Families) in May 2006, omitting the other 
centre right party Platforma Obywatelska (PO, Civic Platform), which came second with 24.1 %. 
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Minister, attracted Europe-wide attention by saying, “if it were not for Germany and 
WWII, Poland would have 60 million people now and would be better represented in 
the EU.” 2  
Erika Steinbach, President of the Federation of Expellees (Bund der 
Vertriebenen, BdV) and member of the Bundestag for the CDU/CSU parliamentary 
group figurs prominently in the media and is able to stir up feelings on both sides and 
precipitate debates about the quality of Polish-German relations, not least because she 
voted against the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. However, she attracts more 
attention in Poland than in Germany, where although Steinbach and the BdV are 
occasionally mentioned in newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung or the 
Spiegel, they are not of great importance to the public. The BdV under Steinbach’s 
leadership launched a foundation to erect the Centre Against Expulsions (Zentrum 
gegen Vertreibungen, ZgV), documenting the expulsions and ethnic cleansings of 20th 
century Europe, including the displacement of some 15 million Germans, 
predominantly from the former Eastern territories of the Deutsches Reich. The Grand 
Coalition supported the idea of erecting a “Visible Sign” (Sichtbares Zeichen), and by 
2008 it was clear that a museum depicting this event would be erected in Berlin and 
run by the Flight, Expulsions, Reconciliation Foundation (Stiftung Flucht, 
Vertreibung, Versöhnung, SFVV) at the German Historical Museum in Berlin. Polish 
politicians accused Germany of trying to rewrite history by painting the German 
people as victims, thus assuaging German collective guilt.  
Another contentious issue is are property disputes. Some former expellees are 
demanding compensation from the Polish government for their property losses. The 
dispute culminated in the founding of the Prussian Claims Society (Preußische 
Treuhand, PT) in 2000, and the filing of 22 individual claims in the European Court 
of Human Rights in December 2006. Although the Court declared the case to be 
inadmissible,3 the PT still exists and seeks to be the “strategic instrument for all 
displaced persons organizations, the victims themselves, and all others who are 
involved in this matter”.4 The German government has repeatedly distanced itself 
                                                 
2 Quoted in “Stimmgewicht in EU: Kaczynski will Kriegstote mitzählen”: 
http://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/stimmengewicht-in-eu_aid_64058.html, accessed 20.02.2012. 
3 For the ruling see European Court of Human Rights, Application no. 47550/06  
by PREUSSISCHE TREUHAND GmbH & Co. KG a.A. against Poland: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=841872&portal=hbkm&source=
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.  
4 See: http://www.preussische-treuhand.org/en/Betrieb.html, accessed 20.02.2012. 
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from the activities of the PT, and its actions were condemned in Germany by high 
profile politicians (including Steinbach) and churches.5 Nevertheless, in Poland this 
isuue stirs up strong responses in the Polish media and the public and disturbs good 
political relations.  
These three events alone demonstrate that Polish-German relations are not 
conflict-free despite favourable international structures. As this short introduction 
indicates, despite overall good relations between the two countries, it is clear that non-
state actors can play a significant role, both constructive and obstructive. Small non-
state actors like the BdV or the Preußische Treuhand are able to cause major tensions 
between the two states. A positive example of non-state actors’ involvement in 
Polish-German relations is the Polish Catholic church which played a significant role 
in initiating dialogue between the Polish and German churches leading to “setting up 
the floor” for their respective governments to officially start bi-lateral relations. By 
contrast, organisations like the BdV or the PT are able to cause major tensions 
between the two states. Therefore, it is not possible to explain Polish-German 
relations at the governmental level alone, something of which the discipline of IR 
tends to be guilty. In this case omitting non-state actors would give an incomplete 
picture of Polish-German relations. 
 
The nature of the Polish-German relationship also matters for all the states that 
participate in the organisations that Poland and Germany are both part of. Especially 
for the EU, a difficult relationship between these two countries, the largest and the 
sixth largest members, would make routine work tedious since Germany and Poland, 
with 120 million people between them, have considerable weight in EU decision-
making. Gridlock at the intergovernmental level has occurred between other states, 
with Greece and its dispute of Macedonia’s name, perhaps the most obvious example.   
Before returning to the question of non-state actors’ influence on foreign 
policy-making and their contribution to Polish-German relations, the next section 
discusses the existing literature on Polish-German relations and identifies the gap that 
this thesis seeks to fill. 
 
                                                 
5 See for example the article from 19.12.06: Vertriebenen-Klage - Auswärtiges Amt versucht, Polen zu 
besänftigen at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,455522,00.html, accessed 20.02.2012. 
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II.	  Literature	  Review	  
 
This literature review is divided into two sub-sections following the two broad areas 
that it discusses: the first is a literature on Polish-German relations and the second  
engages with the literature on the role of non-state actors on Polish-German relations. 
 
Literature	  on	  Polish-­‐German	  relations	  
 
Most literature on Polish-German relations focuses on the troubled history of the two 
countries and their reconciliation. A considerable amount of work has emerged during 
the process of Eastern Enlargement, covering  Poland, Germany and the EU. Another 
branch of literature on Polish-German relations could be labelled “popular relations”. 
History, as the common denominator,  plays a significant role in all these works. 
Concepts which constantly recur in historical legacy literaure include coming 
to terms with the past (e.g. Bachmann, 2005: 197-215); collective memory (e.g. 
Pięciak, 2005: 315-43) and reconciliation (e.g. Gardner Feldman 1999; 2007; 2012). 
Most significance is atributed in WWII and its aftermath (Góralski 2006). In the early 
1990s,Polish-German relations were better than ever before. Germany unified without 
major Polish objections, and following thhe Good Neighbourly Relations treaty,  
Germany became Poland’s prime advocate on EU accession. The literature on Polish-
German relations thus compared their relations to the Franco-German case. In fact, it 
was Polish and German politicians who introduced this comparison (e.g. Pflüger 
1996). Gardner Feldman’s (1999) article on reconciliation as principle and practice in 
German foreign policy concludes: “the German-Polish case [has been] more 
pragmatic, public and institutionalized, and less fettered by history [in comparison to 
reconciliation with the Czech Republic], in part due to its earlier start in defiance of 
Cold War strictures.” (Gardner Feldman, 1999: 355) This analysis is challanged by 
post-2000 developments and advent of the Law and Justice Party, which stirred up the 
past.  An example of how the past lingers in Polish politics is the academic Marek 
Cichocki, who from 2007 was also advisor to Polish president Lech Kaczyński.6 His 
analyses (Cichocki 2004; 2005) use  the past as a justification for certain policies. 
This is problematic if Polish-German relations are supposed to improve. Other 
                                                 
6 http://www.prezydent.pl/ludzie-prezydenta/doradcy/marek-a-cichocki/, accessed 15.07.2009. 
 14 
opinions regarding history in Polish-German relations also abound, such as that of  
Krzysztof Miszczak (2011, Interview) (see Chaper II). 
 
Lutomski (2006) stresses that an unmet challenge in the process of Polish-
German reconciliation is the acknowledgment of Germany’s role as victim. Under the 
Communist regime, research about the expulsions of Germans was not permitted, nor 
acknowledged. Joint academic efforts after 1989 closed this gap (Bachman and 
Kranz, 1998; Borodziej and Lemberg, 2000).  
A considerable amount of literature on Polish-German relations emerged 
during the process of the EU’s Eastern Enlargement. Symptomatically for this period, 
for Freudenstein (1998: 41-54) the relationship between Poland and Germany is 
crucial both for existing and potential new members. Zaborowski (2004)  analyses 
Polish-German relations through Europeanisation as a normative process, implying a 
liberal transformation of past dictatorial regime states with political, economic and 
international dimensions. Zaborowski explains that during the Cold War it was 
impossible for both states to “Europeanise” since the international structure was not 
conducive, but following 1991, Oder-Nisse line and cooperation on Poland’s EU and 
NATO memberships, their relations started to Europeanise (ibid: 79-133). However, 
Zaborowski also uses the Franco-German rapprochement model and points out that 
for full Europeanisation the interest of both states must evolve from “reconcilability” 
to “convergence” and warns that this lies in the distant future for Polish German 
relations. 
 Literature concerned with “popular relations” focuses on mutual perceptions. 
Dmitrow (2005: 419-50) concludes that relations between Poland and Germany have 
worsened in recent years after the positive momentum of 1999 (NATO accession) and 
2004 (EU accession) ended because of the persistence of mutual stereotypes. Whereas 
Germans often view Poles as dishonest (Polnische Wirtschaft) and backward, Poles 
often accuse Germans of chauvinism and neo-nationalism (448-49).  
 
Influence	  of	  Non-­‐state	  Actors	  on	  Polish-­‐German	  Relations	  
 
The literature on German non-state actors and their role in foreign policy-making is 
much more detailed than that on Poland. Therefore, broader strokes are used and the 
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literature on non-state actors and their role in foreign policy making in the respective 
countries in general is presented. The theoretical foundation on the role of non-state 
actors in foreign policy-making is dealt with in ta subsequent section, but here I 
present the literature on Polish-German relations in order to complete the picture and 
to identify the existing gaps. 
Opinion polls have not been presented in this sub-section although public 
opinion could be treated as a non-state actor or pressure group in its own right. The 
reasons for this are manifold, but two stand out: public opinion is not a coherent 
group, and it is not organised. It has been confirmed in various studies that the vast 
majority of people are misinformed or ignorant about foreign policy issues, and that 
only about twenty % of the population has a genuine interest in and knowledge about 
foreign policy issues; the so called “informed or attentive public opinion” (e.g. 
Kriesberg, 1949; Rosenau, 1961; Neumann 1986). Hence, the above mentioned 
opinion polls, whilst certainly being representative of mass public opinion at a given 
point, do not give an insight into the opinion of the informed public, a segment of the 
public that has usually undergone higher education and is therefore more organised 
and better able to pressure policy makers (e.g. Copsey, 2010). However, this does not 
mean that mass public opinion has no influence on foreign policy makers at all since, 
after all, politicians want to be elected, or, in Key’s words (1961: 96): “Mass opinion 
may set general limits, themselves subject to change over time, within which the 
government may act.”7  
 A thorough examination of the role of the churches, which initiated the first 
dialgoue between Germany and Poland, has been carried out (e.g. Kerski et al., 2006).  
The famous sentence, “we forgive and ask for forgiveness” addressed to Germany by 
the Polish Catholic Church, and on which the bishop Karol Wojtyła (later, Pope Paul 
II) worked, is well remembered.8 In 1962 the German protestant church published a 
memorandum specifically designed to influence parliamentarians to give up territorial 
claims east of the Oder-Neisse line spiritually initiating the new Ostpolitik of 
Germany’s Grand Coalition (e.g. Jacobsen, 1992: 35-37, 125-35, 142-45). 
                                                 
7 Emphasis added. 
8 The letter containing this famous sentence was written by Boleslaw Kominek, bishop of 
Wroclaw/Breslau (e.g. Madejczyk, 1994). Without any doubt the spirit of this evangelical gesture 
stems from the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) in which the young Wojtyła participated and where 
German and Polish bishops had contact.     
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 Von Dannenberg (2008: 210-38) touches upon the influence of “interest 
groups” (West German business elites, the refugees and public opinion), however, her 
focus is on Brandt’s government and the decision process at the top level. Her 
summary of the making of the Moscow Treaty is that “the influence of interest groups 
on the government’s policies was generally rather small… [because] the parties in 
government had already developed their stance in consultation with different pressure 
groups [and because] the domestic scene in the FRG had changed by late summer 
1969 and revealed clear signs of changed Ostpolitik.” (von Dannenberg, 2008: 210) 
However, that parties in government consulted pressure groups beforehand means that 
interest groups mattered. Likewise, if the whole “domestic scene” changed in favour 
of Ostpolitik, a cultural explanatory element is visible in explaining foreign policy 
preferences, a constructivist approach. Furthermore, von Dannenberg disregards the 
churches’ role in providing a foundation for the new Ostpolitik. 
 In FPA, there are a number of anthologies, often general and non-theoretical, 
on foreign policy-making in a specific country which cover non-state actors. On 
German foreign policy, Eberwein and Kaiser (2001) and Schmidt et al. (2007) 
emphasise that the role played by a specific non-state actor depends on the policy and 
target region under discussion. The trade unions, for example, “have had 
paradoxically the best chance of influencing official foreign policy whenever the 
German government did not have any diplomatic relationship with the state in 
question” (Bührer, 2007: 293). During the Cold War the trade unions were seen as 
“bridge-builders” towards the east (von Amerongen in Tudyka, 1978: 88-91). 
 Le Gloannec’s anthology (2007), which covers Poland, considers political 
foundations, ethnic minorities and churches, Länder and regions, industrial lobbies 
and small and medium sized enterprises as well as multinational enterprises, and 
presents their role against the backdrop of a specific policy.   
Gardner Feldman (2007; 2012) explores the role of non-state actors in 
Germany’s foreign policy of reconciliation, comparing reconciliation policies towards 
Israel, France, the Czech Republic and Poland, but questioning whether these non-
state actors behave as catalysts, complements, conduits or competitors towards the 
state (2007: 15-45). Catalysts in German-Polish relations have predominantly been 
religious groups driven by a moral imperative. They have managed to set the policy 
agenda and influence the rhetoric and reality at a specific time, triggering an official 
response from the German government (Gardner Feldman, 2007: 17-21).  
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Complements are driven by moral obligation as well as pragmatism. They are 
linked to the government through either one or a combination of the following links: 
public funding, an official framework (treaties and agreements), and forums (e.g. 
school book commissions). Their main influence on the government is the collection 
and dissemination of information, agenda setting, and direct influence through 
political leaders who often sit on the intermediary organisations’ executive board. In 
the German-Polish case, scientific and university exchanges, increased media 
attention, town twinnings and the connection between the SPD and the Polish 
Workers’ Party started to flourish after the German-Polish Basic Treaty in 1972. After 
1989 and 1991, further initiatives and societal organisations mushroomed, for 
example the Fund for German-Polish Cooperation, Help for Self-Help (designed for 
the German minority living in Poland) the German-Polish Economic Promotion 
Agency, the Committee for Cross-Border Collaboration and so on (Gardner Feldman, 
2007: 21-29). 
German political foundations9 are categorised as conduits (Gardner Feldman 
2007: 29-34). The role of political foundations abroad is generally described as 
“promotion of democracy” (e.g. Mair, 1997) and “foreign political aid” (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1991: 33-63). The FES and KAS opened an office in Warsaw in 
November 1989, the former concentrating on projects fostering a social market 
economy, democracy and pluralism, the latter engaging in projects on 
decentralisation, economic transformation and NATO and EU accession (Gardner 
Feldman, 2007; 32-33; Dakowska and Tulmets, 2007: 73-89). The FES gave 
fellowships to Hanna Suchocka10 and Leszek Balcerowicz11 even before the Iron 
Curtain fell. The FNS opened its office in Poland in 1991 and concentrated its 
activities on political education, democratisation and marketisation whilst the HBS 
has been present in Warsaw since April 2002 focusing on gender issues, ecology and 
                                                 
9 The literature refers to German political foundations when these foundations were established and/or 
are linked to parties represented in the Bundestag. These are the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) 
linked to the CDU, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) linked to the SPD, the Friedrich-Naumann-
Stiftung (FNS) linked to the FDP, the Hans Seidel Stiftung (HSS) linked to the CSU, the Heinrich-
Böll-Stiftung (HBS) linked to the Greens, and finally the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (RLS) linked to 
Die Linke. They are financed by a fixed annual budget distributed by the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und 
Entwicklungthat; BMZ) according to the share of the six parties in the Bundestag (e.g. Bartsch, 2001: 
206-19; Bartsch, 2007: 280-89).   
10 Hanna Suchocka was Polish Prime Minister from July 1992 until October 1993. 
11 Leszek Balcerowicz was Polish Deputy Prime Minister from January 1990 until January 1991 and 
finance Minister from January 1990 until December 1991. He is most remembered for the Balcerowicz 
Plan advocating a shock therapy model. 
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EU enlargement. Dakowska and Tulmets (2007: 77) observe that the prospect of EU 
accession “gave political foundations important leeway for the transfer of both 
political ideas and trans-national legitimacy” as the CEEC countries needed advice on 
how to implement the aquis communautaire and the “Poland and Hungary: Assistance 
for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE)” programme. The activity of political 
foundations could be seen as the intrusion of another country’s domestic sphere, but 
they enjoy significant political credit in Poland. They have gained direct information 
flow and important contact networks and perhaps most importantly have had a big 
share in changing the perception of Germans as Teutonic Knights,12 as a Polish NGO 
leader summarised (in Dakowska and Tulmets, 2007: 79). 
Expellee groups and religiously motivated groupings have often acted as 
competitors to the German government (Gardner Feldman, 2007: 34-40). In the 
Polish-German case she mentions three events where expellee interests and policies 
clashed openly with the German government’s official policy: first, during the launch 
of Ostpolitik rapprochement and reconciliation, all the expellee groups organised 
under the BdV opposed the government fiercely in its attempts to recognise the Oder-
Neisse line as the final border. Second, in the late 1970s and 1980s, when Poland’s 
Solidarity movement was launched, the SPD-FDP coalition government was less 
critical of the Jaruzelski regime than many other western democracies. This is in 
contrast to various religious groupings such as the Bensberger Kreis and the Central 
Organisation of German Catholics which supported Polish dissidents like Adam 
Michnik and Władysław Bartoszewski. The links between these non-state actors 
permitted Germany to declare relations with Poland as a “community of interest” 
(Interessengemeinschaft) in the 1990s (Jacobsen; Tomala; Kerski cited in Gardner 
Feldman, 2007: 36). Third, in June 2000 Erika Steinbach, the president of the BdV, 
proposed a Centre against Expulsions (Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen) in Berlin, 
whereas the Grand Coalition government preferred a special exhibition in the House 
of History (Haus der Geschichte) in Bonn. Moreover, in 2004 the Preußische 
Treuhand (Prussian Claims Society) declared its intention to sue the Polish 
government for property lost by expellees (Gardner Feldman, 2007: 34-40). 
                                                 
12 In Poland’s collective memory, the Germanisation of Poland’s western territories and the arrival of 
the Teutonic Knights in former East Prussia plays an important role and is remembered as an early 
example of German aggression. The Teutonic Knights were defeated at the battle of Grunwald (in 
German: Schlacht bei Tannenberg) in 1410, used in Roman Dmowski’s vision of Poland based on the 
territories of the Piast kingdom (e.g. Davies, 2002: 130).   
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Fewer studies consider  non-state actors’ influence on foreign policy-making 
in Poland although the pace to close this gap has gained momentum since the mid 
2000s and exceptions are mostly connected to European integration. Sanford (1999: 
769-97) gives an account of Sejm’s in foreign policy, showing that foreign policy-
making in Poland is influenced by the Foreign Affairs Parliamentary Committee, but 
due to the high fluidity and instability of the Polish party system, the government, in 
the form of the president and the foreign ministry (MSZ), manages to achieve its 
foreign policy goals. However, with the rise of two new centre-right parties, PO and 
Law and Justice, party instability has ended; and, since Poland’s EU membership, a 
new Parliamentary Committee for European affairs has been established, covering 
relations with other EU member states.13 
Szczerbiak (2012) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002; 2012) engage 
extensively on the role of parties, mostly in regards to the EU.  Szczerbiak’s work on 
Poland within the EU, deals with the preferences of political parties, public opinion 
and the Catholic Church, but does not engage with non-state actors’ preferences 
towards the EU. Similarly, Gwiazda (2006: 186-190; 2008: 761) notes the parties’ 
positions on foreign policy issues, mostly EU-related. Copsey (2010) analyses the 
impact of informed public opinion on Polish foreign policy and explores the influence 
of business interests on Poland’s foreign policy in general staing that the business-
government links are informal (2010: 63-64). Copsey also shows (2010: 109-133) that 
the influence of business and popular opinion on Poland’s foreign policy decisions (or 
trade relations) versus Ukraine appear to be significant as shown on an example of the 
Huta Częstochowa Steel Mill where prejudices against “dodgy” Ukrainian capital 
prevented the mill be sold to Ukrainian investors in 2004 and 2005. More speculative, 
the non-expansion of the Sarmatia oil pipeline by Polish authorities to connect the 
flow of oil from Brody to Gdańsk seems to have been motivated to a large degree by 
foreign (Russian) and domestic business interests (Copsey, 2010: 121-24).  
Elsewhere, Copsey and Haughton (2009: 263-86) investigate Poland’s policy 
preference formation in the EU, to identify the domestic factors which are the sources 
of these policy preferences. They emphasise that the relation between business and 
the government is an under-researched topic in the CEECs and that conspiracy 
                                                 
13 See the website of the Sejm: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/komisje/www_sue.htm, accessed 26.02.2012.  
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theories prevail over solid research. This also stems from the unclea link between 
business interests and the government: the representative is uncertain about what is 
permissible and hence interviews are often rejected by the parties (Copsey and 
Haughton, 2009: 282). 
Polish-language literature on foreign policy making in Poland are general and 
legalistic (e.g.: Kuźniar and Szczepanik, 2002; Stemplowski, 2004). Little space is 
dedicated to non-state actors such as political advisory think tanks, described as a 
recent set up modelled after western democracies and as independent from the 
government, but at the same time dependent on state funding (Stemplowski, 2004: 
143-46). 
Before developing research questions and hypotheses from this literature 
review, the  next section presents literature on the role of non-state actors in foreign 
policy-making in general.  This will put the Polish-German case into context, whilst 
providing a theoretical framework.  
 
III.	  The	  role	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  	  
 
This section reviews the literature on the role of non-state actors in foreign policy-
making in general. It puts the empirical section into broader context and provides the 
necessary theoretical basis for any engagement with this topic. First, the theoretical 
foundations of the role of society in policy-making in general is examined showing 
how foreign policy is embedded in the wider policy spectrum. Thereafter, the 
theoretical foundation of the role of society in foreign policy-making is reviewed. 
Lastly I review the literature on non-state actors and their role in foreign policy-
making. This review covers literature from IR and FPA. I choose to present the 
literature in each section as it intersects and refers to the other, since dividing the 
literature review into separate sections would be confusing.  
 
The debate on whether “society” in the broad sense participates in policy-making in 
general can be traced back to the debate between pluralists and elitists. Pluralism 
emphasises the limits placed on the government due to powerful groups being 
checked by countervailing powers (Galbraith 1963), meaning that a coalition cannot 
simply “carry out its policies without having to bargain, negotiate and compromise 
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with its opponents” (Dahl 1963). Elitism, in contrast, insists that society is divided 
into “a class that rules and a class that is ruled” (Mosca 1939: 50) thereby putting 
power into the hands of a few elites in the government and business communities 
(Laumann and Pappi 1973, Laumann and Pappi 1976; Scott, 1991). Following the 
criticism by Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (2004) who argued that analyses 
should include issues that do not enter the policy-making agenda “pure” pluralist and 
elitists responded to these critiques leading to a convergence of both schools called 
neo-pluralism or elite pluralism (e.g. Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987: 271-318; Smith, 
1990; 311-19). Further, Lindblom and Dahl have recognised the shortcomings of their 
earlier work in their more recent publications (Wenman, 2003: 58).  
  The study of “governance” has mushroomed recently, putting policy networks 
into the focus of policy-making analysis. All policy network analysis stresses that 
domestic actors have to be organised in order to form a policy network (e.g. Knoke et 
al. 1996: 3-4). Policy network analysis seeks to shed light on the interdependence 
between public organizations and private interests (Rhodes, 1997: 11-12). 
Governance is concerned with four broad topics. First, in public 
administration and public policy, governance seeks to explain how networks come to 
the fore, and how the rules of policy formulation and implementation are managed. 
This debate focuses mainly on the efficiency of networks in comparison to 
hierarchical structures, but increasingly on the democratic accountability of network 
structures (Kjær, 2004: 15-16; 19-58). Second, in IR, governance focuses on output-
efficiency fomented by problems stemming from globalization. Here, neo-realists and 
liberalists disagree on the degree of focus on states as the principal actors. In addition, 
a normative debate on “global democracy” emerged, focusing on the democratic 
accountability of international organizations (Kjær, 2004: 16; 59-98). Third, the study 
of EU politics has precipitated its own theoretical model: multi-level governance, 
which explores how policy decision are made at multiple levels (supra-national; 
intergovernmental; sub-national) by formal and informal institutions. Here too, the 
issue of democratic accountability in the light of the EU’s alleged “democratic 
deficit” has left its imprint (Kjær, 2004: 16-17; 99-122). Fourth, in comparative 
politics, governance discusses the role of the state in the regulation of economic and 
social development, particularly in developing states (Kjær, 2004: 17; 123-48). The 
other core issue of governance in comparative politics has been democratization, and 
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to what extent agents and structures impact on access to power, the establishment of 
and changes of regimes (Kjær, 2004: 17-18; 149-71). 
The study of governance and policy networks, especially in British public 
policy, is intrinsically tied to Rhodes (1997). In contrast to “agent models”, where 
local authorities implement national policies supervised by the central government, 
and “partnership models”, where local authorities and central departments are co-
equals, the so called “Rhodes model” posits that organizations depend on each other 
for resources and therefore enter an exchange relationship (Rhodes, 1997: 8-9), a quid 
pro quo game in a web of players with a policy-outcome influenced by the 
participating actors. This theory rests inevitably upon the assumption that players act 
rationally, based on a “self-interested exchange calculus” (Freund & Rittberger, 2001: 
79). Rhodes identifies five different networks: tightly integrated policy communities, 
professional networks, intergovernmental networks, producer networks and loosely-
integrated issue networks.  
These networks vary according to membership, general interests, vertical and 
horizontal interdependence, the resources for which their members compete, and the 
dominant interest. The difference between a policy community and an issue network is 
as follows. Within a policy community, actors working on a policy enjoy a close 
relationship; the number of actors is limited and some potential actors are consciously 
excluded; the quality of interaction is high and frequent; consensus prevails over the 
actors’ values, ideology and broad policy preferences; and all actors have some 
resources with which they enter an exchange relationship with the other actors leading 
to a perceived positive-sum-game and a hierarchical structure. An issue network, in 
contrast, is characterised by a large number of participants who mainly consult and do 
not negotiate a policy outcome; the interaction is fluctuating; the actors conflict over 
their policy-outcome preferences; and their power relationship is unequal (Rhodes, 
1997: 43-44).  
 
Foreign policy continues to be seen overwhelmingly as an elitist enterprise, 
state or government centric, as evidenced by how authors define the term. Manners 
and Whitman (2000: 2) define foreign policy as “the attempt by governments to 
influence events outside the state’s boundaries”. Similarly White (1989: 1) sees 
foreign policy as “that area of governmental activity which is concerned with 
relationships between the state and other actors, particularly other states, in the 
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international system.” However, Putnam (1988) has argued that in democratic 
societies foreign policy decisions have to be “ratified” by the domestic interest in 
general. Other authors, such as Milner (1992), argue that powerful interest groups 
influence foreign policy decisions to a large extent.  
Hill (2003: 6) sees this state-centric view as  
 
“ironical given that FPA grew up in reaction to the assumption of classical realism 
that the state was a single, coherent actor pursuing clear national interests in a rational 
manner, with varying degrees of success according to the talents of particular leaders 
and the constraints of circumstance” 
 
Hudson (2005: 1-2) criticises IR, and specifically its theories, for losing sight of its 
“ground”, which is human behaviour. Rather, IR treats the state as a black box, as a 
unitary actor in the international system in a “billiard ball model”. She argues that 
FPA provides this “ground” as it engages with actors, and assumes that all decisions 
are taken by humans and groups that do not act singly, thus discarding the “state black 
box model” (Hudson, 2005: 2). 
 Additionally, it has been argued that a clear divide between domestic and 
foreign policy does not exist. Rather, both are interlinked. Hartmann (2001: 45) 
claims that “domestic policy explains one part of foreign relations” and Kindermann 
(1986: 75) explains that “foreign policy is a product of international and national 
factors and the existent linkages between both factors.” Hill (2003: 38-39), building 
on the work of Rosenau (1997), states that “foreign policy has its domestic sources, 
and domestic policy has its foreign influences.”  
Further confusion arises from the blurred and seemingly synonymous labels 
foreign policy and foreign relations. Eberwein and Kaiser (2001: 4) distinguish 
foreign policy from external relations in Germany saying that: 
 
While “foreign policy” serves the official interests of the state as a whole, as defined 
by the appropriate actors and institutions […] “external relations” entail the totality of 
relations with the outside world maintained by other political and societal actors, such 
as those ministries not traditionally associated with foreign policy, as well as political 
parties and interest groups. External relations can be part of foreign policy, but they 
do not have to be.  
  
This distinction is interesting as Hill (2003: 3) asks whether foreign policy should 
include “almost everything that emanates from every actor on the world scene?” With 
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Eberwein and Kaiser’s distinction one could rule out the international activity of 
NGOs, corporations etc. as (official) foreign policy and label it as part of foreign 
relations. However, this neat distinction appears to be artificial and ultimately state-
centric again. As seen above, and as will be discussed below, whilst various non-state 
actors can pursue their own relations with other states and non-state actors abroad, 
separate from the home-government’s official policy, they nevertheless have an 
impact on relations between the two states and influence the home-government to a 
varying degree depending whether these independent activities stand in competition 
with the government, whether they complement it, initiate a new policy, facilitate its 
exercise and so on. 
 Nye and Keohane (1971) define transnational relations as “contacts, 
coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the 
central foreign policy organs of governments” (Nye and Keohane, 1971: 331). 
Transnational interaction, the movements of tangible or intangible items across state 
borders, might involve governments, but at least one non-governmental organisation 
must play an important part in it (Nye and Keohane, 1971: 332). Thus, the term 
transnational actor (TNA) is employed, but often synonymously with “non-state 
actor” or “non-governmental actor” (Le Gloannec, 2007: 195). Nye and Keohane 
suggest that TNAs can have five effects in interstate politics, such as chaning attitudes 
of elites; contributing to the internationalisation of domestic politics by creating and 
interlinking new national affiliates to to try to influence government policy; creating 
and enhancing dependence and interdependence in  finance, transportation, 
communication and travel, making certain policy options too costly; creating new 
instruments for one government to influence another and emerging as autonomous 
actors with private foreign policies that oppose state policies (Nye and Keohane, 
1971: 336-42). This is groundbreaking as it breaks the “state-centric paradigm”, 
showing the “contamination of interstate relations by transnational relations” (1971: 
343). Other scholars also try to replace the state-centric view (e.g. Mansbach et al., 
1976; Rosenau, 1980).  
Whilst it is apparent that TNAs include actors that act in the international 
arena, such as multi-national corporations (MNCs), their conceptualisation does not 
include smaller “societal actors” that act only in the domestic sphere and not globally. 
These actors can also influence foreign policy decisions by pressurising the relevant 
decision makers. Also, TNAs act in the domestic sphere and are embedded in a 
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particular culture as Strange (1996) notes regarding MNCs. Additionally, Nye and 
Keohane do not examine in detail the difference between a governmental / state actor 
and a non-governmental / non-state / TNA actor. 
 Josselin and Wallace (2001: 3-4) define non-state actors as organisations 
“largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control […], 
operating as or participating in networks […] across the boundaries of two or more 
states, thus engaging in “transnational” relations […] acting in ways which affect 
political outcomes, either within one or more states or within international 
institutions.” However, they stress that a definition based on independence from the 
state would be misleading (Josselin and Wallace; 2001: 2) since “the universe of non-
state actors is […] necessarily diverse. For example, Halliday (2001: 26) reminds us 
that many NGOs “are, in effect, contractors for states”. Likewise, many organisations, 
such as German political foundations, entirely depend on state funding whilst 
enjoying great political leeway (see above). 
 Keck and Sikkink (1998) provide a useful framework for classifying the 
activities of TNAs. They divide their activities into five types, including “issue 
creation and agenda-setting”, “influence on discursive positions”, “influence on 
institutional procedures”,  “influence on policy change in ‘target actors’”; and 
“influence on state behaviour” (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 25). The tactics employed 
for this include creation of links between civil society, states and international 
organisations, creating a dense network that helps the TNAs to enter the international 
stage as significant players (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 1-2). Here, we can notice the 
influence of Rhodes (1997) and Keck and Sikkink’s(1998)  notion of foreign policy as 
a network, and usage of the term “transnational advocacy network”. 
 Building on Keck and Sikkink, Gardner Feldman (2007) identifies four roles 
that non-state actors assume in relation to the government when it comes to 
reconciliation between Germany and Poland: they can be conduits, catalysts 
competitors, or complements. Being a conduit or a complement signifies that the 
relationship with the government is rather harmonious whereas being a competitor or 
catalyst is likely to invoke tension. Moreover, Gardner Feldman argues that the role of 
government is hidden when a TNA performs as a conduit and is more open when the 
activities of a TNA and government are complementary. Acting as a competitor, the 
TNA might precipitate an open or a hidden response from the government (Gardner 
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Feldman, 2007: 15-17). This useful classification could also be applicable to other 
policy areas. 
 Risse-Kappen (1995) identifies two key variables which determine the impact 
of transnational networks in shaping inter-state relations: domestic structures and the 
degree of international institutionalization (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 6-7). Domestic 
Structures, according to Risse-Kappen, determine the availablity of channels into 
political systems and “requirements for ‘winning coalitions’” (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 6-
7). Thus, according to Risse-Kappen (1995: 6-7), it is more difficult for transnational 
actors to penetrate systems of target countries if they have state-dominated structures, 
but once they break through, they have significant policy impact. But,  framented 
states and organised civil society, Risse-Kappen adds (1995: 6-7), are easier for 
transnational actors to access, though they might face obstacles to coalition building.  
Risse-Kappen’s (1995) other variable, international institutionalisation, refers to 
“specific issue-area” regulations as achieved through bilateral agreements, 
multilateral regimes, and/or international organizations. 
 
This overview of literature suggests that political science offers various competing 
theories on the role that non-governmental organisations play in policy-making in 
general, oscillating between elitism and pluralism. “Governance” literature 
emphasises that policies are made within networks; actors depend on each other due 
to resources. Foreign policy is regarded as state-dominated, paradoxically even in 
FPA, a discipline challenging IR’s state as a “black box model”. Literature suggestst 
that non-state actors’ success in bringing their ideas into foreign policy making 
depends on the domestic structure and the degree of institutionalisation. Most 
literature engages with non-state actors acting across domestic borders, neglecting 
actors that do not act globally. Literature also states that non-state actors can influence 
official decision makers directly and indirectly having various means at their disposal, 






IV.	  Research	  Design,	  Sources	  and	  Methodology	  
 
 This thesis investigates the influence of non-state actors, defined as “any actor 
other than the government” (Willetts, 2006: 426) in foreign policy, using Poland and 
Germany as case studies. It examines the influence of these non-state actors is in 
determining the state of Polish-German relations. The main research question is: 
 
What is the influence of non-state actors on Polish-German relations? 
 
The loose definition of “non-state actors” as all actors except the government allows 
the inclusion of actors that have previously remained undetected by the constraining 
nature of a (too narrowly defined) theoretical radar (LeGloannec, 2007: 2). I will also 
include public opinion in my research for, although public opinion is not organised, it 
nevertheless sets important parameters, for democratic governments may act for 
reasons of electoral ambition (Key, 1961: 96) and may function as a catalyst for the 
actions of non-state actors. 
Following the review of the concept of “policy networks” in policy-making in 
general, this thesis argues that foreign policy in Germany and Poland stems from a 
network of various actors drawn from state institutions and society. To demonstrate 
this, three case studies are presented, testing the hypotheses below. However, as 
demonstrated by the literature review, domestic structures and the degree of 
institutionalisation provide the ground for non-state actors to become involved in 
foreign policy-making and determine to what extent they can be successful in doing 
so. This leads to three research sub-questions. The first concerns both countries since 
it contains the bi-lateral agreements and the institutionalised set up: 
 
1. What is the degree of institutionalisation in Polish-German relations? 
 
The following sub-questions will be separated since each country needs to be 
thoroughly examined on its own: 
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2a. What are the domestic structures of foreign policy-making in Germany? 
2b. What are the domestic structures of foreign policy-making in Poland? 
 
Furthermore, prior to any analysis of “policy networks” and an evaluation of non-state 
actors’ influence within them, it is necessary to identify the players that have an 
interest in Polish-German relations. This leads to two two sub-questions that, together 
with the two previous questions, build the core of this thesis since they will be 
answered in three case studies: 
 
3a. What influence do non-state actors have on foreign policy-making towards 
Poland in Germany and what tactics and means do they employ to pursue 
their interests? 
3b. What influence do non-state actors have on foreign policy-making towards 
Germany in Poland and what tactics and means do they employ to pursue 
their interests? 
 
Once the thesis demonstrates that non-state actors have influence on foreign policy 
decisions, it will be possible to judge who the most important actors are. 
 
4a. What are the most important non-state actors in Germany that have an 
interest in Polish-German relations? 
4b. What are the most important non-state actors in Poland that have an 
interest in Polish-German relations? 
 
The following hypotheses derive from the literature review and will be tested: 
 
H1: Non-state actors have a large degree of influence on foreign policy-making in 
both countries. 
H2: German non-state actors are more successful in influencing the government on 
foreign policy decisions directed towards Poland than their Polish equivalents have 
in influencing the government on foreign policy decisions directed towards Germany. 
H3: Non-state actors with business interests have the greatest impact on foreign 
policy-making towards the other country. 
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I define “having influence” broadly as “affecting policy decisions”. A whole 
subfield of literature deals with the question of what “influence” and “power” mean 
(e.g.: Nagel 1975; Morriss 1987; Haugaard, 2002; Lukes 2004). Since the definition 
of influence determines if and in how far influence can be measured and consequently 
what methodology can be applied, it is approporiate to clarify this point.  
Political scientists often conflate the terms “power” and “influence”. Morriss 
(1987: 8-35) points out that “power” and “influence” are not the same, and that this 
confusion has been practised in social science ever since Dahl (1961) talks about 
power when he actually means influence. Power, according to Morriss, always refers 
“to an ability, capacity or dispositional property” which follows that it “is neither a 
thing (a resource or vehicle) nor an event (an exercise of power): it is a capacity14.” 
An actor might have power to do something or have power over someone, but this 
actor must not necessarily exercise it in order to have this power confirmed. Hence, 
many social scientists have committed the “exercise fallacy” by identifying the 
powerful once the exercise of power has been observed, discarding potential or 
inactive power altogether as it cannot be as easily observed and put into a neat 
methodological roadmap.  
In this thesis I will not assess the capacity (power) of non-state actors to 
influence decision-making but rather observable results, and my usage of “influence” 
as “affecting policy decisions” is congruent with Dahl’s (1961) conceptualisation, 
which Lukes calls one-dimensional power, where the focus is on “behaviour in the 
making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of 
(subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, revealed by political 
participation” (Lukes, 2004: 19).15 Following Nagel (1975: 29) I establish and assess 
“a causal relation between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the 
outcome itself”. However, non-state actors can also be influential in policy making in 
a covert way. For example, the government might not put an issue on the agenda in 
order to foreclose conflict with a perceived powerful non-state actor. Similarly, the 
government might make a policy decision on an issue where many actors expressed 
their preferences, but without including them in its final choice. The judgement that 
on that issue non-state actors are not influential because there is no apparent evidence 
might come premature because the government might have made this decision to 
                                                 
14 Emphasis in the original 
15 Emphasis in the original 
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prevent conflict with a silent non-state actor which has not voiced its preferences. 
Lukes (2004) calls this the “two-dimensional power” which is more difficult to 
research since the researcher often needs to detect issues (or actors) that have not 
entered the agenda and where no official documents exist. Attempts to research this 
kind of influence have been made by, inter alia, Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Crenson 
(1971) and Flyvbjerg (1998). 
March (1955: 432) notes that “influence is to the study of decision-making 
what force is to the study of motion – a generic explanation for the basic observable 
phenomena”, but admits that “there is lacking not only an immediately obvious unit 
of measurement, but even a generally feasible means of providing simple rankings” 
(1955: 434). Whilst it is easy to determine the influence of a motor on the velocity of 
a vehicle and to quantify it at any given time, measuring influence of non-state actors 
on a policy decisions in quantifiable terms is sheer impossible with absolute certainty 
since no unit of measurement would be convincing. Besides the occurrence of covert 
influence mentioned earlier, Dür (2008: 561-62) notes three problems that arise when 
trying to measure influence: different channels of influence; occurrence of 
counteracting lobbying; and the wielding of influence at different stages of the policy 
process. Non-state actors can engage in direct lobbying or outside lobbying by 
influencing public opinion with, for example, media campaigns. Counter-lobbying 
complicates the measurement of influence since although the non-state actor has not 
managed to push through its own preferences it might have avoided an even worse 
outcome. Influence can be exercised at the agenda-setting stage, when decisions are 
taken and when they are implemented. The questions whether the researcher should 
assess every individual stage separately or cumulatively makes the measurement of 
influence more difficult than measuring power in physics. I would even add a fourth 
problem not mentioned by Dür (2008): evaluating the time and resources spent 
dedicated to lobbying. In case a non-state actors has successfully lobbied for an issue 
to enter the policy agenda or pursued the government to take a decision in line of its 
preferences one would intuitively conclude that the influence of this actors is high. 
However, what if this actor had to spent a vast quantity of resources and time to 
achieve this? Another non-state actor might have been equally successful in terms of 
outcome but spent fewer resources on the lobbying process and achieved it quicker. 
Does this mean that this actor is more influential? This is difficult to answer 
especially when researchers try to compare influence across different issues since 
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different issues involve a different set of actors, lobbying strategies and used 
resources. 
Since measuring the degree of influence would be positivist and ultimately too 
contested for the reasons given above I will abstain from measuring influence with a 
yardstick. Rather, and without providing a ranking, I assess the non-state actors’ 
influence as either high or low by examining whether and to what extent the 
respective non-state-actors’ preferences have materialised in the agenda setting and 
decision-taking stage of policy-making. Examining actual results avoids the pitfall of 
identifying influence solely on the basis of evidence of access to policy-makers, 
lobbying activity and available and spent resources for such cause which does not 
necessarily lead to influence and only tells us how influence has been achieved 
(Betsill and Corell, 2001: 69-70). I will not engage with the silent form of influence, 
or Lukes’ (2004) exercise of “second-dimensional power” since it is difficult to 
operationalise and at times speculative given the often-encountered lack of 
documentation. Nevertheless, it should benoted that that this kind of influence could 
also have played a role in the case studies and it represents a potential limitation, 
although with the method process-tracing (see below) I have tried to minimise the risk 
of falsely attributing influence to actors that were not responsible for the analysed 
decisions. Furthermore, I neglect the implementation stage. Although it would add 
more quality to the thesis, this stage is more difficult to monitor since it would require 
a longitudinal study  which is beyond the scope of this thesis. The research questions 
can be sufficiently answered if it can be shown that non-state actors’ influence is 
present in the agenda-setting and decision-taking stage.   
The discussion of influence as a dependent variable has revealed that 
quantifying influence is too contested. Likewise, applying a quantitative method 
would not provide the desired results since this would more likely lead to an 
attempted ranking or quantifying of non-state actors’ influence. Neither would 
quantitative methods tell us anything about what strategies and tactics these actors 
used to materialise their preferences, nor would it acknowledge that different means 
and different actors are likely to be involved across different issues. Consequently, I 
assess the influence of non-state actors on three issues presented in three case studies. 
I choose the case study, one of five techniques for comparison identified by Lijphart 
(1971). Since this thesis examines the influence of non-state actors on foreign policy-
making in Germany and Poland, the approach is evidently comparative in nature, 
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albeit it must be acknowledged that this comparison must be seen as preliminary and 
can only add limited comparative value. That is because the small sample N=3 bears 
an important disadvantage: small N-studies do not allow us to generalize findings 
convincingly, especially since small N-studies are often biased towards conflicting 
decisions that have attained a high degree of media coverage (Dür, 2008: 564-65). 
This issue is addressed again in the conclusion of this thesis. However, the focus on 
only three case studies allows an in-depth study reminiscent of single-country 
scholarship, using its methodological toolkit including the use of the two necessary 
languages, which is better suited in exploring causality than statistical methods. 
(George and Bennett, 2005: 21-22). Lees argues (2006: 1001) that the case study as a 
method is best suited for achieving triangulation. According to Sartori (1994: 23), 
case studies can only serve as a tool for comparison if a well-defined theoretical 
framework informs them. I follow this argumentation by using Risse-Kappen’s (1995) 
theoretical framework, extensively engaged with in Chapters II and III, before 
applying it to the three case studies presented above in Chapters V, VI and VII. 
   
The first case study examins the role of non-state actors in Poland’s demands for 
restrictions on the free movement of capital during EU accession negotiations. Poland 
has obtained a twelve-year transitional period (TP), until 2016, for the acquisition by 
foreigners of agricultural land and forests. This is the longest transitional period 
obtained by any new member state for this chapter of the acquis communautaire. 
Whilst it is true that the TP does not apply to Germany alone but to all EU member 
states, the main concern, as will be seen, was that German capital would buy up large 
portions of Poland effectively amounting to a new capitalist form of the “Drang nach 
Osten”. 
The second case study examins the role non-state actors in Germany’s policy 
decision to restrict its labour market until 1 May 2011 to the eight new member states 
from CEE joining the EU in 2004.16 The seven-year transitional period was 
established in a flexible 2+3+2 model. Germany and Austria were the only existing 
member states that made use of both possible prolongations of this restriction and the 
political process of both decisions must be examined together with the initial 
                                                 
16 The states which joined the EU on May 1 2004 are: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Malta and Cyprus. To the latter two states this restriction does 
not apply. Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU on January 1 2007.  
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establishment of the restriction. Whilst Poland was not the only country affected by 
this policy,  with a population of 38 million, it constitutes over 50% of the total 
population joining the EU in 2004. Moreover, Poland’s geographic proximity to 
Germany is arguably the reason why Poland was Germany’s prime concern when the 
policy was implemented. This policy decision is of particular relevance to Polish-
German relations since Germany and Austria are the only existing member states to 
apply this restriction until May 2011. This policy has an economic dimension, 
appealing to business interests (cheap labour costs), but also has a considerable social 
dimension (pressure on wages and particularly high unemployment rate in the new 
Bundesländer) and moral dimension (reconciliation and taking into account that this 
policy might cause feelings of “second class EU citizenship”). This policy is an ideal 
case for analysing which actors were most successful in voicing their preferences, 
thus testing H3, which states that business interests have the greatest impact on 
foreign policy-making.  
The third case study examins the process that led to the decision to build a 
permanent exhibition in Berlin depicting the flight and expulsion of Germans 
following WWII. This case is of relevance because it caused major friction in Polish-
German relations since the idea was put forward by the BdV in 2000. It is a case in 
which the BdV was a competitor to official German foreign policy towards Poland, 
ever since Ostpolitik’s launch in the 1960s. Lastly, it is a case in which economic 
interests are, at first glance, not the primary concern. 
 One could argue that three case studies make this thesis automatically skewed 
towards Germany since the free movement of labour and the museum issue both 
origin in Germany whilst only the free movement of capital seems to be a “Polish 
case”. However, it will be seen that the salience for the free movement of labour was 
equally high in both states and non-state actors had voiced their preferences in both 
countries. The free movement of capital was significantly more salient for Polish 
interests and mostly insignificant for German interest groups. 
The first two case studies concern Polish-German relations in the context of 
EU accession and it is true that the EU always negotiates in its entirety with each 
individual candidate. It is thus possible to question wheteher these cases are 
admissibale for the subject of this thesis, considering that the other fourteen old 
member states also submitted their respective positions during the negotiations. 
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Moreover, how can we control for the influence of actors outside of Germany and 
Poland? When analysing bi-lateral relations it is never possible to completely rule out 
further actors from outside. States and actors do not live in a vacuum but in a vibrant 
international conext of an increasingly globalised and interconnected world, and with 
numerous arenas to voice their preferences. For example, when comparing the 
reconciliation policies of Germany with Japan one must acknowledge the role of the 
United States in pressuring the German governmnet for détente with the Eastern block 
in the 1960s whereas that pressure was absent in Far East Asia since the US was 
content to have won a bulwark against Communism and reconciliation with Korea 
and Japan was not seen as a priority there (Berger, 2012).  
The final EU decision to restrict the movement of labour for seven years in a 
flexible way is not the result of Germany’s demands alone. However, German non-
state actors have lobbied that the German government adopt a certain stance when 
communicating its position to Brussels. Therefore simply equating the final outcome 
with a certain degree of influence of specific actors on Germany’s foreign policy 
would be illogical since other member states and exogenous actors have contributed 
to the final compromise. The same reasoning applies to the restriction on the purchase 
of agricultural land until 2016. Therefore, I assess the influence of the actors’ 
influence on their respective government’s position and not on the final compromise 
reached in Brussels. 
  
In order to establish the “causality between the preferences of an actor 
regarding an outcome and the outcome itself” (Nagel, 1975: 29) the method process-
tracing appears to be the best available choice. The qualitative method process-tracing 
is used to avoid the pitfall of simply equating the correspondence of preference 
voicing with policy output as influence. Klüver (2009), for example, advocates the 
measuring of influence with quantitative text analysis. This method would perhaps be 
useful when assessing interest group influence on technical issues or where financial 
matters are being negotiated allowing us to conduct large N-studies, but cannot rule 
out that the correspondence of preference voicing with policy outcome is a 
coincidence since the government might have responded to an interest group which 
has been omitted in the study. Process-tracing is better suited to assess causality since 
it investigates each element of the causal chain (Zürn, 1998: 640). It allows an 
examination of first, the process of preference voicing, i.e. the access to policy-
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makers, intentional transmission of information, what tactics and resources were used; 
second, an analysis of behaviour alteration in response to that transmission by other 
non-state actors and the government; and third, the evaluation of policy outcome 
against the individual preference voicing (Betsill and Corell, 2001: 74-78). Process 
tracing forces the researcher to take equifinality into account, i.e. considering 
alternative paths through which the outcome might have occurred (George and 
Bennett, 2005: 207).  
This thesis is theory-testing since, for the three case studies, I investigate 
Risse-Kappen’s (1995) hypotheses that two variables are crucial in shaping the degree 
to which non-state actors influence foreign policy-making: domestic structures and 
the degree of institutionalisation. Both variables will be explored as regards Germany 
and Poland in Chapter II and Chapter III respectively. However, since process tracing 
generates numerous observations within each case it can also lead to theory 
development (George and Bennett, 2005: 207). In how far the three case studies 
contribute to theory development is addressed in the conclusion of this thesis.  
In order to test Risse-Kappen’s hypotheses in three independent case studies I 
assessed Germany’s and Poland’s domestic structures in regard to foreign-policy 
making in general first. This helped identifying possible access points for non-state 
actors to influence decision-makers. Once the general domestic foreign policy-making 
apparatuses are known for each state it is possible to assess, for each case study, in I 
how far non-state actors were able to influence the decision-making despite this set-
up, and under which conditions.  In this step, I analysed the official documents which 
set up the foreign policy mechanisms of both countries. However, frequently, 
substantial differences exist between powers that have been granted de jure to certain 
bodies and what de facto takes place. Therefore, additional secondary literature on 
foreign policy-making in Poland as well as Germany was consulted. Lobbying is 
regualted in Germany quite comprehensively resulting in a much richer literature on 
Germany on this topic than in Poland. Consequently, I have complemented the 
secondary literature on Poland with interviews undertaken in Warsaw with 
representatives of lobby groups. Two interviews were particularly helpful: a 
representative from PKPP Lewiatan and a representative from AHK Polska.  
To analyse the degree of institutionalisation of Polish-German relations, the 
relevant official bilateral and multilateral agreements were analysed and secondary 
literature dealing with their content consulted. Further interviews on how far the bi-
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lateral agreements and joint institutions shape Polish-German relations helped 
clarifying this point. Eugeniusz Smolar, senior fellow at the Polish Institute of 
International Affairs; Markus Meckel, 1994-2009 chairman of the German-Polish 
Parliamentary Group; Krzysztof, Miszczak, director of the office of the 
plenipotentiary of the Polish prime minister for international dialogue; and Janusz 
Reiter, 1990-1995 Polish ambassador to Germany have been valuable interview 
partners on that issue. 
 I identified the three case studies to answer sub-research questions 3a-4b, by 
examining the quality print media in Poland and Germany. This revealed the salient 
issues in Polish-German relations since 1998. This timeframe was chosen because it 
includes the events prior to Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004 when non-state actors 
had the possibility of influencing their respective governments in respect to certain 
policies before Poland’s EU entry closed this opportunity, and it allowed an 
examination of the two countries’ policies towards each other with the backdrop of 
the most recent and undoubtedly most important institutionalisation: joint EU 
membership. A longer timeframe would be difficult to justify from a political science 
perspective, and would certainly lean towards a more historical approach. The print 
media in Germany are: Der Spiegel, Der Focus, Die Zeit, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung,  Süddeutsche Zeitung, Financial Times Deutschland, Handelsblatt, die 
Tageszeitung. In Poland the following are published: Polityka, Newsweek Polska, 
Wprost, Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita.  The thesis also examines speeches, 
interviews, official policy documents and statements of policy makers and 
representatives of the vociferous non-state actors, and party manifestos - to detect the 
actors most active in shaping policies.  
As much of the policy process took place behind closed doors, hence this 
requires elite interviewing to gather primary data.17 These interviews were semi-
structured, with open-ended questions in order to gain in-depth insights that formally 
structured and identical closed questions would not allow. The semi-structured 
interviews permit the interviewees to stress their definitions and relevant data 
(Odendahl & Shaw, 2002). To ensure coherence, state and non-state actors  were 
asked about the same issues. This data was verified and triangulated through I 
consulted think-tank and academic experts. Triangulation is achieved when a multiple 
                                                 
17 The author followed the advice and instructions of Dexter (2006: 31-72) on elite interviews. 
 37 
set of data types, sources or methodologies agree with the findings or at least do not 
contradict it (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 66). In the three case studies, this was 
achieved by using three data types: the analysis of official documents, interviewing, 
and the consultation of independent experts. I conducted fieldwork at the Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) in Berlin and at the Polski Instytut Spraw 
Międzynarodowych (PISM) in Warsaw, profiting twofold: from cross-examination of 
data gathered by independent experts working at these institutions and by gaining 
access to the high-profile decision-makers and personalities. The institutions’ 
reputation contributed to convincing these individuals to talk to me.  
Amongst the elites, probably the most authoritative interviews I conducted – 
adding weight to this thesis – were with Egon Bahr, the mastermind behind 
Ostpolitik; Dieter Kastrup, chief of the German delegation negotiating the Two Plus 
Four Agreement in 1990; Markus Meckel, chairman of the German-Polish 
Parliamentary Group from 1994-2009; Erika Steinbach, President of the BdV; Leszek 
Jesień, advisor to the Polish government negotiation team on EU accession from 
1998-2001; Ewa Synowiec, former director of the UKIE and currently Head 
Representative of the EU Commission in Warsaw; and Krzysztof Miszczak, Director 
of the Office of the Plenipotentiary of Prime Minister for International Dialogue. 
 In total some 80 elite interviews were conducted. The includes interviews with 
policy-makers and independent experts, as well as follow-up interviews. Only the 
Interviews that are cited (33) in this thesis are listed in the bibliography. Not all of the 
interviews allowed a recording of their interview, which I respected in accodance with 
ethical research practice. Some of the interviews were conducted on the telephone, 
which was not ideal since it is more difficult to build the trust this way. However, as 
Kezar (2003: 405) points out, “this trust was developed to obtain information to 
expose the elite or gain access.” Moreover, it is questionable whether the “building of 
trust” for the purpose of obtaining information is ethical conduct. 
 
 This research design does not pose any exceptional ethical concerns. Some 
respondents choose to remain anonymous which I respected.  But, certain difficutlies 
were encountered. For instance, I encountered representatives of some Polish non-
state actors’ who refused to give interviews on foreign policy, and it is likely that they 
did so because they do not want to be associated with corruption, a contentious topic 
in the CEECs. Berglöf and Pajuste (2005), for example, notice the poor transparency 
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of corporate-governance arrangements in Poland, and the reason could be to conceal 
corruption or association with it. A good indicator for at least the perception of high 
corruption is the fact that in every electoral campaign this issue was salient (Millard 
2007: 51). Part of the reason are the non-existent, poorly regulated or under-used 
official forums for non-state actors that provide opportunities of voicing their policy 
preferences (see Chapter II). 
 I also noted differing institutional cultures in Germany and Poland when 
trying to contact potential interviewees working in the institutes. Whilst the German 
officials’ response rate to emails with interview requests was very high with answers 
given within a four-week span, Polish officials often did not respond to emails, but 
were keen to meet after I contacted them by phone. This, however, did not pose any 
problems once I adapted to these cultures. 
 Probably the most important limitation for this research is that many important 
individuals involved in the three issues examined had died or were gravely ill. These 
include casualties from the plane crash in Smolensk in April 2010; the Under–
Secretary of State at the Ministry of Finance, Krzysztof Ners, who died in 2006 and 
could have been helpful for the issue of dealing with the free movement of capital; 
and Jan Kułakowski, the chief Polish negotiator for EU accession from 1998-2001, 
who died in 2011 after a long illness.  
 
V.	  Outline	  of	  the	  thesis	  
 
Chapter II, by engaging with Risse-Kappen’s (1995) first variable, determining the 
degree of influence that non-state actors have on foreign policy-making, introduces 
the foreign policy-making systems of Germany and Poland. Conclusions will be made 
on the role of non-state actors in policy-making in general and in foreign policy in 
particular in both countries, drawn from the domestic structure that these countries 
provide for their actors. 
Chapter III will deal with the degree of institutionalisation of Polish-German 
relations. This is the most historical part, since it will introduce bilateral agreements, 
institutions that both countries have created or joined, and forums where interaction 
between the two countries have taken place since 1989. 
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Chapter IV analyses the process of Poland’s EU accession since 1989, 
scrutinizes the motives of Germany, Poland and their respective non-state actors for 
joint EU membership and shows possible access point for non-state actors during 
these negotiations. Thus it provides a contextual setting for the first two case studies.  
Chapter V presents the first of the three case studies, uncovering the influence 
of non-state actors and their influence on Polish-German relations. It tries to achieve 
this by examining Poland’s EU accession negotiations with regard to the free 
movement of capital chapter of the acquis communautaire. 
Chapter VI engages again with Poland’s EU accession negotiations, but deals 
with the free movement of workers. As will demonstrated, whereas the desire to 
restrict the free movement of capital emanated from Poland, in respect to the free 
movement of workers, German interests were at stake. This gives an excellent 
opportunity to compare Poland and Germany, although on different topics, but which 
occurred simultaneously and under very similar circumstances. 
Chapter VII deals with the BdV and its proposal to erect a museum in Berlin 
depicting the flight and expulsion of Germans from the East following WWII. This 
initiated a decade-long process, resulting in the Grand Coalition’s agreement to 
establish a permanent exhibition as part of the German Historical Museum in Berlin.  
Chapter VIII concludes the thesis by returning to the research questions and 
hypotheses and summarising the results of Chapters Two through Six, discusses the 
implications of this thesis and points to further research. 
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2. Foreign Policy-making Structures in Germany and 
Poland 
 
As outlined in Chapter I, this thesis tests Risse-Kappen’s (1995) theory that domestic 
structures determine to a great extent the way non-state actors can influence state 
relations. Therefore, this chapter examines Germany’s and Poland’s domestic 
structures to determine the conditions of non-state actors in influencing foreign 
policy-making in their respective environment. Three levels of analysis are 
considered: first, the official foreign policy-making apparatus; second, civil society; 
and third, the nature of policy networks linking the two. The analysis renders 
preliminary results in examining the three hypotheses developed in Chapter I and, 
hence, sets up the floor for the three case studies which are analysed in Chapter V 
through VII. 
The first part analyses Germany’s domestic policy-making structures, while 
the second part engages with Poland’s domestic policy-making structures. Focus is on 
foreign policy.  Due to space limitations the chapter will focus on the foreign policy-
making mechanisms that are relevant in the Polish-German context since a detailed 
description, of e.g. the Foreign Office, for example, would be impossible here. 
Further, I am aware of the heated discussion of what constitutes civil society.  
Authors argue that companies are profit organisations and should be excluded from 
the definition (e.g. Kopecky and Mudde, 2003). Nevertheless, I will treat civil society 
as including business interests.   
 
I.	  Structure	  and	  actors	  in	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  in	  Germany	  
 
As the literature review discussed, scholars often selected Germany or German non-
state actors as a case study for examining the role of the latter in (foreign) policy-
making. This is unsurprising, given that German scholars were among the first to 
incorporate elements of the humanities into the disciplines of politics, political 
philosophy and sociology. For instance, Eckart Kehr’s (1975) attempt to shed light on 
the influence of business interests on German foreign/defense policy is a part of that 
tradition. He argues that, rather than other states’ defence policies, it was the MPs of 
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Reichstag (parliament of the Kaiserreich) representing capitalism that propelled 
aggressive expansion of the German navy under Kaiser Wilhelm II. Hence, Kehr’s 
emphasis on social structures and economic interests, which later led to the “primacy 
of home affairs over foreign affairs” (Der Primat der Innenpolitik) thesis, can be seen 
as an intellectual precursor to Risse-Kappen’s development of the domestic structures 
variable. It also demonstrates that, already under the Kaiserreich, the structure of 
German politics allowed at least parts of civil society (according to Kehr the Junker18 
and bourgeoisie) to influence policy decisions. This is important  in so far as German 
civil society has had a longer tradition of participation in foreign policy decision 
making than the newly established post-1989 democracies.  
  Germany’s democracy following WWII was specifically designed to prevent 
another dictatorship. The concept of “militant democracy” (wehrhafte Demokratie) in 
describing various Articles of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz, GG)19 illustrate this. The 
institutional setup also supports this. The sixteen mostly artificially created federal 
states were vested with extensive powers in areas including education, and were given 
wide ranging co-decision powers regarding tax expenditure which underscored this 
principle even further. Parties also play a vital role in safeguarding democracy to such 
an extent that Germany has been described as a “party state” (Parteienstaat) 
(Schmidt, 2003: 46-55). 
Article 21 GG states that parties “participate in forming the political will of 
the people”. Designed to minimise the danger of the direct democracy (referenda) that 
contributed to the demise of the Weimar Republic, political parties in Germany are 
meant to help the formation of public opinion and channel the political will to the 
government. Furthermore, German parties consolidated after 1949, expanding their 
electoral base, and the two major parties CDU/CSU and the SPD quickly became 
Volksparteien (Kirchheimer, 1966). Thus they no longer articulated narrow interests, 
nor mirrored religious or ideological cleavages as the case during the Weimar 
Republic. The resulting party stability has contributed to government stability. 
Katzenstein (1987) lists political parties alongside federalism and parapublic 
institutions (e.g. the Bundesbank) as one of the three “nodes” of the entire political 
system. Germany’s strong Basic Law and its federal structure (e.g. Scharpf, 1988), 
                                                 
18 “Junker” in its modern meaning stands for Prussian landed aristocracy. 
19 See especially: Art. 9 allowing the prohibition of anti-democratic parties; Art. 18 allowing the 
restriction of the basic rights of people fighting against the constitutional order; Art. 20 granting the 
right of resistance as a last resort against anyone wishing to abolish the constitutional order. 
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along with coalition governments, were designed to ensure the practice of consensus-
based policies, which only change “incrementally”, (Katzenstein, 1987; Green and 
Paterson, 2005) since the structure produces a large number of veto players who 
constrain the executive. This phenomenon is also known as the internal dimension of 
“semi-sovereignty” (Katzenstein, 1987). Incremental policy change can also be 
observed in foreign policy. Ostpolitik, for example, was not reversed by the 
CDU/CSU in 1982 when the party came to power, even though most of the party’s 
MPs abstained from voting on the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in 1970 (e.g. von 
Dannenberg, 2008). All parties vote together when issues of European integration are 
at stake, and the engagement of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area operations is continued 
when new governments are formed (i.e. Kosovo and Afghanistan). An exception to 
this is Die Linke, which is building its profile on fierce pacifism and euroscepticism. 
Federalism plays a crucial role in Germany’s policy-making system. It is one 
of the main factors contributing to the “joint-decision trap” (Scharpf, 1988), where the 
clash of the federal government and the Länder through the Bundesrat often leads to 
outcomes along the lines of the lowest common denominator.20 Katzenstein (1987) 
identifies federalism as one of the three nodes of Germany’s political system and, 
together with Germany’s centralised society, it represents an important explanatory 
factor for the incremental policy changes. Foreign policy is not exempt from this, 
especially in European policy (Gunlicks, 2003: 360-73; see also below). The Länder 
also participate in foreign relations through cross-border regions and, according to 
Artcile 32(2) GG, whenever the federation signs a bilateral treaty which affects the 
interests of a Land, the latter must be heard well in advance. They can, moreover, sign 
their own treaties if the matter falls with their competences and they obtain the 
federation’s approval (Art. 32(3) GG). This thesis will demonstrate throughout  that 
federalism indeed plays an important role in influencing Polish-German relations. 
Parties also matter in German foreign policy, as various examples 
demonstrate. An important case in which relations with Poland were affected by a 
strict party line that incorporated the wishes of certain sectors of German society was 
the articulation and maintenance of the Hallstein Doctrine21 by the CDU. Also, the 
                                                 
20 The recent federalism reforms have not substantially altered the features described here. For the most 
recent discussion on this issue see, e.g. Auel (2008), Benz (2008), Moore et al. (2008). 
21 The Hallstein Doctrine, practised from 1955 to 1969, when it was abolished along with the launch 
with Ostpolitik, stipulated that the FRG should not conduct any bi-lateral relations with states that 
recognised the GDR. 
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inclusion into the CDU of many former members of the All-German Bloc/League of 
Expellees and Deprived of Rights (Gesamtdeutscher Block/Bund der 
Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten: GB-BHE) in the 1950s was probably an 
important reason why the recognition of the Oder-Neisse line was only possible under 
a SPD-led government in 1970 with the Treaty of Moscow and Treaty of Warsaw (see 
Chapter VII).  
Katzenstein (1987) coined the term “semi-sovereignty” to explain relatively 
high degree of fragmentation in German policy making, compared to industrial states. 
Katzenstein (1987: 367) describes the German system as sectoral corporatist, since 
the actors in the Political-Administrative System (PAS) maintain a close link to the 
private actors, and private actors even maintain a policy monopoly in certain areas. 
The classic example is Tarifautonomie in industrial relations, in which bargaining 
over wage setting takes place exclusively between trade unions and employers’ 
associations.22 
For Germany, the collective traumatic experience of WWII constitutes a 
forceful factor in determining state actors’ room for manoeuvre, not only due to 
external constraints but also due to self-imposed constraints. This “learning from 
catastrophes” was described in Manfred Schmidt’s (1989) work on Germany’s social 
and economic policy, where he developed the concept of the “policy of the middle 
way” (1987; 2006). Katzenstein’s analysis (1987) of “semi-sovereign” Germany 
cannot explain the institutional structure of checks and balances without referring to 
the societal and cultural setting and Germany’s traumatic war experience(s), a fact 
later acknowledged in Katzenstein’s more constructivist work written after unification 
(1997). Constructivist or cultural explanations of state action have their limitations. It 
has been argued that in times of instability and uncertainty cultural factors are 
especially powerful in explaining foreign policy action when they are used as 
“guides” and “as sources of socio-political meaning” (Gaenslen in Hofhansel 2005: 7) 
but less so during times of stability and even less so if concrete decisions have to be 
explained rather than broad patterns (Hofhansel 2005: 7). Nevertheless, Katzenstein’s 
analysis provides a useful explanation for Germany’s foreign policy-making process, 
which should be characterised by a large degree of fragmentation and decentralisation 
with many non-state actors involved in shaping this policy.  
                                                 
22 For an account of recent developments in Germany’s industrial relations see e.g., Streeck (2005).  
 44 
Paterson (2005) analyses the implications of Katzenstein’s semi-sovereignty 
concept on Germany’s European policy. He stresses that external sovereignty was 
fully restored after unification, but that semi-sovereignty persisted in three senses: 
first, Germany’s behaviour towards other states, especially towards France, could be 
labelled as semi-sovereign, reflected in her “reflexive multilateralism”. However, 
Paterson detects modifications in this sense of semi-sovereignty occurring under the 
Red-Green coalition (Paterson, 2005: 269-73); Second, structural and ideational 
barriers ensured fragmented European policy-making. Paterson cites power sharing 
between ministries (Ressortprinzip), and Article 23 GG granting the Länder rights in 
European Union affairs (Paterson, 2005: 273-75); Last, semi-sovereignty continues in 
the sense that the German state has to implement EU policies, the downloading side 
of Europeanisation or EU-isation, and is therefore a significant constraint (Paterson, 
2005: 275-76). Hence, fragmentation of German policy-making towards Poland 
should be expected, as both states are EU members. The following section outlines 
the structure of and actors in policy-making towards Poland. As defined in the 
introduction on governance, the actors will be divided into PAS-actors and private 
actors. 
 
Actors	  in	  the	  Political	  Administrative	  System	  
 
Chancellor and Chancellery 
 
The principle executive actors of German foreign policy are the Chancellor, the 
Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister. Article 73 GG only refers to the 
“Federation” (Bund) as responsible for foreign policy.23 Article 65, however, makes it 
clear that the Chancellor is responsible for general guidelines for all policies, within 
which each minister can manoeuvre. This is known as Richtlinienkompetenz or 
Kanzlerprinzip. As a result, foreign policy strategies and foreign relations with every 
single state depend at large on the personal preferences of the Chancellor and his 
character. The Bonn Republic’s first Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer was Chancellor 
and the first Foreign Minister until 1955, thereby setting an important precedent for 
                                                 
23 All Articles of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) are retrieved from the website of the Deutscher 
Bundestag: http://www.bundestag.de/parlament/funktion/gesetze/Grundgesetz/index.html, accessed 17 
May 2009. 
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the Chancellors’ interest in foreign policy. Examples of the Chancellor’s dominant 
influence in foreign affairs are Adenauer, who pursued a resolute rapprochement with 
France and integration into western structures (Westbindung), and Brandt, who 
launched Ostpolitik. The Chancellor is constrained externally by international 
obligations, and internally by the Foreign Minister with his Ministerkompetenz known 
as the Ressortprinizip. Also constraining are coalition obligations, which can initiate a 
vote of no confidence (Article 67 GG); and public opinion, especially at federal 
election-time. The Chancellor’s is usually amongst the most  popular politicians, with 
only the Foreign Minister ranking higher. This phenomenon is known as the 
Kanzlerbonus. 
 The Chancellor concentrates expertise in the Federal Chancellery to co-
ordinate all policies and to inform and advise. The Chancellery mirrors the structure 
of the various ministries and is divided into five  Directorates-General (DGs) 
(Abteilungen), and policy-area sub-groups (Gruppen and Referate). All Chancellors 
have pursued their own, independent foreign policy agenda, highlighting the 
importance of the DG for Foreign Relations (division 2) (Sturm, 1994: 97-99; Siwert-
Probst, 2001: 22). As of February 2010, Group 21 of division 2 focuses on foreign, 
security and development policy. Division 5 focuses on European policy. This DG 
was made independent under Chancellor Schröder prior to the Eastern Enlargement to 
co-ordinate better European affairs.  
A constraint on the Chancellor’s powers is in Article 15 of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Federal Government (Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung: 
GOBReg). It explicitly states that the Cabinet as a whole shall be consulted for 
discussions about and resolution of all matters of general domestic, foreign, 
economic, social, financial and cultural significance.24 The Article allows 
interpretation as to what constitutes general and when foreign matters overlap with 
the special ministries’ responsibilities. Since Cabinet meetings are confidential, 
research on contemporary decision-making procedures is limited. However, the 
Chancellor’s authority usually obliges ministers to align around his/her position 
(Siwert-Probst, 2001: 24). 
                                                 
24 The Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government (Geschäftsordnung der Bundesregierung) were 
established in May 1951 and have undergone few modifications since (last modification in November 
2002). They can be found at: 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/RegierungundVerfassung/Geschaefts
ordnungderBundesregierung/geschaeftsordnung-der-bundesregierung.html, accessed 12 September 
2009. Emphasis added.   
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 Similarly, since Helmut Kohl’s narrow parliamentary majority in the 1994 
elections, coalition meetings (Koalitionsrunde) have evolved into a fixed instrument 
for policy co-ordination and preliminary decision-making raising the issue of whether 
this procedure hollows out constitutional competences and the official Cabinet, since 
these meetings are confidential (Siwert-Probst, 2001: 25-26). This is especially 
important for foreign policy because, since 1966 when Willy Brandt became Foreign 
Minister, the smaller coalition partner has held this post in conjunction with the 
unofficial Vice-chancellorship.25 Coalitions compete for votes at the federal and state 
level. Hence, the Chancellor and Foreign Minister can conflict over fundamental 
issues, especially if the Foreign Minister attempts to raise their profile vis-à-vis the 
Chancellor. However, the Chancellor has the key cards at his/her disposal allowing 
the Foreign Ministry to be pushed back whenever he/she decides what issue should be 
given top priority (Chefsache). Paterson’s (2010) analysis of the 2005-2009 Grand 




Officially, responsibility for foreign policy rests with the Foreign Minister who leads 
the Foreign Service, divided into the Foreign Office and the missions abroad. It is 
argued that the increasing international activities of specialised ministries (over 250 
units of other ministries deal with foreign or European policy in addition to the 
Foreign Office and Defence Ministry) and the growing importance of non-state actors 
in that policy area have led to changes in the role of the Foreign Ministry, from a 
foreign policy monopoly towards a policy “manager” as co-ordination policies 
becomes more important (e.g Siwert-Probst, 2001: 26-26-28, 30).  That all Foreign 
Office officials are generalists and special expertise from other ministries is often 
required, enhancing inter-ministerial co-operation, aggravates this further. For these 
reasons, Andreae and Kaiser (2001: 39-40) distinguish between foreign policy as 
defined by the institutions officially responsible for foreign policy-making and 
foreign relations as conducted by all the other ministries either as part of foreign 
policy or independently from the Foreign Office (see Chapter I). Article 11(2) 
                                                 
25 Article 69(1) GG does not refer to a “Vice-Chancellor” as this title does not officially exist. Rather, 
according to the Basic Law, the Chancellor nominates a Minister as his “deputy” (Stellvertreter). In 
common parlance, however, Vice-Chancellor (Vizekanzler) is used.  
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GOBReg26 stipulates that negotiations with foreign countries can only be conducted 
with the Foreign Ministry’s consent; a measure to establish a hierarchy in foreign 
policy-making. Similarly, Paragraph 72 of the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal 
Ministries (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der Bundesministerien: GGO) states the 
same if negotiations lead to a bi-lateral or international treaty.27 However, “in political 
practice the great number of new non-state actors generate complex networks that to a 
large extent circumvent such formalised rules.” (Siwert-Probst, 2001: 27) Despite 
these developments and the Chancellor’s Richtlinienkompetenz, all postwar 
governments have followed the primacy of foreign policy over departmental policy 
whenever the interests of the state as a whole were at stake, leaving the Foreign 
Office in charge of affairs. An illuminating case with relevance to this thesis is the 
1991 dispute between the Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office over who 
should be responsible for granting visas. The latter ministry prevailed over the 
question of lifting visa requirements for Poles (Andrea and Kaiser, 2001: 42-46; 49-
50). 
 The Foreign Service (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) is also divided into DGs and 
divisions mirroring the growing demand to streamline all the foreign policies that 
overlap with the other ministries.28 EU enlargement precipitated a structural reform of 
the Foreign Office resulting in moving EU bi-lateral relations from the Political DG 
(DG2) to the DGE, dealing with European policy. The importance of Germany’s 
relations with France and Poland is underlined by these two special Ministers of State. 
After the 2009 federal elections, Cornelia Pieper became the new Minister of State 
responsible for the “co-ordination of Polish-German inter-societal and close-border 
co-operation”,29 replacing high-profile Gesine Schwan.30 This seems to reflect the 
                                                 
26 The GOBReg was amended in 2002 due to the increasing foreign activities of the other ministries 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Bundesregierung/RegierungundVerfassung/Geschaefts
ordnungderBundesregierung/geschaeftsordnung-der-bundesregierung.html, accessed 25 June 2009. 
27 The GGO is available at: 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_144/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Veroeffentlichungen/ggo.html, accessed 
29 June 2009. 
28 An organisational chart for the Foreign Service is available at: http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/Abteilungen/Uebersicht.html 
29 The exact wording in the original is “Koordinatorin für die deutsch-polnische 
zwischengesellschaftliche und grenznahe Zusammenarbeit”  
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/Abteilungen/Uebersicht.html, accessed 29 June 2009. 
30 Professor Gesine Schwan was twice the SPD candidate for the Presidency, each time losing to 
CDU/CSU candidate Horst Köhler. For more information on the Minister of State see: 
http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/Koordinatoren/D-PL-Koordinatorin/D-Pol-
Koordinatorin.html, accessed 29 June 2009. 
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conviction that supporting inter-societal links leads to the best results in reconciliation 
and improving Polish-German relations. However, in day-today relations with Poland, 
this post plays a minor role as reflected by the structure of the responsible DG, since 
the Minister of State does not command her own staff. Nevertheless, the post is meant 
to play the role of a “seismograph” and is important in capturing sentiment in Poland 
and reporting back to the FO (Lübkemeier, 2010 Interview). Division E 08 is 
responsible for bi-lateral issues with, inter alia, Poland. The staff assumes tasks 
requiring economic, political and cultural competence to bundle the activities of the 





As discussed, other ministries deal with foreign policy whenever it overlaps with their 
responsibilities. Thus, specialised ministries send their officials to the missions abroad 
and to EU institutions to gain direct insight into what happens there (Andreae and 
Kaiser, 2001: 41-42). These personnel become valuable assets for their home 
ministries’ DGs, groups and departments. There is no ministry that has not established 
at least one unit that deals with the abroad. The specialised ministries communicate 
directly with their equivalents especially in case of Schengen members for which this 
is a legal requirement (Andreae and Kaiser, 2001: 51).  
For example, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs’ DG 2 deals with the 
labour market and its departments II a6 and II a7, in migration and employment of 
foreigners respectively. Its DG 6 focuses on European and International Employment 
and Social Policy.31 Between 2002 and 2005, Labour and Economy were under the 
roof of one Ministry before these policies were divided by Chancellor Angela Merkel 
(see Chapter VI). Often several ministries could demand a say on a specific issue and 
conflict can arise over the content and wording of a policy, and delineation of 
competence. An example relating to Poles is the regulation pertaining to seasonal 
workers. Whilst the Ministry of the Interior’s DG M deals with migration, policy on 
foreigners and EU harmonisation, the Ministry of Labour had legitimate claims to this 
issue as well. The regulations were stipulated in collaboration, supported by the 
                                                 
31 An organisational chart for the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is available at 
http://www.bmas.de/portal/32944/2009__04__22__organigramm__bmas.html, accessed 30 June 2009. 
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Foreign Office (Andreae and Kaiser, 2001: 50). Both types of conflict can occur on 
three “inter-ministerial levels”. The first involves the Foreign Office as the foreign 
policy maker and one or several specialised ministries. Secondly, two or more 
specialised ministries compete among themselves over an issue. Lastly, conflict can 
occur between the Foreign Office and/or a specialised ministry and the Ministry of 
Finance, which, with its budgetary control (DG II) can constrain the activities of all 
ministries.32 
 
How does effective co-operation happen between these ministries? To resolve 
disputes and find consensus, “teams”, “working groups” or “commissions” are 
established at the ministries and meet under the roof of the ministry officially in 
charge of the issue  (Article 16 GOBReg and Article 19 GGO). Depending on 
whether the issue at stake is a one-time event or is recurring, these Ressortkreise are 
made permanent or ad-hoc. The ministries’ groups and divisions can work together 
directly without requiring rubberstamping from above. Conflicts between the 
ministries are resolved bottom-up from division to directorate and DG level 
(Westerhoff, 2001: 118-20).  
For example: for Germany as an export-oriented country with a foreign trade 
surplus,33 foreign trade relations are important. Hence, the Ministries of Economics 
and Finance are often involved in the foreign policy decision-making mechanism. All 
pertinent foreign trade issues are addressed by a working-level, inter-ministerial 
committee, established in 1995 and comprised of the Foreign Office, the Ministries of 
Economics, Finance, Economic Co-operation and Development, state representatives 
and the head of the Chancellery on the side of the PAS actors and representatives of 
commerce and industry in the form of the Federation of German Industries 
(Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie: BDI) and the heads of the Association of 
German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag: 
DIHT). This represents an official forum for German businesses to voice their 
                                                 
32 An organisational chart for the Federal Ministry of Finance is available at: 
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_2986/DE/BMF__Startseite/Ministerium/Leitung__des__H
auses/node.html?__nnn=true, accessed 1 March 2011. 
33 Prior to the financial crisis commencing in 2008 Germany exported goods valued at 1179.4 billion 
Euros and imported goods worth 1023.7 billion Euros (Destatis 2010: 9). For detailed statistics on the 
German economy see: 
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/EN/Navigation/Statistics/Volkswirtsc
haftlicheGesamtrechnungen/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechungen.psml;jsessionid=D4198156FB77B
61D69F52CB5A222710C.internet, accessed 12 August 2010. 
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interests up to six times a year. The possible influence of business cannot be 
overstated as additional bilateral Chambers of Commerce and the Federal Office of 
Foreign Trade Information (Bundesstelle für Außenhandelsinformation: BfAI) have 
transformed the Foreign Service into almost a DG of the Ministry of Economics, 
since the promotion of Germany as an investment location is one of its primary tasks 
(Siwert-Probst, 2001: 29; Westerhoff, 2001: 121; Bettzuege, 2007: 235). The Foreign 





Non-state actors have another official way to voice their interests and give the 
government expert advice. Article 47 GGO states that legislative proposals have to be 
passed on to the Länder, the umbrella organizations of the German business 
associations and trade unions (Spitzenverbände), experts groups (Fachkreise) and the 
representatives of the Länder at the federal level as soon as possible whenever their 
concerns are touched. This law allows the ministry the discretion to decide when, and 
to what extent the details are passed on (Art. 47(3) GGO). If the legislative proposal is 
of special political significance, the Federal Chancellery has to be informed and its 
consent is required for the private actors to participate (Art. 47(2) GGO). 
 These legal requirements have an important legitimising value for collaboration 
between state and non-state actors but informal contacts are likely to be more 
important. It is unsurprising that representatives of business, industry and labour 
unions all have offices in Berlin.34  
 The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht and the EU’s subsidiarity principle required an 
amendment of the Basic Law introducing Article 23 GG, ‘the Europe Article’ 
(Europaartikel). This article states that the Länder have the right to participate in the 
decision making process when their interests are concerned even where the federation 
has the exclusive right to legislate. The federation must, however, guard the interest 
of Germany as a whole (Art. 23(5) GG). The downside of EU deepening for the 
Länder was that they were compelled to transfer substantial competences to the EU. 
                                                 
34 In the same breath, one has to mention that a large number of decisions pertaining to private actors 
have been transferred to Brussels. Private actors are organised there under various umbrella 
organisations. However, since foreign policy is largely still in the hands of individual member states, 
these issues will not be tackled in this thesis. 
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Minister-presidents often compensate for this representing their Länder abroad, in 
economic discussions, sometimes without the consent of the Foreign Office 
(Westerhoff, 2001: 122). 
 The parliament (Bundestag) also plays a role in foreign policy in three ways. 
First, it participates in parliamentary debates on ratification of foreign policies and 
there is disagreement, when the budget is allocated to the official foreign policy-
making ministries, and on presentation of matters of topical interest. Second, the 
Bundestag as a whole has a say in foreign policy decisions. It has powers in regarding 
widening and deepening of the EU according to Article 23 GG, in deployment of 
German forces abroad, and Germany’s entry into stage three of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) (Krause, 2001: 157-72). But perhaps the most relevant is the 
he creation of parliamentary working groups. These consist of MPs from all 
Bundestag parties. The current, 17th Bundestag, has established 54 bi- and multilateral 
parliamentary groups to exchange information with parliamentarians, civil society and 
the governments of foreign countries.35 A German-Polish parliamentary group exists 
as well. As Markus Meckel, the leader of the German-Polish parliamentary group 
(1994-2009) explains, the activities of the parliamentary groups should not be 
overrated since only one visit by German and Polish MPs is scheduled per year. A lot 
depends on the initiative of the leader of the bi-lateral groups to organize additional 
events. In the 1990s and 2000s, Meckel organized conferences on cross-border co-
operation, Euroregions and Poland’s accession to the EU, where members of the 
Länder parliaments and Bundestag, MEPs and members of the Polish Sejm, Senat and 
regional Sejmiks were incorporated. The Polish side often expressed concerns 
regarding strong regionalization or even federalization. Other workshops dealt with 
energy issues (building the Nordstream pipeline through the Baltic Sea) and historical 
questions. In all, Meckel could not evaluate whether these activities by the bi-lateral 
groups had any influence on the decisions of the government, but “at least they 
contribute to the political climate” (Meckel, 2010 Interview).    
  The federal president – the head of state with ceremonial powers -  is also 
significant. Even though he cannot make foreign policy, the president enjoys a high 
symbolic status. In reconciliation with Poland, Richard von Weizsäcker’s landmark 
                                                 
35 See: 
http://www.bundestag.de/bundestag/europa_internationales/parlamentariergruppen/allgemein.html, 
accessed 25 October 2010. 
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speech before the Bundestag on 8 May 1985 and his visit to Poland in May 1990 are 




Germany’s civil society interacts with the government in a consensus-based political 
culture and stands in a reciprocal relationship to a political set-up designed to allow 
only “incremental policy change” (see above). The classic example is the country’s 
unique model of social market economy, the “Rhineland capitalism (Albert, 1991) or 
a “co-ordinated market economy” (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The tripartite relationship 
between the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations is interlocked in 
many ways.36 The governments and the parapublic institutions strive to guarantee 
price stability (Bundesbank), contribute to high employment and steady economic 
growth (business, workers and governments), and immunise the German economy 
against external shocks (governments). As discussed, business and employer interests 
find enough opportunity to voice their preferences in policy-making, and foreign 
policy is no exception where the foreign office is simultaneously a promoter of 
German business. It is therefore unsurprising that Katzenstein (1987) sees a high 
degree of centralisation of interest groups since this is, for such a model, a 
precondition for effective co-ordination. The two biggest trade unions – IG Metall 
representing manufacturing and Ver.di representing the service-sector – have 2.3 
million members each (Menz 2005: 201). IG Metall and Ver.di, along with six other 
unions, are in turn represented by the umbrella organisation the German Federation of 
Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund: DGB). German employers’ wage-negotiation 
bodies are bundled into the Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände 
(BDA). That the BDA moved to Berlin along with the Bundestag in 1999 hints at 
strong relationship between German politics and business. Although the number of 
companies in employer’s organizations has been falling, and despite a falling 
proportion of union members among all employees (the figure dropped from 27 % in 
1980 to 17 % in 2000. See Streeck and Hassel, 2003: 9), fomented by a dramatic shift 
away from industry to the service sector, German unification (Menz, 2005: 201) and a 
perceived superiority and imitation of the Anglo-Saxon model in the 1990s and early 
                                                 
36 For example, many MPs are simultaneously members of the supervisory board of firms, and the state 
is often an influential shareholder as in the case of Lower Saxony and Volkswagen.   
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2000s among the big stock market listed enterprises (Dax-Konzerne), these bodies are 
solidly anchored in the German polity. 
  
 
II.	  Structure	  of	  and	  actors	  in	  foreign	  policy-­‐making	  in	  Poland	  
 
As in Germany, history is important in shaping political structures in Poland. After 
1989 the framers of the constitution faced a dilemma between a system with a strong 
executive (presidentialism) or a strong parliament. Poland chose semi-presidentialism 
to separate and balance powers (Sanford, 2002: 166-68). Since there is no standard 
form of semi-presidentialism, it is difficult to precisely categorise Poland. Within the 
semi-presidential spectrum of highly presidentialised regimes, balanced presidential 
and prime-ministerial powers, and regimes with ceremonial presidents, Elgie (2005: 
98-112) places Poland in the middle category (although Poland has largely become a 
parliamentary system since the new, 1997 constitution). This is because “the prime 
minister is the primary decision maker, while the president has the power to intervene 
either sporadically or in one or more specific policy areas, usually foreign and 
defence policy.” (Elgie, 2005: 107)  Supporting the claim that Poland displays a semi-
presidential system is the president’s power to veto legislation a priori.37 President 
Lech Kaczyński often used this veto power during the period of co-habitation from 
2007-2010.38 The reason for the president’s powers stem from Poland’s transitional 
period. Following the first partially free elections in 1989 Lech Wałęsa, took over 
presidential powers from Poland’s last Communist President General Wojciech 
Jaruzelski which stem from 1981-83 martial law emergency powers. Wałęsa’s 
confrontational style towards parliament precipitated the consolidation of democracy 
by “encouraging a coalition supporting the weakening of presidential powers” 
(Millard, 2000: 40), leading to the current 1997 Constitution.  
                                                 
37 For a lengthy discussion of Poland’s legislative process, including the president’s role see, for 
example, Nalewajko, Ewa; Wesołowski, Włodzimierz (2007) Five Terms of the Polish Parliament, 
1989-2005. The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 13(10): 59-72. 
38 Until the start of co-habitation in 2007, the President used only one veto. Following Civic Platform’s 
electoral victory, Lech Kaczyński used twelve vetos in the first seven months of Tusk’s tenure. See 
“Trzynaście wet prezydenta Kaczyńskiego”, gazeta.pl, 16.12.2008: 
http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/wiadomosci/1,114873,6071358,Trzynascie_wet_prezydenta_Kaczynskieg
o.html, accessed 16 May 2012.  
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Actors	  in	  the	  Political	  Administrative	  System	  
The Polish constitution places the President as head of government and the Prime 
Minister as Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the position to conduct foreign 
policy. However, the Constitution of 2 April 199739 has limited his overall 
responsibilities and moved Poland towards a model in which parliament is dominant. 
Two articles of the Constitution provide the basis of the president’s foreign policy 
powers. Article 133 mentions that “the president as the republic’s representative in 
foreign relations” 1) ratifies international agreements and informs the Senate and 
parliament (Sejm); 2) appoints and recalls diplomats; and 3) receives foreign 
diplomats and representatives of states. Article 134 makes him the Commander-in-
Chief of the military forces.  
Even though Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość: PiS) demanded more 
political powers for the president under the “Fourth Republic” umbrella project, his 
powers remain curtailed. The inherent intra-executive conflict of balanced semi-
presidentialism, as well as the broad nature of the constitution’s Articles which do not 
go into details regarding specific foreign policy tasks, have led to numerous conflicts 
about the delineation of powers between the president and the prime minister since 
the start of co-habitation in 2007, when Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska: PO) 
under current PM Donald Tusk won the parliamentary elections. It was debated who 
should represent Poland at the EU Council Summits40 and other international events,41 
and it was argued repeatedly that the Constitutional Court (Trybunał Konstytucyjny) 
should resolve this conflict.42 The court’s 2009 verdict resolved the conflict in favour 
of the prime minister.43 
Personal preferences and ideological background play a vital part in the 
president’s influence on bi-lateral relations. President Aleksander Kwaśniewski 
                                                 
39 The Polish Constitution (Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) is available at: 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/kon1.htm, accessed 2 March 2012. 
40 See: “Spór rządu z prezydentem o politykę zagraniczną”, gazeta wyborcza, 29.11.2007. 
41 In 2010 tensions occurred between the president and the prime minister over who should represent 
Poland during the commemoration of the Katyń massacre. See: “Putin zaprosił, ale kto pojedzie”, 
gazeta wyborcza, 12.02.2010. 
42 See: “Trybunał czy ustawa o MSZ?”, gazeta wyborcza, 16.10.2008. 
43 See: “Wszyscy zgadzają się z Trybunałem, a będzie nadal tak, jak jest”, gazeta wyborcza, 
22.05.2009.  
 55 
(1995-2005) fostered relations with the USA, sent troops to Iraq in 2003 and played a 
significant role in mediation during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine due to his 
personal interest in the matter. President Kaczyński, once a part of the Solidarity 
opposition,  continued the pro-American stance whilst at the same time relations with 
Russia deteriorated due to Russian and German plans to build the Nord Stream 
pipeline through the Baltic Sea, and Russia’s ban on Polish meat. 
The president appoints various counsellors which advise him on domestic and 
foreign policy. Under Kaczyński’s presidency, fifteen counsellors advised the 
president,44 of which the appointment of Marek Cichocki was the most relevant to 
Polish-German relations. Cichocki published academic works (e.g. 2004; 2005) 
reiterating the importance of history to Polish-German relations and implying that not 
much improvement can be made in the future since history cannot be undone. 
Cichocki’s, however, is not the only opinion circulating among the elites and he has 
been criticised, inter alia, by Krzysztof Miszczak (2011 Interview): 
We have a new generation: young people on this side and the other and they forget 
about certain things […]. I think that history plays an important role in Polish-
German relations, but it should not close the horizon for development of Polish-
German relations in Europe. We [Poles] think historically. We sometimes exploit this 
fact to find an excuse. Our weakness is history, i.e. our advantage is history because 
we think it is an advantage but this is a weakness because nobody deals with this 
because nobody is interested in this anymore. […] I have explained it to Marek. I 
said: there is one important element, […]: There is NATO, there is the EU, there is a 
common security policy, i.e. a European and later common because this is evolving 
of course, whether it works or not. […] Imagine this situation that someone is 
attacking Germany and we are defending Germany. There is a common security 
space, which has emerged all over the sudden. 
  
Like the German Chancellor, the Polish president has also a Chancellery, 
divided into fifteen offices and one Current Analysis Team.45 The Foreign Affairs 
Office, run by either a Secretary or Under-Secretary of State: ‘prepares analyses of 
issues connected with foreign affairs’, coordinates organisational and technical 
activities, prepares President’s foreign visits, and organises foreign visitors to Poland 
and various bilateral and multilateral meetings.46 
                                                 
44 See: http://www.president.pl/en/counsellors/, accessed 25 October 2009. 
45 See: http://www.president.pl/en/chancellery/, accessed 2 March 2012. 
46 See: http://www.president.pl/en/chancellery/foreign-affairs-office/, accessed 2 March 2012. 
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 According to Article 146 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers (Rada 
Ministrów) conducts domestic and foreign policy and the Foreign Minister executes 
foreign policies. Most of the decision-making process is delegated to the foreign 
ministry (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych: MSZ). The MSZ’s current 
organisational chart47 reveals a hierarchical structure with the Foreign Minister at the 
top, two secretaries of state beneath, with six under-secretaries of state below them. 
The secretaries lead 23 departments, organised by themes, regional policy targets and 
administrative tasks. Alongside, a Director-General commands the Foreign Service,  
divided into ten Bureaus and one Centre. Foreign policy-making towards Germany 
falls under the European Policy Department and the Department of Western and 
Northern Europe. As with the MFA in Germany, responsibilities might overlap 
where, for example, the economy is concerned.  
Since 1989 the MSZ has been restructured and re-organised several times due 
to the internal transformation process and external requirements. The transformation 
process from a planned to a market economy posed many challenges to the MSZ and 
other ministries. However no other ministry was as  affected by Poland’s NAT and 
EU accession, resulting in a fundamental priority change towards western integration 
(Kupiecki, 2002: 99-125; Parzymies, 2002: 67-98). EU integration resulted in the 
1996 creation of an independent department, the Office of the Committee for 
European Integration (UKIE), preparing Poland’s accession and facilitating the 
adoption of the acquis communautaire. In January 2010, the UKIE merged with the 
MSZ. The merger was taxing, with internal struggles concerning the higher 
remunerations that former UKIE officials receive compared to MSZ officials, and 
concerning the organisation of the “new MSZ” and the responsibilities attached to it. 
An independent expert reveals that by December 2009 UKIE workers still did not 
know in which departments they would be working from January 2010 onwards:  
“Nine vice-ministers were initially installed to accommodate the higher paid 
UKIE officials accordingly, and by January 2011 it was still difficult to reach 
people in the MSZ via phone, not even mentioning finding the names on the 
website half a year before Poland’s EU Presidency.” (Anon. a 2011)  
                                                 
47 Available at: http://msz.gov.pl/Organizational,chart,of,MFA,32560.html, accessed 29 October 2009. 
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Ewa Synowiec (2011 Interview), former director in UKIE, comments that the 
merger will bring new input into the rather slow working MSZ, whereas UKIE 
officials had to be dynamic in their work style.  In general, coordination between 
ministerial bodies in Brussels and Warsaw and between line ministries in Warsaw has 
been poor so far (Copsey and Pomorska, 2010). A thorough analysis of Poland’s 
institutional design for domestic policy coordination is still needed (Copsey and 
Pomorska, 2012) before an accurate evaluation of the reforms of the past years and its 
effects could be delivered. 
Foreign Policy-making vis-à-vis Germany in Poland represents an exception 
in the sense that, following Tusk’s  (PO) 2007 electoral win, the Office of the 
Plenipotentiary of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers for International 
Dialogue was created, with the aim of coordination. It commenced operation in 
February 2008 and is responsible for Germany, Israel and relations with the Jewish 
Diaspora.48 The office is located in the Chancellery, and is directly responsible to the 
Prime Minister. Moreover, Władysław Bartoszewski (twice Foreign Minister: March - 
December 1995 and June 2000 - October 2001) became the office’s Secretary of State 
aged 86. Bartoszewski is also well respected in Germany and is an Auschwitz 
survivor (1940-1941). He earned a standing ovation for his April 1995 Bundestag 
speech, commemorating 50th since the end of WWII. He underlined that the 
expulsions of Germans was an act of evil.49 Tusk’s creation of the office was  a 
symbolic gesture for a new start following two years of tedious Polish-German 
relations under PM Jarosław Kaczyński. It also reflects the standing Germany enjoys 
in Polish foreign policy. Germany is Poland’s most important trading partner. In 
2009, Germany accounted for 26% of Poland’s total exports and 22% of imports50 so 
that practically every Ministry in Poland is involved in policy towards Germany 
(Miszczak, 2011 Interview). Raising foreign relations with Germany to the highest 
level and underlining the importance of the partnership, was not emulated in 
Germany. There, Bartoszewski’s equivalent is the Minister of State at the Foreign 
                                                 
48 See: http://www.bpdmen.kprm.gov.pl/index.php?id=228&id2=219, accessed 2 March 2012. 
49 The whole speech given on 28 April 1995 in Bonn is available at: 
http://www.bundestag.de/kulturundgeschichte/geschichte/gastredner/bartoszewski/rede_bartoszewski.h
tml, accessed 2 March 2012. 
50 Information retrieved from the Polish Ministry of Economy at: 
http://www.mg.gov.pl/Wspolpraca+z+zagranica/Wspolpraca+gospodarcza+Polski+z+krajami+UE+i+
EFTA/niemcy.htm, accessed 18 January 2011. 
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Office responsible for Polish-German relations, Cornelia Pieper. Her location at the 
Foreign Office does not suggest that Poland plays as important a role as Germany 
does for Poland. As the director of the office, Krzysztof Miszczak (2011, Interview), 
explains:  
Germany does global policy and it is evident that when you do global policy you do 
not see your smaller partners on the way. […] Germany will only respect Poland as a 
serious partner when Poland’s level of economy will match Germany’s.51 
Though since 1999 Poland has been divided into sixteen regions - 
voivodeships (województwa) - their political powers are limited and have no role in 
the Senat, Polish parliament’s upper chamber, in contrast to the German Länder. 
Before 1999 reform, Poland was divided into 49 voivodeships, but EU accession 
precipitated the strengthening of the regions so that they could compete at the supra-
national level (Ferry, 2003). Their foreign policy activity is limited to the 
representational level within the EU, where their priorities are those of economic 
development. The centralised system poses some difficulties to the pace of decision-
making as far as cross-border co-operation is concerned. As an official at the German 
embassy in Warsaw reveals, the German side spent months negotiating co-operation 
over medical services in the border regions. The German Länder were in favour of 
such an agreement, along with the Polish voivodeships, but the decision makers in 
Warsaw took a long time to decide (Anon. b). 
 Poland’s party and government landscape is unstable. From the first free 
parliamentary elections in 1991, neither the political left nor the right could establish 
parties which would consolidate over time and stabilise. However, two general trends 
can be identified. Until 2005, the communist-successor party SLD dominated the 
centre-left, winning every second election. Governments oscillated from the centre-
left SLD to centre-right or right wing parties, rooted in the Solidarity movement. This 
“tradition” was broken in 2005, when the SLD, shattered by numerous corruption 
                                                 
51 The German press has started to acknowledge to an increasing extent Poland’s importance for 
Germany, and the EU called Poland a “pioneer” and “role model” on the eve of the 2012 UEFA 
European Football Championship. This is a major shift from the 1990s when Poland was widely 
perceived as a country “full of car thieves and post-communist drabness”. See: “The Miracle Next 
Door – Poland Emerges as a Central European Powerhouse”, Spiegel-online 25.05.2012: 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/poland-has-become-the-success-story-of-eastern-europe-a-
834413.html, accessed 29 May 2012. 
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scandals,52 fell from over 40% in the 2001 election to 11% in 2005 and has not 
recovered since. Thus, since 2005 the main political divide is between PO and PiS, 
both centre-right parties53 that claim to be the legitimate heirs of Solidarity. This 
could be the end to party instability and the emergence of a consolidated bi-polar 
centre-right party system, but due to “the high levels of electoral volatility and low 
turnout, low levels of party institutionalisation and weak links between parties and 
their supporters” it is too early to give a definitive assessment (Szczerbiak, 2008: 3). 
The electoral volatility and party instability is identified as a weakness in Polish 
politics and severe consequences for Polish foreign policy as well. Krzysztof 
Miszczak (2011 Interview) comments: 
 
The worst is the fast political rotation we have in Poland. This is the weakest point in 
Polish politics. You conduct some politics for four years, then comes change, new 
people. They have to work into the stuff, and [politics] again remains trash. You cannot 
throw out those specialists and say that is because he is a PO or PiS member because 
this is a loss for the state. And if you look at Germany, there is continuity. There is no 
change like in the US where a new President arrives and changes all the main staff. In 
Germany the Minister changes, the Secretary of State, the parliamentarians and that’s 
it. […] However, a state like the US can permit itself for this, but in a poor country like 
Poland this is counterproductive. Germany has here an immense advantage, the 
continuity of structures and the continuity of institutional memory. […] You know 
when I understood this? When I talked to Pofalla. […] and he said and this is the 
organisational chart of the German Chancellery and there were names like Globke and 
Adenauer on it with the same structure that works to date. And we asked him if 
anything changed since then. And he said absolutely nothing. […] 
 
  
The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) has been very successful considering that it has niche 
appeal (however, farmers are approximately 20% of the population), and it always   
passes the 5% threshold. It formed coalition governments with the SLD in 1993 and 
the conservative PO in 2007. Protecting farmers’ interests might be expected as a top 
policy priority in Poland, especially in accession negotiations (see Chapter V of this 
thesis).   
  Since the 2007 parliamentary elections only four parties (PO, PiS, the SLD and 
the PSL) have passed the 5% threshold,54 entering the Sejm, the lower chamber. 
                                                 
52 The most prominent scandals, contributing most to SLD’s demise, were the Rywin affair (afera 
Rywina) and the PKN Orlen affair (afera Orlena), also known to the Polish public as Rywingate and 
Orlengate respectively.  
53 PiS is often portrayed in western media as a populist-nationalist party of the far right, but this 
assessment is inaccurate. Hanley et al. (2008: 416) label both PO as liberal-conservative and PiS as 
national-social conservative parties of the centre-right. 
54 The German minority is exempt from the five % threshold and gained one MP in 2007. 
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Previously six parties or more in the Sejm was the norm, making three party coalitions 
and minority governments common. Of the five governments55 between 1991 and 
1997 formed under the Little Constitution, two were minority coalitions, breaking up 
over constructive no confidence votes. Two governments resigned due to pressure 
from the co-habiting president Wałęsa. This was one reason for the 1997 reduction of 
presidential powers: making it easier to override his veto, and the president’s loss of 
power to nominate three key government ministers (Millard, 2007: 40). But following 
1997 constitution, governments continued to be unstable. Between then and April 
2012, twelve governments were formed.  Four coalitions split, the prime minister 
resigned twice, and twice the coalition was re-formed (Millard, 2007: 41). This high 
turnover of prime ministers and cabinets triggered by parliamentary crises makes the 
Sejm an important player in controlling the executive, making Poland a system in 
which parliament dominates – Poland can also be seen as a rare case of assembly 
government, echoing the French Third and Fourth Republics (Taras, 2007: 130).  
 Since 2005, politics has not revolved around the pro-market or pro-
interventionist stances seen in other post-communist CEEC countries, but more 
around historical, social and moral issues (Millard, 2007: 49-50). The reasons for this 
can be located in the early transition period. Criminal elements of the Communist 
regime were not prosecuted. Davis (2002: 437) explains that the influential Gazeta 
Wyborcza warned against a “witch-hunt” and Prime Minister Mazowiecki decided on 
a policy of drawing a “thick line” (gruba kreska) under history. However, this is an 
erroneous interpretation of what Mazowiecki actually meant in his 1989 opening 
statement to parliament, when he chose the wording gruba linia meaning that his 
government should only be responsible for what it itself would do.  The Mazowiecki 
government’s inaction regarding the past makes his policy comparable to Spain’s 
(Ash, 1998). This is odd since the strong societal upheaval of the Catholic Church and 
Solidarity movement not only brought down the regime in Poland, but also initiated 
the fall of the Iron Curtain.56 In 1997 Liebich subsumed: 
                                                 
55 The government attempted by Waldemar Pawlak in June 1992 failed to obtain the necessary vote of 
confidence.  
56 In a representative poll in May 2009, 62 % of Poles opined that after the partially free election of 
June 1989 it was right of the Mazowiecki government to find an agreement between the old regime and 
the opposition and to use all layers of Polish society in the construction of democracy. Only 23 % 
answered that the old system and their officials should have been made to account for their deeds 
(CBOS, May 2009).    
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In virtually all post-communist countries […] familiar faces from the communist past 
dominate […] Until age attrition takes its toll the best prospects for success under 
democracy will belong to those who were successful under communism. (Liebich, 
1997: 68) 
Unsurprisingly this and the numerous corruption scandals among the political elite, 
including SLD politicians, contributed to PiS’s 2005 success, when it promised to 
“clean up” the old structures, beginning the “witch-hunt”57 feared after 1989. The 
lustration law also affected the foreign ministry. Under Anna Fotyga, PiS foreign 
minister, 2005 to 2007, over 800 staff members were searched and around 20 
removed.58 
 Corruption is a constant feature in Polish political culture.59 It was salient in 
every electoral campaign (Millard, 2007: 51) and the media (Grigorescu, 2006: 526-
30). In January 2004, 90% of Poles responded that corruption in Poland was rather a 
big or a very big problem. Also, 69% of the public were convinced that it was 
possible in Poland to ‘buy’ MPs and to achieve agreements or legislative change 
(CBOS, January 2004). This was a significant cause of the public’s continuing 
negative attitude towards government, politicians and institutions. In November 2009 
69% believed Sejm’s activities to be “decisively” or “rather bad” (CBOS, November 
2009).60 Longitudinal studies of the public’s trust in key politicians reveals that only 
three or four politicians regularly enjoy trust figures of 50% or higher. Trust in 
political institutions matters since there is a strong correlation between trust in state 
institutions and the level of associational membership and voluntary activity. Low 
trust in public institutions usually corresponds with the weak societies seen in CEEC 
(Sissenich, 2007: 161-77). Thus, politicians are wary of being associated with private 
sector representatives, as lobbying is seen as something ‘dirty’ and corrupt. As 
Rusewicz (2011 Interview) from PKPP Lewiatan explains: 
Lobbying is very badly understood in Poland. This is also not understandable for us, 
and it should not be like that since the lobbying law should make the whole process 
                                                 
57 The lustration law, intended to de-Communise Polish society, even targeted well-respected political 
figures not from the communist camps such as Bronisław Geremek, minister of foreign affairs between 
1997 and 2000 from the previous Christian Democratic Freedom Union (Unia Wolności: UW). 
58 See, for example: “Fotyga czyści dyplomację do dna”, gazeta wyborcza, 23.05.2007.  
59 For recent changes in the perception of corruption in Poland, Poland’s measures for fighting 
corruption and the influence of international pressure on corruption in Poland see Gadowska (2010). 
60 For a cross-national study on trust in the legislative and civil service see for example: Catterberg and 
Moreno (2005) The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies. 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research Vol. 18(1): 31-48. 
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transparent. However, the moment someone gets registered he is immediately 
suspected; i.e. lobbying has a negative, pejorative perception. 
No official fora for private actors exist in which the policy preferences can be openly 
voiced, unlike in Germany, as discussed. In Poland, involving the non-state actors in 
policy making is unthinkable: foreign policy is strictly separated from other policies. 
Following the corruption scandals, the government tried to make the rules on 
lobbying transparent by passing a bill regulating lobbying in the process of 
legislation.61 The bill was criticised for the lack of a satisfactory definition of 
‘lobbying’, and that most lobbyists would not register as required, since the bill 
stipulates punishments for non-observation but does not mention not rights 
(Makowski and Zbieranek, 2010). EU membership and lobbying in Brussels had no 
impact on procedures in Poland. Soszka-Ogrodnik (2011 Interview) from AHK 
Polska explained explains this: 
[…] to date in Poland informal lobbying is still most effective, a lobbying based on 
the tradition that who has the possibilities of approaching the lawmaking source is 
effective. The people who are effective do not necessarily use the formal possibilities 
of lobbying of which the law is talking about. It is based on networking. You need to 
have acquaintances, you need to be in the political-business circles and act in this 
way. […] The law has not changed the common practice. Lobbying was and still is 
based on individual practice. You even say in Poland: ‘what is effective is not always 
loud’. It means if someone wants to get something done, he will not announce it, and 
will not necessarily want to pass it on to the media. The issue will only leak into the 
media in case the ministry or relevant department is completely deaf to the request. 
Then the media start to stir up the issue asking” ‘why is the department not reacting?’ 
And then the department has to react since the issue has become loud. However, 
making something public is the last instrument in the lobbying process. If you can 
handle it discretely then you do it discretely. […] 
	  
Private	  Actors	  
Civil Society and intermediary organisations 
In the early 1990s Poland was viewed as an exception in central and Eastern Europe, 
where civil society and organisational membership is generally weak. The Solidarity 
movement; the strong Catholic church and the non-collectivisation of agriculture, 
were initially seen as indicators of a strong Polish civil society (Ekiert and Kubik, 
1999). Studies suggest that “Polish exceptionalism” should be applied to Poland’s 
                                                 
61 Ustawa z dnia 7 lipca 2005 r. o o działalności lobbingowej w procesie stanowienia prawa. Available 
at: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/lobbing/lobbing.htm, accessed 30.01.2011. 
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unusually weak civil society, as the country has lower levels of organisational and 
religious membership than other post-communist societies (Barnes, 1998: 127). 
Perhaps civil society was not that strong in the pre-transitional period in the first 
place, as Mudde suggests (2007: 220). That Solidarity disintegrated as soon as regime 
change was achieved, supports this.  
Poland’s figures for party membership are low (but the data relies on party 
information so it problematic). Mair and van Biezen (2001: 9) estimate the total 
membership at 326,500 for the year 2000. With Szczerbiak’s  (2001) upper estimate 
of 450,000 individuals, this is still only 1.15 to 1.5% of the electorate and is low 
compared with Slovakia (4.1% in 2000), and Germany (2.93% in 1999). More 
importantly, local structures have weak grassroots representation.  PiS, 2005 election 
winner, had the lowest membership and the “organizational model was emphatically 
that of a cadre, leadership vehicle” (Lewis, 2007: 183). This stands in a reciprocal 
relationship with the extreme party fluidity and instability.  
Although 44% of Poles think that the activities of the labour unions are good 
for the country (CBOS, January 2009), union membership is very low (CBOS, 
February 2008). This is partly due to most people’s belief that they have little 
influence on state decisions (CBOS, January 2009). The most important unions are 
the National Commission of Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity 
(NSZZ Solidarność) and the Polish National Association of Trade Unions (OPZZ) 
founded in 1980 (as the opposition) and in 1984 (by the state), respectively. Smaller 
unions such as FZZ Forum (split from OPZZ in 2002) are also present. The high level 
of union fragmentation does not allow the unions to represent workers with a single 
voice, and the generally low membership, does not give unions enough bargaining 
power to exercise significant pressure on the government, especially since neither 
Solidarity nor OPZZ enjoy public support. Nevertheless, Solidarity tends to be well-
regarded by governments, partly for historical reasons, personal ties and its influence 
in key sectors, including shipbuilding and coal-mining. The more left-wing OPZZ, 
appears to have a more difficult relationship with the government due to its historical 
background.  
Organisations representing Polish business include PKPP Lewiatan and the 
Polish Business Council (Polska Rada Biznesu), and are even more fragmented. On 
matters of European policy their stances are more reactionary than proactive (Copsey 
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and Wochnik, 2009). This does not mean that links to government are weak or 
ineffective. To bridge this fragmentation, and in order to achieve greater impact, the 
Entrepreneurship Congress (Kongres Przedsiębiorczości) was formed in 2008, 
consisting of the American Chamber of Commerce, the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce, PKPP Lewiatan, AHK Polska, Pracodawcy RP and the Polish Craft 
Association (Związek Rzemiosła Polskiego - ZRP).62 Whilst the five members 
managed to find a few common positions (for example a joint position condemning 
the unofficial ties that exist between business and politics in the making of 
legislation),63 due to its broad membership, this forum is not flexible and finding 
consensus is an arduous task (Soszka-Ogrodnik, 2011 Interview).  
In Poland, overall membership in voluntary associations is very low compared 
with other EU members. In 2004, the country ranked 23rd, with 0.39 organisational 
memberships per person, barely half the CEEC average of 0.64, less than half of 
Germany’s 0.74, and significantly lower than the 1.23 average for the EU-15. Even 
the figure for active involvement (mere membership in organizations does not tell us 
anything about the quality of civil engagement) is lower than anywhere in the EU 
except Lithuania (Sissenich, 2007: 161-64).  
The relationship between civil society and the state since 1989 has continued 
to be one of “antipolitics”, understood as civil society’s inherently anti-state attitude 
towards state institutions (Mudde, 2007: 220). Civil society understands itself as the 
“pure we” against the backdrop of a “homogenous corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2001).64 
The “hierarchical relations cross-cut by informal, personalised loyalties and 
undermined by widespread clientelism” (Gąsior-Niemiec, 2010: 95) has still not been 
sufficiently addressed. As a result, a (neo-)corporatist tripartite arrangement of labour, 
government and business, as steers the socio-economic development of Western 
Europe and especially of Germany, is unthinkable in Poland. A tripartite commission 
for socio-economic matters was founded in 1994 and has operated on a legal basis 
since 200165, but in December 2008, in a representative poll, 49 % of Poles responded 
                                                 
62 See: http://www.kongresprzedsiebiorczosci.com.pl/, accessed 3 March 2012.  
63 Stanowisko Kongresu Przedsiębiorczości w sprawie udziału organizacji obywatelskich w procesie 
stanowienia prawa from 19.10.2009. Available at: 
http://www.kongresprzedsiebiorczosci.com.pl/index.html?action=sai&ida=488, accessed 30 January 
2010. 
64 Some authors (Arato, 1991; Curry and Pankov, 2001) blame the continuing existence of Solidarity 
for the continuation of “antipolitics” and weakness of civil society post-1989. This hypothesis is hard 
to verify since Poland is no exception in this respect to other CEEC countries. 
65 See USTAWA z dnia 6 lipca 2001 r. o Trójstronnej Komisji do Spraw Społeczno-Gospodarczych 
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that they never heard of the commission, while 33 % had heard of it but could not say 
what it did. Of the 14 % that were aware of the Commission’s work, only 21 % 
evaluated its activity as good (CBOS, January 2009). Gąsior-Niemiec (2010: 94) 
summarises that the various directives, informal recommendations and invitations 
flowing from ministries to the Third Sector lead to the establishment of multiple but 
inefficient communication, consultation and collaboration between political-
administrative and civil society elites. Moreover, civil society was “unable to play the 
role of social partners in the system of good governance […] aggravated by the 
unwillingness of some other stakeholders – in particular politicians and public 
administration – to share public resources and decision making with these newly 
established partners.” (Gąsior-Niemiec, 2010: 95) 
The following answer to my question ‘How well do the partners of the trilateral 
Commission work together?’ by Małgorzata Rusewicz from PKPP Lewiatan (2011 
Interview) illustrates how difficult collaboration in this forum is, and how the Polish 
government tries to impose its own stance on the social partners rather than finding a 
policy after consulting them:    
 
I do not remember that we [trade unions and business] ever reached any consensus on 
any content. I have the feeling that the presence of the government does not help but 
rather obstructs. The governmental representatives very often do already have a 
position and they often insist that their position should be supported. Depending on 
who is closer to the position, the employers associations or the trade unions, in that 
way the talks are being conducted. Hence, there is no level of real dialogue. The 
problem is also that the consensus reached must not be implemented into national 
law, the last decision lies within the Prime Minister what also makes the activities 
more difficult. We had very stormy negotiations regarding the anti-crisis law that 
ultimately has been concluded with a consensus between the employers’ associations 
and the trade unions, but the government did not sign the consensus. Later, further 
acting of the government had to be forced, and that was one of the most spectacular 
consensuses recently; however, only within the socio-economic background. There 
was no other solution; the government did not want to take certain decisions and the 
leaders of both sides, the employers and trade unions came to the conclusion that the 
trilateral commission is a place where we can improve bilateral talks and take certain 
decisions. However, frankly, there are not too many successes within the commission 
regarding reaching a consensus. I think often we agree on certain facts […] but we 
identify the diagnosis and causes somewhere else and we look for different solutions. 
 
 One would expect that EU accession had an impact on social dialogue, since 
the EU insisted on “good governance” and the inclusion of social partners into the 
                                                                                                                                           
i wojewódzkich komisjach dialogu społecznego. www.sejm.gov.pl 
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political process of enlargement. However, Grosse (2010) shows that this is not 
necessarily the case. European institutions supported social dialogue to improve the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of public policies, but EU accession was based on the 
quick transposition of the acquis communautaire, which is not subject to negotiation, 
thereby weakening social dialogue and leading to the survival of political traditions 
dating from the socialist period. 
 Also, the combination of weak civil society organisations in terms of low 
membership and high fragmentation has contributed more to contentious action rather 
than interest mediation (Ekiert and Kubik, 1999: 1989-91). It means that preference 
formation, agenda setting and representation is mainly left to political parties 
(Sissenich, 2007: 158). Paired with the political culture of “antipolitics”, and 
insufficient fora for civil society to voice their preferences, this results in the fostering 
of informal ties and serves interests that are relatively well organised.  
 
III.	  Conclusion	  and	  implications	  	  
 
The subject of this chapter was the examination of Germany’s and Poland’s domestic 
structures to determine the a priori conditions of non-governmental actors in 
influencing foreign policy-making in their respective environment. Three levels of 
analysis were considered: first, the official foreign policy-making apparatus; second, 
civil society; and third, the nature of policy networks linking the two. 
 Concerning the first level for Germany, one can say that the foreign ministry 
is in charge of foreign policy-making. However, the chancellor has been deeply 
involved in foreign policy and is at times able to overshadow the activities of the 
foreign minister. This conflict is supported by the fact that usually the offices are 
filled with personnel from different political parties. Specialised ministries all have 
their own departments which deal with foreign policy and especially European 
integration. This means that foreign policy-making, though concentrated in the 
foreign office and federal chancellery, has strong constraints from other policy areas. 
Secondary literature indicates that co-operation between the different specialized 
ministries is not only a priority, but also works well, as working committees on 
specific issues are the norm rather than an exception. Federalism also has have an 
impact on foreign policy whenever the interests of the Länder are touched. This 
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usually happens in questions pertaining to European integration, but the minister-
presidents have in the past also liked to “parade” as envoys of Germany abroad. 
Overall, the authority of the state is unquestioned and the state is accepted as a 
caretaker, as Germany’s social market economy dictates. The usually high popularity 
figures of the foreign minister might hint that the foreign ministry’s activity as a 
promoter of German business abroad is much appreciated by the public and foreign 
visits by the foreign minister are usually a good opportunity for him/her to raise 
his/her popularity level. 
Poland, as a semi-presidential state, has often experienced a power struggle 
between the prime minister and the president over who should represent the country 
in foreign affairs. Foreign policy is unquestionably delegated from the council of 
ministers to the foreign office. In Poland, foreign policy is seen as very traditional and 
the separate areas of responsibility are treated as such, while co-operation and co-
ordination between the different ministries and between the president’s office and the 
prime minister is not conducted as well as in Germany. Although European 
integration has precipitated devolution, the regions remain weak and cannot challenge 
the central government in foreign policy-making. Moreover, the state is not accepted 
as a caretaker and due to the experience of 40 years of Communism, state authority 
tends to be challenged by the culture of “antipolitics”. Table 2.1 summarises the 














Table 2.1 Germany’s and Poland’s official foreign policy-making structures 
Component Germany Poland 
 Yes No Yes No 
Strong concentration of foreign 
policy-making power? 
X  X  
No bureaucratic infighting 
existing? 
X  X  
If several offices are in charge 
of fp do they co-operate well? 
X   X 
Executive controls legislative 
process? 
X  X  
Centre (government) controls 
periphery (regions)? 
 X X  
State accepted as a caretaker? 
State authority unquestioned? 
X   X 
     
In general the official foreign-
policy-making system is 
Centralised Fragmented Centralised Fragmented 
 
  
The second tier of domestic structures concerns civil society. The task was to find out 
whether the countries’ civil society can be described as weak or strong. 
 Even though business interests tend not to be regarded as part of civil society 
(see above) the author has included this category as part of civil society along with 
organized labour interests and voluntary organizations. Examined were questions of 
how far organisations claiming to represent these interests are fragmented or 
centralised, and how active they are. The author also asked if cleavages exist, whether 
politics revolves around them, and how easily the public can be mobilised for political 









Table 2.2 Germany’s and Poland’s civil society 
Component Germany Poland 
 Yes No Yes No 
No deep religious, ideological or 
class cleavages? Political attitudes 
do not revolve around them? 
X  X  
Societal demands can easily be 
mobilised for political causes? 
X   X 
Interest groups, societal coalitions 
and organisations are centralised? 
X   X 
     
In general civil society is rather Strong Weak Strong Weak  
 
 
As can be seen, it is quite easy to decide that Germany’s civil society is much stronger 
than Poland’s according to the criteria applied. In Germany, the party landscape better 
resembles the classic left-right split, but, as in most industrialised states, this cleavage 
has increasingly dissipated and the mainstream parties have moved more into the 
centre. In Poland, it is more difficult to detect this classical political cleavage, and the 
country is more homogenous in terms of religion. We have seen that Germany’s trade 
unions and business interests are very well organised and that they are easily 
mobilised for political causes when their interests are touched. This is of course 
strongly correlated to the formalised corporatist structures. Even though membership 
in these core organisations has fallen over the last two decades, both labour and 
business representatives have their place in German politics. Corporatism aside, 
Germans are also more likely to be active in voluntary organisations then their Polish 
counterparts. The Polish labour and business interest organisations are heavily 
fragmented and therefore face more difficulties in mobilising the masses behind their 
cause. 
 The last tier of the domestic structures to be researched was the nature of the 
policy networks linking state institutions with civil society: whether they are 
consensual or polarised. The subject of examination were the questions of whether 
intermediary organisations such as political parties pass on civil society’s policy 
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preferences to the official foreign policy-makers, and whether the political culture 
puts any emphasis on compromise. A missing element in Risse-Kappen’s (1995) 
scheme which should be included is the existence of official fora allowing civil 
society to voice its preferences openly or whether lobbying has to be conducted 
clandestinely. Official fora are likely to support a consensual culture since it is 
accepted that non-governmental bodies have the right to voice their preferences and 
partake in the policy process. The necessity of unofficial lobbying leads to the 
conclusion that this practice is not accepted and the political culture is more likely to 
be polarising. Table 2.3 comprises the findings for Germany and Poland.      
 
Table 2.3 Germany’s and Poland’s policy nature of policy networks 
Component Germany Poland 
 Yes No Yes No 
Intermediate organisations pass 
preferences of civil society on to 
official fp-makers? 
X  X  
Do official fora exist where private 
actors can voice their policy 
preferences? 
X   X 
Does political culture emphasise 
policy compromises? 
X   X 
     
In general civil society is rather Consensual Polarised Consensual Polarised 
 
 
In both countries parties pass political preferences to the government. In Germany, 
parties are fixed organisations important in political life and designed to help shape 
and channel political opinions into the policy processes. The close relationship of 
expellee interests to the CDU/CSU has even had significant repercussions in Polish-
German relations (see Chapter VII of this thesis). In Poland, parties have been 
unstable over the past twenty years, although party fluidity and instability might have 
come to an end. A successful party channelling the interests of one particularistic 
segment of society is the Polish Peasant Party, and its role in foreign policy must not 
be underestimated, especially in bargaining over the CAP in EU accession 
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negotiations. Also, parties have played an important role in the Sejm. Scandals, 
disputes and minority coalitions have often allowed parliament to topple the 
government. This is perhaps a further point where private interests are executed via 
the parties, with severe consequences for the government. Where Germany and 
Poland differ decisively is the existence of fora where non-state actors can voice 
policy preferences. Whereas in Germany this is anchored in legal documents 
regulating the policy process, in Poland official fora are only beginning to materialise 
and are not yet used. Rather, unofficial links have led to allegations of corruption. 
Also, whereas Germany’s corporatist and “semi-sovereign” structures favour a culture 
of compromise, in Poland this is not the case. Prevailing from the divide between one-
party rule and Solidarity dissidents during the last decade of communism, one can 
observe a confrontational culture of “antipolitics”. Also, the instability of 
governments hints to the fact that reaching political compromise is a difficult task in 
Poland. Table 2.4 puts all three tiers of the countries’ domestic structure together. 
 
Table 2.4 Germany’s and Poland’s domestic structures in foreign policy-making 
 Germany Poland 
Tier of domestic structure   
   
Official foreign policy-making apparatus Rather centralised Rather centralised 
Civil society Strong Weak 
Nature of policy networks Consensual Polarised 
   
Domestic structure is Corporatist State dominated 
 
 
The question requiring an answer at this point is: what can be deduced from the 
results pertaining to the question of whether non-state actors have an influence in 
foreign policy-making in Germany and Poland? 
  It has to be reiterated that the results can only render general trends about 
foreign policy processes rather than accurate predictions about the influence of non-
state actors in specific foreign policy issues (see above). Also, domestic structures 
only deliver certain pre-conditions for different actors’ possible involvement in the 
policy process. Preconditions, opportunities and success are separate issues that need 
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to be examined on their own. However, Germany’s domestic structure fits the 
description of what Risse-Kappen calls “corporatist” since in Germany powerful 
intermediary organisations (political parties) exist and actors, in a constant bargaining 
process, operate in a consensus-oriented political culture (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 24). 
Katzenstein’s and Tsujinaka’s analysis (1995: 79-111) shows that the decision-
making process is slow in such systems and that the goals of societal actors are 
achieved in an incremental way. Moreover, once results are on the table they tend to 
be institutionalised and to last for a long time (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 27). Poland’s 
foreign policy-making process seems to be state-dominated since the weak society 
cannot balance the official foreign policy makers and the polarising culture of politics 
does not serve private actors since “officials” are not obliged to include their 
preferences in policy outcomes. This does not mean that they cannot have any 
influence per se. Once single non-state actors gain access to the dominant state actors 
their preferences can be put into practice directly since a compromise with additional 
actors is not needed (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 26-27). Furthermore, this analysis allows 



























Figure 2.1 Incentive for non-state actors (NSA) and governmental actors (GA) to co-
operate in foreign policy-making depending on the domestic structure 
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Source: adapted from (Börzel, 2010: 13) 
 
 
According to this model, Germany’s corporatist structure should provide enough 
incentive for non-state actors (NSA) and governmental actors (GA) alike to co-
operate in foreign policy-making. Since Poland’s foreign policy-making apparatus is 
rather state dominated non-state actors should have a higher incentive to persuade the 













This chapter applies Risse-Kappen’s (1995) second variable, the degree of 
institutionalisation, which determines non-state actors’ degree of a priori influence on 
foreign policy-making, to the Polish-German context. By examining the most 
important bi-lateral treaties in Polish-German relations this chapter renders 
preliminary results to the hypotheses developed in Chapter I and puts the case studies 
which follow in Chapter V through Chapter VII into context.  
The rest of this chapter discusses the most important bi-lateral treaties signed 
by Poland and Germany. Since particular treaties pertaining to the free movement of 
labour, such as the Polish-German labour treaties signed in the 1990s, are the subject 
of analysis in Chapter VI, these will not be analysed in further detail here. Rather 
analyse the two most important treaties signed since 1989: the German-Polish Border 
Treaty of 1990 and – more important for inter-societal relations – the 17 June 
1991Treaty of Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation. Joint EU 
membership, as the most important institutionalisation of relations is subject in the 
separate Chaper IV since it prepares the case studies in Chapter V and VI that deal 
with negotiated transitional periods for Poland and Germany respectively. 
 
I.	  Border	  Treaty	  
 
The “Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on 
the confirmation of the frontier between them”, reaffirming the Oder-Neisse line, was 
signed on 14 November 1990. The border treaty seems unimportant for the main topic 
of this thesis since the treaty66 itself merely reaffirms the border that had been the de 
facto frontier between Poland and the GDR since the end of WWII. It does not 
provide any legal basis for the creation or activities of any non-state actor, and yet it 
was crucial in setting the parameters of behaviour for one important German non-state 
actor which has been paramount in Polish-German relations ever since WWII ended: 
                                                 
66 The treaty is available at: faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/bi-5137.pdf, accessed 5 March 2012.  
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the federation of expellees (BdV) and its respective Landsmannschaften.67 This is 
because Article III of the border treaty effectively ended any possibility of legal 
demands by the expellees to the German government to reclaim the former eastern 
German territories of 1937. What is also more than noteworthy is what the treaty does 
not contain: any provision regulating possible reparations. This is the official reason 
why 23 CDU/CSU MPs did not vote in favour of the treaty’s ratification in the 
Bundestag, one being Erika Steinbach who in 1998 became the president of the BdV. 
This fact has left bitter feelings on the Polish side, making it difficult for any Polish 
government to trust Steinbach and the BdV in their attempts at reconciliation with 
Poland, no matter whether those attempts might be genuine or not (see Chapter VII). 
Moreover, a treaty between two states can never rule out private organisations 
pursuing other ways to achieve reparation payments. A stronger formulation of the 
treaty might arguably have precluded the foundation of the Prussian Claims Society 
(Preußische TreuhandI, PT), which sought in the new millennium to force reparation 
claims by legal action. As a result, it is also important to mention the Border Treaty in 
the context of the case study dealing with the BdV’s attempt to erect a Centre against 
Expulsions in Berlin, which is done in Chapter VII of this thesis. 
 The GDR government, following a Soviet dictum, recognized the Oder-Neisse 
line as early as 6 July 1950 with the Treaty of Zgorzelec/Görlitz. West Germany also 
recognised the border in the Treaty of Warsaw on 7 December 1970 as an essential 
part of Brandt’s Ostpolitik.68 However, whilst the SPD-FDP coalition government 
recognised the Federal Republic’s border, the Warsaw Treaty, as the German 
Supreme Court ruled in both 1973 and 1975, would not be valid for a unified 
Germany since it does not supplement a Peace Treaty as required by the Potsdam 
Declaration of 1945. In fact the Potsdam Declaration states in point VIII Section B, 
when discussing Poland’s western border, that a “final delimitation of the western 
frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement”.69 The end of the Cold War and 
the prospect of German unification therefore required a new treaty that would close 
that chapter forever. During the 2+4 negotiations, the outcome of which represents a 
                                                 
67 As is explained in detail in Chapter VI, the federation of expellees (BdV) is the umbrella 
organisation to which several Landsmannschaften belong.  
68 The Border Treaty of 1990 refers to the previous treaties in Article 1  
69 The full text of the Potsdam Communiqué is available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/psources/ps_potsdam.html, accessed 5 March 2012. 
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de facto peace treaty as mentioned in the Potsdam communiqué,70 the border question 
was raised. Dieter Kastrup, West Germany’s chief negotiator at the highest diplomatic 
level during the five-month long talks, confirms that “the border question was indeed 
the most difficult” (Kastrup, 2010 Interview). When the Berlin Wall came down on 9 
November 1989, the Polish reaction was restrained. Lech Wałęsa, the leader of the 
Solidarity movement, was on the one hand happy for Germany, seeing her communist 
little sister to the east on the verge of collapse,71 but on the other hand he feared that 
Poland might pay the price for German reunification; fears that Kohl’s advisor Horst 
Teltschick shared (Teltschick, 1991: 16; Genscher, 1995: 720). When Kohl published 
his ten-point plan in the Bundestag on 28 November 1989,72 the Oder-Neisse line was 
not mentioned. This precipitated Polish fears of another Yalta where the fate of 
Central Europe would be decided without the participation of Poland. The then 
Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski tried to link the question of German re-
unification with the border issue and proposed that a border treaty be signed prior to 
re-unification and ratified by a united Germany (in Zaborowski, 2004: 82-83). 
Christopher Mallaby, the then British ambassador to West Germany, confirmed to the 
author that Poland successfully lobbied for participation in the 2+4 talks, concerning 
her western border, with the help of France (Mallaby, 2010 Interview). France, 
Germany’s traditional partner in the EC, understood Poland’s fears after Germany 
communicated to Poland that prospects were dim for a border treaty if Poland did not 
refrain from future reparation claims arising from WWII and if the German minority 
did not gain extensive rights.73 One can only grasp Poland’s perception of a possible 
                                                 
70 Some expellees are convinced that this is not the official peace treaty required by the Potsdam 
communiqué (Anon., Interview). However, signing a peace treaty, thereby officially and de jure ending 
WWII, “would not have made any sense” (Stern, 1999: 2071). Moreover, the title of the 2+4 Treaty as 
well as Article twelve of the preamble make it clear that the treaty has a final character and therefore 
substitutes a peace treaty (for an excellent legal discussion of the 2+4 Treaty see Stern (1999: 2069-
72).     
71 Certainly at that point, Poland’s Solidarity politicians preferred having democratic neighbours rather 
than being surrounded exclusively by communist regimes. 
72 Kohl’s speech is available at: 
http://webarchiv.bundestag.de/archive/2009/0109/geschichte/parlhist/dokumente/dok09.html 
last accessed 3.November 2010 
73 Although Kohl demanded on 2 March 1990 that in return for a border treaty the rights of the German 
minority should be written into Polish law, and Poland should abstain from reparation claims (Bingen, 
1998: 267), the Bundestag did not pass these demands in a motion for a resolution on 8 March 1990, 
but declared that Germany acknowledged Poland’s 1953 renunciation of reparations and recognition of 
German minority rights as valid (Bulletin 34, 9.March 1990: 268). Chancellor Kohl was moreover 
irritated by Poland’s tactics in approaching the French and had to clarify this issue with French 
President Mitterrand (Kohl, 2009: 220-22). The German wish to recognize Germans living in Poland as 
a minority was later codified in Article 20 of the Co-operation Treaty (see below), and was motivated 
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German threat if her behaviour vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is taken into account. It was 
only after the border treaty was signed in November 1990 that Poland asked the 
USSR to withdraw all troops from Polish soil, and agreed to dissolve the Warsaw 
Pact, since prior to that moment the Soviet Union was seen as the sole guarantor of 
Polish sovereignty. Certainly, for the Polish public the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
could not happen fast enough after more than 40 years of occupation (Zaborowski, 
2004: 84). 
 The German coalition was split. Genscher, the then Foreign Minister from the 
FDP, would have agreed to an immediate recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. The 
CDU/CSU, with Chancellor Kohl at its head, had more difficulties with immediate 
recognition.74 Cordell and Wolff’s (2005: 52) anonymous interviewee speculates 
about three reasons for Kohl’s hesitation: first, he might have feared a challenge by 
the Supreme Court that had made it clear in its previous rulings what the order for a 
legally binding and definite border treaty must be;75 second, he might have 
underestimated the extent of Polish fears; fears that were augmented when Kohl paid 
Moscow a visit in February 1990, making it difficult for Poland to assess Germany’s 
intentions (Bartoszewski, 2000: 9-14); third, he feared for the influence of expellees 
on his voters. This is a valid and important point. To suddenly affront expellees so 
close to the December 1990 federal elections might have been fatal. As described in 
Chapter VII of this thesis, the expellees initially found their political home in the 
SPD. It was not until Brandt’s launch of Ostpolitik in the late 1960s, culminating in 
the Warsaw and Moscow Treaties of 1970, that the expellees abandoned the Social 
Democrats and found a new political home predominantly in the CDU and CSU. The 
expellees were well-heeded under Kohl’s rule as the steadily rising government 
subsidies to the BdV and its projects demonstrate (see Chapter VII). Ostpolitik could, 
therefore, justifiably and repeatedly become a spark for party-migration if the 
                                                                                                                                           
to a large extent by Germany’s aim to contain the migration of these people to Germany (Koch, 2009: 
381-82). Since German citizenship law was then purely based on jus sanguinis, these people had the 
right to do so. If minority rights had been granted, Germany would have had reason to restrict the 
further inflow of migrants. After the Co-operation Treaty was signed, Germany indeed undertook such 
measures and the inflow of Germans under its citizenship law was restricted mainly to the (former) 
Soviet Union.    
74 The CDU parliamentary president Rita Süssmuth suggested that the GDR and the FRG should pass a 
joint resolution guaranteeing the Oder-Neisse line. The SPD forwarded a petition based on Süssmuth’s 
idea in January 1990. Kohl prevented a vote on this petition through skilful manoeuvring, redirecting it 
to the conciliation committee (Korger in Bingen, 1998: 263). 
75 In fact, the BdV and eight MPs took legal action in September 1990 trying to prevent the border 
treaty from being signed. The Supreme Court dismissed the legal action on 18. September 1990 (see 
Bingen, 1998: 278-79).  
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expellees would not accept Ostpolitik themselves. Tewes (2001: 59) correctly takes 
this line of argument, stating that by postponing the border question Kohl was able to 
make expellees realise that, in order to achieve the unique historical chance of 
German re-unification, accepting the Oder-Neisse line was inevitable (Bingen, 1998: 
275-77), thereby locking the BdV and its members into the norm consensus of 
Ostpolitik. In fact, Kohl himself acknowledges in his memoirs that he waited for the 
right moment (after the December 1990 federal elections) to reaffirm the border since 
“three quarters of the expellees were voting for the Union” (CDU/CSU) and he “did 
not want to risk the prospects of the Union” (Kohl, 2007: 254-57).  
As seen in Chapter II, Germany’s federal political structure designed for semi-
sovereignty makes steering between all actors quite difficult, even though not all are 
apparently directly involved in foreign policy-making. The Republicans (Die 
Republikaner; REP), a right wing party, entered the Berlin state parliament in January 
1989 with 7.5 percent, and the European Parliament with 7.1 percent to the detriment 
of the two Union parties. Kohl was therefore well advised to deal carefully with the 
border question as such an issue could have been excellent fuel for exploiting right 
wing nationalist and revanchist sentiments close to upcoming elections in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, Lower Saxony, the Saarland and later the federal 
elections of December 1990 (Bingen, 1998: 265). This was a difficult balancing act 
since the big opposition parties, the FDP and even some CDU MPs (see above) 
demanded faster recognition of the border. In addition, in a statement by Polish and 
German Catholics in late 1989, Kohl (as a Catholic) was further pressurised: “[it is] 
irresponsible to leave the border question pending and to heed the illusion of the 
return of Germany’s eastern territories.” (Grycz, 2005: 282-88) 
 During the 2+4 negotiations it was stipulated in Article 1(1) that with the 
coming into force of the 2+4 Treaty, Germany’s “external borders shall be the borders 
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic and shall 
be definitive.” Article 1(3) rules out further territorial claims.76 Nevertheless, Article 
1(2) forces Germany and Poland to sign another treaty reaffirming the border, which 
would be binding under international law. With this provision, acceptance of the 
Oder-Neisse line “was made watertight” (Kastrup, 2010 Interview) and appeased 
                                                 
76 The full legal text of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, as the 2+4 Treaty 
is officially called, is available at: http://usa.usembassy.de/etexts/2plusfour8994e.htm, accessed 5 
March 2012. 
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Polish fears. In fact, the Poles who were involved in the part of the negotiations which 
concerned Poland’s borders insisted on a separate treaty to “demonstrate their new-
found independence” (Anon. in Cordell and Wolff, 2005: 52). Therefore the Border 
Treaty was finally signed on 14 November 1990. Article 1(2) of the 2+4 Treaty, 
however, does not stipulate what exactly the wording of the border treaty should be, 
and this was left to Poland and Germany. As mentioned above, the border treaty is 
brief and does not contain any reference to possible reparation claims, nor to 
compensation payments concerning the loss of property by German expellees, or to 
reparation payments to Poland arising from the consequences of WWII77 and to Poles 
who suffered from the Nazi-regime (by forced labour). The latter required a solution, 
since the London Debt Agreement postponed some German debts after re-unification 
and did not address claims by the eastern bloc.78 Poland simply argued that, since 
Germany had lost its eastern territories, former property holders had lost all title to the 
properties now located in the western part of Poland.79 In the words of Cordell and 
Wolff (2005: 54), “the two sides agreed to disagree on the issues of property and 
compensation”. Germany did not want to touch the 1953 London Debt Agreement in 
which all reparation claims prior to and incurred by the war were settled.80 
Additionally, the USSR and Poland had waived their rights to war reparations in 1953 
and the Bundestag made this position clear on 8 March 1990 (Stern, 1999: 2071). 
Kohl (2007: 255-56), during his talk with Polish Prime-Minister Mazowiecki on 9 
November 1990, was sure about Germany’s strong legal position, but “from a human 
perspective this was no good excuse”. Therefore, the Chancellor promised talks about 
the creation of a fund that would compensate victims of the Nazi regime after 
ratification of the treaty.81 
 The omission of these issues from the treaty did not sweep the problems away 
                                                 
77 Poland officially waived its right to WWII reparations only on 10 September 2004, by an act of 
parliament. (Koch, 2009: 377).    
78 For an extensive discussion of the London Debt Agreement see, for example, Guinnane (2004) 
79 The Potsdam Communiqué itself does not mention whether expellees should be compensated for 
their property loss or not.  
80 If the German government had paid any compensation to Poland, Bonn would have breached the 
London Debt Agreement and several other states might also have demanded payments (Kohl, 2009: 
84)  
81 The Foundation for Polish-German Reconciliation (FPNP) was founded in 1992 and, following 
negotiations for the 17 June 1991 Treaty of Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation, 
Germany and Poland agreed on a payment of 500 million Deutschmarks to victims of forced labour: 
http://www.fpnp.pl/, accessed 5 March 2012.  
The 500 million DM were used as seed capital and later fed by further sums stemming from the 
Foundation Memory, Responsibility and Future (EVZ) founded by the Bundestag in 2000: 
http://www.stiftung-evz.de/  
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but postponed them, and they resurfaced in the new millennium. As will be seen in 
Chapter VII, some members of the BdV demanded that Poland’s EU accession should 
be linked to the question of compensation for the loss of property; a topic that was 
used by candidate for Chancellor Edmund Stoiber in the 2002 federal election 
campaign. More importantly, expellees still hopeful of receiving compensation from 
Poland for their loss of property founded the PT in 2000. In 2006 their activism 
culminated in the filing by the corporation of 23 individual claims against Poland at 
the European Court of Human Rights. Even though the court declared the cases 
inadmissible,82 the issue led to major frictions in Polish-German relations. The Polish 
PiS-lead coalition government rightly argued that this situation was only possible 
because the German government refused to accept reparation claims against her, and 
responded to requests from expellees with a letter pointing to “private lawsuits in the 
affected states and international institutions”.83 In December 2006, the German and 
Polish press even claimed that PiS Foreign Minister Anna Fotyga had demanded a 
renegotiation of the border treaty to correct the failure to address this issue.84 This was 
corrected by the MSZ in a press release stating that the border treaty should not be 
renegotiated, but that the problem of compensation could be included in the 17 June 
1991 Treaty of Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation.85 
 An interesting note regarding the border treaty is the wording of Article 2: 
“The Contracting Parties declare that the frontier between them is inviolable 
(unverletzlich; nienaruszalna) now and in future and mutually pledge to respect 
unconditionally their sovereignty and territorial integrity”,86 a wording that was taken 
over from the Warsaw Treaty. In international law this only signifies the renunciation 
of force (crossing of the border by force) and not the definitive recognition of borders. 
Only the word untouchable (unantastbar; nietykalna) would have done so. At the time 
                                                 
82 The court’s “Decision as to the Admissibility of Application no. 47550/06 by Preussische Treuhand 
GmbH & Co. KG A.A. against Poland” is available at: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=841872&portal=hbkm&source=
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649, accessed 5 November 
2010. 
83 See: “Eine besondere Art von Heimweh”, Der Spiegel, 9.08.2004. 
84 “Reaktion auf Entschädigungsklagen: Warschau stellt deutsch-polnischen Grenzvertrag in Frage”, 
Spiegel-online, 19.12.2006: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,455424,00.html, accessed 5 
March 2012. “Polska kwestionuje traktat graniczny”, Wprost 24, 22.12.2006: 
http://www.wprost.pl/ar/98854/Polska-kwestionuje-traktat-graniczny/, accessed 5 March 2012. 
85 MSZ (19.12.2006) “Komunikat prasowy Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych RP – sprostowanie”: 
http://bip.msz.gov.pl/Komunikat,prasowy,Ministerstwa,Spraw,Zagranicznych,RP,-
,sprostowanie,8648.html, accessed 5 March 2012.  
86 Emphasis added by the author. 
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when the border treaty was crafted, France was actually aware of the misuse of words 
but assumed that this would be corrected, implying that Germany had no serious 
intentions of undermining the Oder-Neisse line (Koch, 2009: 375-76). The problem is 
that, strictly speaking, the Federal Republic of Germany continuous to exist as an 
entity of the former German Reich and its 1937 borders. Proof of this can be seen in 
the 1993 version (!) of the Lastenausgleichsgesetz87 (LAG) in which the German 
Ostgebiete are referred to as “currently under foreign administration” (zur Zeit unter 
fremder Verwaltung). The latest version corrects this formulation to “the previously 
under foreign administration maintained Ostgebiete” (den ehemals unter fremder 
Verwaltung stehenden Ostgebieten) (Koch, 2009: 383). Christoph Koch, chairman of 
the Deutsch-Polnische Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V.,88 believes 
that Poland was outmanoeuvred during negotiations over the border treaty, and did 
not pay attention to the detail of the exact wording in which, according to the saying, 
the devil lies (Koch, 2010 Interview). Neither the German nor the Polish side has ever 
raised this issue and, since the 2+4 Treaty definitively confines Germany within the 
borders of the Federal Republic and the GDR, the theoretical question of whether a 
hundred percent watertight de jure border treaty exists or not is probably just splitting 
hairs. 
 
II.	  Co-­‐operation	  Treaty	  
 
The more extensive treaty, equally important, if not more so, was the 17 June 1991 
Treaty of Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation (hereafter Co-
operation Treaty). Its importance lies in those elements which address the two states’ 
societies. Long before common EU-membership was possible, it tackles normative 
issues and adds an institutional level to Polish-German relations. In fact it represents 
the basis for extensive collaboration between various non-state actors, thus putting 
Polish-German relations on two levels: the inter-governmental and the inter-societal. 
This initiation of a “multi-layered approach” has intensified contacts between 
Germans and Poles, helped to overcome stereotypes, and made it possible for inter-
societal relations to remain good and solid, even when inter-governmental relations 
                                                 
87 This law was passed in 1952 to lessen the burden on expellees who had lost most of their property by 
paying them compensation (see Chapter VI) 
88 See: http://www.polen-news.de/, accessed 5 March 2012.  
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turn sour, as during the PiS government’s term of office (see Chapter I) (Smolar, 2010 
Interview). The three case studies in this thesis, it could be argued, are all negative in 
the sense that all the governments’ policy decisions were subject to mutual criticism: 
the restriction of the free movement of workers, restrictions on purchasing land in the 
former German Ostgebiete until 2016, and the creation of a permanent exhibition in 
Berlin depicting the flight and expulsion of Germans from the eastern territories. 
These “negative case studies” are not, however, by any means representative of the 
daily practice of Polish-German relations as initiated by the Co-operation Treaty. The 
reader should bear this in mind when reading the three case studies presented in the 
subsequent chapters. That being said, the co-operation treaty both addressed and fails 
to address some issues that proved to be contentious when the treaty was written and 
over the following two decades. Furthermore, since the co-operation treaty is so wide-
ranging, not all of its 38 Articles can be analysed here in detail. Rather, I have 
selected the points that seem to be most relevant for the subsequent case studies. 
The forerunners of the Co-operation Treaty were eleven individual agreements 
collected in a 78-point joint declaration,89 signed during the visit of a German 
delegation to Poland in November 1989, which already put topics such as youth 
exchange, preservation of nature, establishment of joint cultural institutes and joint 
protection of capital investments on the agenda. During that meeting the protection of 
the rights of the German minority was addressed and Germany pledged financial 
assistance. Already in 1975 the Schmidt administration gave Poland a so-called 
“Jumbo-loan” of one billion DM. By 1989, Poland could not repay the loan because 
her economy had stagnated throughout the 1980s. Kohl and Mazowiecki therefore 
agreed to abate the majority of the debt if Poland would agree to pay the remaining 
570 million DM into a fund that would sponsor joint civil projects. The Fund for 
Polish-German Collaboration (Stiftung für deutsch-polnische Zusammenarbeit SdpZ; 
Fundacja Współpracy Polsko-Niemieckiej FWPN) was registered in Warsaw in 
December 1991 and has managed these funds since then. Both governments nominate 
an equal proportion of the board of managers.90 Over 8,000 projects have been funded 
                                                 
89 See also Kohl (2009: 104). See point II(8) of the declaration, available online at: 
http://www.fwpn.org.pl/?module=articles&id=19, accessed 5 March 2012. 
90 See http://www.fwpn.org.pl/?module=articles&category=6&lng=pl, accessed 5 March 2012. 
 83 
so far, amounting to over €250 million, and currently over 600 projects are funded 
annually, contributing immensely to co-operation between the two societies.91  
Furthermore, on the basis of one of the eleven above-mentioned agreements, 
the German-Polish Chamber of Industry and Commerce (AHK Polen; AHK Polska) 
was founded on 15 September 1994.92 It very quickly became the largest bi-lateral 
chamber of commerce in Poland, and as of November 2010, 1,048 firms are members 
of this chamber of which 835 are Polish and 213 German.93 The fast-growing 
chamber of commerce not only testifies to growing trade and economic 
interdependence between both countries, but also mirrors Poland’s fast growing 
economy which in 1992, only two years after the injection of “shock-therapy”, turned 
from recession to growth (e.g., Jackson et al., 2005). Also, for Germany as an export-
oriented country, Poland’s economic upswing (it was the only EU-member state to 
show GDP growth during the financial crisis) is welcome as an investment 
opportunity and sales market (see Chapter IV of this thesis).    
The co-operation treaty of June 1991 consists of 38 Articles addressing 
normative issues such as human rights (Article 1(2); Art. 8(1); Art. 20(1)), the rule of 
law (Art. 8(1)), and the condemnation of discrimination on grounds of political and 
religious beliefs or ethnic origin (Art. 20-22). Issues range from enhanced economic 
co-operation (Art. 9), financial investment (Art. 10), co-operation in science and 
technology (Art. 15) to areas where both societies contribute to reconciliation such as 
regional co-operation and city twinning, especially in the border region (Art. 12), 
cultural co-operation (Art. 23) youth exchange programmes (Art. 26 and 30), and a 
pledge by both governments to support collaboration between societies, parties, trade 
unions, churches, sports clubs, foundations, the Polish-German forum and similar 
organisations (Art. 29). This is a far-reaching step since collaboration between similar 
organisations on each side of the border can have an impact on policy-making by the 
central governments. For example, co-operation by regional trade unions in the border 
region interfered with the central government’s and the Confederation of German 
Trade Unions’ (DGB) plans to restrict the free movement of labour on Poland’s EU-
                                                 
91 See http://www.fwpn.org.pl/?module=articles&category=31, accessed 5 March 2012. The aims and 
projects that are funded are listed at: http://www.fwpn.org.pl/?module=articles&category=12, accessed 
5 March 2012. 
92 See http://www.ahk.pl, accessed 5 March 2012. 
93 This does not mean that Polish business is more active. On the contrary, many Polish firms are 
subsidiary companies of German firms, founded in Poland and operating under Polish law e.g. Bayer 
Sp. z o.o.; BASF Polska Sp. z o.o. Entity 1096; Deutsche Bank Polska S.A. etc.  
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accession. As will be seen in Chapter VI, German regional trade unions operating in 
the new Länder did not share the government’s fears that unemployment rates would 
rise after Poland’s accession unless free movement restrictions were applied. 
The co-operation treaty introduces an institutional element as well. Not only 
do both partners promise to establish cultural institutions (Art. 24) and support the 
mutual parliamentary groups which have existed since 1987 (Art. 4). With Article 8, 
as Bingen (1998: 294) correctly evaluates, for Poland the most important provision, 
Germany effectively became Poland’s advocate for her EU ambitions.94   
Despite the landmark provisions in the treaty, a number of points were seen as 
contentious by the Polish side. First, the question of compensation resulting from the 
losses of WWII was not addressed; an issue that would resurface over and over again 
in the future (see above and Chapter VII). Second, because Article 20 refers to the 
acknowledgment of a German minority in Poland, some sections of Polish society 
feared that the document established a new presence of Germans in the East, 
dangerously reminding Poles of the Third Reich’s dream of a Mitteleuropa (Cordell 
and Wolff, 2005: 54-55). One needs to bear in mind that these fears have mostly 
vanished, especially in the regions where the presence of Germans is strongest such as 
in the voivodeships of Opole, Lower Silesia and Silesia – the regions that are most 
attractive for investors (Nowicki, 2009).95 Since Poles living in these regions profit 
from German investment and the jobs it creates, they are less receptive to the anti-
German polemics often propagated by the PiS. However, Janusz Reiter, the former 
ambassador to Germany, warns that emotions also play an important role during 
elections and the issue of the Centre Against Expulsions (see Chapter VII) can 
reignite these fears (Reiter, 2011 Interview). Third, and related to the second point, 
Poles living in Germany are not referred to as a minority but as German citizens of 
Polish descent. This issue resurfaced later with the rise of Law and Justice, which 
demanded that Poles living in Germany should get the status of an official minority; a 
point that the Polish government addressed to its German partners for the 20th 
anniversary celebration in 2011 (Miszczak, 2011 Interview). Although Article 20 
grants Poles and people of Polish descent living in Germany the right to safeguard 
their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity, and Article 21 pledges that this 
                                                 
94 In 1991, prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the EU was of course still the EC. 
95 See: Atrakcyjność inwestycyjna województw i podregionów Polski 2009. Available at: 
www.ibngr.edu.pl/index.php/pl/content/.../2670/.../Atrakcyjnosc_2009.pdf, accessed 5 January 2011. 
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identity should be protected and cultivated through necessary conditions such as 
education in the mother tongue, such provisions have not been established by the 
German authorities so far. Given that Poland provides its German minority, 
predominantly living in the Opole voivodeship, with the necessary means for 
receiving instructions in the German language, this could be seen as a violation of the 
treaty (Smolar, 2010 Interview; Miszczak, 2011 Interview). This has often been cited 
by PiS to demonstrate German ill intent, especially if it is taken into account that the 
German minority is exempt from the five-percent threshold for entering the Sejm.96 In 
this context some rare cases have been reported in which, following the end of bi-
national marriages, the Polish parent often lost custody of any children and the 
German youth welfare office (Jugendamt) allowed only supervised contact in the 
German language.97 Wilhelm Höynck (2010 Interview), the German chief negotiator 
of the co-operation treaty, confirms that the minority question was one of the major 
obstacles during the six-rounds of negotiations. The Polish side demanded that Poles 
and people of Polish descent living in Germany should gain the status of a minority. 
Poles living in Poland’s western areas fuelled this position since they feared the return 
of Germans to their homelands, thus possibly displacing them, and causing a repeat of 
the loss of home and the bitter experience of the kresy Poles’ move from east to west 
in 1945. Opposition to Polish demands came from the German interior ministry, 
responsible for minorities. The response was to ask “where is the Polish minority?” a 
question which the Polish side was unable to answer satisfactorily. The German 
interior ministry argued that no Pole had approached the ministry about this or any 
similar matter in the past. Even though the number of Poles and people of Polish 
descent was estimated at about one million, most were Poles exiled for political 
reasons during the Cold War, who had no interest whatsoever in maintaining contact 
with Poland. The difference in the two cases was seen in the fact that Germans living 
in Poland were autochthonous Germans who had lived in Silesia for centuries, 
whereas Poles in Germany were politically motivated exiles or descendants of those 
who had migrated for work, scattered across the whole of Germany (Höynck, 2010 
Interview). 
                                                 
96 Since 1991, the German minority has always had at least one MP in the Sejm. 
97 “Deutsch nach Vorschrift”, Zeit-online: http://www.zeit.de/2004/43/Ehestreit?page=1, accessed 5 
March 2012; “Deutsch-Polnische Irritationen – Angst vor Germanisierung”, Süddeutsche.de, 
23.11.2008: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/deutsch-polnische-irritationen-angst-vor-
germanisierung-1.360607, accessed 5 March 2012; “Sądowa germanizacja”, Wprost, 48/2004. 
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During negotiations for the co-operation treaty, opposition also arose from the 
Landsmannschaften. Chancellor Kohl, as well as foreign minister Genscher, sought to 
incorporate them into the process in a “productive future-oriented manner”, but at that 
point they had probably still not dealt with the shock of the border treaty and their 
collaboration could not be counted on (Höynck, 2010 Interview). This explains why 
Wolfgang Bötsch, on behalf of the CSU and the Landsmannschaften, complained that 
the CSU was not informed about the content of the treaty and demanded amendments 
in regards to the right of domicile, or rather the return of the expellees to the former 
Ostgebiete shortly before the treaty was signed in June (Bingen, 1998: 290).  
 The Co-operation Treaty was taken as the legal basis for future agreements 
such as the “Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the government of the Republic of Poland establishing German-Polish Youth Co-
operation” (Jugendwerk; Współpraca Młodzieży) signed on 17 June 1991, and the 
Cultural Co-operation Agreement of 14 July 1997. In fact, Article 30 of the co-
operation treaty obliged the signatories to establish the Jugendwerk. The German-
French Jugendwerk – set up by the Élysée Treaty in 1963,98 and which has proved to 
be fruitful in educating a new generation free from prejudices and crucial in tackling 
reconciliation (e.g. Baumann, 2005) at its roots (the young generation) – was taken as 
a positive precedent. Already in December 1970, the Brandt administration tried to 
imitate the French-German example during the framing of the Warsaw Treaty. The 
Polish partner did not react to the German suggestion, and it is unclear whether the 
Gomułka administration did not want a German-Polish Jugendwerk, or if they were 
not allowed to discuss it due to Soviet pressures. However, Prime Minister Józef 
Cyrankiewicz invited Egon Bahr to a talk at his holiday home in Masuria (former East 
Prussia) between Christmas and New Year’s Eve 1970 to discuss such a proposal. 
Following the Polish protests in 1970, which occurred only days after the Warsaw 
Treaty was signed and ended with a number of fatalities, Gomułka and Cyrankiewicz 
lost their positions and the promised letter of invitation never reached Bahr (Bahr, 
2010 Interview).   
Today, Germany’s foreign policy envisages cultural and educational policy as 
one of the three pillars of foreign policy (along with political and economic relations), 
                                                 
98 The Co-operation Treaty in its importance for Polish-German relations can certainly be compared to 
the Élysée Treaty. The former goes far beyond the latter though as it includes economic and cultural 
co-operation. For an excellent overview and analysis of the Élysée Treaty see the anthology by 
Defrance and Pfeil (2005).  
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and in 2007 almost €1.2 billion was spent on this, amounting to 0.46 percent of the 
federal budget.99 Intercultural dialogue is thereby especially accentuated and youth 
exchanges comprise an important strategy for achieving this (Kloock, 2008: 132-33). 
In the period 1993-2008 the Jugendwerk funded 48,490 projects involving more than 
1.9 million young people100 in school exchange programmes, internships, stipends, 
teacher training and similar programmes. Eugeniusz Smolar (2010 Interview) attests 
that “the PiS-administration tried hard to destroy Polish-German relations, wanting to 
withdraw some funds from the Jugendwerk. But the pressure was so great that they 
could not do it in the end.” (Smolar, 2010 Interview) This is only one example of how 
a bilateral treaty can foster reconciliation on the inter-societal level, create new 
domestic actors and thereby change the domestic structure of foreign policy-making. 
Article 38(3) of the co-operation treaty stipulates that the treaty should be 
valid for ten years and that it is automatically prolonged by a further five years if no 
party terminates the treaty one year before that date. The Polish Sejm passed a 
resolution on 22 June 2001, on the date of the tenth anniversary of the treaty.101 Point 
three of this resolution describes in what areas the treaty had enabled co-operation 
between Poland and Germany. In the final sentences of point three, Poland underlines 
that she protects the rights of minorities according to international standards and that 
she is convinced that the Polish community living in Germany will increasingly use 
its rights and privileges as well. This already hinted towards Poland’s dissatisfaction 
with the official status of Poles living in Germany, as outlined above. In a report 
conducted by the MSZ in 2009,102 the Polish government, basing its data on German 
statistical research, estimated that about two million people who had migrated from 
Poland were living in Germany. The MSZ included in its estimation the so-called 
Spätaussiedler who have German citizenship, but have not renounced their Polish 
nationality (MSZ, 2009: 177). The report stresses that, above all, the younger 
                                                 
99 “12. Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Auswärtigen Kulturpolitik” available at: 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/KulturDialog/ZieleUndPartner/ZielePartner.html, accessed 10 
November 2010. 
100 Geschäftsbericht für 2008 available at: http://dpjw.org/c28,13,informationen_zum_dpjw.html, 
accessed 5 March 2012. 
101 Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 22 czerwca 2001 r. z okazji 10-lecia podpisania 
Traktatu o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Republiką 
Federalną Niemiec. Monitor Polski 2001 nr. 21 poz. 329 available at: 
http://isip.sejm.gov.pl/VolumeServlet?type=wmp&rok=2001&numer=021, accessed 5 March 2012. 
102 Raport o sytuacji Polonii i Polaków za granicą 2009. Available at: 
www.msz.gov.pl/files/docs/polonia/Raport_PPG.pdf, accessed 5 March 2012. 
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generation is not interested in the activities of the so-called Polonia. Furthermore, the 
Polonia is not well organised. Although numerous Polonia organisations exist, no 
umbrella organisation has been founded, and applications to the German and Polish 
authorities for funding are often not well prepared (about €400,000 Euros p.a. are 
spent by the German authorities for the activities of the Polonia) (MSZ, 2009: 179-
80). Only about 2,300 children learn Polish as their mother tongue at German state 
schools, and often parents are required to organize themselves to obtain this basic 
need for their children, despite the co-operation treaty which is supposed to take care 
of this (MSZ, 2009: 180). In Chapter II it was shown how the centralized structure of 
the Polish political system makes it difficult for the Länder to sign an agreement with 
the respective voivodeships for co-operation over medical services in the border 
regions. In Germany, since education is entirely in the hands of the Länder, they 
would be responsible for fulfillment of the 1991 Co-operation Treaty, although it was 
signed by the federal government. As the MSZ report laments, some Länder, such as 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Bremen, Berlin and Lower Saxony, are more constructive, 
while Hesse and Bavaria are the most obstructive to providing any facilities for Poles 
(MSZ, 2009: 180). This shows once more how differing domestic structures can lead 




This chapter has introduced Risse-Kappen’s (1995) second variable, the degree of 
institutionalisation. It analysed the two most important bilateral treaties marking the 
end of the Cold War, which lifted Polish-German relations to a new level: the 1990 
Border Treaty and the 1991 Co-operation Treaty. Although the border treaty merely 
recognizes the border delineated by the two rivers and does not mention both states’ 
societies, it has had an enormous influence upon the Landsmannschaften and its 
umbrella organisation, the BdV. That is because for over four decades the expellees 
had been fighting for a return of the German Ostgebiete to Germany, and with the re-
affirmation of the border, the last hopes of making this happen were destroyed. Kohl’s 
skilful manoeuvring has irreversibly locked the expellees within the norm parameters 
of Ostpolitik (Tewes, 2001: 59). Nevertheless, as demonstrated, at the time of the 
formulation of the treaty, the expellees’ influence was significant since the CDU/CSU 
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relied on their votes. Importantly, the treaty does not contain the contentious issue 
around compensation for the expellees’ property losses, and compensation to Polish 
victims of the Nazi regime. Whereas the latter was later resolved with the 
establishment by Germany of a fund, the former would resurface again in the new 
millennium with the Prussian Claims Society’s court case. Although dismissed by 
European Court of Human Rights, this issue, which affected Polish-German relations 
might have been precluded by clearer legal codification.    
Nevertheless, the border treaty was a prerequisite for the co-operation treaty 
that followed, since through the guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line certain topics 
which had been on the German agenda for over a decade, such the recognition of the 
German minority and bi-lingual place names in the Opole voivodeship, were suddenly 
made possible (Höynck, 2010 Interview). The co-operation treaty has introduced a 
completely different multi-layered dimension into Polish-German relations. For the 
next few years, Germany became Poland’s prime advocate at the inter-governmental 
level for her ambitions to enter the EU. On the inter-societal level, relations have been 
institutionalised and contribute enormously to the daily practice of contacts between 
Poles and Germans solidifying non-governmental Polish-German relations. This 
proved helpful immediately after Poland’s EU accession when Law and Justice tried 
to instrumentalise fears of Germany for political ends. The analysis of the Sejm 
elections in 2005 and 2007 show that in the former German Ostgebiete, support for 
PiS was much lower than in the rest of Poland. Again, as in the case of the border 
treaty, the issue of property loss was not addressed, an issue which is important also 
in Chapter VII of this thesis. 
  
I have now engaged with both of Risse-Kappen’s (1995) variables, domestic 
structures in Chapter II and institutionalisation of relations in Chapter III, as a priori 
determinants of non-state actors’ influence on foreign policy-making. The following 
chapter will scrutinize joint EU membership another aspect of Polish-German 
institutionalisation important for non-state actors activities and thereby prepare the 
first two case studies that deal with non-state actors role in Poland’s EU accession 
negotiations. Chapters V and VI analyse their influence over the free movement of 
capital and the free movement of workers respectively. Chapter VII examines the 
process that led to the decision to erect a permanent exhibition in Berlin depicting the 
flight and expulsion of millions of Germans following WWII. 
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4. The Process of EU Eastern Enlargement 
 
 
This chapter forms a background for the two first case studies, analysing the achieved 
transitional periods for the free movement of capital and the free movement of labour 
during Poland’s EU accession negotiations. As outlined in chapter I, process tracing is 
employed in all three case studies to, inter alia, establish causality between the non-
state actors preference voicing and the taken policy-decisions. Therefore, it is 
necessary to show briefly the start of the accession process. This chapter demonstrates 
again the importance of Risse-Kappen’s second variable, the institutionalization of 
state-relations as a determinant of non-state actors’ access to policy-makers.  Joint EU 
membership provides the legal and institutional framework, and creates new 
motivations for these actors to voice their preferences.   
The chapter first looks at the Eastern Enlargement, before going to analyse 
Germany’s and Poland’s interests in Polish EU membership, along with an analysis of 
non-state actors interests in this institution. Then, it examines how the decision-
making structure during accession negotiations differed to the usual set-up in foreign-
policy making.   
 
 
I.	  Process	  of	  EU	  Accession	  until	  1998	  
 
The process of the 2004 enlargement effectively started in 1989 and lasted for fifteen 
years, generating a large literature (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2003; O’Brennan, 2006b). 
Here, I focus on the main events.  
The first reaction of the European Community to developments in Poland after 
the first partially free elections to the Sejm in June 1989 was a financial assistance 
programme. The European Council adopted PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance 
for Economic Restructuring), on 18 December 1989103 and allocated ECU 300 million 
to the two countries.104 Between 1990 and 1996 Poland received roughly ECU 200 
million annually (Mayhew, 1998: 140). PHARE was proposed by the EC Commission 
                                                 
103 Council Regulation (EEC) no. 3906/89 
104 PHARE was later applied to the remaining CEECs in transition and today constitutes an important 
tool of EU enlargement.   
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after it was asked at the G-7 Summit in Paris on 14-16 July 1989 to take the necessary 
initiatives in agreement with all member states and other interested countries. 
Chancellor Kohl insisted on this decision (Reinicke in Papadimitriou, 2002: 25), and 
this marks the beginning of Germany’s role as “Poland’s advocate” in the EC/EU. 
Already then, Commission President Delors and Polish Prime Minister 
Mazowiecki discussed the possibility of an Association Agreement, and Frans 
Andriessen, Commissioner for foreign relations, outlined the content of such an 
agreement (Mayhew, 1998: 21). This was realised on 13 December 1991105 with the 
signing of the ‘Europe Agreements’, when the EC signed Association Agreements 
with the Visegrád countries.106 The agreement was asymmetric, since Poland was 
given faster access to the Community markets whilst retaining its protectionist 
measures to facilitate the transition to a liberal market economy. Poland’s strategy 
was comprehensive market liberalisation so that membership would not be possible in 
a distant future, but ultimately inevitable (Torreblanca, 2001: 144-45) – an adaptation 
of German Ostpolitik’s strategy Wandel durch Handel (change through trade). 
However, according to Mayhew (1998: 22), the negotiations “rapidly became hard-
nosed trade bargaining”, since many member states refused to open their markets in 
areas including agriculture, iron, steel, textiles (sectors where Poland could have 
exported the most). Negotiations for the Europe Agreements broke down twice and 
even the coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 did not facilitate their conclusion. 
Moreover, the Community refused to incorporate the promise of possible future 
membership.  Thus, the Europe Agreement must be seen as an end of the romantic 
period when euphoria over the changes in CEE dominated in the “West” with 
unconditional support for the region, and the beginning of a period when interest-
based negotiations would dominate. This must have been a valuable lesson and a taste 
of future accession negotiations beginning in March 1998 (Mayhew, 1998: 22-23).107 
The next landmark was the 1993 European Council, which elaborated the 
Copenhagen Criteria (European Council, 1993). A Commission Report of June 1992 
                                                 
105 Important to note here that the Europe Agreement came into force only in February 1994 (!) after 
the twelve member states obtained all required ratifications from their parliaments. In trade areas, 
where the EC already had exclusive competence, Poland had only to wait until 1 March 1992. 
106 Following the peaceful break-up of Czechoslovakia in 1993 the EU signed separate Europe 
Agreements with the Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
107 For more on the Europe Agreements from the perspective of an ongoing process leading to the 
opening of accession negotiations see Mayhew (1998: 41-131); for an excellent account of the political 
environment surrounding the making of the Europe Agreements see Torreblanca (2001) or 
Papadimitriou (2002).  
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stated that three “conditions” should be met by candidate states: European identity, 
democracy and respect for human rights along with full application of the entire 
acquis communautaire. (European Commission, 1992: 9).  
Additionally, a small trade package was passed: a token of goodwill after the 
laborious negotiations for the Europe Agreements, with agreement that up to 15% of 
the PHARE programme could be used for infrastructure development. As Mayhew 
(1998: 164) assesses, with Copenhagen, “enlargement obtained a sort of inevitability 
without a timetable,” whilst a yardstick was introduced to measure whether EU 
applicants were ready for membership (e.g. Gower, 1999: 13).  
 The German presidency ensured that a major initiative would result from the 
IGC at Essen in December 1994 (Gower, 1999: 8), and indeed all Germany’s 
negotiating skills were required to convince the numerous reluctant member states 
about the resulting initiative (Sedelmeier and Wallace, 1996: 380). Essen marks the 
launch of the pre-accession strategy108 aiming to progressively prepare the associated 
countries for integration into the EU internal market (European Council, 1994). 
Poland applied for EU membership on 5 April 1994. The Commission 
published a White Paper on 3 May 1995 (European Commission, 1995) listing the 
internal market acquis and suggesting a sequencing of the approximation of laws (as 
first-order and second-order measures), since immediate adoption of the entire acquis 
could be inimical to the economic transformation process (Mayhew, 1998: 208; 223-
25). However, the entire adaptation of the acquis in full before accession was an 
important classic method of enlargement (Preston, 1995: 452-53). Poland had by then 
already prepared a White Paper and the Office of the Committee for European 
Integration (UKIE) had checked subsequent national legislation proposals for 
conformity with EU law (Mayhew, 1998: 209). The then Under-secretary of state, in 
the function of a plenipotentiary for European integration attached to the Prime 
Minister’s office, Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, handled all domestic aspects of EU 
integration before the Committee on European Integration was established in 
December 1996 (Rupp, 1999: 99). According to Saryusz-Wolski, the White Paper 
weakened Poland’s enthusiasm for EU integration by not showing a more flexible 
approach (in Trzeciak, 2010: 82). Nevertheless, as Maresceau (2003: 21-22)  
comments, this “approximation of laws” constituted in reality a stringent takeover of 
                                                 
108 The term “pre-accession strategy” was used for the first time in Annex IV to the Conclusions of the 
1994 Essen European Council. 
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community law that was neither “pleasant” nor “stimulating” but a valuable “learning 
process”, and crucial for the actual accession negotiations since deadlocks in the 
negotiations can be detected in areas where approximation has hardly taken place, like 
the free movement of capital and workers. 
 In April 1996, the European Commission sent Poland a questionnaire regarding 
the state of the economy and political and societal life; it was completed by June 
1996.  The opinion on membership was published on 15 July 1997, with a full 
“thumbs up” on Poland’s fulfilment of political requirements. The economic 
requirements were also fulfilled, but the Commission identified large state-owned 
companies as a problem, “where management failures in the face of foreign 
competition could have serious consequences.” Also problematic were agriculture and 
some then-recent trade policies. On the free movement of capital, the Commission 
had already warned that “the application of the acquis regarding the ownership of 
land and related assets by foreign nationals may present a significant problem in the 
medium term.”109 The administrative infrastructure needed in order to adopt the 
Union’s legislative body was deemed “well-established” and “functioning normally”. 
Hence, the Commission recommended the opening of negotiations with Poland 
(European Commission, 1997). Even though the Commission’s Opinions on 
enlargement are not binding, in the case of the CEECs they were likely to be 
influential because some member states were either undecided or probably against 
enlargement (Mayhew, 1998: 175).110 The accession negotiations with Poland 
commenced on 31 March 1998. 
 
I will now examine Germany’s reasons for accepting Poland into the EU, and 
Poland’s reasons for joining. This will be done together with an analysis of the short-
term objectives of the two states and domestic pressure groups’ interests in this 
process, in order to identify some expected positions for the two case studies.      
 
                                                 
109 The free movement of persons was not part of the White Paper measures apart from the linked issue 
of the right of establishment and recognition of qualifications, where the mutual recognition of 
diplomas was judged as partly achieved. 
110 Whereas the so-called Southern Enlargement with Greece in 1981 and Portugal and Spain in 1986 
was undertaken in a hostile international environment (the Cold War), this external pressure had gone 
by the 1990s. Only the 1999 NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia became again a motivating factor for 
enlargement and the remaining seven candidates from CEE were invited to negotiate accession. This 
was acknowledged by the European Council at Helsinki in 1999 with the words “in the light of recent 
developments” (European Council, 1999: para. 10). 
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II.	  Germany’s	  reasons	  for	  supporting	  Poland’s	  membership	  aspirations	  
 
As discussed in Chapter III, on the institutionalisation of Polish-German relations, 
with the 17 June 1991 Treaty of Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-
operation, Germany effectively became Poland’s prime EU “advocate”. This is 
reflected in the process of Eastern Enlargement until 1998 described above, and must 
be seen in conjunction with the 1991 Treaty. Three major reasons underpinned 
Germany’s “advocate role” in becoming the driving-motor for Eastern Enlargement, 
and in particular with respect to Poland: a moral dimension, economic interests, and 
security reasons (Lippert et al., 2001: 14-20; Paterson, 2003: 220).  
 
The	  Moral	  dimension	  	  
 
The moral dimension involves the continuation of Ostpolitik in order to overcome the 
divisions resulting from WWII and to achieve reconciliation with Poland. Dieter 
Kastrup, Germany’s chief negotiator for the 2+4 Treaty and Schröder’s foreign policy 
advisor 2001-2002, stated that the moral dimension - reconciliation with Poland - was 
the principal reason for Germany’s support of Poland’s EU aspirations, “only then 
followed the other reasons” (Kastrup, 2010 Interview with author). Nazi Germany led 
a WWII campaign in the East following an ideology that treated Slavs as ‘inferiors’. 
This cost Poland some seven million civilian lives, including three million Polish 
Jews (Davies, 1997: 1328). Furthermore, Warsaw was flattened following the 
Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Moreover, Poland remained involuntarily on the “wrong 
side of the Iron Curtain”, but it was the 1980 Solidarity movement that helped bring 
this division to an end and ultimately helping German re-unification – a point 
acknowledged by Kohl in his memoirs (Kohl, 2007: 436). Ostpolitik, which began 
symbolically with Brandt’s Kniefall and factually with the signing of the Warsaw 
Treaty in December 1970 (see Chapter III), was the starting point of the policy of 
reconciliation that found its heyday in the 1990s (see literature review in Chapter I), 
but would remain incomplete, with Poland remaining outside the EU. Poland should 





As an export-dependent economy it was in Germany’s interest to expand its market 
eastwards. Whilst this would be possible without enlargement, as Mayhew comments, 
only within the Union can all agents be sure “that there will be no backsliding in 
terms of trade opening” (Mayhew, 1998: 189). At the beginning of the 1990s, Poland 
was a potential market for German goods and direct investments rather than reality. 
 
Table 4.1 Key variables in Polish-German economic relations 1989-2008 
Year German value* 
of exports to 
Poland 
in million € 
German value** 
of imports from 
Poland 
in million € 
German primary 






Jobs created in 
Poland through 
German primary or 
secondary FDI (in 
thousands)†† 
1989   2,946   1,747          5 115     2 
1990   3,425   2,204        13 110     6 
1991   4,611   3,570        44 128     9 
1992   4,299   4,075      149 143   18 
1993   5,048   4,268      320 135   29 
1994   5,406   5,005      592 120   47 
1995   6,615   6,096   1,015 128   66 
1996   8,575   6,032   1,759 127   84 
1997 10,816   7,083   2,875 118 116 
1998 12,536   8,118   4,101 117 149 
1999 12,506   8,892   5,310 124 166 
2000 14,678 11,519   7,278 126 194 
2001 15,266 12,917   8,547 104 214 
2002 16,272 13,671   8,075   61 202 
2003 16,405 15,335   7,603   62 195 
2004 18,778 15,532   9,559 217 197 
2005 22,321 17,003 11,563 152 230 
2006 28,990 21,359 14,186 200 242 
2007 36,405 24,406 17,392 198 269 
2008 40,854 26,124 17,311 267 286 
* Time series EE1030: Merchandise Trade with Poland; external trade including supplementary items, 
exports (fob) 
** Time series EE1318: Merchandise Trade with Poland; external trade including supplementary 
items, imports (fob) 
*** Time series RJ1895: German primary direct foreign investments to Poland  
† Time series RJ7360: Polish primary direct foreign investments to Germany 
†† Time series RJ2310: Polish employees in companies with German primary and/or secondary FDI 
 





As seen in Table 4.1, in the early 1990s the trade relationship was marginal, as the 
total value of German-Polish trade demonstrates. Since Poland’s EU accession in 
2004, the German economy has profited immensely from Poland’s rapid economic 
development and the total value of exports has more than doubled, from €18.8 billion 
in 2004 to €40.9 billion in 2008, making Poland Germany’s 10th biggest export 
market with 3.2% of total exports.111 The increase of more than €22 billion within 
four years of Poland joining the EU offsets the entire increase in German exports to 
Poland in the period 1989-2004. The exporters with most benefit are mechanical 
engineering (25% of exports to Poland), exporters of industrial metals (16%), car and 
ship manufacturers (14%), plastic and rubber manufacturers (12%) as well as 
component suppliers of car parts.112 
Another economic motive for supporting Poland is to take advantage of lower 
labour costs and the possibility of investing in more competitive production sites 
(Lippert et al., 2001: 19; Paterson, 2003: 220). Whilst labour intensive businesses 
should be expected to be in favour of EU Eastern Enlargement since production sites 
can be shifted to Poland and additional competition from the east should keep wages 
in Germany low, it is also clear that trade unions would voice their concerns. In 
reality German business predominantly invests in Polish urban centres with a 
historical focus on industry, so the premise that German business is exclusively 
interested in lower wage costs must be modified, despite German press coverage 
focusing on that topic (Bluhm, 2007: 133), especially during enlargement. If German 
businesses were exclusively interested in the lowest possible wages, investments 
would flow into regions with the lowest income level such as the Subcarpathian 
Voivodeship. Although wage costs did play a role in founding Polish subsidiary 
companies: 
 
they are not stuck at the bottom of a one-dimensional hierarchy of added value but 
rather take over more and more competences for whole products or product segments. 
This increasingly happens for products or complex components with mid-range prices 
that are distributed Europe- and worldwide and to which additional mandates are 
attached. These companies invest in order to stay. (Bluhm, 2007: 126)113 
 
                                                 
111 Polish Ministry of Economics: 
http://www.mg.gov.pl/Wspolpraca+z+zagranica/Wspolpraca+gospodarcza+Polski+z+krajami+UE+i+
EFTA/niemcy.htm, accessed 22 February 2011. 
112 Ibid. 
113 The translation is the author’s own.  
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With this strategy, the cost was merged with quality maintain the German “paradigm 
of quality competition”. Thus the price intensive quality and high-tech sector can be 
maintained in Germany whilst Poland takes over the “ripe” but nevertheless capital 
intensive products or components that require qualifications in the standard sector 
(Bluhm, 2007: 126-27).114 Therefore, Poland must not be seen as a competitor to 
German labour but rather a complement that helps to secure German labour at the 
high-end of the price scale in a globalised world. 
As the third column of Table 4.1 shows, German business has indeed 
increased its FDI from a low €5 million in 1989 to €17.3 billion in 2008, making it the 
second largest investor in Poland after the Netherlands.115 Three phases can be 
detected: in phase one (1989-1994) the total amount of German FDI increased  
slightly. From 1995 onwards investments rose steadily, by roughly one billion Euros 
annually, before they consolidated between 2001 and 2003. In phase three, from 2004 
onwards, FDI more than doubled once German investors knew that Polish EU 
membership was a certainty. German businesses were initially hesitant to the new 
opportunities, partly as a result of German re-unification, which absorbed a vast 
amount of energy from economic actors (Mayhew, 1998: 19; 191). Only once the 
former GDR was economically incorporated and wages in the new Bundesländer rose 
rapidly did FDI to CEEC, and Poland in particular, start to increase. After re-
unification, the unemployment rate in East Germany rose steadily and the region 

















                                                 
114 Bluhm (2007) refers to the CEEC region as a whole of which Poland is a part. 
115 Ibid. 
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Figure 4.1 Regional Unemployment in Germany in 2008 
 
 
Source: Destatis (2009) Deutschland und Leute 2009. Wiesbaden: Statistisches 
Bundesamt: 
http://www.destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/Publika




It was hoped that with Eastern Enlargement, Germany would be “moved” to the 
centre of the EU and that the new Bundesländer would benefit from a prospering 
Poland and from Germany’s geographic centrality within the EU (Lippert et al., 2001: 
20). However, Polish FDI to Germany is very low, as seen in Table 4.1. The biggest 
investors are PKN Orlen S.A. which bought over 500 BP petrol stations, mostly in the 
northern part of Germany;116 the Ciech Group, which bought a sodium carbonate 
plant in Lower Saxony for €75 million; and Azoty Tarnów, which bought a polymer 
manufacturer in Guben, Brandenburg.117 Also, 94% of German companies investing 
in Poland are based in West Germany, with Berlin118 and the surrounding 
Brandenburg region being the only major investor from the east, bypassing the new 

























                                                 
116 PKN Orlen: 
http://www.orlen.pl/PL/CentrumPrasowe/Strony/NowestacjewsieciORLENDEUT.aspx; last accessed: 
23. February 2011. 
117 Polish Ministry of Economics: 
http://www.mg.gov.pl/Wspolpraca+z+zagranica/Wspolpraca+gospodarcza+Polski+z+krajami+UE+i+
EFTA/niemcy.htm; last accessed 23. February 2011.  
118 Berlin can of course be hardly seen as a new Bundesland since West Berlin was part of the FRG 
during the Cold War. 
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Figure 4.2 Location of German companies with branch plants and subsidiary firms in 




Source: Krätke and Borst (2007: 626) 
 
 
In order for the East German region to profit from West German companies 
investing in Poland, it would be beneficial if these investments were undertaken in the 
border region. The majority of German FDI is directed into Polish metropolitan and 
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urban areas, predominantly Warsaw, Poznań, Wrocław, the Upper Silesian industrial 
basin, Cracow and Łódź (Krätke and Borst, 2007: 627-28), not mimicking the 
maquiladora scenario along the US-Mexican border. Since the strategy of German 
business is to ensure “quality competitiveness”, maquiladora type investments have 
not been made and the eastern regions of Germany are bypassed.  
Another economic benefit for German business resulting from Polish 
accession, with the full adaptation of the aquis, would be Polish migrants seeking 
work in Germany and offering cheaper labour while simultaneously exercising 
pressure on wages in general. German trade unions would voice concerns when facing 
this scenario, and this topic, as the second case study, is discussed in Chapter VI. 
 
Stability	  and	  Security	  
 
Security was the last major reason for supporting Poland’s membership. With Poland 
joining the EU, Germany would not be caught between Western Europe and Russia, 
thus escaping the Mittellage (Tewes, 1998: 21; Hyde-Price, 2000: 2-4).119 Whilst 
NATO membership is more important tool for military co-operation, the EU was 
meant to stabilise Poland economically and reduce tensions between a wealthy 
Germany and its neighbours. Hence, the “grey zone” between Russia and Germany 
would disappear (Lippert et al., 2001: 18). Also, the EU would consolidate 
democracy, help with political stability and guarantee peace and security. Moreover, 
the old Communist industries which polluted the environment would be regulated and 
“defused” (Hill, 2002: 106; O’Brennan, 2006b: 149). Unsurprisingly, the Pact on 
Stability in Europe was developed during the German Presidency and signed at Essen 
(European Council, 1994). Franco-German relations after WWII were the cognitive 
model to be mimicked, so that Polish-German relations “previously characterised by 
tensions over territory, ethnic minorities, or disputed historical narratives” would be 
transformed and the early patterns of peace-building that started with the ECSC and 
the Treaty of Rome would be repeated in the east (O’Brennan, 2006a: 160-61).120 
 
                                                 
119 For the development of the concept of Mittellage in German geopolitics since the 19th c. see Schulz 
(1989). 
120 This follows the logic that the EU represents a common western international community 
organisation with joint norms and rules and a common identity (see Schimmelfennig, 2003: 77-111). 
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Long-­‐term	  goal	  and	  short-­‐term	  practise	  
 
Germany had to proceed cautiously. As Tewes argues (1998; 2001), Germany found 
itself in a “role conflict”. It was a traditional integration deepener, but had suddenly 
assumed the role of an integration widener risking its long-standing good relations 
with France. After re-unification, Germany had to prove that it would not give up its 
traditional role and attempt to become a “regional hegemon”. Reunification was 
bought with EMU at Mitterrand’s insistence, and the Maastricht Treaty anchored the 
“new” Germany into the European construct (Torreblanca, 2001: 150-51). Lippert et 
al. (2001: 14) see this “role-conflict” as one of the major reasons why Germany’s 
position in negotiations with CEE was “businesslike”, since Germany would not 
accept a watered-down acquis or paralysis of the EU. These “businesslike” 
negotiations came through as early as the negotiations for the Europe Agreements. 
 
All the major German political, economic and social forces – all political parties, 
every government and opposition party in the sixteen Länder, unions of 
entrepreneurs, trade unions, churches and social groups, academic experts and other 
opinion leaders – claim[ed] that enlargement is a “political necessity and historic 
chance for Europe”, (Lippert et al., 2001: 14) 
 
However, this did not prevent single actors from successfully voicing their 
preferences during negotiations on the Association Agreements. For example, 
Germany obtained a postponement until 1995 for the beginning of the tariff 
dismantlement process for coal imports, because of the possibility of Polish coal 
flooding Germany’s market and undermining the vertical agreements with Germany’s 
coal and steel industry (Torreblanca, 2001: 109). As seen in Chapter II, trade unions 
matter in corporatist Germany and are an important political player that cannot be 
ignored by the political elite. The concentration of the coal industry in certain regions 
(Rhineland, Saarland) means that the relevant Bundesländer would object to potential 
external threats to their industries. The other sectors where Germany voiced 
objections were agriculture (Torreblanca, 2001: 183), steel and transit. Germany, 
being a heavyweight in the negotiations, helped the other member states to secure 
their restriction demands (Torreblanca, 2001: 124, 191). Germany’s semi-sovereign, 
consensus-driven and highly inclusive domestic structure, discussed in Chapter II, 
allows many actors to participate in preference formation. The negotiations for the 
Association Agreements only exemplify the inevitable: whilst a broad consensus on 
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Enlargement existed in society, as argued by Lippert et al. (2001: 14), when it comes 
to negotiations on specific issues, individual actors will seek for short term gains to be 
enabled by the domestic political set-up. Scholars argue that negotiators are able to 
capitalise on this apparent weakness of the Chancellery and relevant ministries at the 
EU-level by presenting their position as more or less final, since domestic re-
negotiation would be taxing and time-consuming (e.g.: Bulmer and Paterson, 1996; 
Collins, 2002). 
 
III.	  Poland’s	  reasons	  for	  wanting	  to	  join	  the	  EU	  
 
Poland’s reasons for wanting to join the EU fit into three main categories: a historical-
cultural, based on ideas of shared identity and common values, practised in the 
political discourse of the “return to Europe”; economic, with the conviction that 
membership would lead to Poland’s prosperity; and security, influenced by the end of 
the Cold War, when Poland had its own “Mittellage” as a frontier state between 
western institutions and Russia. 
 
“The	  return	  to	  Europe”	  	  	  
 
Poland’s political elite in the 1990s was largely composed of the former opposition to 
the Cold-War Communists. Former members of the Catholic Intelligentsia Clubs and 
émigrés had started to turn their ideas into practice, such as that reconciliation with 
Germany and Russia was indispensable, as argued by the Mieroszewski/Giedroyc 
tandem of the Kultura circle (Prizel, 1995). Poland and CEE were seen as wrongfully 
captured the USSR, as argued by e.g. Milan Kundera (1984) and Czesław Miłosz 
(Ash, 2000). Therefore, it was a logical step to “correct” the circumstances after Yalta 
and Potsdam and “return to Europe” – a western community in which Poland saw 
itself deeply embedded. Throughout the 1990s, the  “returning to Europe” debate was 
focused on EU accession, whilst actual implications were largely ignored until 1998 
(Grabbe and Hughes, 1999: 191, 193). As early as April 1990, when the EC was 
about to propose the Association Agreement, Mazowiecki demanded a customs 
union, the free movement of capital, services and persons, the harmonisation of 
agricultural, monetary, social transport and energy policies, and co-operation in a 
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number of policy-areas (measures that would cement the path towards EC accession) 
(Torreblanca, 2001: 69). Importantly, “the return to Europe” was a deep-rooted 
conviction, as well as an accession negotiation strategy. Schimmelfennig (2003: 90-
91; 260-72) shows that most CEECs used this rhetoric to bridge the technocratic 
economic conditionality of the EC/EU that these states could not fulfil by stressing 
their common rules, values and identity. As Shimmelfennig argues (2003: 268-78), 
the EU was “entrapped” in its own rhetoric which was exploited internally by the 
Commission and the pro-enlargement member states and by the CEECs. This is 
exemplified by a warning from Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, that Europe was forging 
another “economic Yalta” or a “new economic Iron Curtain”, following the 
disappointing results of the Association Agreements (Saryusz-Wolski in 
Schimmelfennig, 2003: 268). Hence, the first strategic goal of Poland’s National 
Strategy for European Integration incorporates the “return to Europe” rhetoric, stating 
that “Poland has belonged to Europe in the geo-political, cultural and economic sense 
and shares its basic values that she has co-founded and defended for over thousand 




The second reason for Poland joining the EU was economic. One aspect was that the 
EU would help Poland to “become rich”. The obvious precedent cases were the three 
Mediterranean countries and Ireland. The billions of Euros in structural and cohesion 
would allow Poland to tread the path of these precedent cases. The Polish public 
opinion was highest in its expectations towards EU membership where economy was 
concerned. A July 1999 CBOS survey, found that 51% felt that EU integration would 
have a positive impact on Polish economy. Only 28% opined that it would be 
negative. Similarly, 48% expected a positive impact on the functioning of Polish 
private firms whilst only 21% held a negative view (CBOS, July 1999).  
The economic dimension goes further than a “get-rich-quick assumption”. 
Since Poland had to undertake monumental economic modernisation, EU-
membership as the carrot would serve as an external legitimising factor for domestic 
reforms and hence prevent the transformation losers from blocking these reforms 
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(Cecchini et al. 2001: 157). In that sense, the EU is an “external anchor” that 




Although NATO guarantees Poland’s security, joining the EU also entails a security 
element. As Grabbe and Hughes demonstrate (1998: 6), the CEECs’ enthusiasm for 
joining international organisations can generally be explained by a desire to “re-
integrate into the world economy” and to “depart from the Soviet sphere of 
influence”. Schimmelfennig (2005: 77-92) explores both NATO and the EU as 
organisations of the Western international community, showing that various theories, 
such as the democratic peace paradigm, argue that liberal democratic states do not 
wage war against each other.121 Since the EU facilitates reforms and structures which 
consolidate democracy, it interlocks future member states with old ones and 
contributes to their overall security. When Polish Foreign Minister Geremek opened 
negotiations on 31 March 1998 in Brussels he acknowledged this: 
 
Poland is starting the negotiations with a conviction that membership of the European 
Union is the best choice from the point of view of the security of the state, the 
stability of the democratic order, the consolidation of the foundations of rapid and 
sustainable economic development and the construction of a modern civic society. 
(Geremek quoted in Friis and Jarosz: 2000: 37) 
 
Whilst Poland wanted to join the EU as soon as possible, the short-term goal for 
negotiations would be to join on the most beneficial terms, i.e. to gain access to the 
EU’s internal market without transitional periods (TPs) for the old member states, 
whilst negotiating TPs for its own market in areas where a fast application of the 
acquis would have been too costly or unattainable without postponing accession far 
into the future. The Committee for European Integration, established in January 1997, 
wrote in its National Strategy for Integration (NSI) that it would be important “to 
avoid attempts to negotiate protection periods for too many sectors of the Polish 
economy as this may lead to inadequate preparation of the Polish economy for 
accession to the EU, and consequently to a weakening of Poland’s negotiating 
position.” (quoted in Preston, 1998: 162) This shows that the early negotiating team 
                                                 
121 See also O’Brennan (2006b: 154-56) 
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was well-aware that demanding TPs in one area would lead to possible quid pro quo 
demands from the old member states. The two case studies will demonstrate that this 
happened. Finally, another of Poland’s objectives was to negotiate the highest 
possible level of monetary transfers in regard to policies such as the CAP, and to 
secure the highest possible share of cohesion and structural funds.  
 
IV.	  The	  process	  of	  accession	  negotiations	  
 
Poland was admitted to the negotiation table on 31 March 1998. Derogations to the 
acquis, either permanent or temporary in form of TPs should ideally be exceptional 
although the first precedents were set with the 1973 enlargement (see below). Initially 
the candidates are engaged in “screening” (the legal review of national law against 
community law) of each of the 31 acquis chapters. The Union decided to start 
screening for the chapters where it was assumed that full adaptation would not pose 
many problems (e.g. education, telecommunication, culture). This allowed the 
candidates to find a position on each individual chapter that represented their 
respective negotiation positions. These position papers were passed on to the 
Commission. The Commission was asked by the Council to propose a common EU 
position. Timing and constant contact of the Council members with the Commission 
was crucial in order to influence the formulation of positions. Also, the Council’s role 
was decisive because it was responsible for approving, and bore the final 
responsibility for, the EU position. Member states established so-called enlargement 
groups which would meet twice a week. This lowest tier of negotiations was the 
quickest and least controversial when it dealt with already existing rules of the acquis 
and not when new regulations had to be found. If a common position could not be 
found at this level, the dispute would be passed in a hierarchical structure to the 
Permanent Representatives, from there to the Ministers and from there to the Heads of 
State and Governments (see Heidenreich, 2003: 10-11; 2006: 43-44). Figure 4.4 





Figure 4.3 Hierarchy of the decision-making structure during the negotiations for a 
common EU position on the chapters of the acquis communautaire 
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Source: own adaptation of Heidenreich (2006: 43-44) 
 
 
As will be seen further below, especially the top two tiers of the negotiation hierarchy 
provide ample room for non-state actors to voice their policy preferences. 
 
Once the actual negotiations come to a close, the Union consults with the 
applicant on all chapters of the common acquis and the accession treaty is composed 
jointly; ratification procedure follows. Here, the European Parliament requires an 
absolute majority and the EU Council must make a unanimous decision. The member 
states also ratify the accession treaty according to their national law and the applicant 
countries pass the accession treaty in parliament and usually opt for a referendum. 
Once the ratification certificates are deposited, accession commences (e.g. Schneider, 
2009: 16-17). 
 
The accession negotiations for the Eastern Enlargement provided for a special 
decision-making set-up in Germany and Poland.  In order to identify possible access 
points for non-state actors to influence decision-making, the official decision-making 
structures need to be analysed. 
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Germany	  and	  Poland	  during	  the	  negotiations	  
 
During the negotiations, 31 March 1998 until 5 February 2003, both Germany and 
Poland underwent a change of government, and since the accession negotiations 
established a distinct policy-making network it is necessary to analyse the respective 
significance of the set up and changes. I will only focus on the negotiation structures 
of Poland and Germany, rather than the Commission although the Commission’s 
position in the negotiations was crucial, especially given its role as the proposition 
initiator of the common EU stances which were often accepted by the Council, since 
all final Council adaptations required unanimity. Also, by publishing roadmaps with 
clear timelines122 the Commission could increase the pressure to reach consensus 
(Heidenreich, 2003: 13-14). The Commission had the advantage of dictating 
Chapters’ negotiation order (see Heidenreich, 2006: 44-45). By leaving until last 
negotiations pertaining to the free movement of labour and capital, which were 
expected to be difficult, the pressure to reach consensus would be greater, since 
failure at that stage would have become politically costly (Orzechowski and 
Verheugen, 2009: 113). 
 A significant change in the German political landscape was the victory of the 
SPD in the 1998 federal elections. After sixteen years of CDU/CSU-FDP under Kohl, 
a new SPD-Green coalition government took over. For Poland, it was crucial whether 
Gerhard Schröder would maintain Germany’s role as “Poland’s advocate” in the EU. 
It was Kohl who, during his 1995 visit to Poland, promised accession by the year 
2000 and Jan Kułakowski, Poland’s chief negotiator from 1998 to 2001 always 
referred to this promise during the negotiations. Verheugen, who was also part of the 
German negotiation team before he became Commissioner for Enlargement, 
retrospectively evaluates Kohl’s promise as a mistake, since it slowed down Polish 
politicians’ efforts to apply the acquis (Orzechowski and Verheugen, 2009: 142). 
As discussed, Germany’s “semi-sovereign” structure allows only incremental 
change in foreign policy, so a stance which repudiated enlargement was unlikely. 
Nevertheless, the Red-Green tandem introduced a variety of foreign policy changes 
                                                 
122 The Commission Enlargement Strategy Paper containing a roadmap was published on 8 November 
2000. It would later be endorsed by the Nice European Council and defined the main goal to be 
enlargement before the European election in June 2004 (Smith, 2001: 118).  
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during its tenure, which could allow the conclusion that German foreign policy 
became more assertive. Two cases illustrate this: Germany’s participation in the 1999 
Kosovo War without a UN mandate; and Germany’s refusal to participate in the Iraq 
campaign in 2003 (Leithner, 2009). Some observers also comment that the Schröder 
government showed less enthusiasm for enlargement and therefore favoured a slower 
pace, although this has been denied (in Lippert et al. 2001: 16). Analysing the 
Coalition Agreement of 20 October 1998 reveals that the Red-Green tandem 
committed itself to enlargement in point XI/2 (SPD and Greens, 1998). However, 
Schröder made it clear that in future, Germany would pay more attention to national 
interests and pursue a more assertive foreign policy on the European stage as well, 
including enlargement (Bulmer et al., 2000: 109) 
Also, Markus Meckel (SPD), the then leader of the German-Polish 
parliamentary group, revealed that whilst in an aircraft with Schröder on the way to 
his first official visit to Poland, he advised the new Chancellor that he would need to 
continue supporting Poland efforts to join the EU. The Chancellor responded “aber 
ich will ja gar nicht” (but actually I do not want to) (Meckel, Interview 2010). Thus, 
the new government was willing to negotiate accession conditions in a way that 
would achieve the most beneficial terms for Germany. However, Schröder was 
officially in favour of enlargement, since this would be beneficial for “German 
business and political interests”, and therefore favoured the EU’s eastern expansion 
“as soon as possible” (Schröder in Jeřábek, 2011: 123), but under a new slogan of 
“new realism” where German concerns about labour mobility would manifest 
themselves in demands for restrictions (Lippert, 2002: 247). Since Schröder officially 
supported enlargement, contrary to his personal preferences, but in line with the 
interests of business, this can be seen as a sign of how close the link between the 
Chancellor and German business interests was, something which must be taken into 
consideration further below.  
Despite the “new assertiveness”, the SPD-Green coalition continued to act as 
“Poland’s advocate”, perhaps even more so than their CDU-FDP predecessors. There 
was some resistance to Eastern Enlargement in “conservative circles”, and the SPD-
government’s position during accession negotiations was always in Poland’s favour. 
For example, Germany had to break down resistance by some member states which 
were not in favour of Poland’s membership at that time, such as Sweden, reveals 
Frank Elbe, the former German ambassador to Warsaw (2011 Interview). 
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The first friction with the EU on enlargement connected to the safeguarding of 
German interests was Agenda 2000, intended to restructure the EU budget for 2000-
06 with enlargement in mind. The high costs of German re-unification and high 
unemployment against which the new government wanted to be assessed (see 
Siefken, 2006), put severe strains on the German budget. The new government 
included the objective of lowering Germany’s net contributions to the EU in its 
coalition agreement (see Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2010: 181). This domestic 
Nettozahlerdebatte (net contributor debate),123 together with rocketing unemployment 
rates (see Figures 4.1), paired with a more assertive Social-Democrat-led government, 
augured that Germany would not easily step back from possible demands for TPs (see 
Bulmer et al., 2000: 108-12; Lippert et al., 2001: 28-29) in areas that would constrain 
the financial situation, possibly lead to higher unemployment, or more wage pressure 
in the low-skilled sector. Some Länder, such as Bavaria, linked the issue of 
enlargement finance, arguing to keep costs as low as possible (Jeffery and Collins, 
1998: 96). As seen in Chapter II, Article 23 of the Basic Law allows the Länder to 
influence European policy. However, whilst the Bavarian position might have come 
handy for backing the negotiating position in Brussels, blocking or slowing down the 
momentum of enlargement would have required a consistent definition of a clear 
position that would support collective action by the Länder (Jeffery and Collins, 1998: 
99). 
Lastly, the change from the Conservative-Liberal tandem to the Social 
Democrat-Green coalition meant that certain interest groups, such as the German 
Farmer’s Union (Deutscher Bauernverband – DBV), would lose some possibility of 
influencing agricultural policy, since most farmers vote conservative and the Ministry 
for Agriculture traditionally belonged to the CDU when in power. Germany’s 
resistance to a general curtailment of CAP subsidies cannot be explained by pressure 
from the DBV but rather by fears pertaining to the financial situation of large farms in 
East Germany and, as Germany is a major net-contributor to the EU budget, by the 
desire to receive as much money back as possible (Rieger, 2007: 305). Relations with 
the Red-Green government worsened even further in 2001, when Renate Künast 
(Green Party) became Agricultural Minister and her aggressive course away from 
                                                 
123 It is worth noting that the Nettozahlerdebatte or the Zahlmeister Deutschland (paymaster Germany) 
debate had already started before 1998 (see Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2010: 181; Jeřábek, 2011: 175-
76). 
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organised towards ecological agriculture led to a classic concept of the enemy, 
explained Willi Kampmann from the DBV (Interview, 2011). Her ideas met 
considerable opposition in Brussels and were not realised in the end, but throughout 
her incumbency, until 2005, sentiment amongst farmers was against her.    
 It might have been expected that the SPD would offer an opportunity for 
labour unions to voice their preferences, especially on topics including social policy 
and workers’ concerns, due to the SPD’s traditional link with the unions, and the  
unionists’ tendency to vote SPD. However, this link had already been weakened when 
the unions left the Konzertierte Aktion in 1977124 and was eroded further by 
Schröder’s labour market policy in 2003 with Agenda 2010 (Schiller, 2007: 447). 
Nevertheless, in its 1998 electoral program, the SPD invoked a renewal of the social 
market economy and a union for labour (Bündnis für Arbeit) (SPD, 1998). Therefore 
the relationship between the unions and the SPD was much closer at the time of the 
accession negotiations than it is today. 
 
Germany’s	  negotiating	  structure	  
  
 Reflecting the net contributor debate, the Schröder administration made some 
changes to the structure of EU policy decision-making that would affect the accession 
negotiations. The EU policy co-ordination responsibilities of the Economics Ministry 
were transferred to the Finance Ministry (Bulmer et al., 2000: 110), whilst the 
Foreign Ministry would gain competences, particularly for the accession negotiations. 
Prior to the Maastricht Treaty, the Economics Ministry had shared European policy 
co-ordination with the Foreign Office, given the almost purely economic nature of the 
then EC. It was now the Finance Ministry that assumed these tasks: to distribute EU 
policy documentation to the relevant ministries and the legislative branches and 
communicate with COREPER (Bulmer et al., 2000: 24). The 1998 changes are a 
result of two major causes. First, the reforms were needed after Maastricht. The 
launch of the EMU project encroached more on the Finance Ministry, whilst the 
Foreign Office became the only ministry to which all three pillars were relevant 
(especially CFSP), and it made sense to strengthen the role of the Foreign Office in 
                                                 
124 The labour unions left due to a quarrel with the government over the Codetermination Act of 1976. 
See Fehmel (2010), especially pp.: 129-42.  
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the co-ordination process. Second, the Finance Ministry was also “upgraded” to 
reflect the Schröder/Lafontaine power-tandem. Due to Lafontaine’s early resignation 
as Finance Minister, as well as the leadership skills of Foreign Minister Fischer 
(Bulmer et. al, 2000: 25), the Foreign Office became the more important co-ordinator 
of EU-policy. The Foreign Office’s role would be enhanced again with the Schröder 
administration’s 2002 re-election, with a marginal victory over the CDU/CSU-FDP 
opposition, due to the Green party’s contribution to thwarting Schröder’s plans to 
dictate European policy from the Chancellery (Ostheim, 2003; 373). Foreign Office 
also had the advantage of embassies, which would function as seismographs in 
candidate countries’ capitals. The German ambassador to Warsaw during the 
accession negotiations, Frank Elbe, participated in the internal debates in Poland and 
actively tried to defuse some polemic discussions such as that Poland EU membership 
would be exploited by Germany to achieve a new capitalist Drang nach Osten, 
buying up Polish land (Elbe, Interview 2011). For the actual accession negotiations, 
the Finance Ministry would co-ordinate the technical financial issues, whilst the 
Foreign Office co-ordinated the instructions to the Permanent Representatives 
(Jeřábek, 2011: 142). Mostly, the Foreign Office would issue the instructions, but the 
domestic decision-making procedure would allow the Chancellery to issue 
instructions, as in labour mobility (Schönfelder, Interview 2011). Given the diverse 
nature of the 31 acquis chapters, the relevant specialised ministries were also involved 
in the negotiations cycle. The Permanent Representatives would receive instructions 
from the Foreign Office, but during the actual negotiations the COREPER officials 
would have to be flexible to achieve consensus among the fifteen member states. 
Afterwards, the document would go back to the specialised ministries again for 
comments. Here, it becomes clear why the Foreign Office had an important role as 
co-ordinator and mediator between all specialised ministries and the common EU 
position that would emerge in Brussels (Schönfelder, Interview 2011).    
As discussed in Chapter II, the Chancellery’s division 5 is responsible for 
streamlining EU policies; the Chancellor’s Richtlinienkompetez would always allow 
him to interfere in the actual negotiations, especially when a topic was “top priority”. 
Moreover, the regular IGCs of the European Council would allow the Chancellor to 
set and prepare the general guidelines for the more technical work at COREPER level 
in Brussels. The Chancellor’s other advantage is his ability to negotiate directly with 
his foreign counterparts – in this case the Polish Prime Minister. Figure 4.5 maps 
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Germany’s a priori decision-making structure for Eastern Enlargement, with 
governmental actors in blue. Visually it is clear that the Chancellor and the Foreign 
Office play a central role. The EU level of negotiations is in green, whilst the Polish 
actors are in red. This diagram is by no means complete. For example, the German 
and Polish Foreign Ministers in contact constantly, and regular meetings took place as 
during the negotiations (Schönfelder, Interview 2011). It is important to highlight here 
the possible access points for non-state actors in influencing the decision-making 
apparatus; they are represented in yellow. As analysed in Chapter II, the GGO grants 
interest groups the right to voice their preferences to the relevant ministries. The two 
most important interest groups to mention are the two peak organisations representing 
workers’ and employers’ concerns: the DGB and the BDA. The Chancellor is 
constrained by party politics (coalition politics, pressure from the ruling SPD and 
opposition parties) and by public opinion. Since the Chancellor is located in the centre 
of media attention, he is exposed to strong pressure from public opinion, through 
opinion polls for example. He cannot ignore public opinion, as he wants to be re-
elected. This argument is also valid for other political posts such as foreign minister, 
but perhaps less so since the individual ministers are not “in charge” of government.  
Schröder was also very close to German business interests. This explains why 
he was officially strongly in favour of enlargement despite perhaps contrary personal 
preferences. During his incumbency, the car industry especially125 seems to have 
enjoyed a preferential treatment and Schröder, serving on the Volkswagen board, 
intervened on multiple occasions on behalf of the German manufacturers or 
suppliers;126 the media nicknamed him the “Car-Chancellor” (der Auto-Kanzler) (see 
e.g. Rathgeber, 2005: 10-11). Schröder was most likely aware of the German public’s 
perception of the car industry as a guarantor of prosperity (Metzger in Rathgeber, 
2005: 11), and the interventions gave him the opportunity to present himself 
favourably in the media – something that the Chancellor understood very well, 
especially during his first term, giving him another nickname: the “Media-
                                                 
125 The financial sector and business in general would also receive massive tax relief which would 
upset the SPD’s grass roots, giving Schröder the nickname “Genosse der Bosse” (comrade of the 
bosses) (see Michael Naumann’s article “Krise des Bürgertums: Auch die Linken haben nichts geahnt”, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28.08.2011).  
126 For example: Schröder instructed the Environment Minister Jürgen Trittin to vote against an EU 
Directive that would have obliged the car industry to recycle old cars without any additional costs. This 
instruction came right after Schröder met Volkswagen CEO Ferdinand Piëch (Rosenbaum, 2002). As 
former Minister-President of Lower Saxony – and due to the state’s large stake in Volkswagen – 
Schröder was on the supervisory board of VW and hence well-connected to the industry. 
 114 
Chancellor” (der Medienkanzler) (Rosumek, 2007: 221-61). Today, German car 
manufacturers and suppliers are the greatest beneficiaries of Poland’s accession. The 
Chancellor’s closeness to German business and industry was one reason for the SPD’s 
rift with unions, and this special relationship must be acknowledged when analysing 
Germany’s negotiation structure, even though any direct links to special interests in 
the Chancellery are difficult to verify because it is not the industry’s official channel 
for raising certain preferences. 
As noted, the Länder have, according to Article 23 of the Basic Law, the right 
to influence EU policy. They can also negotiate certain positions by threatening to 
vote against specific proposed laws in other areas which must be passed by the 
Bundesrat. The media do not directly influence the official decision-making actors 
since they do not have official access; but they are important since they allow an 
opportunity for other interest groups to attract their attention. Extensive media 
coverage of workers’ concerns might shape public opinion which in turn exercises 
pressure on parties and ultimately on the political posts of government. That way, 
interest groups might indirectly influence policy-makers via the media – a secondary 
strategy. 
An important player in controlling the negotiation process and providing 
transparency for the public was the Bundestag, especially the committee for EU 
affairs.127 Article 45 of the Basic Law constitutes the legal basis for this Committee 
and refers to Article 23 which grants the Bundestag an opinion-making role in 
European affairs. As with the Bundesrat, the government is must inform the 
Bundestag about negotiations with the EU “as soon as possible” (Art. 23(2) GG). All 
parties provided MPs for the 36-member committee between 1998 and 2002. Since 
the members belonged simultaneously to other committees, this led to a good balance 
in expertise. The committee was in regular contact with the government, the DG 
ENLARG, and candidate countries’ embassies and parliaments (e.g. Sejm’s EU 
Committee), with committee members travelling to candidate countries (Jeřábek, 
2011: 149-56). Hence the Bundestag provided a forum for parties to voice their 
preferences during negotiations and individual interests from the MPs’ constituencies. 
Even though a cross-party consensus on the necessity for Eastern Enlargement existed 
                                                 
127 The Bundestag’s Committee for European Affairs is called Ausschuss für die Angelegenheiten der 
Europäischen Union and was created during the 12th Bundestag in 1991, endowed with its current 
functions. 
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controversies did exist on individual questions such as the free movement of workers 




Figure 4.4 Germany’s decision-making apparatus for Eastern Enlargement and 
possible access points for non-state actors 
 
 




Poland’s	  negotiating	  structure	  
 
As discussed in Chapter II, the Polish post-1989 political landscape was characterised 
by party instability and a polarising political culture that often leads to open 
confrontation rather than to consensus as compared to Germany. This had also had 
repercussions on the enlargement negotiations. In January 1997 the Committee for 
European Integration (Komitet Integracji Europejskiej - KIE) was established 
following a Government Act of 8 August 1996 (Preston 1998: 162). In September 
1996, national elections brought change. The coalition between the Communist 
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successor party (SLD) and the Peasant Party (PSL) was substituted by a new coalition 
comprised of the Solidarity Electoral Action party AWS and the Freedom Union UW. 
AWS was incoherent in its position: it was not a party in but an electoral coalition 
consisting of the Solidarity trade union bloc, liberal and patriotic conservatives, 
Christian Democrats and Catholic nationalists. As a result, the “party” – in the course 
of the next four years – disintegrated, transformed into a parliamentary club and 
dissolved after a defeat in the 2001 national elections. Thus, party discipline was  
weak and added to tensions with the liberal democratic UW, led by Leszek 
Balcerowicz (Blazyca and Kolkiewicz, 1999: 132-33). In addition, only the junior 
partner, the UW, with prominent members such as Leszek Balcerowicz and Bronisław 
Geremek, had experience in Polish-EU relations, having negotiated the Europe 
Agreements of 1991 and having pushed for EU membership as the focal point of 
Polish foreign policy. Especially in comparison to its major coalition partner, UW 
was seen as the “party of the liberal intelligentsia” with a strong pro-European profile 
(Neumayer, 2008: 150). AWS, in contrast, contained elements that feared the loss of 
sovereignty and Eurosceptics who voted against the Europe Agreements or demanded 
their re-negotiation – above all the patriotic wing KPN-OP and the Christian National 
Union (ZChN) which demanded a “Europe of Fatherlands” (Blazyca and Kolkiewicz, 
1999: 134). Thus, there was always the danger of political implosion over EU 
accession. Whilst AWS nominated the Prime-Minister (Jerzy Buzek), the Freedom 
Union exploited the weakness of the loosely connected AWS by seizing the finance 
ministry (Balcerowicz) as well as the foreign ministry (Geremek). The Freedom 
Union would also have liked to control the Committee for European Integration, but 
AWS was reluctant to leave the entire control of European affairs to its junior partner. 
Surprisingly, Ryszrad Czarnecki, a ZChN member, became the head of the KIE. 
Initially, this moderated the ZChN’s anti-EU rhetoric by giving the “Eurorealists” a 
say. Weakness in handling European affairs was exposed when Poland lost some 
PHARE funds in May 1998, followed by diverging EU perspectives, precipitating the 
sacking of Czarnecki as the head of the KIE, after which Prime-Minister Buzek 
installed himself as its chairman (Blazyca and Kolkiewicz, 1999: 135-36). This led to 
a split within the ZChN as the fiercest anti-EU radicals feared that the party was no 
longer able to protect Polish interests, so founded Polish Agreement (Porozumienie 
Polskie – PP) in April 1999, rejecting EU accession. This facilitated the ZChN’s 
participation in the government until 2001 (Neumayer, 2008: 151-52).  
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This gave rise to the following initial negotiating structure of the AWS-UW 
coalition between 1998 and 2001. Strategic decisions were undertaken in the 
Committee for European Integration (KIE) led by the Prime Minister, aided by the 
plenipotentiary of the government for Poland’s accession to the EU, the foreign 
minister and the secretary of the KIE. These individuals constituted a “political 
management of negotiations” (Kułakowski and Jesień, 2007: 298). Further members 
of the KIE were the secretaries of state and leaders of the most important government 
departments, i.e. the Foreign Ministry, Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Economics 
as well as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Justice. The KIE’s 
administrative arm was the UKIE, divided into several departments, of which the 
departments of legal harmonisation, of political integration and of European law 
played the most important roles. These strategic decisions were presented to and 
adopted by the Polish Council of Ministers and in turn prepared by the negotiating 
team consisting of nineteen members and led by the above-mentioned plenipotentiary, 
Jan Kułakowski. Country positions could only be changed by the Council of Ministers 
once proposed by the negotiation team (Kułakowski and Jesień, 2007: 298). The 
negotiation team included two pillars: a political advisory section, to co-ordinate the 
work of the entire team, which included trade unions and employers’ organisation 
representative, and the negotiating pillar, consisting of ministry representatives, which 
would take the actual decisions. The foreign minister would be the head of the Polish 
delegation at international conferences on accession. The embassies also played an 
important role in capturing the mood in the existing member states, reporting back to 
the MSZ in Warsaw. From the beginning, the legislative branch was incorporated into 
the negotiation process. After approval by the government, the chief negotiator would 
present the most important strategic positions of the Polish government (on accession 
and its progress), to the marshals of both chambers of parliament and leaders of the 
Commission for European Integration and to the Foreign Policy Commission of both 
parliamentary chambers (Polish Government, 2000: 26-27). 
Non-governmental actors were also involved in the process. Kułakowski 
confronted popular feelings about Poland’s accession negotiations through the 
“Understanding the Negotiations” campaign, issuing publications informing the 
public on integration issues. Kułakowski also travelled to the regional capitals for 
sixteen conferences in which he could listen to a range of opinions and criticism 
(Kułakowski and Jesień, 2007: 299). Social and professional groups participated in 
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the meetings, voicing their own, and regional, concerns pertaining to certain Chapters 
(Polish Government, 2000: 53). Since the 1997 regional reform, a Joint Commission 
of Government and a Territorial Self Government, consisting of fourteen 
representatives of central government and fourteen representatives of the territorial 
self-governments, was created by an Ordinance of the Council of Ministers on 22 July 
1999. Within this Commission, a Committee for European Policy gave the regions an 
opportunity to influence negotiations in plenary session (Polish Government, 2000: 
53; 102-03). As noted in Chapter II, Polish regions are weak and the influence they 
could have exercised on the negotiations should not be over-emphasised since this 
Commission was new at that time. Nevertheless, this Commission was another 
official forum where matters could be raised. 
Modelled after EcoSoc, the EU Economic and Social Committee, Poland set 
up a Provisional Liaison Committee for co-operation with EcoSoc. Nine Polish third 
sector organisations belonging to the Liaison Committee: the Consumer Federation, 
the Business Centre Club, the Polish Business Council, the Polish Chamber of 
Commerce, the Polish Craft Association, the Federation of Trade Unions of 
Agricultural Employers, the National Council of Chambers of Agriculture, the 
”Solidarity” Trade Union and the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), 
consulted the negotiation team until 6 June 1999 when the Consultation Team 
assumed this task (Polish Government, 2000: 55; 103). This is another example how 
the internationalisation of relations creates more opportunity for non-state actors to 
play a role in foreign policy-making. Whilst the above-mentioned social partners were 
officially able to voice their preferences, the reality was often different. As 
Władysław Mucha, the then vice-leader of Poland’s second trade union OPZZ, 
explained to the author:  
 
neither during the AWS-UW nor during the SLD-PSL coalition did trade unions have 
much influence on EU-accession topics. Very often trade unions sought their own 
way to European trade unions associations. Neither do I remember any of the OPZZ 
leaders having any direct involvement in the negotiations team nor did any of the 
negotiations team ask us for an opinion regarding the acquisition of real estate by 
foreigners or the free movement of workers. (Mucha, 2011: Interview) 
 
This is not surprising, as the SLD-affiliated OPZZ was in open conflict with AWS at 
the time and in April 1999 left the Commission for Social and Economic Affairs. The 
Commission criticises the absence of an “autonomous social dialogue at sectoral level 
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[and] no progress … at enterprise level, with social dialogue not taking place in most 
new enterprises” under Chapter 13 of the acquis (social policy and employment) 
(European Commission, 2000: 55). As analysed in Chapter II, the confrontational 
style of “anti-politics” in Poland makes dialogue between interest groups and 
government difficult. Therefore, official claims about the inclusion of social partners 
in decision-making must be evaluated critically. 
 Officially, frequent ad-hoc meetings with relevant social partners, 
professional groups, church representatives, academia and media were held with 
Kułakowski or Task Sub-Groups of the Negotiation Team during the course of the 
accession negotiations (Polish Government, 2000: 56-60). Figure 4.5 (from official 
sources) shows the most important actors and the detailed decision-making structure 
within the government. In Figure 4.6 I visualize the web of interaction of most 
important actors involved and show access points for non-state actors. An important 
non-state actor is the Sejm. As noted in Chapter II, Polish politics are often conducted 
in a confrontational style with the Sejm a perfect forum to fight “political battles” 
openly. Debates in parliament enable parties to voice their preferences. Even 
members of the governing party might voice their dissatisfaction there, as the first 
case study discusses. If reported by the media, controversial debates can influence 
public opinion, which can influence party positions and exert pressure on the political 
posts in government. 
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Figure 4.5 Preparation of Poland’s Position Papers 
 
 




Figure 4.6 Polish decision-making apparatus for EU Accession and possible access 
points for non-governmental actors 
 
 





The Polish negotiating team underwent considerable restructuring following the 
governmental change of 2001. Party dynamics played a crucial role. The SLD, a pro-
European party and the only one supporting a federal model of European integration 
(Zuba, 2009: 331), became the strongest party in the Sejm with 47% of all mandates. 
Second came PO with 14.1% of all mandates, the largest opposition party. The SLD’s 
junior coalition partner, the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), gained 9.1%. Two populist 
parties also entered the Sejm, and would play an important role in the negotiations, as 
discussed below. The first was the Self-Defense (Samoobrona), led by Andrzej 
Lepper, appealing mainly to the rural population, as it constituted an agrarian trade 
union. It played the role of a major protest and anti-system party (Piskorski, 2010: 29-
40) which “unfolded a vision of threats for the Polish farmer resulting from Poland’s 
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planned accession to the EU” (Zuba, 2009: 333). The other populist party was the 
right-wing Catholic national League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) 
which was decidedly anti-EU on political, economic and ideological grounds until the 
2003 accession referendum (Zuba, 2009: 334). Last was a new party, Law and Justice 
(PiS), also critical of the EU, but supporting the anchoring of Poland within west 
European structures, though not without pointing to the risks of accession in the 
economic and cultural spheres (Zuba, 2009: 333). These opposition parties are 
important, since parliament was indirectly involved in the accession negotiations. As 
noted, the chief negotiator presented the progress of the EU accession negotiations to 
both chambers of parliament. This represented an ideal platform for all parties to 
exercise pressure on the government. As will be seen, in the case of the land issue the 
parties exploited the topic, highly politicising negotiations over that chapter. 
Moreover, since the media covered parliamentary debates and the parties’ polemics, 
public opinion increasingly feared that Poland was “for sale” and the government was 
obliged to adapt a tough stance on the issue. 
Between 1998 and 2001, Poland’s progress in the accession negotiations was 
slow. Santer introduced the Progress Reports for each candidate, but the pace sped up 
after Prodi made Verheugen Commissioner for Enlargement and gave him horizontal 
powers in his DG. As a means of putting pressure on each candidate state, Verheugen 
merged the Helsinki and Luxembourg Groups. However, after the first two years, 
Poland was the country with the fewest closed chapters (Orzechowski and Verheugen, 
2009: 140-41). As a result, the new government was forced to speed up negotiations 
and simplified the structure. Importantly, the chief negotiator, now Jan Truszczyński, 
moved from the Chancellery to the Foreign Ministry (MSZ), as this body was now 
responsible for the negotiations. The MSZ was also given a separate department for 
the European Union and negotiation operations (Świeboda in Trzeciak, 2010: 95). 
The difference between Kułakowski’s and Truszczyński’s negotiating style also 
played a role in the speed of negotiations. Kułakowski, an academic with some 
diplomatic experience, concentrated on the basic strategic and political goals whilst 
paying attention to public opinion and the various pressure groups. He also preferred 
to bind together several issues in order to force consensus and compromises. 
Truszczyński, very experienced in diplomacy and administration, concentrated more 
on the technical aspects of negotiations, paying little attention to public opinion. He 
preferred to progress gradually (Trzeciak, 2010: 98). 
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As noted, the negotiation team was split into two pillars, of which the political 
advisory group was meant to listen to the concerns of employers’ associations and 
trade unions. In Chapter II my analysis demonstrated that Polish interest groups are 
fragmented, which results in favouring larger and more established organisations. 
This was criticised in the Commission’s November 2000 Progress Report on the 
chapter dealing with SMEs. The report notes that the Polish economy has undergone a 
severe transformation process. In the early 1990s large enterprises dominated, while 
by 2000 SMEs already prevailed, constituting the core of the Polish economy and 
employing almost two thirds of the total labour force, accounting for half of both 
GDP and total exports and 60% of all imports. Despite this, “the main focus of 
attention often remains [on] large-scale enterprises usually in traditional heavy 






This chapter explored Poland’s EU accession. Despite Poland obtaining an Accession 
Agreement early on, old member states favoured a free market with Poland as long as 
has no impact on their economies. Sectors including agriculture, iron, steel and 
textiles, remained shut. Germany was no exception. This foreshadowed the 1998 
accession negotiations.  
The chapter analysed possible motives for Germany’s continuous support. 
Three reasons stand out: a moral dimension, security and economic opportunities. The 
last point concerns non-state actors’ interests since a prosperous neighbour could 
provide new business opportunities. Trade unions and the eastern Länder should be 
expected to demand labour mobility restrictions since it could lead to wage pressure 
and arguably higher unemployment rate in this region. However, a prospering 
neighbour also demands more goods and services helping to secure German jobs. 
Poland’s motivations for EU membership are connected to post-Cold War western 
integrations, security and economic prosperity; an expectation shared by most of 
Poland’s population. Both states negotiation structures reveal that various access 
points for non-state actors’ preference voicing were created, notably at the ministerial 
and head of government levels. Noteworthy, German Chancellor Schröder’s indirect 
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quote that he was actually not interested in Polish EU accession underlines once more 
the analysis of Chapter II: the importance of Germany’s polity that only allows 
incremental policy changes. This also shows that possible personal preferences of a 
Chancellor do not outweigh the interest of the entire German economy and all the 
interest groups attached to it since Germany continued to support Poland’s accession 
efforts.  
Poland’s negotiation structure was changed and the first chief negotiator Jan 
Kułakowski tried to involve as many actors as possible in the negotiation decision 
trying to force consensuses that would back the government. As revealed by my 
Interview with an OPZZ union representative, some non-state actors seem to have 
been favoured over others. Moreover, since the negotiation positions were passed to 
the parliament the parties had a great role in commenting these positions, bringing 
them to the public and forcing a debate that would most likely lead into a 
confrontational style of dialogue as Chapter II has revealed. The next two case 


























5. The Free Movement of Capital 
 
Following on from the previous discussions of the foreign policy structures of 
Germany and Poland, their degree of institutionalisation, and the 2004 EU 
enlargement, this chapter, uses the free movement of capital case study to test all 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter I. The subsequent chapters will address the same 
hypotheses using the case studies of free movement of workers to Germany and the 
Centre for Expulsions.    
Although, as discussed, the EU negotiates as a community, the two first case 
studies demonstrate a strong link to German-Polish relations. The two following 
chapters demonstrate that both transitional periods (TPs) result directly from the 
Polish-German constellation. The long TP on free movement of capital regarding 
agricultural land is a direct result of Polish fears of a German land-grab, a new 
peaceful “capitalist Drang nach Osten” (discussed below). The TP regarding free 
movement of workers was initiated by the German government due to domestic 
pressures fearing a “flood” to the German labour market, with the poor and populous 
Poland especially singled out.  Legally, the new members’ accession is agreed 
unanimously128 thus it is important to examine the negotiations of specific inter-state 
dynamics.  
 
	  The	  free	  movement	  of	  capital	  and	  the	  acquisition	  of	  land	  by	  foreigners	  
 
The freedom of EU citizens to acquire real estate in any member state belongs to 
“horizontal” issues, i.e. this right impacts on several community provisions depending 
on the purpose for which the purchased property: the free movement of workers, the 
freedom of establishment, the freedom to provide services and the free movement of 
capital. Council Regulation 1612/68 establishes that an EU citizen employed in the 
territory of another member state must enjoy the same rights enjoyed by workers who 
are citizens of the host state, including the right to own of housing.129 Under 
community law, legal persons have the right of establishment, and the acquisition of 
land and property is part of that. A company providing services may need to acquire 
                                                 
128 Former TEU Art. 49 states that accession treaties must be “ratified by all the contracting states in 
accordance with their constitutional requirements”. 
129 See also C-305/87 [1989] Commission vs. Greece. 
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real estate even if the services are temporary, while the real estate is acquired on a 
permanent basis. However, the ECJ ruled that foreign companies should not be 
prevented from equipping themselves with infrastructure.130 Lastly, prohibition of the 
acquisition of real estate also infringes on the free movement of capital, since 
investments often lead to such a transfer. The ECJ even discerns a breach of free 
movement of capital in cases where property has been acquired and a link between 
the property purchase and its use for economic activity cannot be established beyond 
any doubt (Mik, 2002).131 During negotiations, the Polish government treated the 
issue under Chapter 4 of the acquis, dealing with the free movement of capital, and I 
will analyse this issue in line with the negotiations, but the horizontal character must 
be borne in mind.   
From the beginning of accession negotiations, there was recognition candidate 
states would have problems fully implementing Chapter 4 of the acquis in cases of 
land and property acquisition by foreigners. The earliest precedent for derogations 
from community law had already been established with the 1973 enlargement. 
Denmark132 – in what is now one of the few examples of a permanent derogation from 
the acquis – secured a provision preventing foreigners from acquiring land or a 
second residence along the Danish coast. Such properties can only be rented,133 and 
foreigners can buy real estate in Denmark for business and primary residence 
purposes.  More important precedents for Poland and CEECs were the 1995 
derogations of the EFTA enlargement. First, these exceptions were granted during the 
most recent enlargement, and more importantly after ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Second, all three countries were wealthier than the CEECs, but they 
nevertheless obtained TPs of five years before the requirement to allow EU foreigners 
the right to acquire second homes. The TP was granted in order to appease public 
fears in those countries of an invasion of wealthy Germans eager to snap up holiday 
                                                 
130 See C-55/94 [1995] Gebhard vs. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano. 
131 See C-302/97 [1999] Klaus Konle vs. the Republic of Austria; C-423/98 [2000] Alfredo Albore.  
132 Denmark and the UK have even acquired the status of “pariah states” due to their permanent opt-
outs from EU integration, especially after their reluctance to participate in EMU and Justice and Home 
Affairs (Watts and Pilkington, 2005: 35). 
133 Legally, Article 6(4) of Directive 88/361EEC stated that limiting the right of Community citizens to 
acquire real estate in another member state should be treated as inapplicable from 1 January 1994 
unless a member state has secured a reservation in the Treaty itself. Denmark has secured for herself 
such a reservation and is still allowed to retain it (Mohamed, 1999: 117). This derogation has been put 
into Protocol 32 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
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homes (Jesień, Interview 2011).134 The UKIE, in its Public Information Programme, 
specifically declared that it was drawing on the experiences of the EFTA enlargement 
(UKIE, 1999: 9). Consequently, it can be deduced that TPs in respect to property 
issues with regard to the free movement of capital are not uncommon and are 
accepted by existing member states. The Polish negotiation team was aware of this, 
and would also seek a TP. 
 In 1997, a first cautious Commission assessment on the prospect of the free 
movement of capital regarding real estate in Poland was given in point 3.1 of Agenda 
2000, “Internal Market Without Frontiers”. The Commission states: “Legislation 
regarding the ownership of land and related assets by foreign nationals remains 
inadequate and will require clarification and alignment in the medium term. […] 
Investments in real estate in Poland, other than foreign direct investment, will be the 
last item to be liberalized,” and concludes that, “The application of the acquis 
regarding the ownership of land and related assets by foreign nationals may present a 
significant problem in the medium term.” (European Commission, 1997: 43) Before 
negotiations were opened in March 1998, the UKIE published a National Strategy for 
Integration and declared that “the obvious goal of the government will be to maximize 
the benefits and to minimize the costs” of accession (UKIE, 1997: 8) and, pertaining 
to the free movement of capital, warned that the “full freedom of acquisition of 
tangible assets by foreign subjects” could become a problem during negotiations 
(UKIE, 1997: 21), adding, on agriculture, that “regulations regarding the acquisition 
of land will be passed in the interest of the Polish economy as well as instruments 
used in the countries of the European Union,” (UKIE, 1997: 30) thereby hinting that 
Poland would want a TP. It can be concluded that, from the beginning of accession 
negotiations, all parties acknowledged that the liberalization of real estate would be a 
“tricky question” and that a TP would probably be negotiated, similarly to the 
preceding enlargement rounds. This also means that connecting restrictions on the 
free movement of capital with restrictions on free movement of labour as a quid pro 
quo exchange, as requested mainly by Germany and Austria (see Chapter VI), is not 
entirely academically sound since the need for a TP was already acknowledged 
                                                 
134 In 1997 even The Independent published an article reporting how Germans peacefully “invade 
Europe” and locals have no chance to obtain holiday homes for themselves: “Germans put towels down 
across Europe”, The Independent, 2.03.1997. 
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beforehand.135 Many analyses and media reports nevertheless present this as a 
package deal (e.g. Mihaljek, 2005: 192-93).  
  
Nevertheless, there were sound economic reasons in favour of a TP in this area. Alan 
Mayhew, Head of Relations with Central and Eastern Europe 1992-95 at the 
European Commission and in later years advisor to the Polish government, attested in 
an assessment of negotiations in 2000 that the liberalization of agricultural land and 
forests could be dangerous if foreigners bought large enough areas leading to possible 
social tensions in the candidate countries. Foreigners might buy land simply for 
speculative gains and swift price rises could make the restructuring of farming more 
complicated (Mayhew, 2000: 36-37). Others argued that trade liberalisation of 
farmland would actually be beneficial for three reasons: first, foreign investors would 
want to make money and the only way to do so would be to make agriculture more 
efficient. In that sense, foreigners would not only drive land prices up, but at the same 
time would introduce new methods of production, new technologies, and 
improvements in organization and management techniques. Second, foreign 
competition would benefit Polish farmers because rising land prices would permit 
them to leverage their property more easily, and so acquire more acreage and more 
inputs. Third, assuming that farmers behave in a rational manner, any restrictions in 
the form of TPs would encourage farmers to hold on to their farmland in the 
expectation of a significant price increase once the restrictions expired. This would 
obstruct land consolidation and the development of a more efficient agrarian 
structure, since marginal and inefficient producers would be reluctant to sell their 
farmland and leave the business (Dadak, 2004: 286). As seen below, the negotiation 
team concentrated on the possible negative effects of real estate liberalization in the 
justification for a long TP. 
Kułakowski, was aware that price differences between Poland and more 
affluent EU member states (e.g. Netherlands and Germany)136 could lead to increasing 
real estate turnover (Kułakowski and Jesień, 2007: 306). However, Mayhew argues 
that “this is a problem, like the free movement of workers, because it is considered a 
problem by politicians and the electorates.” (Mayhew, 2000: 36-37) The obvious 
                                                 
135 The author would like to thank Leszek Jesień on this point. It needs to be added at this point that a 
compromise between the two topics was reached, however. See below. 
136 Before Polish accession, Dutch farmland was thirty times more expensive and West German 
farmland ten times more expensive than Polish farmland (Dadak, 2004: 277).  
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question is why Polish politicians and the electorate considered this a problem. 
 The main reason is historical, specifically related to the consequences of WWII. 
Poland was moved westwards and obtained large areas from the former German 
Reich’s eastern territories. Poles from the Kresy region, today predominantly in 























accessed 6 March 2012. 
 
 
Thus, the Polish population is sensitive about land issues and Poles living in the 
former German territories are especially sensitive to the prospect of Germans 
returning to their, or their ancestors’ former property – whether through attempted 
legal measures (Preussische Treuhand: see Chapter VII) or by purchase. As Chapter 
III has demonstrated, these fears have already played an important role in discussions 
over the Border Treaty in 1990 and the signing of the Co-operation Treaty in 1991. 
As Leszek Jesień explained to the author, despite Polish media coverage focusing on 
the likelihood of Germans buying up agricultural land, another issue which played a 
role was judicial in nature. After Poland was given the former German territories at 
the Potsdam Conference, the state created a large number of State Agricultural Farms 
(Państwowe Gospodarstwa Rolne),137 of which the majority were located in these 
                                                 
137 These state farms were modelled after the Soviet sovkhoz. 
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territories. When Poland made the transition to a market economy, these collectivised 
farms were dissolved and the ownership of the land was transferred to an agency for 
agricultural real estate (Agencja Wolności Roles Skarbu Państwa – AWRSP). People 
could then either buy or lease the land. Given their lack of substantial financial means 
at that time, the majority of farmers chose to lease the land for a period of 99 years. 
Also, collectivisation after WWII was highly arbitrary and, while some resettled Poles 
were able to own farms, they received this agricultural land in the former German 
territories on the basis of an act of endowment, and real estate registers remained 
unregulated. In addition, land registers in the former German territories were outdated 
and the Communist government had not managed to regulate this issue properly. As a 
result, most farmers living in the so-called regained lands had no experience of 
owning private property and were understandably scared of possible investors from 




The Polish government conducted an opinion poll which revealed that, whilst 
up to 70% of Poles were ready to vote in favour of Poland’s accession, over 60% of 
those “yes” votes would become “no” if there were immediate liberalisation of real 
estate acquisition (in Kułakowski and Jesień, 2007: 306). Similar results were 
published by CBOS in June 1998. Although at that time 32% of all respondents 
regarded foreign investment as insufficient, 25% as satisfactory with only 13% 
evaluating foreign investments as too high, when it came to the question of foreigners 
investing in various types of real estate, the majority of respondents opined that 












Table 5.1 Polish public opinion on the possibility of foreigners acquiring various 
types of real estate (in percentages) 
Should foreigners be 
allowed to buy: 
Yes, without 
limitations 
Yes, but only with 
special permission 
No, they should not 
be allowed at all 
woodland   3 15 74 
bodies of water (lakes 
etc.)  
  3 17 71 
recreation areas with 
beautiful landscape 
  4 20 68 
farmland   5 26 63 
construction sites in 
towns 
  5 32 55 
houses 11 30 51 
manufacturing plants   8 35 48 
apartments 16 31 45 
 
 
Source: CBOS, June 1998: Polish Public Opinion: Acceptance of the Presence of 
Foreign Capital in Poland 
http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion_1998.php, accessed 6 March 2012. 
 
 
In an analysis of Polish press releases in the two months preceding the opening of 
accession negotiations in March 1998, Łubieński (1998) concluded that Poland was 
depicted in the Polish press as a supplicant or a student of the EU which had to 
comply with EU rules, whilst at the same time the EU was presented as a dominant 
and authoritarian institution which did not allow exceptions to these rigid rules. A 
headline in the then third biggest daily Rzeczpospolita, with roughly 1.5 million 
readers, stated that Poland would negotiate its EU accession “on its knees” (in 
Łubieński, 1998: 12). As a result, the government was under pressure from public 
opinion and the media to defy the gloomy picture of Poland being a weak negotiator. 
Further pressure arose from the public’s evaluation of the negotiation team’s abilities 
to negotiate for Poland’s benefit. In November 1999 the Ośrodek Badania Opinii 
Publicznej (OBOP) published a representative opinion poll revealing that, whilst 42% 
of the population overall trusted the negotiation team, another 42% did not trust it. 
Interestingly, farmers were the group with the highest level of mistrust of the 
negotiation team, with 73% (OBOP, 1999: 11). For farmers, of course, not only land, 
but also CAP subsidies and other related matters were important issues. Nevertheless, 
the possibility of foreign farmers entering the Polish agricultural market on Polish soil 





On 19 March 1998, when Ryszard Czarnecki, head of the KIE,138 informed the Sejm 
about the upcoming accession negotiations, several MPs asked questions about land. 
Szczęsny Zarzycki, an MP from the PSL, referred to “disturbing signals”, especially 
in the northern and western voivodeships. He also talked about companies leasing 
some 200,000 hectares of land with foreign capital and asked about the possibility of 
keeping Polish land in the hands of Poles, stressing that “as a Pole, a member of PSL 
and a farmer” his fatherland was precious to him and he would not agree to use Polish 
land as a token in order to reach any negotiation breakthroughs. Czarnecki responded 
that he was aware of the practice in other countries like Denmark and Austria where 
derogations from community law exist and affirmed that these precedent cases would 
be used in negotiations. Also, Czarnecki stated that, as an MP from “Wrocławian 
land”, he was aware of the emotions attached to this issue and that the government 
would not play with these emotions. At the same time, Czarnecki made it clear that 
the negotiation tactics could not be revealed at this stage. Roman Rutkowskim, an MP 
from the governing AWS, also raised this issue as the top concern. He gave an 
example from the Gorzów Voivodeship139 where Polish-German business 
partnerships were buying land and “even though there is no proof, but when I meet 
with electors from this place it is revealed that everybody knows that the owner of this 
bought bankrupt farm is […] not Kowalski but some Miller or Schmidt.” (Sejm, 
19.03.1998) 
 
These two examples from MPs reveal that the Sejm was exercising pressure on the 
government and its negotiation team from the start. More specifically, the pressure 
was emanating from political parties (in these two examples AWS and the PSL) as 
well as indirectly from certain interest groups (here farmers represented by the PSL) 
and especially from certain constituencies (the former German territories). 
 On 21 May 1998, Marek Naglewski, under-secretary of the Interior Ministry 
and Administration, presented to the Sejm the legal status quo on the possibility of 
                                                 
138 Ryszard Czarnecki was head of the KIE between 17 October 1997 and 27 July 1998 before Prime-
Minister Buzek seized the post for himself following the loss of some EU funds (see above). 
139 The Gorzów Voivodeship bordered Germany and was one of the 49 voivodeships which existed 
from 1975 until the 1998 reform which gave Poland its current regional structure of 16 voivodeships. 
The majority of the Gorzów municipalities now belong to the Lubusz Voivodeship.  
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foreigners acquiring real estate in Poland and the statistics on that matter. The law 
regulating the acquisition of real estate by foreigners dates from 24 March 1920.140 
Naglewski explained that all real estate turnovers required authorisation from the 
Interior Ministry (MSWiA). Since 1 January 1998, however, foreigners have not 
required a permit for the acquisition of shares in publicly listed companies which own 
real estate. For all other companies, however, an authorisation is required. Naglewski 
cited the 1990 grant of 565 permits to foreigners wishing to acquire real estate in 
Poland. In 1997, 2001 authorisations were granted. Amongst natural persons, 367 
Germans obtained a permit of which 18 were for apartments and 349 for plots 
amounting to a total of 120 ha. Individuals from the former CIS constituted the 
second largest group of nationals with only 57 permits, whilst the second largest 
group from the EU were Swedish citizens with 40 authorisations. The Polish regions 
mostly affected by these acquisitions were Warsaw (Warszawa), Opole, Gdańsk, 
Bielsko-Biała, Katowice, Szczecin, Cracow (Kraków) and Poznań (see Figure 4.9). 
The majority of legal persons acquiring real estate in Poland were business 
partnerships domiciled in Poland. In 1990, only 74 permits were issued and by 1997 
the figure had risen to 1,326 amounting to the acquisition of 2,692 ha, or about 2 ha 
per firm. The foreign companies behind these acquisitions were from following 
countries (in order of size oF investment, largest first): Germany, The Netherlands, 
The USA, France, Britain and Sweden. The investments were made in voivodeships 
with large cities or close to urban areas (Warsaw, Katowice, Poznań, Gdańsk, 
Wrocław, Ostrołęka). Moreover, the under-secretary stressed that these investments 
were a natural process of foreign investment, and that liberalisation of this law would 
be needed if Poland wanted to join the EU (Sejm, 21.05.1998).  
As the above statistics suggest, it would be an exaggeration to talk about a 
flood of Germans eager to “buy up” the former German territories. The 120 ha 
acquired by German natural persons is negligible and, as Cezary Gawlas (2011 
Interview) explained to the author, to date these people have mostly been Germans 
                                                 
140 Ustawa z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o nabywaniu nieruchomości przez cudzoziemców. Article 1 
specifies that not only is the consent of the Interior Ministry required when a foreigner wishes to buy 
real estate, but also that of the Ministry of Defence, and when the land is agricultural the Ministry of 
Agriculture as well. The law remains in force until Poland’s transitional period ends in May 2016. 
The full legal text is available at: 
http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/Download?id=WDU20041671758&type=3, accessed 6 March 2012. 
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born in Poland who emigrated to Germany141 and who plan to retire close to their 
place of birth as they still have family and cultural ties. Also, companies buying real 
estate have done so in large urban areas where high population density promised a 
high concentration of consumers, workers and better-developed infrastructure than in 









Zarzycki, an MP from the PSL, exclaimed that as a Pole and a peasant he 
would not consent to liberalisation of the law imposing limitations on the possibility 
                                                 
141 The majority of these Germans buying real estate in Poland have been so-called “late emigrants” 
(Spätaussiedler) as defined by Art. 116 of the Basic Law. This explains why the Opole and Katowice 
voivodeships have been amongst the most affected by German purchases of real estate since these 
areas were inhabited by ethnic Germans or people who define themselves as Upper Silesians. 
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of foreigners acquiring land. He also asked about the “fate” of the 200,000 ha of 
agricultural land in the possession of the AWRSPs (Sejm, 21.5.1998). PSL MP Janusz 
Dobrosz delivered a fierce speech, saying that land is the treasure of the whole nation 
and must remain in the hands of Polish peasants and producers. He referred to the first 
National Sejmik of Polish Peasants142 which ruled that “selling precious land to 
foreigners is a crime against the nation and the Polish state.” He stressed that the 
“PSL does not think in terms of short-term gains that only benefit liberal-orthodox 
groups,” claimed that nobody in Poland actually knew how much land foreigners had 
bought and opined that the figures presented by the ministry were already “dangerous 
for Poland’s raison d’être, especially since acquisitions by foreigners, and mainly 
Germans, are concentrated in the regained lands”. This would be further aggravated 
by the fact that these lands still belong to Germany in her legal thinking, as Article 
116 of the German constitution proves. He also referred to Cardinal Stefan 
Wyszyński’s words: 
 
Here, on Polish soil, we are the hosts. It is up to us to decide the direction of our life 
and existence. Poland, in spite of the partitions, was saved only because the farmers 
and the villages defended every piece of land with their teeth so as not to give it to 
strangers. Homeland, especially in our geo-political system, is a momentous element 
that must be properly handled. (Sejm, 21.5.1998)143 
  
Zofia Krasicka-Domkam, an MP from the ruling AWS, who in 2001 obtained 
a mandate for the right wing LPR, reminded parliamentarians of an old saying that “as 
much Poland exists as Polish soil lies in Polish hands,”144 obviously playing with 
fears of Poland’s traumatic past – the three partitions of the 18th century as well as the 
last partition between the USSR and the Third Reich. Furthermore, she referred to 
various press articles stating that Poland had lost some 28,000 ha to mainly German 
foreigners. She also said that agricultural land in the northern and western region 
would lie fallow after the dissolutions of the PGRs, that this soil would be sold to the 
highest bidder and that “society expects an update of the law that would serve 
national interests” (Sejm, 21.5.1998). Ireneusz Niewiarowski, MP from the SKL, a 
conservative peasant group belonging to the governing AWS, stressed that foreigners 
                                                 
142 Sejmik as a diminutive of sejm denotes a regional or small assembly. The Krajowy Sejmik Chłopów 
Polskich (National Sejmik of Polish Peasants) was founded and lead by Zdzisław Podkański from the 
PSL. This Assembly was fiercely against EU integration and later called for a “no” in the referendum 
on accession.  
143 All translations are the author’s own. 
144 In Polish: tyle Polski – ile polskiej ziemi w polskich rękach. 
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buying land in Poland for investment purposes create jobs in Poland and that “no 
foreigner will carry the land out of Poland”. However, when it comes to foreigners 
wishing to acquire agricultural real estate for purposes other than investment, they 
should be treated differently since this type of land was significantly cheaper than in 
Western Europe. Moreover, the MP suggested mimicking the Danish model 
prescribing that anyone wishing to buy agricultural land in Denmark must be a Dane 
or an EU citizen who does not possess this type of land abroad and who settles down 
in Denmark within six months of such an acquisition (Sejm, 21.5.1998).145  
Antoni Macierewicz,146 an MP from the opposition eurosceptic Movement for 
the Reconstruction of Poland (Ruch Odbudowy Polski – ROP) alleged that the 
ministry did not know the real situation and that the figures presented would have to 
be “multiplied by ten or twenty” (Sejm, 21.5.1998). Another ROP member, Dariusz 
Grabowski, said that “ROP supports the position that first, land is our great treasure; 
second, history has taught us that ‘as much Poland as Polish soil in Polish hands’; and 
third, one has to do everything to prevent land from becoming the object of 
speculation.” (Sejm, 21.5.1998)  
 
These summaries of MPs’ speeches demonstrate how emotionally the topic of land 
was discussed in the Sejm, especially by the peasant party PSL and the peasant and 
eurosceptic wings of the governing AWS. What can be detected is the reciprocal 
relationship between parliamentarians, the media and public opinion. Hence, 
parliamentarians would play an important role during negotiations, by providing 
transparency to the public, and would also function as a medium for interest groups 
(especially peasant interests and rural regions) to exercise pressure on the government 
to adapt a “tough” position in the negotiations. The tactics applied by MPs were to 
“push all the buttons” in order to stir up emotions amongst the public and create 
emotional press coverage by referring to Poland’s traumatic history, the German 
threat, Catholicism and peasant heroism. These elements are of course deeply 
engrained in the Polish psyche since these topics are extensively covered at school in 
the study of Poland’s history. 
                                                 
145 Indeed, Alan Mayhew, an advisor to the Polish government during accession negotiations, 
confirmed to the author that one way for foreigners to acquire agricultural land was to marry a Pole 
(Mayhew, Interview 2010). However, the amount of people willing to do that was low. Marriage seems 
to be a high price to pay for quick financial gain given the possible legal consequences. 
146 Macierewicz entered the Sejm in 2001 as an MP for the right wing League of Polish Families 
(LPR). He was Interior Minister 1991-92 for the ZChN during the Jan Olszewski government. 
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Poland’s	  first	  position	  
 
After the screening process described in Chapter 4, on 13 July 1999 the KIE adopted 
Poland’s first position in the area of free movement of capital, asking for a TP lasting 
five years for the acquisition of real estate for investment purposes and one lasting 
eighteen years for agricultural and woodland real estate.147 This position refers to the 
above-mentioned historical, social, political and economic (lower purchasing power 
of Poles and low real estate prices) circumstances and states, “this is the only area 
dominated by political arguments”: 
 
Polish public opinion is [sic] particularly sensitive to the issue of land ownership. 
Therefore negotiation results in the area of freedom of real estate acquisition can be a 
decisive factor for the approval of the future Accession Treaty by Poles. Hence full 
understanding of the issue lies in the interest of both Poland and the European 
Community as well as of its Member States. (Polish Council of Ministers, 1999: 2) 
 
The position also makes reference to the reconciliation process which started after 
WWII but which started in Poland only recently, and also states that this process 
“must not be excessively accelerated” since the process is not only one between 
“power elites” but also between people. At the same time, the people’s approval is 
necessary for the process of reconciliation to overcome “the Yalta division of Europe” 
(Polish Council of Ministers, 1999: 2). 
 
An eighteen-year TP would be exceptionally long. However, domestic pressure 
coming from public opinion, farmers and pressure groups including the PSL, as well 
as pressure exerted by almost all parties including certain factions of the ruling AWS, 
influenced the government in applying for this long period. Despite a rapid fall of 
over 10% since 1989, 19.2% of Poland’s total labour force was still employed in 
agriculture, forestry and fishing (OECD, 2000: 25). This staggering number would 
not allow any government to play with the wishes of farmers or their pressure groups. 
Coalition politics also played a role. Whilst the junior coalition partner UW would 
have been satisfied with a 12-year derogation, AWS had to take its various factions 
                                                 
147 In comparison, no other candidate states applied for a transitional period on the acquisition of real 
estate for investment purposes, and most candidates applied for a ten-year transitional period regarding 
the acquisition of farmland and forests. 
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into account. As noted above, AWS was not a party in the traditional sense but was 
itself a coalition of various factions. Within AWS the eurosceptics, the right-wing and 
factions more inclined towards the farmers demanded a much longer derogation. The 
ZChN especially voiced demands for a 25 year TP or even a permanent derogation 
from community law (Kułakowski and Jesień, 2004: 244-45). Another important 
reason for the lengthy demand is tactical in nature. After all, these were accession 
negotiations with the EU, and once negotiations are closed re-negotiation is very 
difficult.148 Therefore, it is better to ask for a long TP knowing that the other side will 
probably demand a shorter period. Afterwards one can always tighten the screw a bit 
more, but if one does not leave any room for manoeuvre the bargaining chip is lost. 
 
Break-­‐up	  of	  the	  AWS-­‐UW	  coalition	  
 
At the end of May 2000, UW left the coalition. Tensions between AWS and UW had 
been mounting since 1999 over a number of issues. Most importantly, UW refused to 
support Marian Krzaklewski, the coalition partner’s candidate for the presidential 
election in 2000; UW refused to support a number of AWS’s legislation proposals; 
and numerous local coalitions between the two had already started to break up. The 
final blow for the coalition was an incident over the re-election of Warsaw’s mayor 
Paweł Piskorski who was supported by the trio AWS, UW and the SLD. The 
difficulties in re-electing Piskorski in February 2000, due to the lack of one decisive 
vote from AWS, initiated the demise of the coalition. This left AWS as a minority 
government, and consequently also in a potentially weaker position for negotiations 
due to more political opposition and increased susceptibility to criticism from non-
state actors. As a result, there was no room whatsoever to cut the call for an eighteen 
year TP in this policy field until possible re-election in 2001 (which by then already 
looked unlikely), unless AWS wanted to risk complete political suicide due to the 
extreme politicisation of the issue. In a January 2001 interview, Rzeczpospolita asked 
Prime Minister Buzek if a compromise between the two key issues of free movement 
of workers and free movement of capital was the only way to accelerate negotiations 
and whether Poland was willing to accept a shortened TP for the real estate question. 
                                                 
148 Re-negotiations are of course not impossible as the British have demonstrated with the precedent of 
the British Budgetary Question (BBQ), but this requires a certain weight and has the consequence of a 
certain reputation. 
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Buzek replied that the eighteen-year period was based on analyses of land prices, 
economic growth and the restructuring of the agricultural sector, and that Poland’s 
future lay in the hands of large farms, for which the transaction of land between 
Polish peasants was needed.149 In May 2001, close to the September elections, the 
opposition PSL also repeatedly demanded that the eighteen-year period not be the 
subject of negotiations and that such a TP could only be shortened “for self-employed 
farmers who live in Poland and know the language, as in France or Denmark.”150 
Only a governmental change would politically enable a compromise. That is one 
major reason why AWS failed to close Chapter IV of the acquis.  
 
The	  EU’s	  response	  to	  Poland’s	  position	  and	  Germany’s	  interests	  
 
The community as a whole 
 
The European Union responded to Poland’s demands with its expected position that 
the acquis must be applied in full, thus confirming the principle that “applicants 
accept the acquis communautaire in full” identified by Christopher Preston (1995: 
452-53). This response must be seen first and foremost as tactical. The author has 
shown above that transition periods in this area are quite common and both sides were 
aware of this. By insisting on the acquis in full the EU would retain an important 
bargaining chip, however, which could later be traded in the case that any member 
states asked for TPs in other areas, such as the free movement of workers – a quid pro 
quo trade which indeed occurred at a later stage.  
 Given that the European Commission’s reports on Poland’s progress towards 
accession (1999; 2000; 2001) naturally only report on Poland’s progress in applying 
the acquis and on the status of the negotiations it is hardly surprising that these 
documents contain only sporadic references to the free movement of capital and the 
acquisition of land. For example: 
[the] acquisition of real estate by foreign entities is still subject to the granting of an 
authorisation, especially in the case of agricultural land, with the exception of some 
specific transactions which may be freely carried out. According to the Polish 
authorities, there has been a moderate increase in the amount of land purchased by 
                                                 
149 See: “Szybko, ale bez ustępstw”, Rzeczpospolita, 19.01.2001. 
150 Ryszard Smolarek, PSL MP, in “Polska-Unia: gdzie są granice kompromisu”, Rzeczpospolita, 
11.05.2001. See also “Nowa strategia negocjacji z Unią Europejską”, Rzeczpospolita, 07.06.2001. 
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non-nationals. (European Commission, 1999: 31) 
 
Many official Council documents were closed to the public until the author asked the 
Council for permission to view them.151 Nevertheless, since the Council’s positions 
were agreed unanimously, it is difficult to trace how the Council agreed on the 
Common Positions, and in particular which countries had an interest in liberalising 
the acquisition of real estate in Poland. Moreover, the documents merely stress that 
Poland should apply the acquis in full and, wherever Poland asks for a TP, the 
community “invites” the applicant to provide more information on the relevant 
matter. An example is the Council’s document 9095/00 dated 31 May 2000 revealing 
a draft common position stating that: 
 
as an overall response to Poland’s request for transitional periods, the EU recalls its 
general negotiating position that transitional measures are exceptional, limited in time 
and scope, and accompanied by a plan with clearly defined stages for the application of 
the “acquis”. Furthermore, they must not involve amendments to the rules or policies of 
the EU, disrupt their proper functioning or lead to significant distortions of 
competition. (Council of the EU, 2000: 2) 
 
Furthermore, in the draft common position the Council laments that Poland’s request 
for a five-year TP for second homes is not sufficiently justified and that the 
justification for the eighteen year TP for agricultural land does not sufficiently explain 
why immediate liberalisation would endanger or prevent reform in that sector. Rather, 
foreign capital, the Council argues, would accelerate reform as proven in other areas. 
Also, the Council “invites” Poland to reconsider its position, including the length of 
the TP (Council of the EU, 2000: 5). Finally, in May 2001 the European Commission, 
having recognised the political sensitivity of the issue, proposed to all candidate 
countries a seven year TP on the acquisition of farmland by foreigners with a review 
clause after three years which would allow the TP to be shortened or even abolished 
altogether. Furthermore, in order to uphold the right of establishment as one of the 
fundamental freedoms (see above), the Commission proposed that self-employed 
farmers should have the right to buy agricultural land. Also, foreign farmers should 
                                                 
151 These Documents, useful for this research, include: document 11357/99 
ENLARGEMENT - Preparation of the Accession Conferences with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia at Deputy level on 30 September 1999 = Chapter 4:Free Movement 
of Capital; document 9412/01 ENLARGEMENT – Preparation of the next Accession Conference with 
Poland = Chapter 4:Free Movement of Capital; document 11067/02 Negotiated Measures: Transitional 
Measures Concerning Poland – Chapter 4:Free Movement of Capital 
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have the right to purchase land after a leasing period of three years. The purchase of 
real estate for investment purposes should be liberalised immediately from EU entry 
onwards since such restrictions would actually hamper Poland in her economic 
development.152 Additionally, the Commission proposed a five year TP for the 
acquisition of so-called second homes. At the time of the negotiations, the proposal 
was perceived as a trade-off for the demands of the member states which wanted a TP 
of five to seven years for the free movement of workers. All candidates except Poland 





Since this thesis is concerned with Polish-German relations it is not entirely relevant 
which member states requested the liberalisation of the real estate question. It is more 
apt to analyse whether Germany was interested in Poland opening this market, if so, 
for what reasons, and from where this interest came. 
 Frank Elbe, German ambassador to Poland at the time of the negotiations, 
explained to the author that the German side was aware of Poland’s worries regarding 
the real estate question, worries which amounted to “irrational hysteria” at that time. 
The ambassador participated in many discussions and conferences in Poland 
whenever he was invited to talk on Polish EU accession and he took considerable 
“joy” in “destroying intellectually” the arguments that Germany wanted to pursue a 
capitalist “Drang nach Osten” (Elbe, 2011 Interview). Was this perhaps diplomatic 
appeasement on behalf of the German government or influential interest groups? 
None of the research conducted points to the possibility that the government or any 
German interest group was pressuring for a liberalisation of the real estate question. 
Wilhelm Schönfelder (2011 Interview), the German Permanent Representative to the 
                                                 
152 See “Dziurawa ochrona przed wykupieniem”, Rzeczpospolita, 05.05.2001. 
153 The Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovakia accepted a 7 year 
transitional period for the acquisition of farmland, Slovenia did not derogate from the aquis but 
obtained a special arrangement instead – the possibility of resorting to a general economic safeguard 
clause for 7 years in real estate. Cyprus and Malta were not required to liberalise farmland and forests 
due to the small area of this type of land available on these islands. For second residences Cyprus, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary obtained a 5 year transitional period, the three Baltic states liberalised 
that type of real estate from their date of EU entry. Malta obtained a permanent derogation, allowing 
foreign EU nationals to buy a home only after a five year residency on the island (Mihaljek, 2005: 
194).  
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EU, reassured the author that during the negotiations Germany was very careful not to 
insist that Poland liberalise its real estate market, knowing the fears which existed and 
the debates taking place in Poland at that time. Even within the Council, it was the 
Netherlands, with its expansive agricultural sector, rather than Germany, which had 
more interest in Polish soil and was pushing demands in respect to land.154 When 
asked whether the German Farmer’s Association (DBV) had perhaps pushed for a 
tough stance, given the opportunity for a cheap “land grab” just across the German 
border, Schönfelder could not recall any such activities (2011 Interview). This was 
confirmed independently by Willi Kampmann (2011 Interview), the director of the 
DBV’s Brussels office.155 According to him, there was no regular contact between the 
German delegation and the DBV in Brussels. Rather, all DBV’s opinions on 
enlargement were based on the Commission Progress reports. The DBV’s position in 
general was that “accession is accession” and there should not be any TPs or 
derogations from community law regardless of the chapter. This position, however, 
does not seem to stem from the DBVs desire to enable its members to invest in cheap 
Polish agricultural land, but reflects more the desire to cement its insistence on the 
free movement of workers, since for years German farmers have relied on Polish 
labour during the harvest season (see Chapter VI). Even though some farmers were 
asking about the possibility of acquiring land in Poland, generally the vast majority of 
investors were not interested in doing so. Besides, the DBV has not run a service to 
facilitate such activities and all individuals were asked to pursue such investments 
privately. The debate around Polish accession reminds Kampmann of German re-
unification, when East German farmers feared a massive aggressive expansion of 
West German agricultural business – a scenario that did not occur on a large scale 
(Interview, 2011). 
 As seen above, German business was investing increasingly in Poland. 
Analysing Poland’s first negotiation position reveals that the Polish request would 
have prevented EU legal persons from acquiring real estate for investment purposes 
for a period of five years. (Polish Council of Ministers, 1999). Naturally, German 
business should have been alarmed by the prospect of there being no possibility of 
investing in the required factories and supermarkets etc. (including parking space 
                                                 
154 The Polish daily Rzeczpospolita reported on 21.12.2001 that over one hundred Dutch families 
wished to settle in Poland, confirming Schönfelder’s claims. See: “Bruksela Ruzumie Polskie Obawy”, 
Rzeczpospolita, 21.12.2001. See also Miller’s direct negotiations with Wim Kok (2009: 142-46). 
155 The DBV has maintained an office in Brussels since 1995. 
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which also requires land).156 It is therefore not surprising that in its 1999 position 
paper, the BDI stresses that candidates must apply community law in full “to create 
legal certainty for companies and to prevent a fragmentation of the single European 
market. […]“The principle of not allowing long transition periods and extensive 
derogations should be adhered to.” More specifically, the BDI criticises “some 
countries’” demands for derogations concerning property that would “obstruct capital 
flow and free investment decisions”, and “demands that the EU not yield to these 
efforts” (BDI, 1999). How great the BDI’s influence was in crafting the Commission 
proposal of May 2001 (see below) is hard to quantify since it is very likely that other 
business organisations from the other member states would have had a similar view, 
but the sheer weight of the German economy alone renders it probable that the 
Commission would have listened carefully to the BDI’s opinion on this subject. The 
BDI, by approaching the Commission in Brussels directly, at the same time allowed 
the German negotiation team to refrain from raising the subject in the Council or, in 
the words of Schönfelder, to “proceed cautiously”. This might explain why the 
Commission proposal of May 2001 does not mention a TP for real estate for 
investment but suggests a significantly lower TP of seven years for farmland and 
forests. 
 The last possible German “interest group” having some interest in buying 
property on Polish soil was the group of the so-called late emigrants (Spätaussiedler; 
see above). As Cezary Gawlas, the Director of the Department for Authorisations and 
Concessions at the Polish Ministry of Interior and Administration, explained to the 
author, “these were the kind of Germans that were interested in a second home in 
Poland, before and after Poland’s accession to the EU. These are people with roots in 
Poland wishing to retire and not speculate on price fluctuations. Consequently, 
permissions have in general been granted to them since they could prove that they 
wanted to settle down in Poland.” (Gawlas, 2011 Interview) As seen above, German 
natural persons bought 367 plots and apartments in 1997. Given that 600,000 
Spätaussiedler moved from Poland to Germany between 1988 and 1998 alone and a 
further 848,000 between 1950 and 1987 (in Bade and Oltmer, 2003: 21), that number 
is negligible and one can hardly speak of a coherent interest group. Besides, apart 
                                                 
156 In fact since Poland’s accession to the EU, foreign supermarket companies have become the largest 
owners of Polish land in terms of area due to the parking lots required for customers’ vehicles 
(Chmielewska-Gill, 2011 Interview).  
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from the BdV, the late emigrants are not organised into an interest group that could 
have influenced the German government’s negotiation position. 
 
 
New	  coalition	  –	  significance	  for	  the	  negotiations	  and	  new	  position	  
 
The author has analysed how the negotiation structure changed following the Polish 
parliamentary elections in September 2001. Two new right-wing parties, Self-Defence 
(Samoobrona) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin), entered the 
Sejm. This would not make it easy for the government to answer the fierce attacks in 
parliament if new negotiation positions involved compromises. Perhaps more 
importantly, the strongest party, the SLD under Prime-Minister Leszek Miller, entered 
a coalition with the PSL, a peasant party. The return of the PSL to government meant 
that a party with an almost exclusive appeal to farmers and the rural population – and 
therefore a “quasi interest group” – would share with the pro-European Communist 
successor party SLD responsibility for negotiating a chapter that was of vital interest 
to its voters. In addition, the PSL, as a parliamentary group with connections to its 
grass roots, would make sure that the government was under constant pressure to 
negotiate a long TP for the acquisition of agricultural land by foreigners.  
 The PSL likes to emphasise that it is an old party, having been founded in 
1895 during the Russian partition, when the peasant movement was strongly in favour 
of Polish independence.157 By doing so, the party gives the impression of being truly 
patriotic and of serving Poland’s interests, and it can potentially profit from this 
image amongst the population. It has been seen above how the PSL underlined this 
hypothesis in the Sejm debates by linking the issue of acquisition of land by 
foreigners with the peasants’ battle for independence.  
The PSL’s other advantage is its history under Communism, a history which 
the party likes to avoid mentioning. The PSL was included in the 1945-1989 regime 
and supported it (Osa et al., 2003: 5),158 meaning that when the government was 
formed with the Communist successor party, the SLD, many members of both parties 
were surely familiar to each other from the past. Osa et al.’s (2003: 13-20) analysis of 
                                                 
157 See http://psl.pl/historia/, accessed on 10 August 2011. 
158 The PSL narrates the story quite differently by claiming that it was “forced” to participate in the 
Communist government. See http://psl.pl/historia_w_latach_1949-1989/, accessed on 10 August 2011.  
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the Polish agricultural policy network on the eve of EU accession reveals that within 
an agricultural policy communication network of 78 actors comprising political 
parties, trade associations, non-profit organisations, public institutions and 
government agencies, the PSL is indeed well-connected to the core actors. Moreover, 
it is the only party that permits its members to use the facilities and staff of the four 
relevant state agencies (Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development; Agricultural 
Restructuring and Modernisation Agency; Agricultural Market Agency and State 
Treasury Agency for Agricultural Property) (Osa et al., 2003: 18). Whilst this is not 
surprising, both since the PSL is an agrarian party which should naturally seek to 
access all government bodies which deal with agriculture, and because it formed part 
of the government 2001-2003, it indicates that this party should have the best chance 
of influencing the negotiation positions.  
This reaffirms the analysis in Chapter II that, in general, Polish trade 
associations are very fragmented, making it difficult to speak with one voice and 
influence policy-making. None of the public institutions was contacted either by the 
negotiations team or another governmental body, neither for advice nor for an 
objective analysis of the consequences of liberalisation or of a TP for the acquisition 
of farmland by foreigners (Sikorska, 2011 Interview). A team from the Foundation of 
Assistance Programmes for Agriculture (FAPA), established by the Ministry of 
Agriculture in 1992, “participated in the accession negotiations and working meetings 
with the European Commission, and drafted analyses for this purpose in 
negotiations.”159 Wanda Chmielewska-Gill, researcher at FAPA, participated in the 
negotiation team dealing with the agricultural sector, and was also responsible for the 
real estate question. She assured the author, however, that she spent most of her time 
on the question of milk quotas and direct payments as there was an order from the top 
not to make any objective analyses of the real estate question. The negotiation 




In December 2001, not even three months after the new coalition came to power, the 
new negotiation team led by Jan Truszczyński presented a modified position on this 
                                                 
159 See http://www.fapa.com.pl/index.php?ln=en, accessed on 18 August 2011. 
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chapter of the acquis to the Council of Ministers. The following major changes were 
proposed:   
 
• Instead of eighteen years Poland proposed a twelve year transitional period for 
the acquisition of farmland and forests 
• Counting from the date of EU entry, EU citizens who became self-employed 
farmers would have the right to purchase farmland after leasing it for: 
A) seven years in the Warmian-Masurian, Pomeranian, Kuyavian-
Pomeranian, West Pomeranianian, Lubusz, Lower Silesian, Opole and 
Greater Poland voivodeships 
B) three years in the remaining eight voivodeships 
• Regarding second residences, Poland proposed a five year transitional period 
and citizens acquiring a residence in order to provide tourism services should 
not fall under that derogation 
• No transitional period for the acquisition of real estate for investment purposes 
was requested (Polish Council of Ministers, 2001) 
 
The first point listed here represented a cut by one third from the initial request of 18 
years. The third and fourth points acknowledge that foreigners acquiring residences in 
order to run tourism businesses fall under the category of investors and so legally fall 
under the right of establishment. Also, the fourth point recognizes that investors are 
needed in Poland to conduct business that would be beneficial for Poland’s economic 
growth. Therefore, the change in position is not surprising. The second point, 
however, represents a possibility for foreigners to acquire land after de facto proving 
that they want to buy the land to run a business. Moreover, the 7-year leasing 
requirement for the northern and western voivodeships represents a tough hurdle and 
in addition seems to be directed against Germans, since the voivodeships coincide 
with the former German territories and deviates from the Commission’s May 2001 
proposal of three years. 
 
Ewa Synowiec (2011) comments on these changes as follows, revealing the prime 
motive of the TP demands: 
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[…] From the beginning it was clear that a transitional period for investment 
purposes was unattainable, and, besides, it was in the interest of Poland not to 
establish any barriers since in that way we would have negated the idea of the internal 
market. 
 
It seems 18 years was tactical since you have to give a big ceiling to be able to give in 
a little. I think we reduced it significantly anyway from 18 to 12 years. 
 
I think at the beginning there were even thoughts to introduce a permanent derogation 
from community law regarding the purchase of land by foreigners in the westwern 
voivodeships and Mazuria. The society does not divide the question of land into 
different categories such as investors, non-investors, second houses, agricultural land, 
forrestry. There were psychological obsessions: ‘the German will come and buy’. 
Moreover, the status of the so-called regained lands was not precisely regulated and 
some incidents occurred where Germans came and hired lawyers trying to regain 
their former property or obtain some restitution. 
 
Interestingly she also reveals (Synowiec, 2011 Interview) the general mood that 
circulated among all the involved negotiation personal:  
 
In my opinion […] during the meetings at the civil servant or even political level 
mostly the position outweighed ‘we will not enter the EU cheaply’ i.e. give too many 
concessions. It was clear that the question of land purchase was politically very 
sensitive, and for sure SLD did not want to allow to be accused that it is selling land 




Figure 5.3 Poland’s administrative divisions since 1999 
 
Source: http://www.masterpage.com.pl/resource/polandmaps/adminpolandlarge.jpg, 
accessed on 23 August 2011. 
 
As explained, the regulation of land ownership after 1945 resulted in state agencies 
leasing land in the so-called “regained” areas to Poles for 99 years, whilst in the east 
most farmland remained in the hands of peasants. Therefore, the proposed derogation 
was not necessarily directed against foreigners or Germans per se, but had reasons 
rooted in ownership transformation. The proposal itself justifies the request by 
quoting statistics from the State Treasury Agricultural Real Estate Reserve, which 
sold or leased farmland to foreigners. Over 90% of all transactions involving foreign 
natural, foreign legal or domestic legal persons with stakes held by foreigners had 
been concentrated in the eight voivodeships quoted above (Polish Council of 
Ministers, 2001). The crucial questions are: how did the new government arrive at the 
new position and what role did non-governmental actors play in its formulation? 
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As the above shows, the pressure on the government from parliament, the media and 
public opinion not to compromise on the real estate question was constantly high, 
especially in regard to the eighteen year TP for farmland and forests. In June 2001 the 
polling institute Pracownia Badań Społecznych (PBS) conducted a representative 
survey on behalf of the daily Rzeczpospolita questioning the public about Poland’s 
EU accession. Nearly three quarters of respondents opined that the government 
should insist on the eighteen year TP even if it meant a delay in accession. Farmers 
were the group least inclined to accept a compromise.160 Given the political sensitivity 
it is not surprising that shadow Prime-Minister Leszek Miller did not give any hints in 
the media that he would compromise on this issue. In August 2001, however, the 
German daily Handelsblatt published an interview with Miller stating that he would 
also compromise with the EU on the real estate question and would be willing to 
shorten the TP, for which he was immediately attacked at home (Miller, 2009: 57). 
Although the SLD’s electoral manifesto speaks about closing negotiations with the 
EU, it does not pledge that the eighteen-year TP should be a priority but merely states 
that the party will support “upholding a TP” (SLD-UP, 2001). This, of course, leaves 
the back door open for compromise on the real estate question without compromising 
an electoral pledge. Strangely enough, the PSL does not mention a TP for the turnover 
of agricultural land in its electoral manifesto at all (PSL, 2001). The manifesto only 
declares that Polish farmers should receive the same amount of direct payments as in 
the rest of the EU. Also, the PSL was the only “established” party not to sign an 
agreement on 22 August 2001 pledging to collaborate on EU accession after the 
elections: (Verheugen and Orzechowski, 2009: 94). 
 Simultaneously, other right-wing parties with a rejectionist stance towards the 
EU, including the LPR and Self-Defence, entered the Sejm. Their electoral success is 
largely explained by their open anti-European and anti-liberal rhetoric, which 
appealed especially to the huge number of unemployed of that time (15.7% - 17.4% 
were registered as unemployed in 2001).161 Samoobrona’s leader Lepper blamed “the 
dominant role of an international alliance of liberal elites and financial and political 
corporations, ruthless with regard to ordinary people and whole nations.” (Lepper in 
                                                 
160 See: “Do Unii bez ustępstw”, Rzeczpospolita, 02.07.2001. 
161 Główny Urząd Statystyczny (GUS – Central Statistical Office). See 
http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_677_ENG_HTML.htm, accessed 6 March 2012. 
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Korkut, 2002: 308) But also other anti-EU “interest groups”, such as the True Poles 
Association, Christus Civitas, the Catholic-National Movement, the Real Politics 
Union and Alternatywa mushroomed and thrived on criticism of the EU (Korkut, 
2002: 308; Verheugen and Orzechowski, 2009: 95). This means that there was 
pressure on the government to negotiate accession conditions which were acceptable 
for the public, in order to secure a “yes” in the referendum on accession and keep the 
radical parties at a distance in future elections. Similarly, the EU had to be aware that 
insisting on a 7-year TP for agriculture and forests – an area that very few member 
states and their interest groups actually cared about – would have risked possible 
Polish non-accession. It would have been disastrous for the EU if the biggest and 
most important CEE state had not joined. 
 
In his memoir on EU accession, Miller emphasises the EU’s pressure to successfully 
conclude the remaining chapters as soon as possible if Poland wanted to join with the 
other candidates. In October 2001, Belgium’s Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt162 
visited Poland and urged Miller that other important issues had to be resolved. Miller 
was sure that he was talking about the chapters relating to free movement of capital 
and workers (Miller, 2009: 40-41). The next day Miller flew to Berlin and met 
Chancellor Schröder. Schröder explained to Miller that only about a third of Germans 
supported Eastern Enlargement, that a general fear of cheap Polish labour persisted 
that would drive German unemployment rates still higher, that the introduction of the 
Euro had already been decided over the heads of the population, and that the 
population would punish the SPD if no TP for the free movement of workers were 
negotiated one year before the federal elections, since this was the official position of 
the opposition CDU/CSU. At the same time, Schröder pledged not to object if a 
compromise could be found between the Ministers of Labour on the EU level and that 
he could raise the contingents for Poles wanting to work in Germany (see Chapter 
VI). Miller explained to Schröder that many Poles feared that Germans would buy up 
Polish land and that he could not ignore this issue either (Miller, 2009: 47-48). This 
meeting is important since a compromise was agreed at the highest level on the two 
most contentious chapters for both Poland and Germany, the two most important 
countries involved in the negotiations. From Miller’s account one can also see how 
                                                 
162 From July through December 2001, Belgium held the EU-Presidency. 
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both politicians had to pay attention to domestic affairs and various pressure groups in 
their decisions. 
 During a KIE strategy meeting it was SLD Foreign-Minister Cimoszewicz 
who proposed the lifting of demands over the acquisition of land for investment 
purposes and the shortening of the TP for farmland and forests to 12 years, while 
allowing foreigners who leased farmland for at least 3 years the opportunity to buy it. 
Cimoszewicz also said that, since he came from one, he knew that the fear of 
Germans was strong in villages and that this should be taken into account. Also, a 2-
year TP for the free movement of workers should be acceptable (Miller, 2009: 61-63). 
 On 14 November 2001 the KIE adopted this new strategy for the EU accession 
negotiations and it was presented to the public.163  
 
Reactions	  to	  the	  new	  position	  
 
Interest groups reacted very critically to the government’s acceleration of the 
accession negotiations and the compromise on the real estate question, but they could 
not alter the government’s proposition. A new debate on the government’s new 
position took place in the Sejm on 29 November 2001 in which critical voices were 
heard. Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz presented the new position and was asked how 
much land had been sold to foreigners to date, to which he answered that about 
50,000 ha had been sold, representing 0.016% of Poland’s territory (Sejm, 
29.11.2001). Critical voices came even from the PSL, the junior coalition partner. 
PSL MP Stanisław Kalemba criticised the government’s information policy (Sejm, 
29.11.2001). Lech Kaczyński (PiS) criticised the possibility of foreigners acquiring 
land once it had been leased for at least three years. He referred to the fact that land 
was much cheaper in Poland and that this compromise would allow land to “fall into 
foreign hands very fast”. Furthermore, this compromise would endanger the 
referendum on EU accession (Sejm, 29.11.2001). A day before, on 28 November 
2001, Cimoszewicz acknowledged that he had made a “technical and organisational 
mistake” by presenting Poland’s new position to the EU first and only then to the 
Polish public (in Trzeciak, 2010: 183). When the European Commission asked UKIE 
chief Danuta Hübner why this happened she responded sloppily “because nobody 
                                                 
163 See: “Będziemy inaczej rozmawiać z Unią”, Rzeczpospolita, 15.11.2001. 
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asked for it” (in Miller, 2009: 81). This gave the opposition the possibility of applying 
for a vote of no confidence against Foreign Minister Cimoszewicz (Sejm, 
14.12.2001), once more confirming the author’s analysis in Chapter II that politics in 
Poland is conducted in a confrontational manner. Gabriel Janowski, an MP from the 
LPR, delivered a highly emotional speech. He played with the emotions of 
parliamentarians and the public by saying that the 90% of the press in the north-
western voivodeships was in the hands of German capital and therefore would not 
write about these issues and would not print his statements warning of the 
colonisation and partition of Poland. He accused Cimoszewicz of treating the leasing 
issue as marginal, whilst over 500,000 ha land was already in the hands of foreigners. 
Furthermore he cites a letter written by ordinary voter Marian Turek from the 
Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship to the President: 
 
I am convinced that within a few years, maybe 40 or 50 Germans will buy our land in 
the west and north of Poland. And in the life of a nation that is a very short span. 
Nothing has changed except that the current Drang nach Osten will be conducted 
with the aid of capital. (Sejm, 14.12.2001) 
  
Although the motion was defeated164 on 14 December 2001, the opposition used all 
rhetorical means to attack Cimoszewicz and the government. 
In the meantime, in January 2002, the Director-General of DG-Enlargement 
accepted the twelve year TP for agricultural land and forests and the possibility of 
acquiring agricultural land after a leasing period of three or seven years depending on 
the territory,165 but asked Poland allow the these leasing years to be counted from 
before the date of accession, in order to allow foreigners already living in Poland to 
acquire land faster. He stressed that Poland should accept this offer if she wanted to 
count on the Commission’s support in the EU.166 This last issue became a litmus test 
for the coalition. Verheugen paid a visit to Poland on 28 February 2002. He spoke 
directly to Kalinowski, the PSL’s leader, about the compromise and felt that 
Kalinowski wanted to break up the coalition, perhaps sympathising with the more 
radical Samoobrona (Verheugen and Orzechowski, 2009: 298-306). Verheugen told 
Kalinowski that he might be able to do something about “the partition of Poland” 
                                                 
164 130 parliamentarians voted in in favour, 236 against, 44 abstained. 
165 See: “UE przyzna częściowe dopłaty bezpośrednie dla polskich rolników” 
http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/UE-przyzna-czesciowe-doplaty-bezposrednie-dla-polskich-
rolnikow-242160.html, accessed 6 March 2012. 
166 See: “Bruksela czeka na informacje”, Rzeczpospolita, 07.02.2002. 
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when it comes to the leasing length, but he would not accept the other demands 
presented by Kalinowski who wished that only individual farmers, not foreign 
companies, should be able to purchase land (Miller, 2009: 147-48). Therefore, he 
threatened to abandon the negotiations and return to Brussels and recommend that the 
EU not welcome Poland as a member (Verheugen and Orzechowski, 2009: 298-306). 
Miller confirms in his memoirs that the land issue was sensitive for Kalinowski and 
the PSL. On 26 February Kalinowski asked Miller not to make any decision on this 
matter before 12 March when he would present the compromise to the PSL. The 
peasant party was under enormous pressure to protect the interests of its voters. The 
PSL affiliated National Council of Agriculture Chambers (Krajowa Rada Izb 
Rolniczych) published its position on 2 January 2002 stating that it did not accept the 
government’s proposed shortened transition period of 12 years, criticising the lack of 
consultation with the farmers’ association on such an important issue.167 Nevertheless, 
Kalinowski and Miller both agreed to accept the compromise and send a communiqué 
to all agrarian interest groups explaining that this was a good deal which protected 
Polish interests (in Trzeciak, 2009: 189). This shows that, even though the 
government initiated the new proposal single-handed, it was nonetheless careful to 
include the relevant interest groups retrospectively. This was more important, in this 
case, for Kalinowski, the Minister for Agriculture and Vice Prime-Minister, and his 
faction, as they needed to appease their electorate. Eventually, the coalition split in 
February 2003 over an SLD-initiated project to introduce a road tax vignette, but this 
was only the final straw. For the SLD, its junior partner had become unreliable.168 
In March 2002 the Commission accepted the counting of leasing time from the 
beginning of EU accession and recommended the closing of the chapter. The member 
states accepted this on 19 March 2002 and the chapter was provisionally closed 
together with the free movement of labour chapter. Poland thus obtained the longest 
TP of the eight CEEC candidates. In return, the member states could keep their labour 
markets closed for up to seven years, a TP that was particularly important for the 
Austrian and German governments (see Chapter VI).    
                                                 
167 Krajowa Rada Izb Rolniczych on 2 January 2002. See: http://www.ppr.pl/artykul-ppr-
2303.php?_resourcePK=2303, accessed 30 September 2011.  
168 The coalition was ended by the SLD due to constant internal conflict. Without any doubt the land 
issue contributed to this decision. See http://www.bankier.pl/wiadomosc/Koalicja-SLD-UP-PSL-
rozpadla-sie-pozostaje-rzad-mniejszosciowy-SLD-UP-653169.html, accessed 30 September 2011. 
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 The opposition, however, did not leave it at that, and the League of Polish 
Families applied for a referendum on the question of land sales to foreigners. 
Zygmunt Wrzodak gave a fierce speech saying that Polish land in the west was 
twenty times cheaper than in some German Länder, referring in the same breath to the 
“eastern expansion” of the European Union under German dominance and the concept 
of a “European Empire inspired by new leftism and liberalism” which had 
commenced with the Maastricht Treaty. Furthermore, he quoted Chancellor Schröder, 
who had said at the annual meeting of the BdV that the return of the expellees was 
only a question of time. Wrzodak also referred to Erika Steinbach who urged all 
member states, the European Commission and the European parliament to accept 
Polish accession only if the Czech Republic outlawed the so-called Beneš Decrees 
and Poland the decrees of 28 February and 6 May 1945 as well as 3 March and 8 
March 1946 which effectively dispossessed Germans in the eastern territories and 
guaranteed Poles their then newly acquired property (see Chapter VI). He thus 
questioned the willingness of Germany to accept the final borders of 1990, and to 
cement his doubt Wrzodak mentioned Article 116 of the Basic Law, which still refers 
to the borders of 1937 (see Chapter III) (Sejm, 15.03.2002). On 20 March the Sejm 
voted against the referendum sought by the LPR with 263 votes against and 140 votes 
in favour, including the entire PiS and Samoobrona factions. Of the 41 MPs from the 
peasant party, eight did not vote, three abstained and seven were in favour, whilst 23 
were against the referendum. The opposition was not crestfallen and continued with 
its confrontational politics, and in November 2002 applied to combine the question of 
land sales with the general referendum on EU accession. Once more the Sejm voted 
against the proposition, but this time 33 MPs from the PSL faction voted in favour of 
the proposition whilst the entire PO faction voted against it.      
 Even though the land issue did not play a role at the December 2002 summit 
of the Council of the European Union in Copenhagen (the main issue of contention 
was direct payments to farmers), the last hurdles were overcome in the Danish capital, 
the same city in which the process of enlargement had commenced in 1993 (see 
above). The date for accession was fixed for 1 May 2004, and the Accession Treaty 
was signed in April 2003. Polish voters accepted the Accession Treaty in a 
referendum conducted in July 2003, with 77.5% in favour. The low turnout of only 
58.8% was not unusual in comparison to other parliamentary elections, but surpassed 
the 50% threshold required to make it effective. In the end the land issue proved not 
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to be important enough to reject such a historic opportunity: the prospect of 
membership, and all the advantages associated with it. Interestingly, people in the 
northern and western voivodeships were most enthusiastic about EU membership 
with a “yes” vote of 85% and more.169 The economic inter-linkage with Germany and 
positive experiences with foreign companies as huge investors in those regions as 
outlined above played a more important role than the fears of farmers, ultimately a 
minority of the population. 
 
To summarise: the Accession Treaty of 16 April 2003 grants Poland in point four of 
annex XII the right to: 
 
• maintain in force for five years from the date of accession a transitional period 
regarding the acquisition of second residences. Nationals of the EEA that 
legally reside in Poland for at least four years shall be treated like Polish 
citizens. 
 
• maintain in force for twelve years from the date of accession a transitional 
period regarding the acquisition of agricultural land and forests.  
 
• Nationals of another Member State or of a State which is a party to the 
European Economic Area Agreement who want to establish themselves as 
self-employed farmers and who have been legally resident and leasing land in 
Poland as a natural or legal person for at least three years continuously, shall 
not be subject to the provisions of the preceding subparagraph or to any 
procedures other than those to which nationals of Poland are subject as regards 
the purchase of agricultural land and forests from the date of accession. In the 
Warmińsko-Mazurskie, Pomorskie, Kujawsko-Pomorskie, 
Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, Dolnośląskie, Opolskie and Wielkopolskie 
voivodships, the residence and leasing period indicated in the preceding 
sentence shall extend to seven years. (Treaty of Accession: annex XII) 
 
Although the opposition treated this as a defeat and as negotiating on the knees, these 
                                                 
169 For the official results broken down by voivodeship see: 
http://referendum2003.pkw.gov.pl/sww/kraj/indexA.html, accessed 30.09.2011  
 157 






This chapter has analysed the TPs for the free movement of capital negotiated by 
Poland for EU accession, focusing on the role of non-state actors. The chapter cannot 
falsify H2 since the EU is an institution that both countries aspired to share.   
During the negotiations for this common goal a plethora of non-state actors 
had the chance to influence their respective governments to maintain certain 
negotiation positions – in this case regarding the free movement of capital, or Chapter 
4 of the aquis communautaire. In Germany this was already common practice as 
discussed in Chapter II. The Commission urged Poland to establish dialogue with 
social partners. The first period of negotiations, during the AWS-UW coalition, 
dialogue was indeed intensive, and chief negotiator Jan Kułakowski or the Task Sub-
Groups of the Negotiation Team held frequent ad-hoc meetings with relevant social 
partners, professional groups, church representatives, academia and the media during 
the course of the accession negotiations (Polish Government, 2000: 56-60). 
Kułakowski even visited all sixteen new administrative divisions.  
That Poland distinguished between former German territories (north and west 
of the country) and the other voivodeships (south and east) regarding the lease-time of 
agricultural land prior to foreigners’ purchase, may be a case of regions having a say 
in foreign policy-making. This would contradict the analysis in Chapter II shows that 
regions are unimportant in Polish foreign policy-making. However, this is a unique 
case that has not established a precedent in the strictest sense. Moreover, it must also 
be concluded that certain social partners, for instance NSZZ Solidarność, were 
disfavoured in links to government.  
During final phase of negotiations under the SLD-PSL coalition, the new 
government position was presented without consideration of non-state actors, leading 
to dissatisfaction from the oppositon, the farmers’ associations and bewilderment of 
the Commission. The inclusion of other non-state actors in a new compromise 
position would most likely have led to rigid and confrontational stances as the 
opposition has continuously demonstrated, once more confirming the analysis in 
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Chapter II, and the argument that civil society in Poland often pursues “anti-politics” 
tactics. 
 The pressure on the government over the real estate question was immensely 
high throughout the entire period of negotiations, coming from parties in parliament, 
the media, public opinion and, above all, farmers and certain farmers’ associations. 
The latter group was able to exercise pressure on the PSL, which was in government 
from September 2001 until February 2003, since these associations and their members 
are the core of the PSL’s electorate. 
 Comparing this issue with Germany is difficult since most German interest 
groups were disengaged from the topic, including the DBV, the organisation 
representing the German farmers who were supposed to “buy up” Poland. The BDI, 
representing German industry, was the only concerned actor, contesting Poland’s 
application for a TP on acquisition of real estate for investment purposes. This would 
have collided with the industry’s interests in investing in Poland. Poland dropped this 
demand, realising that such a practice would have significantly harmed Polish 
economic interests. Therefore, in Germany’s case the facts point towards not 
falsifying H3, but it cannot be quantified with certainty how influential the BDI was 
in pursuing the German government to defend German economic interests within EU 
structures, leading to the EU refusing this Polish demand. This is because the EU 




















6. The free movement of workers 
 
This chapter analyses the free movement of workers in the context of the Polish EU-
accession negotiations in order to determine the degree of influence that non-state 
actors have on foreign policy-making in Poland and Germany. As in the previous 
chapter, this case study is directly related to Polish-German relations based on 
German fears of a Polish “flood” of the labour market.  
Moreover, the EU’s rule that each member state can decide individually as to 
whether to open its labour markets immediately or after two, three or another two 
years (2+3+2 scheme), meant that Germany and Austrial were the last of the EU-15 to 
liberalise their labour markets, in May 2011. This further justifies the appropriateness 
of this case study for the overall argument of the thesis. It invites an analysis of the 
2006 and 2009 decisions to “leave the door shut”, examined throughout the chapter. 
Section I of this chapter discusses the legal aspects of the free movement of 
workers in the context of EU law and examines previous experiences of TPs. Section 
II analyses the domestic situation in Poland and Germany on the eve of accession by 
examining their respective labour markets and attitudes towards labour mobility. 
Section III analyses the negotiations, German government’s proposal for a TP and 
pressure from non-state actors. The same analysis is then applied for Poland. Section 
IV will scrutinize Germany’s 2006 and 2009 decision to prolong the TP, non-state 
actors’ involvement and Poland’s response.  
 





The free movement of workers is one of the fundamental rights in EU community 
law, as defined in Articles 39-42 of Title III of the EC Treaty170 and Regulation 
(EEC) No 1612/68 (European Commission, 2002b: 3). The term “worker” must not 
                                                 
170 The provisions regarding the free movement of workers are still to be found in Title III of the 
Lisbon Treaty but moved to Title IV of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. In the following I will 
refer to the EC Treaty since the accession negotiations took place under this Treaty.  
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be interpreted in a restrictive way171 and migrants must be treated as such when they  
undertake genuine and effective work,172 are under the direction and supervision of 
another person, and receive remuneration for this activity.173 This includes trainees, 
apprentices174 and part-time workers, with a ten hour working week being sufficient 
to qualify as a worker.175 Even working below the minimum subsistence level set by 
the host country176 or voluntarily leaving work in order to undertake full time studies 
(related to the work)177 does not disqualify the migrant from the status of “worker”. 
Thus, the ECJ has filled the legal void resulting from the absence of a clear definition 
of what constitutes a “worker” in Article 39 EC in the EU citizen’s favour, making it 
relatively easy to obtain this status. This is important since migrant workers enjoy 
considerable rights: the right of residence and in the recipient member state and the 
right to remain there (Art.39(3)(d) EC); access to employment and equal treatment in 
employment resulting from the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
nationality; and the same tax and social advantages as the recipient country’s 
nationals. In addition, family members are entitled to accompany workers, enjoying 
the same rights as host country nationals (European Commission, 2002: 6-8). 
 
Economic	  vs.	  Political	  Aspects	  
 
The “worker” status rights and the associated costs for the host state might explain 
why existing member states are wary of new EU member states, especially when 
considerable incentives exist that could motivate the citizens of new member states to 
emigrate in large numbers. The most significant incentives are economic and include 
higher wages and better jobs, although other incentives also play a role.178 Assuming 
that workers are rational actors, they will weigh the benefits of migration against the 
                                                 
171 See C-53/81, Levin ECR [1982] 01035. 
172 Work is real and effective if the labour service rendered forms part of the normal labour market. 
Hence, there must be demand and supply for such services. See C-456/02, Trojani ECR [2004] I-7573, 
para. 24.  
173 For an exhaustive discussion of this issue see, for example, Condinanzi et al. (2008: 78-103)   
174 See C-66/85, Lawrie-Blum ECR [1986] 2121, paras. 17-20; C-3/90 Bernini ECR [1990] I-1071; C-
313/01 Morgenbesser ECR [2003] I-13467.   
175 See C-71/88, Rinner-Kuhn ECR [1989] 2743. 
176 See C-139/85, Kempf ECR [1986] 1741. 
177 See C-39/86, Lair ECR [1986] 3161, para. 37; C-3/90 Bernini ECR [1992] I-1071, paras. 18-21. 
178 Other incentives might include the desire to learn a new language, a better climate in the host state, 
the desire to experience something new and so on. Economists distinguish between “push” and “pull” 
factors influencing the decision to migrate. For an overview see, for example, Belke and Hebler (2002: 
128). 
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costs179 and decide on that basis whether to stay or emigrate (Sinn and Werding, 
2001: 41).  
There are arguments both for and against the free movement of workers. The 
Commission argues that this is “an important element in achieving efficient labour 
markets and a high level of employment” (European Commission, 2002b: 3). Clearly, 
the Commission favours labour migration given its role as a European integrationist.  
Competing economic theories speak in favour or against labour mobility, 
depending on the affected group’s perspective.180 On the global scale, when low and 
semi-skilled workers migrate from a developing country to a developed country, 
unemployment in the developing country can be reduced, wages there may rise and 
the country can benefit from foreign currency remittances. But, these migrants can 
exercise wage pressure on the population of the developed host country. High-skilled 
workers and the economy of the developed country as a whole, in contrast, will 
benefit from the lower prices of services rendered and goods produced by these 
migrants (IOM, 2008: 43). Hence, it is prudent to distinguish between different 
groups affected by labour mobility. Simultaneously, provided that free movement of 
capital is in place, restrictions on the free movement of labour only lead instead to the 
“migration of capital” to the workers (Sinn, 2004: 463). Therefore, a restriction on the 
free movement of workers, as often demanded by trade unions, could turn into a 
Pyrrhic victory if employers decide to shift entire production facilities to the country 
with cheap labour. 
 Most economic theories were developed from the experience of the Anglo-
Saxon countries which have a long tradition of internal labour mobility and 
immigration. The EU experience is significantly different. Socio-cultural and 
linguistic differences between EU states undermine assumptions about the inter-
changeable worker presented by economic theories, so labour mobility is significantly 
lower (Nickel, 1997) and migrants return relatively quickly. This is the least used of 
the EU’s freedoms. In 1998, when accession negotiations commenced, the EU foreign 
population of Germany constituted a mere 2.3 % of the total population and 25.1 % of 
foreign population (in Moreno-Fontes Chammartin and Cantú-Bazaldúa, 2005: 9-10). 
Moreover, the German experience of a migration cohort has shown that after ten years 
                                                 
179 The costs of migration are the expense of moving to the new country, the cost of visiting family in 
the country of origin, and also the material and immaterial costs of adaptation to the new environment.  
180 For an excellent overview of the distributional consequences of labour mobility see: Borjas, George 
(1995) The Economic Benefits from Immigration. Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9(2): 3-22.  
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only about 40% remain, and after 25 years only 30%, whilst the remainder move back 
(in Sinn and Werding, 2001: 40).  
 Politicians treat the free movement of labour differently to the free movement 
of goods and capital. Bilateral and multilateral agreements erect more barriers and 
imposed more restrictions (Jain and Mukand, 2009): a reason for which can be found 
in the domestic dynamics of potential (im)migration181 target countries. Pritchett 
(2006) argues that what limits migration is the idea that it threatens national culture. 
Hence, the rhetoric surrounding the (im)migration debate is a possible motor driving 
voting behaviour.  
The German government had to proceed cautiously on this since the median 
voter is to be found amidst the unskilled and low-qualified employees who amount to 
70% of the economically active population (Belke and Hebler, 2002: 166), the 
population with the most reason to ‘fear’ migration from the east. Of the EU-15 
states, Germany had some of the lowest support for Eastern Enlargement, with 36% 
support in spring 1998 and 34% in 1999.182 Eurobarometer polls at the end of 1997 
also revealed the correlation that the German public made with unemployment, with 
47% thinking that Eastern Enlargement would lead to higher unemployment 
(European Commission, 1998: 51; Wood, 2004: 156).183 “Taking the population on 
board” by reducing fears, whether justified or not, therefore became important for the 
government (Brinkmann, 2010 Interview; Schönfelder, 2011 Interview).  
 
 
II.	  The	  situation	  in	  Germany	  and	  Poland	  ahead	  of	  accession	  
negotiations	  
 
Analysing the Polish and German situation before labour mobility became an issue 
during negotiations is important to assess whether the justifications for a TP provided 
by specific interest groups were objective or exaggerated. This constitutes the grounds 
                                                 
181 In this context, the term immigrant describes the a person coming into the EU from outside, whereas 
a migrant describes a person moving from one EU member state to another. 
182 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/41a3_en.htm. Accessed 20 November 
2011. 
183 Only Austria had a greater proportion linking enlargement to rising unemployment, with 51 %. This 
reveals that geographic proximity is an important factor for the public. 
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on which the decision was based, and can be divided into economic and cultural 
factors. 
 Chapter IV demonstrated that Germany’s unemployment rate was high on the 
eve of the accession negotiations, especially in the new Länder (see Figure 4.1). In the 
old Länder, the average unemployment rate was 9.4% in 1998, falling to 8.8% in 
1999 and 7.8 % in 2000, due to the economic boom. In the new Länder, the average 
unemployment rate for those years was 18.2, 17.6 and 17.4% respectively 
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (BfA), 2001: 16-17) showing that the east did not profit 
from the boom to the same extent. The Federal Labour Office (BfA) identified 
structural differences as the major reason for this gap. Whilst the west profited from a 
greater share of industry and the B2B service sector driven by exports, the east still 
suffered from another setback to the construction industry and cuts in the public 
sector (BfA, 2001: 23-24). As will be discussed, the construction sector was one of 
the major protagonists in pressurising the government to push for TPs in the area of 
free movement of labour and services. Foreigners were identified by the BfA as one 
of the “problem groups”  with the unemployment rate of 17.3% (due to unskilled 
labour in this group) in comparison to 10.7% amongst natives in 2000 (BfA: 2001: 
19). Whilst qualified foreigners are not grouped with asylum seekers and former 
Gastarbeiter working in the blue collar sector, the “Problemgruppe foreigner” 
features prominently in the media and public perception, especially when linked to the 
notion of welfare state abuse. Public opinion does not automatically distinguish 
between various groups of foreigners. In that context it would not matter whether a 
Polish migrant was competing against the German unemployed or complementing the 
German labour market if the public already had a negative opinion. 
  The Polish labour market was particularly sluggish at the time. Poland was 
the candidate state with the highest unemployment rate. The 1998 figure of 10.4% 
rose to 13.1% in 1999 and 15.1% in 2000. The peak came in 2002-2003 with 20%, 
approximately 3.2 million registered unemployed.184 There were three reasons for 
this.. First, GDP growth slowed down and fell below 5% in 1998. Second, another 
baby-boom generation entered the labour market. Third, external demand fell 
significantly as a consequence of Russia’s economic crisis (Szczapa, 2007: 4). 
Furthermore, Poland’s GDP per capita was only a little above 40% of the EU-15 
                                                 
184 Główny Urząd Statystyczny (Central Statistics Office): 
http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/5840_677_ENG_HTML.htm, accessed 25 October 2011. 
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average in 2003, whilst Germany’s was close to 100%. In terms of wages, a Polish 
worker would earn €510 per month in comparison to an average of €2,350 earned in 
Germany, whilst in industry, hourly labour costs amounted to €4.32 in Poland in 
comparison to €27.15 in West Germany and €19.49 in East Germany (Sinn, 2004: 
462).185 These figures, paired with Poland’s geographic proximity making commuting 
by Polish workers to big cities like Berlin and Frankfurt/Oder easy, suggest that ahead 
of Poland’s EU accession considerable economic incentives existed for a large 
proportion of the Polish population to emigrate. Due to Tarifautonomie and the lack 
of a nation-wide minimum wage in Germany, possible fears of Poles “flooding” the 
German labour market are therefore understandable since Poles would be able to 
undercut national wages.  
 Cultural factors also played a role in motivating non-state actors and the 
government to restrict labour movement on the German side. There is little doubt that 
historical circumstances shaped a “migration culture” in Poland. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, Polish contract workers in the construction sector in Germany often stayed 
beyond the end of their contracts. Similarly, the so-called wakacjusze (vacationers) 
found work as clandestine worker-tourists in the USA during the Communist era.186 
This “migration culture” derives partly from the Communist regime which fostered a: 
 
popular entrepreneurial culture of the opportunistic-debrouillard (rather than modern 
rational) kind by forcing citizens to use "unofficial" (extralegal) means and "crony" 
support networks to make everyday life possible. (Morawska, 2001: 59) 
 
As a result, the system gave rise to a “homo sovieticus” (Zinoviev, 1985) who 
employs various survival tactics to make ends meet, instead of relying on the state. 
One of those tactics, for those who could obtain a passport, was to seek employment 
abroad. More than 1.1 million Poles emigrated - 55% to West Germany187   (Okólski, 
1999: 19). This persisted after Communism fell, aided by the mass unemployment 
caused by shock therapy. By the mid-1990s an estimated “600,000-800,000 Polish 
                                                 
185 Figures are exchange-rate-adjusted. For a concise overview of the most important figures see also: 
http://www.polish-online.com/polen/wirtschaft/loehne-lohnkosten.php, accessed 25 October 2011.  
186 Amongst the vacationers were Lech Wałęsa’s parents who went to the US in 1973 having been 
invited by family members to earn illicit money. Wałęsa justified this by saying: “Their decision to go 
was dictated by common sense and tradition: in our family there had always been someone on the other 
side of the ocean. It was in our blood: one or the other went over there so that the rest of the family 
could count on some security and a chance of financial help.” (quoted in Morawska, 2001: 59) 
187 It must be acknowledged that the vast majority of these “Poles” were ethnic Germans claiming 
German citizenship under Article 116 of the Basic Law. 
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tourist-workers were engaged in undocumented informal-sector employment in 
Western economies” and even more were active in illicit cross-border trade 
(Morawska, 2001: 61). These “tourist stays” lasted 2.5-3.5 months on average and 
about 75% of these Poles worked in Austria and Germany (Morawska, 2001: 51).188  
 Official bilateral agreements intended to regulate the flow of the Polish labour 
force between Poland and Germany also existed. In 1992, 51,000 Polish contract 
workers were employed in Germany. The quota was later reduced to 20,520, of which 
10,000 places were reserved for construction workers (limited to five years), 
amounting to four % of all employees in the German construction industry (Menz, 
2001: 255-56). Menz (2001: 255-56) writes that the quota was designed to fill skilled 
labour shortages caused by the initial boom after re-unification, regulate the inflow of 
migrants, promote economic development in Poland know-how transfer, curtail illegal 
immigration, continue some of the bi-lateral agreements conducted between the GDR 
and Poland and initiate a new Ostpolitik. The effect on the German construction 
sector, however, was quite disturbing. Many German employers simply retained their 
previous illegally employed Polish workers, only between 8 and 16% of the contract 
workers fulfilled the legal requirements, and German employers exploited the 
possibility of subcontracts with relatively cheap Polish companies (Menz, 259-61). 
Although the 1996 Law on Posted Workers (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegestz) stipulated 
that the payment of the minimum lowest wage bracket on German construction sites 
was mandatory, the heavily guarded Tarifautonomie prevented the BDA from 
agreeing to universal application (Allgemeinverbindlichkeit) of such wage brackets 
(Menz, 2001: 262). Thus, it is not surprising that the public, trade unions and some 
small and medium sized enterprises demanded restrictions on Polish labour mobility. 
 More important are the Polish seasonal workers who found their way to 
Germany. Since 1991, Art. 4 of the Anwerbestoppausnahmeverordnung (ASAV) 
made it possible at peak times for foreigners to be employed for up to three months in 
the agricultural, forestry and hospitality sector. Of the 200,000 seasonal workers per 
annum between 1996 and 1999 (90% in agriculture), over 90% were Poles. The figure 
rose to 237,000 in 2000 (BMI, 2001: 54-56). This is important because many 
Germans made contact with the Polish Erntehelfer who left an impression as hard-
                                                 
188 As early as 1890-1914, Germany was so popular amongst Poles for seasonal work that the saying 
jezdzic na saksy (going to Saxony) became synonymous with “network-supported travels abroad to 
earn additional income for the family” in general (Morawska, 2001: 61). 
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working individuals. Additionally, many Poles gained first-hand experience of 
earning hard currency and seeing the higher living standards. 
 In general, Germany’s attitude towards migration has been ambivalent. Despite 
the immigration of millions of Gastarbeiter189 and their families (Familiennachzug) 
in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s,190 the political consensus position was that Germany 
was “not a country of immigration”. Throughout the Kohl era this stance was limited 
to the CDU/CSU, preventing a departure from this notion since the party was 
dominant at the federal level until 1998 (Green, 2004: 26-109). With the advent of the 
SPD-Green coalition in 1998, a new debate emerged on the agenda driven by the need 
for high-skilled labour and integration issues (Green, 2004: 111). At the Cebit 
Computer Fair in his hometown of Hanover in February 2000, Chancellor Schröder 
announced a Green Card programme which would address the lack of IT specialists. 
This short-term measure was limited to 20,000 places,191 and granted a maximum five 
year work permit for non-EU nationals earning over DM 100,000 annually. During 
the dot-com bubble the US was eyed with envy and highly skilled Indians were 
targeted with this measure. This was immediately torpedoed by Jürgen Rüttgers, the 
CDU candidate in North Rhine-Westphalia, with the populist slogan “Children 
instead of Indians” (Kinder statt Inder), which was picked up by the right wing 
Republikaner for its electoral campaign (Goel, 2009). A number of studies circulated 
publicly which predicted a drastic fall in the support ratio (economically active to 
inactive) from over 4.4:1 in 1995 to 2.1:1 by 2050 due to Germany’s low fertility rate 
and increased life expectancy (in Green, 2004: 114). This added to pressure for a new 
immigration policy (Ausländerpolitik), which culminated in the 
Zuwanderungsgesetz192 coming into force in 2005. The making of the law was 
                                                 
189 The term Gastarbeiter (guest worker) indicates that the immigrants would eventually leave. In 
reality many Gastarbeiter stayed and brought their families over. The Anwerbestopp in 1973 made the 
decision especially hard for the guest workers as anyone who decided to leave would almost certainly 
leave for ever (Green, 2004: 36-37). The absence of an adequate integration policy and a complicated 
Ausländergesetz paired with the politicians’ denial that Germany was de facto a country of immigration 
(Einwanderungsland) would later lead to delayed integration debates linking immigration to 
exploitation of the German social system and what Germany’s dominant culture (Leitkultur) should be 
(Green, 2004: 119-20). The Swiss intellectual Max Frisch captured the complexity of this issue with a 
witty comment which still echoes: Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, und es kamen Menschen (we called for a 
labour force, but people came instead) (quoted in Razum et al., 2011: 555; translation is my own).  
190 The first Gastarbeiter was welcomed from Italy in 1955. Numerous other bi-lateral agreements with 
Turkey, Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia followed, until the Anwerbestopp in 1973.  
191 By March 2002 less than 11.500 Green Cards had been awarded, evidence for the limited success of 
the initiative (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung in Green, 2004: 128). 
192 Note that the word Zuwanderungsgesetz avoids the word immigration (Einwanderung) and uses the 
word Zuwanderung, introduced by the Christian-Democrats in the 1990s and preferred by 
 167 
accompanied by a debate over whether Germany’s culture would be undermined by 
immigration and what the Leitkultur (dominant culture) should be (Green, 2004: 119-
29).193 Whilst the migration of EU nationals as a consequence of Eastern Enlargement 
is entirely different to the aforementioned, these issues entered the agenda 
simultaneously. This shows, at least, the German reservationist tradition towards 
(im)migrants as a whole; at most, it explains in part the demand for a TP in this area 
even though the long-term demographic trend would actually demand a softening of 
immigration policy in general. EU enlargement would represent an opportunity to 
make use of workers who did not require Green Cards and who came from the same 
Judeo-Christian cultural background. Therefore, the reasons for Germany’s cautious 
approach to labour liberalization must be uncovered. 
 




In December 2000, Chancellor Schröder put the TP for the free movement of workers 
on the government’s agenda for the first time194 with a speech at a regional SPD 
conference in Weiden, thereby deciding for himself when the topic would enter the 
political discourse (Rudolph in Jeřábek, 2011: 229). In his speech he made assurances 
that he was aware of fears of an influx of competitively priced workers and 
commuters and a race to the bottom for wages, social security and environmental 
standards: “If the free movement of labour were introduced with enlargement, we 
would also be confronted with a greater influx to Germany. That would not be 
supportable for parts of our labour market, especially where unemployment is high.” 
(Schröder, 2000: 7) The literature (e.g.: Jeřábek, 2011: 227-28; Nissen, 2009: 185-86; 
                                                                                                                                           
restrictionists who merely tolerate immigration for moral-political and constitutional reasons rather 
than actively seeking it (Joppke, 1999: 97-98).  
193 The topics Zuwanderung and Leitkultur still lead to controversies and heated debates, as 
exemplified by the summer 2010 public discussion following Sarrazin’s publication of Deutschalnd 
Schafft sich ab (2010).  
194 In a Spiegel Interview in November 1998, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, from the Greens, stated 
that together with enlargement there should be a brief TP for the free movement of labour. At the same 
time, Fischer referred to the Southern Enlargement and argued that this enlargement had lowered 
migration pressures. He predicted that fears of a massive influx of workers would be proved wrong and 
refers to France (Fischer in der Spiegel 48/1998: “Wir wollen keinen Soli tanzen”). 
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Schneider, 2006: 79) supports the hypothesis that the demand for a TP in this area 
came directly from “the top”, a fact independently confirmed in various interviews 
with me (e.g. Brinkmann, 2010; Högl, 2010; Meckel, 2010; Schönfelder, 2011). As 
noted in Chapter IV, Schröder had been an unusually business-friendly for an SPD-
politician. Hence, what were Schröder’s motives and which actors might have 
influenced his decision to demand a TP for the free movement of labour? 
 Eva Högl, SPD MP since 2009,  previously working for the Federal Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs, asserts that whilst the initiative came from the left, 
political discussion led in the end to a “consensus across all parties on the issue” 
(Högl, 2010 Interview). It is necessary therefore to analyse the positions of the six big 
parties represented in the Bundestag (SPD, Greens, CDU, CSU, FDP and PDS)195 
which might have pressured Schröder to adopt such a stance.  
 The partners in government, SPD and the Greens, had already agreed in October 
1998 in chapter XI/2 of their coalition agreement that, “in order to prevent accession-
related economic and social cleavages, appropriate transitional periods are necessary, 
for example in the free movement of labour.” (SPD and Greens, 1998)196 By 
mentioning it so early the government had restricted its room for manoeuvre 
considerably. The voters elected the SPD because of Kohl’s failure to reduce the 
unemployment rate and the lack of “blooming landscapes”197 in the East, but also 
because the SPD promised to tackle unemployment, and Schröder announced early on 
that he wanted to be judged by his performance in reducing it (see Siefken, 2006). In 
1998, 95% of voters regarded this as the top priority (in Lees, 2000: 100). The new 
government began trying to fulfil the electorate’s hopes by reducing unemployment 
with the Alliance for Jobs (see Lees, 2000: 112-16; Timmins, 2000). Migration 
accompanied with labour liberalisation does not lead automatically to a higher 
unemployment rate. However, the unemployment rate at that time was particularly 
                                                 
195 The SED successor party PDS merged in 2007 with Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral 
Alternative (WASG), forming today’s Die Linke. 
196 Translation is my own. Neither the SPD nor the Green party manifestos for the 1998 Federal 
election mention the necessity of negotiating a TP preventing the immediate free movement of labour 
in the EU accession negotiations (SPD, 1998; Greens, 1998). 
197 Kohl’s famous promise of “blooming landscapes” (blühende Landschaften) for the new 
Bundesländer has become a common phrase of mockery of the Chancellor’s underestimation of the 
challenges of re-unification. See, for example, the cover article of Der Spiegel 39/2004 “Jammertal 
Ost”.   
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high in the unskilled and low-wage sector (BfA, 2001: 144; Högl, 2010 Interview).198 
With the opening of borders to candidate states and all the uncertainty about how 
many Poles would actually come, Schröder would have risked giving the opposition 
opportunities to attack him and leaving his voters disillusioned if these migrants had 
caused the unemployment increase further. The accusation would have been that he 
did not do all he could have done to prevent unemployment from rising (Brinkmann, 
2010 Interview). 
 This argument has even more weight if the CDU/CSU position on the topic is 
considered. Although the CDU and CSU’s joint party manifesto for the 1998 federal 
elections does not refer to the free movement of workers per se, the document states 
that “sufficiently long transitional periods are necessary after accession due to the 
huge differences in economic development and are of interest to the candidates and 
the EU alike” (CDU/CSU, 1998). Perhaps a more specific reference to workers was 
avoided due to the conservative camp’s close relationship to employers who as a rule 
have an interest in market liberalisation.199 Also, this would facilitate coalition talks 
with the FDP – which did not mention any demands at all for TPs (FDP, 1998). In any 
case, the CDU/CSU’s Wahlplattform (electoral alliance) was the only manifesto 
which mentioned the word “transitional period” at this early stage, as the PDS’s 
programme failed to do so (PDS, 1998). Moreover, the CSU demanded the closure of 
borders to CEEC nationals three years before Schröder’s Weiden speech: “the CSU 
has definitely demanded not to open the German labour market for the East European 
candidates before 2015.” (in Belke and Hebler, 2002: 170) Bavaria’s geographic 
proximity to the CEEC countries was one line of reasoning in that case and would 
later be picked up by the other proximate federal states (Schönfelder, 2011 Interview).  
 The eastern Bundesländer did not discuss the topic of free movement of labour 
in the context of Eastern Enlargement in their respective parliaments, and only started 
to do so after Schröder put the topic on the political agenda. This does not mean that 
individual Minister-Presidents did not influence the Chancellor’s position on the 
issue. According to Germany’s chief negotiator Wilhelm Schönfelder (2011 
Interview), the eastern states were very much interested in a TP because they feared 
                                                 
198 Of course at that time nobody knew where in the host states Polish migrants would work. 
Drinkwater et al.’s (2009) analysis shows that most Polish migrants in Britain have been medium to 
highly skilled young males, self-employed or indeed working in the low-skilled sector. 
199 In general, business favours market liberalisation in areas such as labour to drive or keep wages 
down. Occasionally, however, business might favour market regulation when it wants to avoid 
competition from outside.  
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further rising unemployment. 
 If Schröder had not put the topic on the agenda, the opposition would have used 
this in the 2002 electoral campaign (Meckel, 2010 Interview). Although the first Red-
Green term was rather union friendly compared with its second term (Schmidt, 2007: 
295-12), the Alliance for Jobs also required the unions to discuss the taboo of 
collective bargaining in return for 10,000 apprenticeships promised by employers 
(Geyer et al., 2005: 109-10). Finance Minister Eichel’s DM 30 billion savings plan 
for the 2000 budget, presented in May 1999, led to further confrontation with the 
unions. To actualise the ambitious cuts it was suggested that the Sozialhilfe be 
abolished or halved, the coal compromise terminated200 and widows’ pensions cut: 
“Of all things the party that began its term intending to re-instate ‘social balance’ 
(Schröder), now has to cut back social expenditure and trim vested rights.” (Geyer et 
al., 2005: 103-04) Given all of this, it would be difficult to sell open borders to an 
electorate fearing incoming wage pressure whilst the government was starting to 
demand many sacrifices from the low wage sector and the unemployed. 
 Eckhard Lübkemeier (2010 Interview) argues that the Weiden advance and the 
subsequent negotiation position must be seen in light of the harsh Hartz Reforms 
(severe cuts in social benefits, see below). In that respect, the TP for the free 
movement of labour would be a pill to sweeten painful reforms still to come; a theory 
that was rejected in other interviews (e.g. Schönfelder, 2011). Given that the 
accession negotiations were advancing rapidly (Chapter 2 of the acquis, the free 
movement of labour, was opened on 26 May 2000), Germany had to present her 
position at some point, and when the Austrian government came forward with a 
demand for a seven year TP in early 2000 (in Schneider, 2006: 77-78), it provided a 
good opportunity for Schröder to do so. It was handy for the Chancellor that the move 
killed several birds with one stone, and he presented a five point programme in his 
government policy statement following the Nice Summit in January 2001 in which he 
stated that Germany needed a seven year TP; proposed a flexible model that would 
make the shortening of the TP possible after five years; said that this could, for 
individual countries on application, be further shortened; that in case of a general 
shortage of skilled labour one could grant controlled access to the German labour 
                                                 
200 The coal compromise (Kohlekompromiss) was agreed between the federal government, the state 
governments, the Ruhrkohle AG and the unions in 1997. It stipulated that state subsidies would be 
capped at €2.7 billion, production at 22 million tons and employee numbers at 36,000 until 2005. 
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market; and that at the same time a TP for the free movement of services was needed 
in individual sectors such as in the construction and craft sectors (Schröder, 2001). 
 The government also considered studies by independent experts. This 
demonstrates the answer given to the opposition on 7 February in the Bundestag. The 
government stated that it was aware that “Central and Eastern European migrants are 
– in comparison to migrants from the Southern Enlargement – higher qualified, more 
flexible and are prepared to accept jobs below their qualifications […] which would 
affect native employees in jobs of low or simple qualification levels.” (Bundestag, 
2001: 45) It quoted a DIW and ZEW study assuming that during the first decade after 
accession an annual inflow of 220,000 migrants would occur, of which 35-40% would 
be employees. 
 Other independent studies (used by governments and the Commission) 
predicted, however, different scenarios with estimations of the migration potential 
ranging from 2 to 4% of the candidates’ total population (e.g.: Bauer and 
Zimmermann, 1999; Boeri and Brücker, 2001). The highest estimation of 7-8% was 
provided by the well-respected president of the ifo-institute, Hans-Werner Sinn, a 
frequent interviewee in the German quality print and TV media on topics of economic 
concern. Affected interest groups could choose the study which best supported their 
demands. 
 
The	  Commission’s	  suggestion	  	  	  	  
 
According to Brinkmann (2010 Interview) the German negotiation team applied for a 
5+2 model, just as Schröder had indicated in his government policy statement. On 11 
April 2001, the Commission finally proposed a mechanism that strongly mirrored the 
German and Austrian wishes (the other existing member states were initially quiet on 
this issue). Four points would characterise the TP: 
 
•    The general transition period lasts for 5 years. During this time, Member States 
continue to operate their own national measures on accepting workers from the new 
Member States. […] 
•    An automatic review is held after no more than 2 years. This review is based on a 
factual report from the Commission to the Council. […] the Council, acting by 
unanimity […], decides whether to shorten or lift the transition period. This could 
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lead to the full application of the acquis communautaire, […] Member States that so 
wish would be able to continue with national measures. 
•    One further optional additional review per country may be held at the request of a 
Member State […] with a view to further relaxation of controls. […] 
•    The general transition period ends after 5 years. In the case of serious disturbances in 
its labour market, which will be examined by the Commission, any Member State 
may maintain its national provisions for a further maximum period of 2 years 
(European Commission, 2001).201 
 
The	  German	  social	  partners	  
 
In our interview, Gisbert Brinkmann assured me that the realisation of the 
Chancellor’s TP plans would have been difficult in the case of resistance by both 
social partners, the DGB and the BDA/BDI. This is also valid for the subsequent 
reviews in 2006 and 2009 which would either lead to the maintenance of the TP or its 
abolition (Brinkmann, 2010 Interview). In its positions of 9 July 2001 and 15 May 
2002, the DGB welcomes the Commission’s proposal and demands that the decision 
on whether the TP would remain in place for seven years or be shortened should be in 
the hands of the member states. The DGB stated that the free movement of workers 
and the free movement of services should be directly combined “to prevent false self-
employment (Scheinselbstständigkeit) and the illegal practice of companies sending 
workers abroad (Entsendefirmen) […] and to protect sensitive service industries from 
wage cutting competition.” (DGB, 2001, 2002) The free movement of services in the 
labour context is often forgotten (e.g. Trzeciak, 2010), but is equally important. Since 
the EC Treaty grants the right of establishment in Articles 43-48 and the right to 
provide services in Articles 44-55, a TP for the free movement of workers could have 
been circumvented by CEEC nationals if they became self-employed or registered 
with a firm which would collect a few workers and then enter the labour market and 
engage in wage and contract competition. This is especially relevant in labour-
intensive sectors such as the construction industry. As a result, it was not only in the 
interest of the DGB to protect the labour market, but also of specific sectors of the 
industry represented by the BDI. Thus, the BDA and BDI had a hard time finding a 
                                                 
201 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/561&format. Accessed 20 
November 2011. 
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joint position (Schneider-Bodien, 2010 Interview). In their joint position of February 
2001, the two big employers’ associations praised the flexible model for the free 
movement of workers suggested in Schröder’s Weiden speech, which “picks up the 
demands of the German economy” but they lament that seven years would be too long 
as it would harm chances of economic development in the new and old member states 
alike. The position acknowledges that in certain sectors and in border regions, 
“special developments” in labour migration could occur, but the dynamic of economic 
development in the candidates would imply migration pressure overall. The 
organisations requested a flexible model with clear objective criteria that would 
enable the shortening of the TP after five years and differentiation for specific sectors. 
In branches of the economy with a skills shortage (Fachkräftemangel) or a lack of 
apprentices it should be made possible to open borders for citizens of the new 
member states. Also, the position calls for preferential treatment for skilled workers 
from the new member states in the “Zuwanderung debate” and calls for expansion and 
maintenance of seasonal and similar work programmes (BDA & BDI, 2001). Section 
II of the position, dealing with the free movement of services, is much shorter and less 
straightforward. The vague phrasing of the very first sentence, “for the free movement 
of services no TPs should, in principle, be applied,”202 mirrors the conflicting interests 
of the different sectors, especially the construction sector, which was strongly in 
favour of a long TP (Schneider-Bodien, 2010 Interview). This is congruent with 
Jeřábek’s (2011: 234-35) research and can also be found in official statements made 
at that time. Thomas Bauer, a member of the BDA and HDB203 steering committee, 
facing the possibility of immediate liberalization accompanying Eastern Enlargement 
remarked: “I accept that in future a part of the German construction sector won’t 
exist, but a complete loss of the entire German construction sector cannot be in the 
interest of politics,” and he suggested a synchronised TP for ten years for the free 
movement of workers, services and the right of establishment.204 In general, the BDA 
focused more on social issues whilst the BDI stressed the lack of skilled labour, but 
the discussions between the BDA and BDI were very intensive and controversial and 
some companies even feared an exodus of skilled workers from Poland because some 
                                                 
202 Highlighting added. 
203 The HDB (Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie), Federation of the German Construction 
Industry is organised in the BDI and BDA. 
204 See: “‘big bang’ durch die EU-Osterweiterung? – Bayerische Bauindustrie fordert Harmonisierung 
der Wettbewerbsbedingungen durch Übergangsregelung”, Baulinks, 21.06.2001, 
http://www.baulinks.de/webplugin/2001/0274.php4, accessed 25 November 2011. 
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companies had invested in Polish companies or were planning to do so and wanted to 
prevent a “brain drain” effect (Wehnert, 2010 Interview). 
 When comparing the two social partners it becomes apparent that the DGB’s 
position was much more coherent and decisive throughout. German business was in 
favour of liberalisation, but some sectors demanded a TP for the free movement of 
services and individual companies saw benefits in having completely closed borders. 
This made it much easier for the DGB to come out on top and also explains why all 




From the start of accession negotiations, obtaining freedom of movement for workers 
was one of the top priorities identified by UKIE in its 1997 National Strategy for 
European Integration. The document states in points 2.67-2.69 that the most important 
task, alongside the recognition of Polish qualifications, was to obtain access to the EU 
labour market and to eliminate TPs for Polish workers as quickly as possible (UKIE, 
1997). Given the high and rising unemployment rate and an additional labour market 
opening in Poland’s neigbourhood, providing an opportunity to bring the rate down, 
this strategy by Polish officials is not surprising. For a vast section of the Polish 
population, open borders across Europe would be opportunity to find a job. Pure 
economic factors, however, were not the only reason why any Polish government 
could not afford to accept TPs easily in that area. As explained in Chapter IV, 
following forty years of Communism and closed borders with the West, EU 
membership would signify an end to the “division of Europe”. Polish EU entry 
without population mobility would mean a prolongation of this division. Following 
the Commission’s communication of the suggestion, one Polish diplomat in Brussels 
responded that “we do not want to be treated as second-class citizens of the EU. We 
have enough problems with rising anti-EU sentiment in the country.”205 If any 
government had given in easily on this issue, the confrontational style of Polish 
politics (see Chapter II) and media pressure (discussed in Chapter 4), would have 
meant immediate opposition attacks on the government and the negotiation team. 
                                                 
205 See: “Europe Sets Out Migration Options”, Financial Times, 09.03.2001. See also: Szczerbiak, 
Aleks (2001) Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership. Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 39(1): 105-22. 
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 As expected, Polish public opinion regarded the TP proposed by the 
Commission as unnecessary. In July 2011 CBOS poll, only 6% answered that the 
seven year TP was the correct length; another 6% opined that it was a bit longer than 
necessary; 15% said that it was significantly longer than necessary; 16% answered 
that it was difficult to judge; whilst 57% regarded the TP as unnecessary. Moreover, 
73% of Poles opined that the Polish government should not accept the seven year TP 
on the free movement of workers, while only 11% were in favour of accepting it 
(CBOS, July 2001: 8-9). In a UKIE poll conducted between December 2001 and 
January 2002, Germany was the prime target country for those seeking work in the 
EU-15, with 38% wanting to migrate there. The UK came second with 12% and 
France was third with 9% (in Trzeciak, 2010: 227-28). Thus  geographical proximity 
and the previous experience of seasonal work played a role for potential Polish 
migrants. It also shows that German fears that their country would be the prime target 
for CEEC nationals were correct. 
 Polish labour unions expressed a negative view on the possibility of a TP for the 
free movement of workers. In its position KK 190/99, NSZZ Solidarność connected 
the free movement of workers with the free movement of capital and stated that a TP 
in these areas would be economically unsound and socially harmful as it would lead 
to “social dumping through the inflow of investment with the goal exploiting the 
cheap labour force”. It would also lead to a “growing grey sector and possibly 
growing unemployment in the West due to the influx of persons from new member 
states to the old member states without the possibility of legally employing those 
migrants,” thus blocking the process of wage approximation between west and east.206 
This position was reaffirmed in the union’s position KK 23/2001 in which NSZZ 
rejects the German Chancellor’s and the DGB’s demands for a TP in this area. The 
union reminds that this would be a regress of the joint declaration of 18 March 1999 
between Marian Krzaklewski and Dieter Schulte, the leaders of NSZZ and the DGB 
respectively, who stated that they would oppose a liberalised market of services, 
capital and goods without an open market for labour.207 The labour union OPZZ 
judged the progress in the negotiations similarly to NSZZ. Whilst complaining that 
the government did not provide information about the strategy used during the 
                                                 
206 See: http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/pl/dokumenty-w-sprawach-ue/stanowisko-kk-nr-190/99.html, 
accessed 20 November 2011. The translations are my own. 
207 See: http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/pl/dokumenty-w-sprawach-ue/stanowisko-kk-nr-23/2001.html, 
accessed 20 November 2011. 
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negotiations on the free movement of workers and the resulting potential benefits and 
costs of full liberalisation, the OPZZ laments that the TP suggested by the 
Commission would lead to discrimination against Polish workers and an asymmetric 
relationship between German and Polish companies. Also, the OPZZ questioned 
European solidarity since German fears seemed more important. The union asked the 
government whether Poland would become a member of a “second degree” (OPZZ, 
2001). The OPZZ’s comparatively harsh tone towards the government can be 
explained by the fact that it was affiliated with the opposition SLD (Duszczyk, 2002: 
154-56), but both unions were clearly decisively against a TP in line with the 
government. According to Ryszard Czarnecki, German labour unions were more 
active than Polish unions, which can be explained by the formers’ defence of their 
labour market in the interests of their members, whilst the latter did not benefit from 
an immediate liberalisation (in Trzeciak, 2010: 212). 
 Polish employer’s organisations also rejected a TP for the free movement of 
workers only differing from the labour unions in their reasoning by applying more 
economic rather than social arguments (Duszczyk, 2002: 117-19). This appears 
counter-intuitive. It should be in the interest of employers to keep wages low and the 
high unemployment rate in Poland ensured wage pressure kept it so. Labour mobility 
could endanger that. The most obvious explanation for their position must be found in 
the underestimation of Polish workers’ willingness to seek employment abroad. The 
employer’s organisations argued that German fears were unjustified (in Duszczyk, 
2002: 117-19). It is doubtful that employer’s organisations would argue this way had 
they known the massive exodus of labour force that occurred from May 2004 
onwards. This is underlined by some organised sectors’ appeal to the Polish 
government to request a prolongation of the TP from the German government in 2009 
(Soszka-Ogrodnik, 2011 Interview; official at German Embassy in Warsaw, 2011 
Interview). Given that by 2010 the monthly wage of a worker on the construction site 
for the Warsaw stadium hosting the 2012 European football Championships had risen 
to over PLN 7,000 (Sozka-Ogrodnik, 2011 Interview)208 this is not surprising. 
Officially, however, the Tusk government always demanded a free labour market, 
perhaps to appease its electorate, although aware that such requests would be futile. 
 
                                                 
208 In 2010, the exchange €/PLN exchange rate was relatively stable at around 1:4. PLN 7,000 would 
amount to about €1,750. 
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Achieving	  a	  solution	  
 
The outcome achieved must always be contemplated in the general context of the 
dynamics between member states at that time. In May 2001, Spain tried to block 
negotiations between the EU and Poland by trying to link the issue of free movement 
of workers with the structural funds which Spain feared it would lose once the CEEC 
countries joined. The Spaniards tried to obtain a guarantee that the amount of 
structural funds received would remain stable. They promised to support Germany’s 
position if Germany would back Spain in turn over the structural funds issue 
(Schneider, 2009: 28-29). This helped the Austrian and German government to gather 
support among the EU-15 and they rejected the Spanish demands, arguing that the 
two issues should be kept separate. Spain gave in and supported Germany’s demand 
for a seven year TP (Trzeciak, 2010: 218-19). At the same time, the Polish 
government tried to form an “alliance of the candidates” to enhance their weight in 
negotiations (Trzeciak, 2010: 220-22). If all the candidates could have presented their 
positions jointly it would have been more difficult for the EU-15 to ignore their 
wishes, since a failure of negotiations would have been more embarrassing for the EU 
than for the candidates. The alliance did not last long. Poland maintained its demand 
for an eighteen year TP for the acquisition of real estate by foreigners (see Chapter IV 
of this thesis), which was criticized by the other candidates, and Hungary accepted the 
suggestion of a seven year TP for the free movement of workers relatively quickly 
(Trzeciak, 2010: 221). The governments were themselves under pressure to conclude 
the negotiations as quickly and present this achievement to their electorates. 
Verheugen’s tactic of negotiating with 10 candidates simultaneously to create 
competition between them over who would become the Musterknabe (star student) 
worked to the EU’s advantage. 
 An amicable compromise between the two countries was agreed at the top-level 
by Schröder and Miller on 24 October 2001 in Berlin. As discussed in Chapter IV, the 
two leaders struck a deal in a quid pro quo fashion. The German Chancellor 
convinced the Polish statesman to accept a TP for the free movement of workers, 
arguing that only a third of the population supported Eastern Enlargement, and that 
the SPD would not forgive him if he did not insist on the TP one year ahead of the 
federal elections, since this was the official position of the CDU/CSU. Miller 
explained that the real estate question was important for Poland since the general 
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population feared that Germans would start to buy up Polish land (Miller, 2009: 47-
48). 
 When the chapter was opened, only Austria and Germany showed any signs that 
they would eventually apply for a TP in this area. One by one more member states 
joined in, demanding such a solution. This can be explained twofold. First, the 
member states must have expected that the majority of CEEC nationals would target 
Germany and Austria as a work destination. Once this option was eliminated, the 
focus would shift to the remaining thirteen. A “race to the bottom” was opened once a 
state communicated the willingness to apply for a TP. Second, any state not applying 
for a TP would become the focus of attention in the CEEC media, which would show 
the work opportunities there, potentially diverting migration pressures towards that 
state. That partially explains why in the end Great Britain, Ireland and Sweden were 
the “last states standing” and the only ones not to apply for a TP. 
 Brussels took all the opinions of the EU-15 and found a solution in the flexible 
2+3+2 model, allowing each member state to decide whether it wished to open its 
labour market from the date of enlargement or to restrict it for two years. After the 
first two years the Council would review the functioning of the TP on the basis of a 
report from the Commission. Each individual Member State would notify the 
Commission whether it would continue applying the TP or open its borders. Each 
state could also shorten the TP from the third year onwards. After these three years, a 
member state would have the chance to prolong its protectionist measures by another 
two years, but only “in case of serious disturbances of its labour market or threat 
thereof and after notifying the Commission” (Accession Treaty, 2003: Annex XII).209 
It is important to note that if a state wishes to use the last two years of the TP it must 
convince the Commission based on objective, rational facts rather than on any fears 
from the electorate or individual pressure groups. However, as discussed below, 
Austria and Germany got away with spongy argumentation in achieving the last two-
year prolongation to the TP, something that went widely unnoticed by the public. 
Once again non-state actors and party politics played a significant role in this. 
 Austria and Germany were granted the right to restrict access to some sensitive 
service sectors which could lead to serious general or regional disturbances of the 
labour market. For Germany this applied to the construction sector and related 
                                                 
209 Emphasis added. 
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branches, industrial cleaning and interior decorators.  
 
 
IV.	  The	  decisions	  of	  2006	  and	  2009	  
 
Chancellor Schröder was re-elected in 2002 by a narrow margin and the coalition 
retained its majority thanks to an improved result for the Greens. What saved 
Schröder was his categorical rejection of the Iraq war in the electoral campaign and 
the flood of the river Elbe in the east where the CDU/CSU-candidate Stoiber failed to 
make an appearance. Without these two external events the SPD would probably have 
lost to a CDU/CSU campaign exploiting Schröder’s failure to keep his promise to 
lower unemployment (see Güllner et al., 2002). It was clear that the re-elected 
government had to do something to bring unemployment down if it wanted to stand a 
chance of another re-election. Two measures taken by the re-elected government are 
particularly relevant here. The first was the creation of the so-called “Super Ministry” 
(Superministerium), and second were the social reforms following the Hartz 
Commission’s recommendations. 
 In 2002 the Economics Ministry and the labour sections of the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs were merged into a new Federal Ministry for Economics 
and Labour led by the new Superminister Wolfgang Clement. As discussed, Schröder 
was close to German business and liked to present himself in the media as the 
Autokanzler. This creation of the new ministry reflects his stance as it allowed a 
Ministry which traditionally favoured German business to “hijack” the Labour 
Ministry, which had better relations with the unions. What seemed like a good idea at 
that time, as an attempt to “overcome traditional departmental thinking” (SPD and 
Greens, 2002) ended in disaster and the Ministry was redivided at the beginning of the 
Grand Coalition in 2005. The different cultures which had developed over the decades 
made collaboration very difficult and one section of the ministry accused the other of 
favouring certain interests, explained Brinkmann (2010 Interview). Fabian Wehnert, 
at the time, employed by the BDI, confirmed that debate was not possible when the 
two Ministries were merged (2010 Interview). Debates and dialogue were, however, 
necessary in deciding whether to prolong the TP in 2006, as was listening to the 
positions of the unions and employers’ associations. The coalition agreement of 2002 
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does not mention the free movement of labour, and the 2006 decision on prolongation 
would have been made by the Red-Green coalition had the federal elections not been 
called ahead of schedule in 2005, following the SPD’s defeat that year in North 
Rhine-Westphalia. 
 The second important measure was the reforms implementing the suggestions 
made by the Hartz Commission in summer 2002. The 21 member commission, named 
after Peter Hartz, a personnel director at Volkswagen, included no more than two 
representatives from the labour unions and suggested reforms which would alienate 
the left wing of the SPD and the unions from the SPD leadership.210 The commission 
suggested thirteen measures, of which the most important were the integration of 
Arbeitslosenhilfe (unemployment assistance) with Sozialhilfe (social assistance) and 
the placement of unemployed persons with private firms to perform temporary work 
after six months of joblessness (Streeck and Trampusch, 2005: 184). Most of the 
suggestions were turned into legislation, and “Agenda 2010”, intended to make the 
German economy more flexible and competitive, followed in March 2003. It was 
made easier for firms to opt out of sector-wide industrial agreements and major cuts 
were also made to the unemployment and sickness benefits, and small companies 
were able to hire and fire more easily. The unions called the measures “unfair”, “one-
sided” and the “dismantling of the welfare state”, opposing the measures in public 
(Streeck and Trampusch, 2005: 185). Even though only an SPD-led government could 
have pushed through reforms so painful for the working class and the unions 
(Lübkemeier, 2010 Interview), it meant that a shortening of the TPs would not have 
made sense to the public. The state had started to demand more from the low-wage 
sector and the unemployed, whilst it would be opening its borders to more 
competition from new member states. However, it was no longer up to the Red-Green 
coalition to decide on this matter, as Chancellor Schröder asked President Köhler to 
dissolve the Bundestag immediately after the SPD suffered defeat in the North Rhine-
Westphalia elections in 2005. 
 
                                                 
210 The reforms described below led to a massive exodus of SPD members, causing the CDU/CSU to 
become the German party with the strongest membership for the first time ever in 2008. Also, 
disappointed SPD members founded the WASG (Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit - 
Labour and Social Justice – The Electoral Alternative), which later merged with the PDS and formed 
Die Linke, which took 8.7 and 11.9 % of the vote respectively in the federal elections of 2005 and 
2009, thus establishing itself as a strong party to the left of the SPD. 
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The	  2006	  decision	  
 
 The Grand Coalition, Germany’s second after 1966-69, agreed a remarkable 
position on the free movement of workers in its 2005 coalition agreement: “After the 
first two-year transitional period in 2006 we will use the possibility of prolongation 
for a further three years and will then, after consulting the Commission, campaign for 
a further prolongation of two years.” (CDU/CSU and SPD, 2005) As discussed, the 
Accession Treaty allows the use of the last two years in cases of serious disturbances 
of the labour market or the threat thereof. How could the parties predict the 2009 
situation four years beforehand? Obviously from the start this was a political issue 
rather than a case of observing EU agreements. For the SPD, the TP was one of the 
last issues where the interest of the unions could be heard, and an opportunity to 
safeguard its credibility as a social-democratic party. Merkel, on the other hand, could 
use this, among other initiatives, to “move the CDU leftwards” stealing votes from the 
centre-left and moving towards the Greens, thus opening options in a now solid five 
party system that would otherwise always favour the SPD in finding a junior coalition 
partner. The first decision had to be made, though, in 2006. 
 The DGB stated in its 4 April 2006 position paper that it saw no room for 
abandoning the TP for free movement of labour and underlined that “especially the 
cross-border free movement of services cannot be used to undermine labour rights in 
the work place” (DGB, 2006). The BDA also supported this position, but it pressed 
for a more relaxed approach to highly qualified workers (qualified workers could 
obtain permanent residency – unbefristete Niederlassungserlaubnis – only if they 
could prove an income of €86,400). When the BDI evaluated the 2005 coalition 
agreement, it assessed the premature agreement to prolong the TP by three years, 
under section 17 “Europe”, as “rather negative”, stating that “with hindsight about the 
lack of qualified workers and Germany’s demographic development this has to be 
assessed critically, and [f]lexible mechanisms should allow a cautious opening of the 
German labour market for qualified applicants as soon as possible.” (BDI, 2005) This 
is again an indecisive stance and mirrors different needs across different sectors, the 
interest in qualified workers alone and indifference when it comes to the low wage 
sector. The mostly overlapping positions of the unions and employers’ associations 
was confirmed in an interview with Gisbert Brinkmann (2010) from the Federal 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, whose division collected all the position 
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papers and was responsible for the co-ordination of the decision-making procedure for 
the two prolongations of the TP. According to this official, all the Bundesländer were 
in favour of the prolongation. In addition, the Berlin Land started to demand a general 
minimum wage (Mindestlohn). Berlin was targeted as a destination for workers from 
CEEC countries, especially Poland. Close to the German-Polish border, and a hub 
with over three million citizens, the city-state offered ample opportunities for workers 
from the CEEC countries in the area of craftsmanship and health care. They used a 
loophole in the legislation by registering companies and offering their services as one-
person companies or in small groups. According to Eugeniusz Smolar (2010 
Interview), by 2010 some 100,000 Poles were living in Berlin, and about 40,000 
Polish companies were registered there offering services as floor tillers, plumbers, 
nurses and so on. A minimum wage would prevent cutthroat competitive wages, but 
calls for this remained unanswered for the next five years.211 
 
The	  2009	  decision	  
 
 Much more controversial was the 2009 decision to prolong the TP for a further 
two years. Officially, this could only be done in cases of serious disturbances of the 
labour market or the threat thereof. From the start of the Grand Coalition, the Agenda 
2010 reforms were fruitful, and the official unemployment rate fell from its 2005 peak 
by 1.593 million or 33% of the 2008 figure (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2009: 39). 
Unemployment dropped in East Germany too, profiting from the economic boom, but 
also due to mobility from East Germany to West Germany (427,000 people migrated 
from East to West Germany in 2008) and a shrinking labour force which might more 
than halve the economically active population by 2050 from ten million to 4.5 million 
(BfA, 2009: 45). Given this development, the government should have had a hard 
time justifying another two year extension to the TP. 
 As early as September 2007, the BDA was arguing that every fifth vacancy was 
“difficult to fill”, especially in growing sectors, and despite €27 billion and €28 
billion investments in training the domestic workforce and young people there was a 
                                                 
211 In 2010 the IHK Berlin counted only 5,970 Polish companies registered in Berlin. Poles were the 
largest group, ahead of Turks (5,671) Vietnamese (1,647). See: http://www.ihk-
berlin.de/servicemarken/presse/Zeitschrift_Berliner_Wirtschaft/BERLINER_WIRTSCHAFT_Archiv/
Berliner_Wirtschaft_2010/BERLINER_WIRTSCHAFT_November_2010/1040260/Berliner_Wirtscha
ft_im_Zeichen_der_Internationalisierung.html, accessed 8 March 2012. 
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shortage of skilled labour (Fachkräfteengpässe). The association demanded (i) the 
facilitation of access to the labour market for the new EU members; (ii) that the TP 
not be prolonged in general and all-embracingly; (iii) that the minimum wage not be 
made a precondition for the free movement of labour (BDA, 2007). This was 
reiterated in 2008 and amended with the argument that Great Britain and Ireland had 
experienced a more dynamic economy, a positive effect on the age distribution, and 
that Germany was losing out to these states as a migration magnet for qualified 
workers (BDA, 2008). Again, the BDA stressed the need for qualified workers, but 
the vague formulation that the TP not be prolonged “in general and all-embracingly” 
reflects the difficulty of finding a common position across all sectors. Once more, the 
construction sector wished to prolong the TP whilst other sectors could not wait for 
liberalisation (Schneider-Bodien, 2010 Interview). 
 The IG BAU union of construction workers drafted an early statement and was 
against liberalisation in 2009, but the DGB was in a difficult situation because the 
eight stakeholders had differing opinions. The sectors and regional unions especially 
were “rather in favour of opening the borders, leading to a progressive dialogue, but 
did not draft a common position themselves in the end” (Kramer, 2010 Interview). 
This is surprising, since the eastern Bundesländer were among the fiercest supporters 
of a TP in 2004. Markus Schlimbach from DGB-Saxony explained in an interview for 
this thesis that the regional DGBs in the eastern Länder had had positive experiences 
with their Polish and Czech partners and that the border regions was only seen as 
transit land for potential migrants targeting West Germany (Schlimbach, 2010 
Interview). A DGB Saxony position paper does not explicitly call for prolongation of 
the TP in 2009, but stresses that it is important to keep young qualified workers in the 
region and not give them incentives to migrate to far away UK or Ireland. The paper 
also sympathises with the Polish and Czech positions and calls for enhanced border 
co-operation (DGB-Sachsen, 2007).  
 This might explain why Brandenburg’s Minister-President, Matthias Platzeck, 
(SPD) and Saxony’s Stanislaw Tillich (CDU) were against the last prolongation 
according to Brinkmann (2010 Interview). However, the states did not make this 
demand official. One reason might be because they did not want to stab their parties 
in the back at federal level. According to Schlimbach (2010 Interview), the committee 
for labour and social policy (Ausschuss für Arbeit und Sozialpolitik) and the 
committee for economic policy (Wirtschaftsausschuss) of the Bundesrat both 
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discussed the issue, with the former being in favour of another prolongation and the 
latter against it. This shows a similar pattern to the situation when the Labour and 
Social Affairs Ministry and the Economics Ministry were united between 2002 and 
2005, with both ministries “serving” different interests. In addition, the Foreign 
Ministry was against a further prolongation of the TP, keeping in mind what a 
prolongation would mean for relations with the CEEC countries, but could not prevail 
over the Interior Ministry’s position (official at German embassy in Warsaw, 2011 
Interview). Krzysztof Miszczak (2011 Interview) commented the German Interior 
Ministry’s position with the following quote showing frustration with the Interior 
Ministry and at the same time understanding why all the talks with the German 
Foreign Ministry and its embassy in Warsaw bore no fruits: 
 
The German Interior Ministry is so damn conservative on every level, you cannot 
imagine. Those civil servants sit there since x years with their empty heads. They 
always think: some minister will arrive and say this and that but we will do our thing 
anyway. And those civil servants prepare all those Vorlagen, those instructions. 
 
Although Polish-German relations were good overall due to the multi-layered 
approach (see Chapter III of this thesis), the Centre Against Expulsions issue initiated 
by the BdV was a major strain on Polish-German relations at the top (see Chapter VI 
of this thesis). The opening of borders for Polish workers could have sent a positive 
signal. In the end, Germany applied for the last two year TP, arguing that there were 
serious disturbances in the labour market for the long-term unemployed and the low 
qualified sector (Bundesanzeiger, 2009), hoping that the Commission would wave 
this through, though fearing that it would not (official at German embassy in Warsaw, 
2011 Interview). The Commission did not object to Germany’s reasoning and it 
would be interesting to examine why it allowed Austria and Germany to keep their 
respective TPs: a topic for further research. 
 Surely Angela Merkel as Chancellor, with her Richtlinienkompetenz, could have 
spoken a Machtwort and resolved any conflict between the ministries and the 
different wings of her own party. After all, the CDU is supposed to be close to 
German business. As seen, several reasons would have justified an end to the TPs in 
2009: the social partners were not as decisively in favour of a prolongation as in 2006, 
and in addition, all the remaining EU-15 states except Austria were indicating that 
they would end the TPs. Even though the coalition agreement of 2005 stated that the 
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two Volksparteien wanted a prolongation in 2009, this could have been reversed. This 
cannot be explained by unlikely disproportionally strong influence from the German 
construction and craftsmanship sector, but must also be sought in party politics. 
Another federal election was scheduled for September 2009 and Merkel probably did 
not want to risk confrontation with the SPD, giving the opponent ammunition for a 
perceived social topic. After the SPD’s social reforms had alienated the left wing of 
the party, the CDU could profile itself as the better option in that sphere. This did not 
pass unnoticed by liberals who criticised Merkel’s path as “social-democratisation of 
the CDU” (especially Brüderle from the FDP). The SPD, with Frank-Walter 
Steinmeier and Franz Müntefering at the top, started to shift the party leftwards 
again212 in April 2009 while Brussels was awaiting a decision regarding the TP. For 
the electoral campaign the SPD demanded a general minimum wage of approximately 
€7.50 (SPD, 2009), in line with the demands of the DGB which had been 
campaigning for a minimum wage for a while (Kramer, 2010 Interview). By agreeing 
on this seemingly social topic, the CDU avoided any confrontational issues which had 
potential to be used for populism and electoral mobilization. The campaign remained 
boring, and the lowest ever turnout in a German federal election hurt the SPD the 
most (see Saalfeld, 2011: 1).  
 The government’s decision was also criticised by independent experts for being 
harmful. Despite the TPs, many migrants came anyway through unofficial channels, 
often with lower qualifications than those coming to the other EU-15 member states. 
It would also prevent skilled labour from coming to Germany, contradicting the 
general strategy of closing the borders on the one hand and attracting workers with 
higher education on the other. For an export-oriented country especially this was 
harmful for its image (Zimmermann, 2009: 423). From 1 January 2009, the 
Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz213 came into force, answering the calls from the 
BDA/BDI position papers for more skilled labour. This stipulated that: 
 
1) the labour market was open to workers from the new member states with 
higher qualifications, and the usual check of whether the job could have 
                                                 
212 See: “SPD-Wahlprogramm: Mit Steinmeier und Müntefering nach links”, Die Zeit-online, 
16.04.2009, http://www.zeit.de/online/2009/17/spd-bundestagswahl-programm, accessed 26 November 
2011. 
213 Gesetz zur arbeitsmarktadäquaten Steuerung der Zuwanderung Hochqualifizierter und zur 
Änderung weiterer aufenthaltsrechtlicher Regelungen (Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz), 
Bundesgesetzblatt 2846: 2008, Teil I, No. 63. Bonn, 24 December 2008. 
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been filled by a native became obsolete. 
2) for higher qualified workers (Hochqualifizierte), the labour market was open 
if they earned over €63,600 of the social security contribution ceiling. This 
was lowered significantly from the previous €86,400. 
  
The law counters any argument that Germany may have prolonged their TPs to 
prevent Poland from losing more qualified workers. In fact, it adds to the so-called 
“brain drain” (or “brain waste” – when qualified workers start working below their 
qualifications), by trying to attract skilled labour alone, but keeping unqualified 
workers and labour from the low-wage sector at bay. It also shows that the 
government treated the TPs as an “adjustment tool” for migration and the 
unemployment rate. 
Polish	  reaction/	  inaction	  
 
The official statement of the Polish government was always that Germany should 
open its border to all Polish workers (Miszczak, 2011 Interview). Several interview 
partners among unions, employers’ associations and government officials in Germany 
and Poland stated that after 2006 Poland complained about the lack of skilled labour 
as many Poles had migrated to the EU-15 states in pursuit of well-paid work. Ewa 
Synowiec (2011 Interview) summarised the situation: 
 
Unfortunately the year 2008 was the worst in terms of emigration in Poland. By then 
many people emigrated to Ireland and Great Britain and there were such fears [of a 
mass exodus of specialised workers], depending on the sector, especially in the 
construction sector and medical professions. It was also the case with nurses, but 
there was the issue that their qualifications were not acknowledged. In the public 
health care system it was feared that dentists and anaesthetists would leave. 
 
Programmes launched by Polish local politicians to counter the exodus support this. 
In Opole, the programmes “Opolskie – tutaj zostaję” (Opole - here I stay) and 
“Opolskie – tutaj powracam” (Opole – here I return)214 were launched in an attempt 
to convince young Poles to remain loyal to their region, along with incentives to open 
a business there rather than seeking an El Dorado abroad. Several city mayors and 
                                                 
214 See: “Młodzi wyjadą do Niemiec i już nie wrócą”, gazeta wyborcza-online: 
http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,101562,9027350,Mlodzi_wyjada_do_Niemiec_i_juz_nie_wroca.html, 
accessed 25 November 2011. 
 187 
businessmen also went to the UK and Ireland and tried to convince Poles to return to 
Poland.215 In that context Poland should be glad that Germany prolonged its TPs in 
2006 and 2009 respectively. However, what annoyed Polish officials was the 
Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz described above, which lured away highly 
qualified workers who had been educated at the Polish taxpayer’s expense, but who 
then migrated westwards in pursuit of higher wages. Rusewicz, an official from PKPP 
Lewiatan, Poland’s strongest business association assured me that:  
 
We did not prepare an official opinion on that practice. However, we did address this 
issue to the Polish and German media. […] What really concerns us is indeed the 
intensive courting for specialists and students. At the moment the Brandenburg 
government conducts talks with many regional associations and Lewiatan in the 
Masovian voivodeship about cooperation regarding students who would like to go to 
Germany, get some practical training there, but with the thought to employ them for 
longer. And indeed we perceive these activities as intensive. […] In the future this 
could indeed endanger the human resource management in Poland and we fear the 
brain drain a bit. We have paid attention to this issue recently. 
 
As Krzysztof Miszczak (2011, Interview) explained: “you cannot do that, attract the 
best brains but keep the others away”. Also the Tusk government was considering 
taking Germany to the ECJ due to the inappropriate prolongation of her TPs despite 
evidence that the labour market was not experiencing serious disturbances (official at 
German embassy in Warsaw, confirmed by Miszczak, 2011 Interview). The official 
reason for Polish inaction was that the two years would be up anyway by the time the 
case was resolved and it would have strained Polish-German relations to the detriment 
of Poland’s interest in other areas: 
 
Yes, that it is true [we did consider raising this issue in Brussels]. However for 
political reasons we refrained from such a step. […] You can gain a lot today for two, 
three weeks but the political raison d'être is different. We need Germany’s support in 
finance, CAP. We are not as developed in these areas. We also looked for France 
support. Politics has an element of concession. I give you something, you give me 
something in return […]. (Miszczak, 2011 Interview) 
 
Clearly, strained Polish-German relations would have been exploited by the 
opposition (PiS) for its own purposes, as it has often played the “anti-German 
card”.216 Thus strategic party politics must also be “blamed” for the Polish 
                                                 
215 See: “Miasta kuszą emigrantów: Wracajcie do Polski. Mamy dla was pracę”, Gazeta Wyborcza-
online: http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,6140598.html, accessed 30 November 2011. 
216 For the 2011 Sejm elections, PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński again used anti-German rhetoric to 
attract voters. See: “Polens Oppositionschef unterstellt Großmachtphantasien: 
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government’s inaction. Miszczak’s (2011 Interview) comments Germany’s 2009 
decision as 
 
a pity […] Because of Germany’s false policy Ireland and Britain profit. […] We 
have appealed to the German government but there was a wall [meaning German 
government did not want to listen]. Now the German government acknowledged that 
they made a mistake. During our recent discussion the German government was 
saying that they would like to see up to 100,000 Poles on the German labour market, 
but Poles do not want to go. You know, the German society is so closed to foreigners, 
so conservative and anti-European and create their own psychological frontier 
because they think they are better. Somehow they have it codified here [points to the 





The flexible 2+3+2 model, applied to free movement of workers and services in the 
construction industry, industrial cleaning and interior decorators for Germany at the 
EU-15 level does not correspond to preferences of all member states, but 
demonstrates the influence of sectoral interests in Germany. The construction sector 
was vociferous and successful in demands for a TP to protect its business. It benefited 
from Polish-German bilateral treaties. The construction sector often employed Polish 
workers illegally. Prior to Poland’s EU accession this sector wished to fight 
competition from Polish companies providing services in Germany. The construction 
sector’s influence is reflected in Chancellor Schröder’s mention of it in his 
government policy statement in the Bundestag in January 2001, at the time when he 
himself raised the issue publicly. Schröder had only in November 1999 announced a 
governmental package to rescue Germany’s biggest construction company, Philipp 
Holzmann, from insolvency. This was in line with the Chancellor’s self-
representation strategy as the saviour of German jobs, especially in the tabloid Bild-
Zeitung.217 The liberalisation of workers and services would, in that context, 
contradict the Chancellor’s actions. But, business was slow in the new Bundesländer, 
which could call for help from their respective Minister-Presidents, and the Bavarian 
                                                                                                                                           
Kaczynski zieht im Wahlkampf die anti-deutsche Karte”, 
http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/polen400.html, accessed 29 November 2011. 
217 For Chancellor Schröder, a good relationship with Germany’s biggest tabloid Bild was particularly 
important. In 2002, Bild’s chief reporter Béla Anda became government spokesman. For Schröder, Bild 
was “half of the media business” and during the first two years Bild presented him very favourably 
(Rosumek, 2007: 225).  
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CSU was the first party to demand a TP in that area. The unions had been in favour of 
a TP from the start, but one cannot automatically draw the conclusion that they 
defeated the interests of the employers’ associations just because a TP was agreed. 
The flexible model of revisions and extensions indicates compromise and the 
possibility of adjusting policy in favour of business whenever needed.   
 Party politics and the electorate’s fears also play a significant role in the 
accession negotiations as well as in the prolongations in 2006 and 2009. This is 
demonstrated by the coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and the SPD in 2005 
which agreed four years in advance to seek the last prolongation despite not knowing 
that far in advance whether the labour market would experience serious disturbances. 
The SPD could not afford to risk further confrontation with her left wing or the unions 
after the difficult social reforms of “Agenda 2010”, and the CDU under Angela 
Merkel exploited the SPD’s “neue Mitte” by moving left, avoiding confrontation with 
the SPD and presenting itself as more competent on questions of economics. In that 
context it unsurprising that Merkel announced the introduction of a comprehensive 
minimum wage at the time of the TP’s expiry in May 2011, and the SPD gained some 
momentum in the polls in the second half of 2011. 
 It is difficult to draw any meaningful conclusion about the role of non-state 
actors in Poland when examining H3 for this topic. The unions and employers’ 
associations were both in favour of the liberalisation of the free movement of 
workers, and that has been the Polish government’s position since the UKIE’s 1997 
national strategy. Poland accepted the TPs in return for the meeting her demand that 
the acquisition of real estate by foreigners be restricted for 12 years. Despite growing 
concerns over the lack of qualified workers, especially in construction and 
craftsmanship, due to the mass exodus of Poles, workers which were much needed for 
the economic boom experienced since accession in 2004, the government insisted on 
a full liberalization of the German labour market and was particularly annoyed by 
Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz, exacerbating Poland’s “brain drain” problem. But 
no Polish government could permit itself to be anti-EU and openly state that it wishes 
a closed labour market for Germany, in order to protect Polish sectoral businesses. 
Regarding H1; in this case the new Bundesländer played an important role in 
demanding a TP, justifying it by the high unemployment rate, especially in the low-
wage sector. The regional divisions of unions also communicated their experiences to 
the top level. Party politics at the federal level prevented the respective Minister-
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Presidents from making public their opposition to the last prolongation in 2009, but 
the fact that non-state actors have an additional access point at state-level has been 
made apparent and is an important distinctive feature, compared to the Polish policy-
making apparatus. Also, in the German case, official position papers are respected by 
the government and are an integral part of the political system. In Poland, social 
partners often complained about a lack of information. Although they voiced their 
preferences they did so confrontationally, especially when the association’s political 
affiliation did not match the party composition of the government. This has been 
consistently the case in the preceding chapter, as well as in this one. It must be 
admitted that for both issues in Poland and Germany public opinion and the fears of 
the electorate were very important for policy-makers in deciding on a position for the 
accession negotiations. Therefore, individual non-state actors’ preferences were 
always weighed against the political costs and it is not possible to attribute clear-cut 
results to either the success or failure of any single actor’s influence. This is valid for 
the DGB’s positions, which matched the public’s attitude towards enlargement as a 
whole in Germany, and the agricultural organisations in Poland which wanted what 
the majority of Poles did: to prevent Germans buying up land. Hence, at most it can 
be stated that these actors enhanced their demands by instrumentalising the media and 
the parliaments as a mouthpiece (especially in Poland’s case). 
 Like Chapter V, this chapter cannot falsify H2. Joining the EU has meant both 
countries lifting their relations to a new level, institutionalising their relations more 
through inter-linkage and through joint or diametrically opposed interests which 
create friction or satisfaction. This chapter has shown that the German regional unions 
also argued on behalf of their Polish counterparts, even though the DGB as an 
umbrella organisation took a different position later, in 2009. Although the regional 
DGBs and eastern Länder were not successful in realising their preferences, the fact 
that they include these considerations adds to the multi-layered approach of Polish-
German relations, making them more solid. 
 
7. The “Centre Against Expulsions” 
 
 
This chapter analyses the decision-making process leading to the establishment of a 
permanent exhibition at the Deutsches Historisches Museum (DHM – German 
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Historical Museum) in Berlin, depicting the flight and expulsion of millions of 
Germans, following the WWII and the Potsdam Conference. This issue differs from 
those looked at in the previous case studies in two crucial ways. First, whereas the 
free movement of workers and the free movement of capital were negotiated at the 
bilateral and EU levels, for the purpose of Poland’s EU enlargement, this issue is in 
principle a German domestic political decision that affects Polish-German relations 
for reasons examined further below. Hence, there is limited opportunity for 
comparison between German and Polish foreign policy-making in this case. 
Nevertheless, the issue demonstrates how the German political system enables non-
state actors to access decision-makers and successfully influence foreign relations. 
That a similar case cannot be found in Poland for comparative purposes, points to the 
limitations that non-state actors face in the Polish system. Furthermore, the original 
initiative for the project, which eventually resulted in the permanent exhibition still 
under development at the time of writing, stemmed from the Federation of Expellees 
(Bund der Vertriebenen – BdV), and the interest of the business community in what is 
essentially a cultural venture has therefore been unremarkable. Consequently, H3 is 
addressed here indirectly by showing that it is not only non-state actors with 
economic interests which have an impact on decisions pertaining to Polish-German 
relations. 
 Second, whereas the previous case studies are completed in the sense that the 
chapters of the acquis communautaire and TPs have been negotiated, this issue is not 
entirely concluded. The exhibition is under development and the reactions to it will 
have much analytical value. The issue may play a role in Polish-German relations 
beyond this point, but this thesis is unable to take that into account. However, the 
most important political decisions have already been made and they are sufficient to 
showcase the topic of this thesis. 
 This topic is very contentious and laden with emotion on the Polish and 
German side -  this is the issue that has strained relations between the two countries 
the most in the last decade. One relationship-straining argument has been the notion 
that the project allows Germany to reverse its own and Poland’s roles as perpetrator 
and victim. The problem begins with differences between the terminology in 
circulation on each side. Whereas in Poland the terms wysiedlenie (resettlement; 
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Aussiedlung) and less often przesiedlenie (move; Übersiedlung)218 are used, in 
Germany the term Vertreibung (expulsion; wypędzenie)219 is commonly accepted. 
This is reflected in the historical texts used in Polish secondary and grammar schools 
(Ruchniewicz, 2006: 151-59; Migdalski et al., 2007; Strobel and Maier, 2008; 
Ruchniewicz, 2010: 2-8).220 What seems like minor linguistic difference carries wide-
reaching, potentially explosive political and societal implications based on differing 
perceptions of history and what constitutes “the truth”. This thesis uses the terms 
‘expulsion’ and ‘expellees’ throughout – this must not be interpreted as a sign of 
partiality. This chapter does not engage in the debate over how nations should 
remember events; it also does not give a “correct” account of historical events. 
Rather, it examines the process of political decisions and, in that context, the selection 
of certain terminology is unavoidable. Using the word “resettlement” would not do 
justice to the numerous cases where Germans were moved in a more violent 
manner.221 Hence, “expulsion” and “expellees” is understood as collective term for 
the events that took place during and right after WWII and the people affected. 
 The chapter first presents a brief overview of the expellees’ role in German 
society, their political organisation and their activity until the end of the Cold War. 
                                                 
218 In this particular context the German language is more specific than the English language. The 
Oxford Duden German Dictionary (1990: 727) translates the term Übersiedler simply as a German 
native moving to the Federal Republic from East Germany. Ruchniewicz (2006) also uses the word 
Zwangsmigration (forced migration).  
219 The German law distinguishes between Vertriebene (expellees) who were residents of the former 
German Ostgebebiete on 1 January 1939 and Heimatvertriebene (Heimat expellees) who were 
residents of the former Ostgebiete on the 1 January 1937. The former received the Vertriebenausweis 
B, the latter the Vertriebenausweis A (see Art.1 and Art.2 BVFG). In Poland, due to the Cold War and 
the uncertainty of the final borders, any discussion about the expulsions were repressed since the 
regime sought to legitimise the new Poland and did not want to weaken its negotiating position with 
the FRG (see Madajczyk, 2006: 242-46). 
220 Poland and Germany have acknowledged the problem of differing historical perceptions leading to 
misunderstandings, tensions and the straining of relations between peoples, and therefore in 1972 
created a joint commission under the auspices of UNESCO for the creation of a Polish-German history 
book for schools (Deutsch-Polnische Schulbuchkommission). The Commission is based at the Georg-
Eckert-Institut in Braunschweig. See: http://www.gei.de, accessed 13 March 2012. Höpken (2006: 114-
15) identifies three weaknesses in dealing with the topic of expulsions in German schools: first, the 
German expulsions are not covered comparatively; second, there is superficial reflection on the causes; 
third, expellees’ experiences of integration into the FRG and GDR are not adequately dealt with.   
221 According to Salzborn (2007: 97) the generalised usage of the term “expulsion”, “obscures the 
ambiguous and contradictory nature of the historically diverse phenomenon which took place in several 
phases.” By referring to Schieder (in Salzborn, 2007: 97-98) he rightly points out that there were in 
truth four distinct, overlapping phases: i) evacuation of indigenous Germans by the German authorities; 
ii) flight; iii) “wild expulsion”, i.e. unofficial and unorganised expulsions before the Potsdam 
Conference; iv) deportation following the Potsdam Conference. The term “expulsion”, “purposefully 
introduced after the Second World War […] was intentionally launched as part of victim terminology 
and as part of a political strategy […] supposed to underline the status and the representation of the 
resettled Germans as victims.” (Salzborn, 2007: 98) 
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Then, the chapter analyses the events and the decisions which followed the initiative 
presented by the BdV in 2000. This includes Poland’s reaction and the resulting lack 
of co-operation between the two countries on the project. The process is divided into 
three sub-sections roughly corresponding to the three different governments and their 
respective roles in tackling the issue: the SPD-Green government of 2000-05, the 
Grand Coalition of 2005-09 and the CDU/CSU-FDP government.    
 
 
I.	  Ostflucht:	  flight	  and	  expulsion	  
 
In September 1939 millions of German were living in the so-called Ostgebiete 
(eastern territories): 9.955 million Germans within the German borders 
(Reichsgrenzen), and 8.312 million outside the German borders (Reichling in Kossert, 
2008: 22).222 The expellees did not come exclusively from the territories that would 
later become Polish, an important point for this chapter.  
When Soviet troops advanced westwards in 1944, a mass exodus commenced 
of millions of German living in the Ostgebiete. As early as July 1944 the inhabitants 
of the Memel Territory (Memelland) were evacuated. When the Red Army crossed 
the Vistula in January 1945, some 4-5 million Germans fled westwards and hundreds 
of thousands died of hunger or allied bombing or were caught by the advancing army. 
Many women were raped (Hirsch in Kossert, 2008: 27-28). 
At the 1943 Tehran and 1945 Yalta conferences the allies agreed to move 
Poland’s eastern border back to the Curzon Line. This line had been Poland’s border 
in the east after WWI until Marshal Piłsudski had moved it further east after victory in 
the Polish-Soviet war. Poland would lose 180,000 square kilometres in the east but 
would be compensated by gaining 103,000 square kilometres of land in the west, up 
to the Oder-Neisse Line. During the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 the allies 
agreed on the new borders but stated in point VIII of section B that the “final 
delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement” (as 
discussed in Chapter III).223 Article XII states: 
                                                 
222 On the history of Germans in the East see, for example, the ten volume Deutsche Geschichte im 
Osten Europas (2002) published by Siedler Verlag. 
223 The full text of the Potsdam Communiqué is available at: 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/psources/ps_potsdam.html, accessed 9 March 2012. 
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The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize 
that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining 
in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that 
any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner. 
(Potsdam Conference, 1945) 
 
The allies considered the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne a successful precedent case for 
establishing an “exchange of people” between Turkey and Greece. Thus, the allies 
tolerated the Beneš Decrees expelling the German population from Czechoslovakia as 
well as the expulsions under Polish leader Bierut and in the other states. The argument 
used then was that “as long as there are no minorities, there cannot be any territory 
claims.” (Münz, 2002: 722) In 1945/46 these expulsions were seen, in terms of 
international law, as “harsh, but acceptable”. Today, however, these deeds would be 
retrospectively seen as ethnic cleansing and unacceptable, as demonstrated by the 
interventions in Kosovo, Bosnia and East-Timor. This observation, made correctly by 
Rainer Münz (2002: 723), is important because, as seen further below, it is one of the 
main explanatory arguments for why the BdV, under Erika Steinbach’s leadership, 
embarked on a project to erect a museum depicting and condemning the expulsions. 
International law changed over time and with it the expulsions of Germans can be 
seen in a different light. 
 Yalta and Potsdam reversed Hitler’s “Generalplan Ost” policy, and prepared 
and legitimised the expulsion of millions of Germans (Faber, 2002: 742). Other 
nations, though, suffered a similar fate, including 1.4 million Kresy Poles who were 
expelled and resettled in the regained lands (Kossert, 2008: 33) of the new Piast 
Poland. These expulsions were, more often than was necessary, not conducted in the 
“humane manner” stipulated at the Potsdam Conference. Officially, the Polish 
government forbade arbitrary acts of revenge under threat of harsh punishment. In 
reality, however, local Polish authorities tolerated excessively retributive acts, as 
described by Bahlcke (2006: 167) regarding the expulsion of Silesians. Essentially 
everywhere where expulsion of Germans occurred (from the territories mentioned 
above) it was often conducted in a cruel manner (see Kossert, 2008: 32-40). In total, 
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twelve to fourteen million Germans were expelled in the different phases,224 while 
two million perished (Kittel, 2007: 7). 
 Some ten million people arrived in the western zones, subsequently the FRG, 
excluding refugees from the Soviet Occupation Zone (SOZ) and Spätaussiedler.225 
The allies, underestimating the sheer volume of arrivals, agreed on certain quotas for 
accommodating expellees, but they were very soon filled and the expellees were 
moved to areas where capacities were still available (Kossert, 2008: 59). Table 6.1 
shows the total number of expellees and the proportion of the population they 
represented in the eleven Bundesländer. Additionally, four million expellees had to 
find a new home in the SOZ. The GDR government could not oppose Soviet policy 
and simply treated the expellees as “resettlers” (Umsiedler), denying them any victim 























                                                 
224 Not all Germans were expelled immediately. For example, some qualified workers who were seen 
by the local authorities as irreplaceable for reconstruction and training of Polish workers were 
prevented from leaving (e.g. Bahlcke, 2006: 197-98). Others, such as the Silesians of the Upper 
Silesian industrial basin, were seen as suitable for “re-Polonisation”. These Germans would emigrate to 
Germany as Spätaussiedler (see below) in several waves from the 1950s onwards. 
225 Spätaussiedler (late repatriates of German origin) are people of German origin, previously residing 
in the former Soviet Union or the former Eastern Bloc States, who have moved permanently to 
Germany. Bundesministerium des Inneren: 
http://www.zuwanderung.de/ZUW/DE/Zuwanderung_hat_Geschichte/Spaetaussiedler/Spaetaussiedler
_node.html, accessed 12 January 2012.  
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Table 7.1 Total number of expellees in the eleven Bundesländer and their respective 
share of the population in 1950, 1961 and 1970 




The local populations were not always welcoming to the expellees. Offensive labels, 
such as Polacken (a pejorative term for a Pole), Gesockse, Flüchtlingspack (expelled 
rabble) and others, were often used; although many expelled families also had good 
experiences (see Kossert, 2008: 43-86). Local populations were poor, and were now 
forced to share their living space and food, and their reactions can be understood in 
that context. But, the expellees were part of the German Volk who experienced non-
solidarity soon after Hitler’s cult of Deutschtum (Germanness). This is an important 
point, it later plays a vital role in the BDV’s project. The survivors remember the 
“xenophobia” they experienced, and they often lament the insufficient recognition of 
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the hardships they suffered226 and their contribution to the Wirtschaftswunder and the 
new Germany.   
 
II.	  Organisation,	  integration	  and	  political	  activity	  and	  influence	  of	  the	  
expellees	  in	  the	  FRG	  before	  1990	  
 
In autumn 1945, the first expellee organisations emerged as registered associations 
(eingetragener Verein, e.V.),227 although they were officially forbidden by the allies 
(Kossert, 2008: 139-40). In 1948, the first umbrella organisation was founded in the 
British zone, disguised as a reconstruction organisation (Stickler, 2004: 35). The 
expellees organised themselves into Landsmannschaften,228 representing their regions 
of origin. In April 1949, two umbrella organisations emerged: the Zentralverband der 
vertriebenen Deutschen (ZvD) for economic and social questions and the Vereinighte 
Ostdeutsche Landsmannschaften (VOL) responsible for cultural tasks. This divided 
structure reflects the struggle between the two organisations’ leaders who often used 
their positions as springboards for a political career. Throughout the 1950s conflict 
prevailed between the two, leading to the failure to found a united Bund der 
vertriebenen Deutschen (BvD) (Stickler, 2004: 33-53). In 1959 the two organisations 
merge into the single umbrella organisation Bund der Vertriebenen (BdV) (Stickler, 
2004: 78-98). By 1956 the two organisations had over 2.1 million members, 
amounting to 23.7% of expellees (Stickler, 2004: 147). Although this seems to be an 
impressive degree of organisation, four years previously the number of members had 
been 3.5 million (or 42% of expellees), so they had dropped by roughly a third. 
Numbers declined partly due to the Federal Expellee Law (Bundesvertriebenengesetz 
– BVFG)229 passed in 1953 and the Equalization of War Burdens Act 
                                                 
226 In a December 2002 representative poll by Allensbach, 66 % of all expellees in West Germany, and 
70 % of all expellees in East Germany responded that they had had problems with integration into the 
new societies for a long time (Petersen, 2005: 24-25). 
227 In the German legal system an eingetragener Verein is a legal person and enjoys many legal rights 
as defined in the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code - BGB). Most German amateur sports 
clubs are e.Vs.  
228 According to the BdV, twenty Landsmannschaften are organised today under the umbrella 
organisation BdV: http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/derbdv/struktur-1.php3, accessed 15 January 
2012. The total number of Landsmannschaften varied at times due to splits and mergers.   
229 The BVFG, besides stipulating the conditions that had to be met in order to qualify as an expellee 
Vertriebener, Heimatvertriebener, Sowjetzonenflüchtling and Spätaussiedler (first section), grants 
rights and benefits (second section) and regulates the administrative procedure. For this chapter, Article 
96 is of importance since it ensures financial support for cultural activities, maintenance of culture and 
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(Lastenausgleichsgesetz – LAG)230 passed in 1952. Both laws promised expellees 
improvements in social conditions and permanent integration into West-German post 
war society. The Wirtschaftswunder contributed to declining membership figures 
(Stickler, 2004: 147).  
Nevertheless, this group had disproportionately high unemployment rates and 
low property ownership compared to the local population (see Kossert: 2008: 87-
109). In 1992, an evaluation of 212 interviews with expellees born between 1900 and 
1932 revealed that for 49% of the interviewees (and 77% of their parents) social 
status declined following expulsion. Only 8% of the interviewees (and 1% of their 
parents) experience social advancement (von Engelhardt in Kossert, 2008: 136). 
Moreover, the LAG was perceived by the local population as an unfair burden and as 
overly generous to the expellees,231 which helps to explain why expellees were often 
treated with hostility and a lack of sympathy when they later protested against 
Brandt’s Ostpolitik. 
The expellees meet at annual Heimat-meetings (Tag der Heimat). On 5 
August 1950 the spokespersons of the Landsmannschaften and the umbrella 
organisation signed the Charter of German Expellees (Charta der deutschen 
Heimatvertriebenen) in which the expellees refrained from “revenge” (Rache und 
Vergeltung), but also asserted that “forcing man to separate from his homeland means 
to kill him in spirit” (Charta, 1950). Hence, the Charter established the right to a 
homeland, and is a cornerstone for the organisations’ demands for the return of the 
territories. Retrospectively, politicians and intellectuals evaluated the Charter 
differently. Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble said on the 26 August 2006 in 
Stuttgart at the 65th anniversary of the expulsion of Germans from Russia 
(Russlanddeutsche),232 that the Charter shows “greatness and an aptitude for 
learning”, and that “ it is not revanchism and depression which dictate the Charter but 
                                                                                                                                           
scientific engagement with the topic (see below). See http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/bvfg/index.html, accessed 16 January 2012. 
230 Up to 1987, the law was modified 31 times (Kossert, 2008: 98). 
231 The LAG forced the local population to pay, over the next thirty years, 50 % of the value of their 
property at the time of the 1948 currency reform. The money was used to compensate those who had 
lost or suffered heavy damage to their property in WWII. The expellees were one group which 
benefited most since they had had to leave their property behind. However, by 1979, the expellees had 
received compensation amounting to only 22 % of their property which, in addition, was undervalued 
(Grosser in Kossert, 2008: 101). 
232 Stalin expelled the Russian Germans (also known as Volga-Germans) from the Volga German 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, east of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, after Hitler’s 
Operation Barbarossa commenced in June 1941 (e.g. Muth, 2010). These Germans were also used for 
forced labour.  
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the belief in the future, Europeanness and Christian humanity.” (Schäuble, 2006)233 
Brumlik (2005: 92-108) opines that the Charter stresses the singularity of German 
suffering, reflects the repression of national-socialism, does not deal with the causes 
of the expulsions, and that the wording “refrain from revenge” was wrongly chosen 
since one can only refrain from something when one is entitled to it. That opinion is 
widely accepted in Poland, and in an interview for this thesis, Director of the Office 
of the Plenipotentiary of Prime Minister for International Dialogue, Krzysztof 
Miszczak,  called the Charter “insolent” since it was Poland which was “entitled to 
refrain from revenge for the suffering caused by Germans including the misdeeds in 
the Warthegau”. 
Contemporaries evaluated the influence of the expellees as “not 
unremarkable” (Jöhren in Stickler, 2004: 191). The expellee party Gesamtdeutscher 
Block/Bund der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten (BHE) was a junior coalition 
partner in five Bundesländer in the 1950s. A Ministry for Expellee Questions 
(Bundesministerium für Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen)234 was established; in 
Adenauer’s second cabinet (1953-57), four ministers were expellees; and the number 
of expellee civil servants in all the ministries was quite high (Stickler, 2004: 191-
208). Nevertheless, despite the big parties’ recognition of their voting power, the 
expellee organization(s) “were not [in contrast to contemporary portrayals] a powerful 
pressure group and their influence was kept within narrow limits by their own 
structural weakness and the mechanisms of party democracy.” (Stickler, 2004: 209) 
The big Volksparteien (the CDU/CSU and the SPD) both courted the expellee 
vote, often making hopeful and unrealistic promises (see Stickler, 2004: 212-346; 
Kossert, 2008: 165-81). The following two quotes from the two most important 
political figures in the young FRG serve as excellent examples of this. As late as 
1961, Adenauer said at the annual meeting of Silesians in Cologne that “Alsace-
Loraine returned to France, according to its own wish, only after 47 years. Do have 
patience, have endurance and have hope.” (in Kittel, 2007: 9)235 However, in a 1957 
interview, Adenauer remarked in the context of the new borders that “one cannot turn 
                                                 
233 Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl laments in his memoirs that the Charter “has still not been 
sufficiently recognised” (Kohl, 2005: 371). 
234 The Ministry was renamed the Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und 
Kriegsgeschädigte and was closed in 1969. From then on, the Interior Ministry was responsible for 
questions dealing with the expellees.   
235 For more on Adenauer’s revisionist position on the question of the Ostgebiete at the beginning of 
his Chancellery see, for example, Bingen (1998: 26-35). 
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the wheel back, I think this is impossible. The Russians moved the Poles westwards, 
the Germans further west […] Therefore one needs to find an agreement with Poland, 
perhaps at the European level as well.” (in Bingen, 1998: 65) Brandt signed a 
message to the same group’s 1963 meeting with the words: “Breslau, Oppeln, 
Gleiwitz, Hirschberg, Glogau, Grünberg are not only names, these are living 
memories […] Renunciation equals treason, who would deny it? 100 years SPD […] 
means 100 years of struggle for the self-determination of peoples.” (in Stickler, 2004: 
244)236 The same year Bahr drafted the beginning of Ostpolitik with the concept of 
“change through rapprochement” (Bingen, 1998: 95). 
That the expellees could not prevent the 1970 Warsaw Treaty underlines the 
thesis that they were not as influential as often portrayed and were rather “vocal but 
uninfluential” (von Dannenberg, 2008: 221-30). However, earlier tentative attempts 
by CDU officials to accept the Oder-Neisse line failed due to immense public 
pressure and the “vociferous protests of expellee activists” (Ahonen, 1998: 44). That  
it took West Germany a quarter of a century to recognise the border and normalise 
relations with the eastern bloc countries can be attributed to domestic pressures and 
the expellees’ efforts, not just to the West German Staatsräson of isolating the GDR, 
as Ahonen (1998) points out. Ostpolitik also marked the beginning of the BdV’s 
alliance with the CDU/CSU. Initially, many expellees were more inclined towards the 
SPD since it was the party which stood up for those who did not have much and 
supported the LAG.237 After the launch of Ostpolitik, many expellees turned their 
backs on the SPD and switched to the opposition CDU, such as Reinhold Rehs 
(spokeperson for the Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen and president of the BdV 1967-
70) and Herbert Hupka, thus calling into question the BDV’s official stance of being 
above party politics (Stickler, 2004: 252-79). Even before the launch of the SPD’s 
Ostpolitik, the link between the SPD and the expellees had weakened considerably for 
a number of reasons overlapping with the above-mentioned declining membership 
rate in the expellee organisations. As discussed, the CDU’s rhetoric courted the 
expellees and promised a Germany within its 1937 borders. Further, Adenauer’s CDU 
skilfully integrated the expellees politically by establishing a special Ministry for 
                                                 
236 Brandt’s rhetoric represents a continuation of the first SPD postwar leader Kurt Schumacher’s 
endorsement of the expellee cause, promising as early as 1946 to “fight with all peaceful means… over 
every square kilometre east of the Oder-Neisse.” (in Ahonen, 1998: 42) 
237 The CDU managed to successfully integrate the members of the BHE, which was dissolved in 1961 
(see Bösch, 2001). 
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Expellee Affairs, by giving ministerial posts to expellees, and by integrating BHE 
politicians into the CDU. Also, pressing social needs were resolved with the LAG and 
the BVFG. Lastly, Adenauer’s Westbindung proved to be economically beneficial and 
the Wirtschaftswunder replaced irredentism on the list of priorities. Michael 
Schwartz’s argument that “expellee integration equals economic growth plus time” 
(in Ahonen, 2005: 13) is perhaps too simplistic, but is certainly valid for the two 
Germanies and Finland (Ahonen, 2005).238    
 After the launch of Ostpolitik the expellees put their hopes in the conservative 
party. Undoubtedly the CDU/CSU was not honest with the expellees about the border 
question in the 1980s, meaning that Kohl had to manoeuvre carefully to reconcile re-
unification, recognising the Oder-Neisse line, possible exploitation of the issue by 
right-wing parties and his own electoral ambitions (see Chapter III). However, by 
1990 the overall influence of the BdV had declined significantly, leading to its 
marginalization, according to Ociepka (1997: 286). She identifies four main reasons. 
First, economic equalization with the “local population” was completed, alongside 
compensation for the war losses through the LAG. Hence, the BdV could no longer 
claim to represent an economically disadvantaged group, thereby losing an important 
part of its appeal in the 1950/60s. Second, although the BdV managed to find MPs in 
the CDU/CSU party who would vote for its interests in the Bundestag, such as the 23 
MPs who voted against ratification of the 1990 Border Treaty (see Chapter III), the 
fact that it could not live up to its own ambition to be an organisation which 
transcended party politics and found support across all parties weakened its range of 
influence among elites. Third, the BdV does not possess the instrument of a classic 
interest group: party financing. Rather, the BdV relies on subsidies from the federal 
and Länder budgets. Fourth, this leaves only one leverage method: the voting 
behaviour of its members, but the parties know that an electoral recommendation by 
the board does not necessarily reflect the opinions of its members (Ociepka, 1997: 
286-91). To this list one could add declining membership due to natural “dying out”. 
As Stickler comments on the declining trend in the 1960s, “the significance of the 
organization falls together with declining membership. Therefore, the BdV and its 
                                                 
238 Ahonen’s (2005) article compares the two Germanies’ and Finland’s experience with expellees, and 
tries to establish the underlying cause of the “taming” of the “expellee threat” after 1945. He identifies 
three transnational underlying causes. First, the Cold War itself, with the presence of two powerful 
hegemons in the two Germanies, prevented the expellees’ claims from materialising. Second, economic 
growth. Third, the emergence of a new more dynamic society which accepted change due to the 
destruction of the war, which had uprooted old structures.  
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predecessor organization have always been eager to overestimate the membership.” 
(2004: 140) However, whilst the BdV’s membership declines,239 the number of 
expellees does not necessarily decline as well. The BVFG originally granted the status 
not only to the actual expellees but also to their descendants, meaning that by 1974, 
31.4% of all “expellees” had been born after 1949 (Schlau in Hopp, 2010: 90), 
leading to the bizarre situation that the absolute number of “expellees” is increasing. 
Although an opinion poll by the Allensbach institute suggests only 6% of the German 
population thinks that the children and grandchildren of the contemporary witnesses 
should also be seen as expellees, 29% responded that that they themselves or someone 
in their family had been affected by the expulsions, a rate that has increased from 
24% in 1959 (Petersen, 2005: 20-21). This offers the BdV the potential to play an 
important role in issues like the preservation of the memory and heritage of the 
historical Ostgerman culture. This is underlined by the fact that 44% of the population 
and 63% of the expellees opine that the expellee organizations are important for the 
maintenance of traditions (Petersen, 2005: 55). Hence, despite all the apparent 
weaknesses of the BdV and the Landsmannschaften, how is it possible that the 
organization, under Erika Steinbach, succeeded in her proposed project, straining 
Polish-German relations for over a decade? I suggest that one contributory factor was 
the expellees’ assumed quasi-monopoly on the maintenance of the Ostgerman culture 
and heritage due to the general apathy of the wider population about this, and the 
CDU/CSU’s generous financial support for the expellee organizations.  
 
Memory	  politics;	  financial	  support;	  CDU/CSU-­‐expellees	  link	  and	  the	  effects	  
 
Under the 1982-98 CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, federal subsidies for the maintenance 
and development of and research on the cultural heritage of expellees’, as anchored in 
Article 96 BVFG, increased significantly, underlining the alliance of expellee 
                                                 
239 As of today (January 2012) the BdV claims that some 1.3 million individuals are organised in the 16 
Landesverbände and 20 Landsmannschaften See: http://www.bund-der-
vertriebenen.de/derbdv/struktur-1.php3, accessed 9 March 2012. The actual amount is most likely 
much lower. At the time of the controversy surrounding the manning of the foundation board of the 
“Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation” foundation, the BdV claimed to represent two million members. 
The news agency DDP claimed in its research a membership of 550,000. See: “Verwirrung um 
Mitgliederzahl - FDP fordert Aufklärung über Größe des Vertriebenenbundes”, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,670494,00.html, Spiegel-online, 06.01.2010, 
accessed 9 March 2012.    
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organisations with conservatives (see Table 6.2). In addition, individual Bundesländer 
were able to finance expellee organisations and their activities. The Länder assumed 
patronage over the Volksgruppen240 and subsidised their respective protégé-groups. 
Especially in Bavaria, where the CSU governed with an absolute majority from 1962-
2008, the Sudeten German Landsmannschaft was integrated into the state as the 
“fourth tribe” (vierter Stamm),241 thus enjoying many privileges. For example, a 
Sudeten-German Foundation was created in 1970 and the Bavarian Minister-President 
is always its chairman. Also, Bavaria contributed half of the DM 25 million expenses 
for the Sudeten German House in Munich (Hopp, 2010: 130-31). 
 
 
Table 7.2 Federal subsidies in thousand DM* for the maintenance of the cultural 
heritage of the expellees as stipulated in Art. 96 BVFG in the years 1973-2010** 
Year The entry “subsidies for the 
maintenance of the cultural 
heritage of the expellees” in 
the Interior Ministry 
The entry “subsidies for 
German-political work 
including the tasks 
according to Article 96 
BVFG as well as the 
foundation 
“Deutschlandhaus” in 
Berlin” in the Federal 





Germans in their 




1973   2,938    
1974   3,051    
1975   3,387 1,039   
1976   3,557 1,000   
1977   3,773 1,007   
1978   3,868 1,159    4,218 
1979   4,029 1,945    4,274 
1980   4,186 2,101    5,006 
1981   4,282 2,251    4,282 
1982   4,170 start of Kohl 
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition 
2,344    4,170 
1983   4,360 2,435    4,360 
1984   6,200 3,000    6,200 
1985   6,500 4,000    6,500 
1986   8,000 3,500    8,000 
1987 10,500 3,700  10,500 
                                                 
240 With the term Volksgruppe, the author means German groups coming from different regions, such 
as Volga Germans, Danube Swabians etc. The English approximation “ethnic group” would not 
accurately enough convey the meaning of Volksgruppe, stressing the cultural component rather than 
just the “blood” element of an ethnos.   
241 Since 1956, the Sudeten Germans have been recognised as constituting a “tribe” alongside the 
Franks, the Swabians and the Old Bavarians (Cordell and Wolff, 2005: 94). It is also noteworthy that 
the Sudeten Germans have been the most cohesive expellee group and most adept at maintaining a 
collective identity (Hahn in Cordell and Wolff, 2005: 93). 
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1988 15,000 4,147  15,000 
1989 17,594 5,383  22,870 
1990 20,424 5,510  26,618 
1991 35,045 5,990 (from now on 
Interior Ministry) 
2,000 43,579 
1992 36,100 5,563 2,000 46,884 
1993 36,100 6,007 2,000 47,398 
1994 35,100   56,756 
1995 30,665  1,800 44,273 
1996 30,690  2,000 45,459 
1997 32,000  2,000 52,917 
1998 29,000 (start of Schröder 
SPD-Greens coalition) 
 2,000 52,453 
1999 
 
26,164 (from now on 
competence lies in the 
hands of the Minister of 
State in the Federal 
Chancellery and the Federal 
Government Commissioner 
for Culture and the Media) 




Art. 96 BVFG 
and the cultural 
life of foreign 
minorities) 
2000 26,943  1,000  43,493 (3,600)  
2001 20,198  1,000  35,149 (1.950) 







2003 19,801  - 31,252 (1.950) 
2004 24,638  - 30,787 (1.950) 
2005 18,838 start of Merkel 
CDU/CSU-SPD govt. 
 - 27,057 (1.893) 
2006 21,285  - 29,114 (1.835) 
2007 21,006  - 30,748 (1.866) 
2008 20,401  391 31,718 (1.561) 
2009 22,126 start of Merkel 
CDU/CSU-FDP govt. 
 391 36,464 (1.244) 
2010 20,722  391 32,592 (1.409) 
* all amounts stated in Euro have been converted into DM 
** In addition to the federal government, the individual Bundesländer have the possibility of 
subsidising expellee organisations and maintaining their cultural heritage according to Art. 96 BVFG 
*** The amounts stated in the previous columns do not necessarily add up to the total stated here. 
Several positions in the federal budget cite Art. 96 BVFG as a legal reference 
 




The inter-linkage between the conservatives and the expellee organisations went 
beyond financial support. Until 1998, Interior Minister Schäuble, Chancellor Kohl 
and several other members of the government and lower ministerial levels either 
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visited the organisations’ events or sent festive greetings to them. Also, several 
motions demanding the protection of minorities and settlement rights in the CEEC 
states, the acknowledgement of expellees’ contribution to Germany’s reconstruction 
and the injustice of expulsions, and the continuation of subsidies – prepared by the 
Union faction “Expellees and Refugees” – were passed during the CDU/CSU 
government’s tenure (Hopp, 2010: 128). MP Herbert Czaja (CDU) was president of 
the BdV from 1970 until 1994, when MP Fritz Wittmann (CSU) took over. In 1998 
MP Erika Steinbach (CDU) became its president, demonstrating once more the 
expellee organization’s affiliation with conservatives. 
 The expellee organizations used the subsidies for their Heimat meetings, their 
maintenance costs, and also for museums depicting the Ostgebiete culture and other 
Eastern settlements.242 Whether the cultural heritage of the Ostgebiete and the 
German settlers in the East has been sufficiently cultivated can only be answered 
subjectively. Kittel (2007) suggests a second “expulsion of expellees” from the 
collective memory243 of Germans by analysing memory politics from the 1961 Berlin 
crisis until the beginning of the Kohl era in 1982. He sees a relentless decline and 
“ghettoization” of expellees and their memories following Brandt’s Ostpolitik, and a 
tendency of the population to see the expulsions as “a just atonement for guilt for the 
world war and the Holocaust without an engagement with its own injustice in a proper 
cause and effect analysis. Kittel argues furthermore (2007: 169) that the expellees 
“were given special guilt for national-socialism,” which is “historically wrong”. 
Nevertheless, by 1989 some 5,000 academic titles were published on the topic of 
“expulsions” and “expellees” (Wolfrum in Wittlinger, 2006: 72), and by 2003 some 
                                                 
242 By the year 2000, the following museums were subsidised by the federal budget: Pommersches 
Landesmuseum (Greifswald), Ostpreußische Landesmuseum (Lüneburg), Westpreußische 
Landesmuseum (Münster), Schlesisches Museum zu Görlitz (Görlitz), Oberschlesisches 
Landesmuseum (Ratingen), Haus Schlesien-Schaufenster Schlesien (Königswinter), 
Donauschwäbisches Zentralmuseum (Ulm), Siebenbürgisches Museum (Gundelsheim), Museum 
Ostdeutsche Galerie (Regensburg). Furthermore, the following regional establishments were 
subsidised: Ostpreußische Kulturstiftung (Ellingen), Nordostdeutsches Kulturwerk (Lüneburg), 
Göttinger Arbeitskreis (Göttingen), Stiftung Haus Oberschlesien (Ratingen), Stiftung Kulturwerk 
Schlesien (Würzburg), Adalbert Stifter-Verein (München), Südostdeutsches Kulturwerk (München); 
and the nationwide: Martin Opitz-Bibliothek (Herne), Institut für deutsche Musikkultur im östlichen 
Europa (Bonn), Künstlergilde Esslingen (Esslingen), Stiftung Museum Ostdeutsche Galerie 
(Regensburg) (Drucksache, 14/4586: 4). 
243 Maurice Halbwachs coined the term “collective memory”. An engagement with the concept for the 
purpose of this thesis would lead to an unnecessary deviation. Suffice to say that the term describes the 
memory of groups that is constantly reconstructed on the basis of the present and is therefore a social 
construct (Halbwachs, 1992: 39-40). The concept is not uncontested since it is very difficult to 
measure.   
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100 authors had dealt with these topics in approximately 50 novels and other forms of 
fiction (Flögel in Wittlinger, 2006: 72),244 so that Wittlinger subsumes (2006: 73) that 
despite the predominant discourse of German responsibility for war guilt, another 
“counter-discourse” of “Germans as victims” has existed. Despite all that, by 2002, 
only 18% of all Germans could exactly pinpoint and a further 21% could vaguely 
indicate where Silesia is located on a map (Petersen, 2005: 32-33).245 Also, over two 
thirds of all respondents had never heard of any of the museums dealing with the 
history of the expellees and their culture (Petersen, 2005: 59).  
Paired with the public perception of the expellee organisations preservers of 
traditions, this gives the BdV a great deal of legitimacy to launch the project that is 
this chapter’s subject of analysis. The exact causes for the population’s ignorance 
about the historical German East can only be speculated, but a mixture of general 
indifference, the low priority set by the Bundesländer in schools as well as 
insufficient promotional work by the expellee organisations is responsible in part. 
Cordell and Wolff (2005: 94) identify in regards to the Sudetendeutsche 
Landsmannschaft’s (SdL) role on questions of property restitution from the Czech 
Republic and their Recht auf Heimat credo: due to “wider societal apathy and lack of 
interest with regards to the expellees” the SdL gains prominence within and outside of 
Germany since it has the field to itself. Here, the same effect can be identified at the 
level of the umbrella organisation. 
 
III.	  The	  expellees	  after	  1990:	  critical	  juncture	  and	  Steinbach’s	  
presidency	  
 
After the 1989 and the cementation of the Oder-Neisse line in the 1990 Border Treaty 
(see Chapter III), the expellee organisations were confronted with a new reality. It 
was clear that the last hopes of a return of the Ostgebiete to Germany were shattered, 
but the open borders of a free Europe would enable expellees to visit their former 
                                                 
244 In a representative poll in December 2002 by Allensbach, 26 % of the overall German population 
and 39 % of all expellees said that they had at least heard of Siegdried Lenz’s So zärtlich war Suleyken. 
Also, 21(38) % of the respondents had at least heard of Lenz’s Heimatmuseum and another 21(34) % 
had heard of Günter Grass Im Krebsgang (Petersen, 2005: 43; in brackets the responses from 
expellees).  
245 Also, 32 % could exactly and another 25 % could vaguely indicate the location of the Sudetenland. 
Petersen (2005: 32) explains that at the time of the poll, the Sudeten was in the media because former 
Czech Minister-President Zeman called the Volksgroup “Hitler’s fifth column” and the media attention 
probably contributed to the population’s better knowledge of that geographic location.  
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Heimat, establish contact with the new inhabitants and remaining Germans, and 
enable new possibilities for restitution claims and demands for the right to settle. The 
choice was hence one of reconciliation versus antagonism. The different 
Landsmannschaften of the BdV took different paths. Most famously, in 1990 the SdL 
decided to support the filing in the US of a collective court case for restitution against 
the Czech Republic (Cordell and Wolff, 2005: 96); and on 14 December 2000 the 
Prussian Claims Society (Preußische Treuhand – PT) was founded as a limited 
liability corporation (GmbH), with the Landsmannschaft Ostpreußen participating as 
a partner with 40%. In September 2001 the Landsmannschaft Schlesien acquired 
another  10% of the stake.246 Parallel to this, the Landsmannschaft Schlesien had been 
engaged with Poland in a process of reconciliation and cross-border co-operation, and 
many expellees, as private individuals, had been active in the restoration of churches, 
theatres, cemeteries, monuments, and the creation of small Heimat-museums in the 
former Ostgebiete (Cordell and Wolff, 2005: 100-02; Steinbach, 2010 Interview).247 
Therefore, although activities which strained Polish-German relations were perhaps 
not officially supported by the BdV as a whole, the individual Landsmannschaften 
were nonetheless its members, and suspicion from CEEC states are understandable, 
no matter what the BdV’s intention’s and despite the PT’s claim that to be 
independent of the BdV.248 In addition, the persons who were active in the BdV, the 
individual Landsmannschaften and the PT overlap,249 meaning that many Poles might 
see the BdV and its project as a wolf in sheep’s clothing. 
 In 1998 Erika Steinbach became the BdV’s new president; the first leader in 
the organisation’s history without any recollection of the expulsions. Steinbach was 
born in 1943 in Rumia/Rahmel (in then occupied Reichsgau Danzig-Westpreußen). 
She fled with her mother and siblings from Gotenhafen (Gdynia) on the ship Pelikan, 
two days after the MV Wilhelm Gustloff was sunk (Steinbach, 2010: 29-43). The fact 
that Steinbach is the daughter of an occupier is often a point of criticism in Poland 
(e.g. Miszczak, 2011 Interview), but her father came from Lower Silesia, making 
                                                 
246 See: http://www.preussische-treuhand.org/de/PVerwirklichung.html, accessed 20 January 2012. In 
September 2001, the Preußische Treuhand was turned into a GmbH & Co.KG a.A., a special type of 
limited partnership in which the general partner is a GmbH, but which nevertheless constitutes a 
variant with shares. 
247 There are no official statistics measuring the number of expellees active in the restoration of their 
former Heimat, as they undertake these projects as private citizens (Steinbach, 2010 Interview).  
248 (ibid.) 
249 See: “Polen fürchten die Preußische Treuhand”, tageszeitung, 13.02.2004. 
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Steinbach an expellee according to the BVFG, since her family could not return there. 
Experts in Germany and Poland give Steinbach credit for moderating the tone of BdV 
members vis-à-vis expeller states (Vertreiberstaaten), and also skilfully modernizing 
the organization (Baring, 2010 Interview; Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, 2011 Interview). 
Nevertheless, Steinbach aroused a lot of controversy: she was one of the 23 
Bundestag MPs voting against recognition of the Oder-Neisse line in 1990 (see 
Chapter III). She made some insensitive remarks even before the project was 
presented by the BdV in 2000. In 1999, when criticising the fact that expulsion 
decrees were still in force in some candidate countries, and that the property 
restitution question was still open she stated: “no fighter jets (Kampfflugzeuge) are 
needed. A simple ‘veto’ is enough for the accession of unreasonable candidates.”250 
She made a similar remark when justifying her “yes” for the ratification of the 2003 
EU Accession Treaty (Steinbach, 2003; Meckel, 2006: 14-15).251 Other controversial 
statements followed after the project was presented in 2000 (see below). This, of 
course, has not made it any easier to convince Poles and nationals of the other CEEC 
states to trust the BdV’s intentions – even though they might be honest and 
reconciliatory – not least because the BdV carries the history of decades of opposition 
to Ostpolitik. 
 Whether Steinbach made these statements consciously or not, the effect is the 
same: they are not taken lightly abroad, causing a storm of outrage in the media252 and 
amongst political elites, thereby bringing Steinbach to prominence in Germany, and 
leaving the political elite no choice but to deal with the issue and try to mend strained 
Polish-German relations. Steinbach is aware that the print media is interested in 
selling their product (Steinbach, 2011 – Interview), and this might be a tactic for 
achieving her goals. This thesis is supported by her remark at a CDU-
Landtagsfraktion workshop in Düsseldorf in February 2010 when she commented on 
                                                 
250 Quoted in “Das Gewissen ist gegen Vertreibungen sensibilisiert – Den Worten müssen Taten 
folgen”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26.08.1999 
251 Steinbach said that she only said “yes” to the Accession Treaties because the Bundestag voted on all 
ten treaties as a package, implying that had the vote been conducted on each candidate separately, she 
would have said “no” to the Czech Republic and Poland.  
252 Perhaps most famously, the Polish weekly Wprost depicted Steinbach on the cover of its 38/2003 
issue in Nazi uniform sitting on Chancellor Schröder’s back as a comment on Steinbach’s initiative to 
erect a Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin. 
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IV.	  The	  process	  to	  the	  decision	  
 
The process leading to the decision to create a permanent exhibition at the DHM in 
Berlin depicting the flight and expulsion of Germans can be divided into three phases, 
roughly coinciding with office terms of three governments. The first phase begins in 
2000, with the presentation of the idea by the BdV and ends in 2005 when the Red-
Green coalition ends. During that time, a heated debate begins in both countries; 
characterised by SPD opposition to the idea, with two counter-projects as an attempt 
to pull the carpet from under the BdV’s feet. A second phase lasts between 2005 and 
2009, when the Grand Coalition agreed on a “Visible Sign”, but did not agree on how 
to realise the project. This phase coincides with the PiS-led government in Poland and 
is a low point in Polish-German relations. The third phase, commencing with the 
CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in 2009, is characterised by the realisation of the “Visible 
Sign” accompanied by a quarrel over the composition of the foundation board and the 
scientific advisory board. The following three sections are organised according to this 
pattern. 
 
A	  Centre	  Against	  Expulsions	  –	  Act	  I	  
 
According to Steinbach, it was her idea to establish a “central memorial and 
remembrance site” exhibiting the flight and expulsion of Germans from the east. 
When she became president of the BdV in 1998, she asked herself, “what do I want to 
make mine and my organisation’s task?” (Steinbach, 2010 – Interview). She names 
her motivations as, first the general public’s lack of knowledge about the “diversity of 
expulsions and resettlements”; second, to show the rich cultural heritage of the 
expellees; and third, to “remind of the fate of almost fifteen million expellees of 
                                                 
253 In the original: “ein Drache steigt erst auf durch Gegenwind”, meaning that opposition is helpful in 
achieving a goal.  
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which about two million perished, and which belongs to Germany’s history and 
identity.” In the BdV committee’s discussions, “we decided that [the memorial] 
should be in Berlin to make it visible for all,” and it was also Steinbach’s idea to 
“show solidarity with the other expellees” and to depict not only the fate of the 
Germans, but of the other nations of the 20th century, “to outlaw expulsion publicly 
because it is always illegal under international law.” (Steinbach, 2010 Interview) 
Although these statements offer satisfactory explanations, especially in public 
discourse, a number of other, possible motivations should be explored. 
 First, Markus Meckel (2010 Interview), then an SPD MP and chairman of the 
German-Polish Parliamentary Group (1994-2009), suggests that due to the 
professionalisation and increased scholarisation of the museums, paired with 
reductions in the federal funding for the expellees (see Table 6.2), as part of the new 
“Concept for Research and Presentation of German Culture and History in Eastern 
Europe” (see Drucksache 14/4586), the BdV found a new project to counter the Red-
Green government’s interference. Steinbach (2010 Interview) denied this by saying 
that the cutbacks had come much later than the idea, which was developed in March 
1999 and presented in June 2000.254 However, as Knut Nevermann (2010 Interview), 
SPD Deputy Minister of the Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the 
Media from 1998 to 2006, explained in our interview, “we were not even in office and 
it was obvious to us that we wanted to cut them down to size [the subsidies]” since the 
BdV had been “a pure front organization” under Kohl.255 It is likely that the BdV 
knew about these plans and that the leaders had an inkling of the rough climate to 
come under a Red-Green coalition, given their strong affiliation with the CDU since 
the launch of Ostpolitik. 
 Second, Meckel (2010 Interview) also suggests that this, the BdV’s most 
prominent project, was intended to establish the organisation permanently across all 
party lines, as for some time the BdV had been experiencing a fall in membership.256 
The way the BdV executed its plan appears to support this thesis. Steinbach managed 
                                                 
254 The BdV made plans for a “Centre Against Expulsions” public for the first time at the 1999 Tag der 
deutschen Heimatvertriebenen in Berlin on 29 May 1999. The BdV’s concept was presented in June 
2000 in a 21 page paper (Salzborn 2003: 1021-22). See also the foundation’s website: http://www.z-g-
v.de/english/aktuelles/?id=39, accessed 29 January 2012. 
255 Nevermann explained to the author that the federal government was paying 44 full time cultural 
advisors (Kulturreferenten) and that the museums’ directors were not acting independently of the BdV.  
256 Similarly, Mildenberger (2002: 732-33) argues that the BdV used the project to try to find a place in 
the new Berlin Republic. 
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to win over Peter Glotz (SPD), who became her co-chair at the “Centre Against 
Expulsions” foundation (Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen – ZgV), founded on 6 
September 2000.257 Glotz, born in the Sudetenland and a professor of media and 
society at the University of St. Gallen (2000-2004), was a respected, high profile 
social democrat, and his visibility contributed to bridging the gap between the Social 
Democrats and the expellees. When in the summer 2001 the ZgV foundation sent 
letters to all German municipalities inviting them to support the foundation with one 
ten-pfennig piece per inhabitant, many SPD-led city councils approved the call for 
donations because they saw Glotz was a co-signatory.258 Other SPD-politicians also 
sympathised with the BdV and its project. At the Tag der deutschen 
Heimatvertriebenen on 29 May 1999, Interior Minister Otto Schily (SPD) criticised 
the political left for its bad relationship with the expellees (in Salzborn, 2003: 1121), 
an issue Günter Grass259 deals with in the novel Crabwalk (Kossert, 2008: 9). Later it 
became clear that Schily was an advocate for the BdV’s project, and wanted to create 
a task-force including members from the government and the ZgV foundation which 
would try to find a suitable location in Berlin for a museum, but the advance was 
blocked by the SPD and Green factions in the Bundestag.260 When Glotz died in 
2005, Schily was asked by Steinbach whether he would like to become his successor 
as co-chairman of the ZgV foundation (Baring, 2010 Interview). 
 The fact that Steinbach managed to convince the BdV board to strive for a 
museum which would not only depict the flight and expulsions of Germans, but also 
the other forced migrations of the 20th century, was a shrewd move aimed at gaining 
support from the public and politicians from other political parties. Such a project 
would show a universal phenomenon of expulsion, distract from the focus on the BdV 
and German expellees alone and open new angles on the topic. It would seem to 
contradict the perception of the BdV as an organisation which only stood for its own 
interests; and it would put opponents in a tight spot by suggesting that the “BdV is 
able to show empathy for the fate of others, but if you oppose our project you not only 
deny us empathy, but also the other international expellees.” The idea has also been 
                                                 
257 See: http://www.z-g-v.de/aktuelles/?id=39, accessed 28 January 2012. 
258 See: “Die Katze im Sack gekauft – Wie deutsche Gemeinden etwas vorschnell Geld für das 
Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen spendeten”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11.11.2003. 
259 Nobel Prize for Literature winner Günter Grass is also a prominent SPD member. 
260 See: “Berlin vor neuem Mahnmal-Streit - Ein ‘nationales Projekt’ verstört die Nachbarn – 
Gedenkstätte für deutsche Vertriebene trifft bei Polen und Tschechen auf Widerstand: Keine 
Aufrechnung von Unrecht”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.07.2003 
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linked to the tragedies of the Balkan Wars in the 1990s when many displaced persons 
found refuge in Germany, making the issue of expulsions topical again for the public 
and politicians (e.g. Schlögel, 2003: 18; Ther, 2003: 215-16a) and hence difficult to 
ignore.   
 Third, Baring (2010 Interview) suggests that the ZgV would function as a 
“final festive funeral for the lost Ostgebiete”. Steinbach (2010 Interview) called this a 
“stupid remark” since the expellees not only came from there, but also from the Banat 
for example. This is a valid point, but the fact that Baring is a member of the scientific 
advisory board of the BdV’s ZgV foundation carries some weight, and whilst perhaps 
this was not the primary motive, it could serve as a farewell to the Heimat in general. 
 Fourth, a ZgV located in Berlin would seek proximity to the “Memorial to the 
Murdered Jews of Europe” which the Bundestag decided to erect in 1999, and which 
was completed in 2005, thereby claiming victim status for the expellees as well. 
Moreover, the ZgV would imitate the conceptualisation and realisation of the US 
Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington. Although Steinbach (2010 Interview) 
denied this to the author, Salzborn (2003: 1123) identifies this from the interview she 
gave in May 2000 to the Leipziger Volkszeitung. As mentioned above, Germany’s 
main “collective memory discourse” since the launch of Ostpolitik has centred on her 
role as perpetrator, although a parallel “Germans as victims discourse” also existed, 
though overshadowed by the former. Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has 
also increasingly engaged in the latter discourse.261 Another phenomenon that has 
been observed since the student revolts is a “memorial movement” 
(“Gedenkstättenbewegung”) which has led to over 100 memorial sites reminding 
three million annual visitors of Nazi crimes (Lutz, 2003: 251-60).262 This was also 
criticised by the intellectuals Stefan Berg and Henry Broder in a Spiegel article.263 
The authors complain that Jews, the Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, expellees and 
other groups demand their own memorial and use Wolfgang Thierse’s vocabulary of 
“victim-lobbyism” (“Opfer-Lobbyismus”).         
 Although none of the above four “alternative” motives for erecting the 
memorial can be proved with absolute certainty, they are clearly identifiable and lie 
                                                 
261 Two published works exemplify this thesis: Jörg Friedrich’s (2002) Der Brand. Deutschland im 
Bombenkrieg 1940-45, dealing with the bombing of Germany by the allies, arguing that from 1944 the 
bombings no longer made military sense; and the 2006 movie Dresden portraying the bombing of the 
city in 1945.   
262 See also http://www.gedenkstaettenforum.de/, accessed 30 January 2012. 
263 See: “Gedenken – Jedem das Seine”, der Spiegel, 05.01.2004. 
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within the realm of possibility and have been used in critical debates among 
intellectuals and politicians in Germany as well as in Poland. 
 
The first two years after the BdV’s official presentation of the project in 2000 were 
rather quiet in terms of public debate and political activity. On the 50th anniversary of 
the Charter of the German Expellees on 3 September 2000, Chancellor Schröder 
stated that Poland’s and the Czech Republic’s EU accession negotiations would not 
be linked to the expellees’ property restitution demands, and that he was reserved on 
the prospect of a Centre Against Expulsions. This was interpreted by the BdV as a 
rejection, even though Schröder’s remark did not give a definitive answer (Salzborn, 
2003: 1122). The BdV continued its work on the foundation and sent the above-
mentioned requests for donations to all municipalities and Bundesländer. The CDU-
governed Länder, Lower Saxony, Hesse and Baden-Württemberg as well as CSU-
governed Bavaria assumed patronage over the foundation and sponsored the ZgV 
with five Euro cents per inhabitant. The foundation managed to attract well-respected 
personalities like the historian Arnulf Baring, professor of international law Alfred-
Maurice de Zayas and the German rabbi Walter Homolka to support its cause by 
joining its scientific advisory board. Moreover, support was won from individuals 
including Deutsch Bank CEO Rolf Breuer, theologian, civil-rights activist and 
President of Germany since March 2012 Joachim Gauck, Hungarian novelist György 
Konrad, football coach Udo Lattek and TV-entertainer Harlad Schmidt.264 To date 
Steinbach has used these personalities skillfully as proof of wide support across 
German society and globally (e.g. Steinbach, 2010). The impressive list of supporters 
became an effective way to exercise pressure on politicians to tackle the issue since it 
demonstrates broad support, and legitimizatises the need for such a centre. 
 In February 2002, the German Cultural Forum for Eastern Europe265 organized 
a debate on the ZgV. During the debate Markus Meckel suggested such a centre in 
Wrocław (Breslau) to prevent a “national house of expulsion” and to create a 
European project (Meckel, 2002: 30). Meckel (2010 Interview) claims this was 
spontaneous. The initial reaction in Poland was negative, but the Polish historian   
Włodzimierz Borodziej defended Meckel’s suggestion and called for a debate on his 
                                                 
264 For the full list see: http://www.z-g-v.de/aktuelles/?id=40, accessed 3 February 2012. 
265 The German Cultural Forum for Eastern Europe was founded in 2000 as a non-profit organization 
and is financed by the Federal Government’s Commission for Cultural and Media Affairs. See: 
http://www.kulturforum-ome.de/, accessed 3 February 2012.  
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suggestion.266 On 15 May 2002, one day before a Bundestag debate was scheduled on 
a possible ZgV in Berlin, the chief editor of Poland’s largest daily, Gazeta Wyborcza, 
published an open letter in his paper and Die Welt addressed to Chancellor Schröder 
and Prime-Minister Leszek Miller suggesting that such a centre should be built in 
Wrocław that would “neither be a centre or museum of German suffering that would 
turn perpetrators into victims, nor a museum of Polish martyrdom and colonization, 
but a museum of catastrophes and symbol of a renewal of our joint Europe.”267 The 
Bundestag debated three motions. The CDU/CSU faction called for the government to 
create the basis for a “constructive […] collaboration with the ZgV [foundation] […] 
and to find a suitable building in Berlin to realize the project.” (Drucksache, 14/8594) 
The FDP, in turn, supported such a centre, but wanted co-operation from European 
partners (Drucksache, 14/9068). The SPD-Green coalition called for the beginning of 
a European dialogue to talk about a ZgV, co-operation from personalities from other 
European states on such a centre and that the preparatory work by the House of 
History in Bonn which had prepared an exhibition on the expulsion of Germans 
should be incorporated into it (Drucksache, 14/9033). The debate that followed 
reveals how successfully the BdV managed to convince politicians from parties other 
than just the CDU/CSU of its intentions. Hans-Joachim Otto (FDP) linked the topic of 
expulsions to the tragedies in Kosovo, Sudan and Liberia and specifically stated that 
the ZgV foundation was non-partisan and that personalities such as Arnulf Baring, 
Dieter Blumenwitz and György Konrad, participants in its scientific advisory council, 
proved its international orientation (Bundestag, 16.05.2002). Antje Vollmer (Greens) 
stated that the causes of the expulsions could be found in the French Revolution 
which had given birth to populism and nationalism, and therefore favoured a 
European centre and advocated the co-operation with other nations (Bundestag, 
16.05.2002). Norbert Lammert (CDU/CSU) defended Berlin as the location since 
Germany had a special relationship to the causes and effects of expulsions, along with 
15 million victims (Bundestag, 16.05.2002). Vollmer’s remark is of particular 
interest. She acknowledges that different expulsions can be shown in one 
centre/museum by making nationalism a common thread of all the expulsions of the 
19th and 20th centuries, and thereby supports the BdV’s idea. This, however, is very 
                                                 
266 See: “Porozmawiajmy o propozycji Meckela”, Rzeczpospolita, 7.03.2002.  
267 “Breslau, nicht Berlin – Auf Initiative des Bundes der Vertriebenen soll in Berlin ein Zentrum gegen 
Vertreibungen entstehen – Gastkommentar”, Die Welt, 15.05.2002. See: http://www.welt.de/print-
welt/article389241/Breslau_nicht_Berlin.html, accessed 4 February 2012.   
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controversial. Lutz (2003: 258-59) explains that it is problematic to show different 
expulsions together, since the viewer often mixes up the events. This, in turn, could 
lead to a hidden suggestion that Germany is trying to attenuate its war guilt by 
blaming nationalism as the cause of WWII and hence make perpetrators into the 
victims of an abstract ideology that practically all nation-states share. This has been 
one of the major points of criticism in Poland (Miszczak, 2011 Interview). 
 Steinbach responded to Michnik’s letter in Die Welt on 18 May 2002 stating 
that unfortunately not many Germans would travel to Wrocław to see an exhibition, 
but it was the purpose of the centre to confront as many Germans as possible with the 
topic.268 On 4 July 2002, the Bundestag rejected the CDU/CSU’s motion and passed 
the SPD’s motion (Plenarprotokoll 14/248). A day later, Meckel and Rita Süssmuth 
(CDU) wrote a letter to the presidents of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia and Bosnia informing them about the Bundestag’s resolution and asking 
their respective countries to cooperate on a European project for the erection of a 
centre against expulsions (in Troebst, 2006: 68-69). Meckel’s (2010 Interview) 
strategy was to push the issue on two levels - governmental and presidential - to 
create so much pressure that a national centre would never be possible. However, 
Poland’s President Kwaśniewski did not respond. According to Meckel (2010 
Interview), Kwaśniewski was afraid of the CDU/CSU Chancellor candidate Stoiber 
who was demanded that Poland annul the Bierut Decrees. Kwaśniewski’s concern 
was that Stoiber might not be able to take his remarks back if he were elected as 
Chancellor given the privileged position of the expellees in Bavaria (see above). 
Poland’s former ambassador to Germany, Janusz Reiter, explained in  Der Spiegel on 
1 July269 that the expulsion decrees have been annulled and that only the 
nationalization decrees of the most important sectors of economy were still in force. 
Moreover, the term “Bierut Decrees” was a German invention, since in Poland the 
legal basis for the expulsions was the Potsdam Declaration rather than a governmental 
decree, as was the case with the Beneš Decrees in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, 
Reiter compared that the planned ZgV was a “pendant to the Holocaust Memorial”. 
                                                 
268 “Stellungnahme des Bundes der Vertriebenen vom 18. Mai 2002 zum offenen Brief von Adam 
Michnik and Bundeskanzler Schröder und Premierminister Miller”, Die Welt, 18.05.2002. 
269 See: “Unnötige Polemik – Interview with Janusz Reiter”, Der Spiegel, 1.07.2002. 
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After Stoiber’s remarks, Schäuble flew to Warsaw and explained that this was a 
misunderstanding.270  
Stoiber’s remarks, paired with the Prussian Claims Society’s activities, help to 
explain why Poland became mistrustful. Given the proximity of Poland’s referendum 
on EU accession in June 2003, German elites decided to halt the issue (Meckel, 2010 
Interview). After Poland’s “yes” in the referendum, the issue surfaced again. On 14 
July 2003, Meckel called publicly for a “European Centre Against Expulsions, Forced 
Migrations and Deportations”, and by 5 September 2003 numerous experts and 
politicians from Germany and the CEEC countries, including Poland’s former Foreign 
Ministers Bartoszewski and Geremek, and Marek Edelmann, the last survivor of the 
1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, signed it.271 Intellectuals from Wrocław, in turn, 
published a plea to erect such a centre in their city in the regional issue of Gazeta 
Wyborcza (in Troebst, 2006: 84-85). The advisory board of the ZgV foundation 
responded with a condemnation of the perceived artificial polarizing debate between a 
national versus a European project on expulsions and underlined that a European 
approach was already included in its own foundation. Furthermore, the centre was 
foremost an issue of internal politics, a matter of showing empathy towards German 
expellees who had not received any in previous decades.272 Also, Glotz argued that 
such a centre could not be built without the expellees, should not be moved up to state 
level and that an international project would take 30 years to realise.273 
 In the meantime, the BDV’s ZgV foundation set up the Franz-Werfel 
Memorial Prize for human rights, to be awarded every second year to persons or 
institutions working against expulsions and ethnic cleansing.274 This was another 
intelligent move by the foundation to become accepted by society as an institution 
which did not concentrate on the sufferings of Germans, and helped the ZgV to gain 
international prestige. 
 Christina Weiss, Federal Government Commissioner for Culture and the 
Media published an article in the German weekly Die Zeit on 2 October 2003 
                                                 
270 See: “Verbitterung über Ignoranz”, die tageszeitung, 4.07.2002. 
271 See: http://markus-meckel.de/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/Aufruf-Europäisches-Zentrum-gegen-
Vertreibungen_mit-Unterzeichnern.pdf, accessed 5 February 2012. 
272 “Ein nationales und ein europäisches Anliegen”, http://www.z-g-v.de/aktuelles/index.php3?id=23, 
accessed 5 February 2012. 
273 “Ein ‘nationals Projekt’ verstört die Nachbarn”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 15.07.2003.  
274 “Franz-Werfel-Menschenrechtspreis gestiftet”, http://www.z-g-v.de/aktuelles/index.php3?id=18, 
accessed 5 February 2012. Since 2009, the prize has been awarded annually. 
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advocating an idea developed by the SPD’s historical commission to create a network 
of scientists, publicists and museum experts across all European countries (in Troebst, 
2006: 95-99). Similarly, Germany’s President Rau and Poland’s President 
Kwaśniewski called jointly on 29 October for a European dialogue on this issue.275 
Meckel (2010 Interview) and Nevermann (2010 Interview) both admit that the 
concept of developing a European network was meant to destabilise the BdV’s  and 
make their foundation obsolete. The idea was to create a foundation in Poland that 
would officially be equally funded by Poles, Czechs and Germans. The German 
government, however, was willing to carry most of the costs (Nevermann, 2010 
Interview). After several meetings between international experts on a possible 
European Network,276 conferences on the topic of expulsions277 and meetings by the 
culture ministers of Germany, Poland and other CEECs,278 on 2 February 2005 the 
culture ministers of Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary finally published a 
declaration of intent to found a European Network of Memory and Solidarity. Austria 
and the Czech Republic, however, declared they would co-operate on its projects, but 
did not agree to participate in the foundation itself, demonstrating how difficult it is to 
achieve international consensus on the issue.279 Before the intention could become a 
reality, the sudden change of government in Germany in 2005 and the electoral 
victory of Law and Justice in Poland halted the possible projects of the European 
Network Memory and Solidarity foundation, founded on 23 August 2005. According 
to Nevermann (2010 Interview) “about a year of work was missing and the network 
would have made the ZgV superfluous.” Whilst the ZgV foundation congratulated the 
European Network on its creation, and saw it as a gift for its fifth birthday (in Troebst, 
2006: 227-28), Steinbach could not conceal her Schadenfreude in an interview to the 
author (2010), when commenting on the failed attempt to oust the ZgV.  
 
In the meantime, on 27 November 2003, the Sejm passed a resolution 
founding a Centre for the Remembrance of European Nations under the auspices of 
                                                 
275 See: http://www.dpg-bundesverband.de/links_und_dokumente/bv_zeitgeschichte/1187815.html, 
accessed 5 February 2012. 
276 See Troebst (2006: 169-70).  
277 See Troebst (2006: 100-105). 
278 See Trobest (2006: 161-62). According to Nevermann (2010 Interview) the negotiations with the 
other CEEC states were very difficult. The Czech envoys especially were resistant to the idea.  
279 See: http://markus-meckel.de/ehrenamtliche-taetigkeiten/aufarbeitung-von-
geschichte/europaeisches-netzwerk/, accessed 5 February 2012. 
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the Council of Europe. The resolution warns that “certain national experiences cannot 
be taken out of their historical context”, underlines that German suffering was a 
consequence of WWII, reminds that the “resettlements” were decided at the Potsdam 
Conference by the allies and advocates a centre which would commemorate the 
sufferings of all European nations in the 20th century. In particular, the crimes of both 
totalitarian regimes, Nazism and Communism, should be commemorated and 
researched under the auspices of the Council of Europe (in Troebst, 2006: 105-07). 
After a year of debates in the Council, however, the Polish proposal was rejected 
since a two thirds majority was needed and only a simple majority was achieved. The 
French envoy Bernard Schreiner spoke against such a centre, since it would deal with 
two different tragedies on the same level, deportations to death camps and expulsions 
of nations (in Troebst, 2006: 216). It borders on naivety if Polish politicians seriously 
believed they could obtain the necessary approval in the 47 state Council of Europe, 
let alone that the realization of such a mammoth project was possible with the consent 
of states like Russia. What this shows though is how sensitive Poland was about the 
ZgV at that time and how all possible means were used to undermine Steinbach’s 
project.  
 In September 2003 Steinbach was invited to Warsaw by Poland’s daily 
Rzeczpospolita to present the ZgV and to participate in a debate. This falls into the 
period when the weekly Wprost published a cover picture of Steinbach in Nazi-
uniform riding Chancellor Schröder, and a Rzeczpospolita journalist even asked 
Steinbach if she was washed as a child with soap made from concentration camp 
victims.280 This public focus on Steinbach, amounting to her demonization and 
making her effectively public enemy number one has been rather helpful for the 
BdV’s cause, since she could not be ignored anymore. The German press had never 
paid much attention to this ordinary CDU MP, but by 2003 many articles were 
covering Polish reactions to Steinbach,281 possibly even making the German public 
more sympathetic to her cause. 
 This is supported by the 19 July 2004 (the 60th anniversary of the Warsaw 
Uprising) BdV organization of a Berlin event, “Empathy – The Way to Engage with 
One Another”282 in which personalities like Ralph Giordano and Cardinal Karl 
                                                 
280 See: “Die Austreibung der Angst vor der Erinnerung”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2.09.2003.   
281 See Ibid. as an example.  
282 In the original: Empathie – der Weg zum Miteinander. 
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Lehmann participated.283 Whatever its intentions, this was another useful tool for 
convincing the German domestic political landscape that the BdV’s approach had 
changed from the “vociferous naysayers” of the Cold War. In Poland, however, this 
was seen by former Foreign Minister Bartoszewski as provocation, saying that the 
Warsaw Ghetto Uprising is “holy in Poland” and that he did not want this 
organization [the BdV] to commemorate it.284 
	  
A	  Centre	  Against	  Expulsions	  –	  Act	  II	  
 
When the SPD lost elections in North Rhine-Westphalia in May 2005, the party 
leadership decided to dissolve parliament.285 This led to the formation of a Grand 
Coalition with Merkel (CDU) as the new Chancellor. Whilst the SPD neither 
mentioned the ZgV nor the European Network in its manifesto, the CDU/CSU 
manifesto specifically stated that it wanted to “set a sign in Berlin in the spirit of 
reconciliation and commemorate the injustice of expulsions and to outlaw them 
forever.” (DCU/CSU, 2005: 36) The compromise in the Coalition Agreement 
stipulated that the coalition “also wants to set a visible sign in Berlin to, in 
cooperation with the European Network Memory and Solidarity […], commemorate 
and outlaw forever the injustice of expulsions.” (CDU/CSU-SPD, 2005: 114) For the 
ZgV, the Grand Coalition was good news on the one hand, since the CDU/CSU was 
now in power, but on the other hand the SPD would thwart any plans to create a 
museum with the participation of the BdV. Lutz (2003: 256) gives a good account of 
why the participation of a victim organisation is problematic: 
 
Since memorial places are closely connected to certain groups, political aims can 
obstruct a critical discussion. Therefore, in Germany memorial places are often 
structured as a foundation under public law. The advisory board is divided into a 
body of victims organised into an international advisory council as well as a scientific 
advisory council. The highest organ is the foundation board where the chairmen of 
both advisory councils have voting rights. Either the federation, or the state where the 
memorial place is located mostly funds the foundation board. The foundation is 
                                                 
283 See http://www.bund-der-vertriebenen.de/presse/index.php3?id=95, accessed 6 February 2012. 
284 See: http://www.ipn.gov.pl/portal/pl/18/2626/PRZEGLAD_MEDIOW__19_lipca_2004_r.html, 
accessed 6 February 2012. 
285 The government decided to undergo the procedure of a vote of no confidence in the Bundestag and 
the SPD and Greens abstained, ensuring that elections were called for September 2005.  
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subsidised by the state and is hence not absolutely free but due to the structure 
decoupled from the daily political business.  
 
As will be seen, the foundation board will become important later. 
  Before the “visible sign” was specified, the ZgV foundation continued its 
work and launched its first exhibition, called “Forced Paths – Flight and Expulsion in 
20th century Europe” in the Kronprinzenpalais in Berlin, opened by the President of 
the Bundestag Norbert Lammert (CDU)286 on 10 August 2006. The exhibition 
displayed nine different examples of expulsions287 and around 300 exhibits were 
presented. Steinbach (2010 Interview) is very proud of the exhibition and underlines 
that it was entirely financed through expellees’ private donations. Of particular 
interest are also the 20 exhibits lent by Polish museums. A scandal was caused by the 
ship’s bell from the Wilhelm Gustloff, which was lent by the Central Maritime 
Museum in Gdańsk. The museum had kept the bell in storage for over a decade, and it 
was later kept in a restaurant, not attracting much attention. After the bell was 
borrowed by the ZgV and made public, PiS politician Dorota Arciszewska-
Mielewczyk called it a scandal and nobody wanted to admit who gave permission to 
lend the bell. Obviously under huge pressure, the director of the maritime museum 
demanded the bell’s return.288 According to the ZgV, over 60,000 people visited the 
exhibition between 11 August 2011 and 29 October 2006, including 130 school 
classes.289 Thereafter, the exhibition went on tour, going to 14 German towns, with 
the last exhibit concluding on 29 September 2011.290 This became a useful tool for 
keeping the pressure on any German government to realize the agreed Visible Sign 
agreed by the Grand Coalition. Steinbach herself (2010 Interview) declared that the 
upcoming permanent exhibition in the German Historical Museum would be 
accompanied by “watchful eyes”.  
Germany’s president Horst Köhler, whose ancestors hail from Bessarabia, 
attended the September 2006 Tag der Heimat and complimented the expellees for 
                                                 
286 See: http://www.z-g-v.de/aktuelles/?id=39, accessed 6 February 2012. 
287 The exhibition showed the expulsion of Armenians in 1915/16; of Greek and Turks in 1922/23; of 
Jews in Germany after 1933; of Germans after WWII; Poles, Ukrainians and the Baltics; of Finns from 
Karelia in 1939/40-44; of Italians at the end of WWII; Cyprus 1963/64 and 1974-75; and Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s. For the complete catalogue, see: http://erzwungenewege.z-g-v.de/, accessed 6 February 
2012.  
288 See: “Awantura o dzwon z wraku ‘Wilhelma Gustloffa’”, gazeta wyborcza, 17.08.2006. Also: “Erst 
die Glocke und dann? Polens rechte Regierung attackiert Berliner Vertreibungsausstellung”, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19.08.2006. 
289 See: http://www.z-g-v.de/aktuelles/?id=49, accessed 6 February 2012. 
290 http://www.z-g-v.de/aktuelles/?id=39, accessed 6 February 2012. 
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having integrated well into German society and also encouraged them to co-operate 
with the European Network and the planned Visible Sign (Köhler, 2006). Poland’s 
Prime-Minister Jarosław Kaczyński called this “one of the most disturbing events that 
has happened in Germany in recent times.291 During the PiS government’s term of 
office, Polish-German relations reached a low point for several reasons besides the 
planned memorial.  At that time any cooperation on the museum/European Network 
issue was impossible (Meckel, 2010 – Interview). 
Unsurprisingly, the coalition waited until a new Polish government was 
elected in October 2007 before making plans for the Visible Sign public. Tusk made 
Foreign Minister Bartoszewski Plenipotentiary to the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers for International Dialogue, partly, it seems, because his authority might 
improve relations between Poland and Germany. Bartoszewski, an Auschwitz 
concentration camp survivor, gave an important speech in the Bundestag in 1995 
stating that Poles were also perpetrators and mourned the Germans who had lost their 
Heimat.292 But, Bartoszewski refused to answer any of Steinbach’s letters since the 
ZgV had been launched.293 His appointment therefore symbolizes on the one hand the 
willingness of the government to enter a dialogue with the Germans, but on the other 
hand also indicates that dealing with Steinbach herself was unacceptable. On 22 
October 2010, the 50th anniversary of the BdV, Chancellor Merkel said that a plan for 
the Visible Sign would be presented soon.294 Volker Kauder, chairman of the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary faction, announced that by the end of the year an SPD 
compromise would be reached and that, for him, “a documentary centre about flight 
and expulsions was unthinkable without Steinbach’s participation.”295 Tusk had 
already suggested a general museum of WWII in Gdańsk in December 2007, where 
expulsion could also find a suitable place. The chosen day for the announcement 
carries a hint of another attempt to neutralize the Visble Sign, even though Miszczak 
                                                 
291 See: “Lammert will im Streit um Köhler-Rede vermitteln”, 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,434959,00.html, accessed 6 February 2012. 
292 See: 
http://www.bundestag.de/kulturundgeschichte/geschichte/gastredner/bartoszewski/rede_bartoszewski.h
tml#barto, accessed 6 February 2012. 
293 All Steinbach’s letters to Bartoszewski can be found in Steinbach (2010: 148-50). Miszczak (2011 
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accessed 1 September 2010. Content has been removed.  
295 See: http://www.welt.de/politik/article1301871/Kein_Zentrum_aber_ein_sichtbares_Zeichen.html, 
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(2011 Interview) denied that the museum in Danzig had anything to do with any 
planned museums in Berlin.  
Early in February 2008, Neumann (CDU), Germany’s Federal Commissioner 
for Culture,  presented, in Warsaw, the plan for the Visible Sign. Germany was 
hoping for Polish co-operation, but to no avail.296 Poland’s new government, whilst 
signalling willingness to improve relations, was under pressure from the opposition 
and the public “not to sell out to the Germans”. Due to the contentious public 
perception in Poland of expellees, the BdV and Steinbach, the room for manoeuvre 
was limited, regardless of Bartoszewski’s personal animosity towards Steinbach. As 
Miszczak (2011 Interview) explained, the plenipotentiary made it clear to Neumann 
that Steinbach was no partner for the Polish government since she was part of an 
NGO, whilst Bartoszewski was the government and therefore there could be no 
dialogue on the matter. In March 2008 the federal cabinet passed a plan of how to turn 
the Visible Sign into practice as a law to be submitted to the Bundestag. The work 
undertaken by the House of History (Bonn), exhibiting the topic of expulsions and 
engaging with the various interpretations of expulsions, was meant to become the 
basis for a permanent exhibition in Berlin. The Deutschlandhaus in Berlin would be 
renovated at a cost of €29 million and would be subordinated to the German 
Historical Museum (DHM).297 The most important questions, of who would lead the 
conceptualization of the exhibition and who would be nominated for the foundation 
board, remained. 
                                                 
296 “Vertrieben oder ausgesiedelt; Berlin und Warschau tun sich mit dem Erinnern schwer”, 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5.02.2008. 
297 “Gedankenloses Gedenken”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25.03.2008. 
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At the end of December 2008, the Bundestag finally passed a law creating the 
German Historical Museum foundation according to German foundation laws. 
Section Two of the law gave birth to the dependent Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation 
Foundation (Stiftung Flucht, Vertreibung, Versöhnung – SFVV), whose purpose is 
“in the spirit of reconciliation to commemorate flight and expulsion of the 20th 
century in the historical context of WWII and the national-socialist expansionist and 
annihilation policies and their causes.”298 The foundation board was intended as 
thirteen members of which two had to be members of the Bundestag, while other 
institutions could also appoint members. The foreign office, the Interior Ministry and 
the Commissioner for Culture and the Media could appoint one member each, the 
BdV three members, and the Protestant Church, the Catholic Church and the Central 
Council of Jews one member each. It was obvious from the start that the BdV would 
nominate Steinbach as one of its appointees, since paragraph 19 does not stipulate that 
Steinbach could not be appointed. Bartoszewski warned that the German government 
should not accept Steinbach’s candidacy since this would lead to complications in 
Polish-German relations. Appointing Steinbach would be “as if the Vatican sent 
Bishop Williamson, who denied the Holocaust, to Jerusalem for talks.”299 According 
to Miszczak (2011 Interview), Bartoszewski talked with Merkel about this point as 
did Miszczak with Christoph Heusgen, Merkel’s influential foreign policy advisor. 
Merkel assured the Polish government that Steinbach would not form part of the 
foundation board. The reason for Bartoszewski’s insistence was opposition pressure 
that the “government would sell out to the Germans and be their vassals” and the 
cards were put on the table: “either you want normal Polish-German relations or you 
talk to Steinbach and damage the policy of this government for the future and you will 
lose a partner.” (Miszczak, 2011 Interview) Merkel, on the other hand, was pressured 
by the CDU/CSU for being too liberal and for softening the Christian Democrats’ 
conservative line, as exemplified by Georg Brunnhuber’s (CDU) remark: “We have to 
be careful not to lose the last stalwart. We haven’t got many left that are emotionally 
                                                 
298 See: Gesetz zur Errichtung einer Stiftung “Deutsches Historisches Museum” (DHMG): 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/dhmg/gesamt.pdf, accessed 6 February 2012. 
299 See: Bartoszewski ostrzega Berlin, Rzeczpospolita, 16.02.2009. 
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connected to us [CDU].”300  
This situation is a good example of what Otto Kirchheimer (1966) identified 
as a process that catch-all parties undergo: de-ideologisation in order to attract voters 
from the centre. At the same time the CDU/CSU had to accommodate the wishes of 
the different strands within the party, and expellees, together with the more 
conservative branch of the Union constitute one such strand.301 Given that the number 
of expellees has declined significantly over the last six decades and that the 1.3 
million members that the BdV claims to represent is probably an exaggeration (see 
above), one can only speculate as to why the two Union parties pay so much attention 
to the BdV. It is likely that the CDU and CSU deem it better to accommodate various 
smaller and rather unimportant groupings within its own ranks rather than to risk 
losing them to other parties. A similar example of a small group managing to gain the 
support of the Christian-Democrats are farmers, who also represent only a fraction of 
the population and the economy. The BdV case is even more salient since, in contrast 
to the farmers’ association, it is not a group with important financial resources since it 
is not an economic association, but relies on federal and Länder subsidies for survival 
itself. This seems to call into question the general hypothesis which claims that actors 
strongest in resources should be most successful in influencing policy-making. This is 
a case that proves that resources are not necessarily needed to do so. 
 Since the CDU/CSU could not decide alone (with SPD as a coalition partner) 
Steinbach was cornered, but the BdV had another ace up its sleeve. Rather than 
nominating Steinbach as the third BdV member, the post was symbolically left empty 
as a gesture of protest,302 in the conviction that there would be another opportunity. 
The idea was to postpone the issue until after the September 2009 federal elections 
and to then decide anew. However, the CDU/CSU’s new coalition partner, the FDP, 
had no intention of supporting the conservative wing of the CDU/CSU. Since Article 
19(3) of the initial SFVV law stipulated that the government decides on the 
                                                 
300 See: “Union – Angst vor der Wahrheit; Der Streit um Vertriebenenchefin Erika Steinbach belastet 
die innere Balance der CDU/CSU”, Der Spiegel, 02.03.2009.  
301 If any “international comparison” must be found for this issue, then it would be the Yasukuni Shrine 
in Tokyo, which Japan’s Prime Ministers have visited regularly because of the conservative faction 
which the LPD has to pacify, despite violent protests abroad. For a discussion of the shrine see: Breen, 
John (2008) (Ed.) Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan’s Past. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
302 Der Stuhl bleibt leer; am Ende wollte Steinbach nicht riskieren, ihrem eigenen Projekt im Wege zu 
stehen: dem Zentrum gegen Vertrebungen – und den deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 5.03.2009. 
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composition of the foundation board, the FDP effectively had a veto. How important 
the issue has become can be seen by the fact that the new Foreign Minister 
Westerwelle’s (FDP) inaugural visit was to Poland, which was a minor affront to 
France, traditionally a first port of call for new German governments. Westerwelle 
underlined that the new government will “prevent anything that is not in the spirit of 
reconciliation”.303 After a long coalition quarrel on the Steinbach issue,304 the BdV 
suggested a change in the SFVV law meaning that the government would not have a 
veto on the appointment of the board. In return, the BdV was willing to relinquish its 
right to nominate Steinbach for one of the seats.305 This would increase the 
foundation’s independence from the government. The final compromise between the 
CDU/CSU, FDP and the BdV was different. The SFVV law’s new Article 19 would 
now stipulate that, instead of the government, the Bundestag would appoint the 
nominated candidates. Also, the foundation board would be increased from thirteen to 
21 members and the BdV could nominate six instead of three members, meaning a 
slight increase in “influence” from 23.8% to 28.6%. Miszcak (2011 Interview) 
explained that the Polish government understands that seven Bundesländer 
parliaments would be elected in 2011, but called this compromise “weak” from 
Merkel’s side since she admittedly prevented Steinbach from being on the board “but 
she did not do more” and allowed an increase in the BdV’s influence. 
 Finally, a scandal erupted around the SFVV’s scientific advisory council. On 7 
July 2009, Tomasz Szarota, a Polish professor of Polish history and WWII expert, 
was invited by Hans Ottomeyer, director of the DHM in Berlin, to be part of the 
scientific advisory council, having cooperated with DHM on a previous exhibition.306 
According to Szarota (2011 Interview) “due to the name ‘reconciliation of Polish-
German relations’” he saw it as “a duty to participate”. Szarota, whose father was shot 
by Germans, would have brought to the SFVV not only his expertise as an academic, 
but enormous symbolic weight and his acceptance of the position must be seen as a 
success for the foundation. However, Szarota left the council shortly afterwards since 
                                                 
303 Cited in: “Vorsichtiger Auftritt in Warschau; Polen reagiert positiv auf den Besuch des neuen 
Außenminister Westerwelle”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 02.11.2009. 
304 See: “UNION – Der Quälgeist; Das zerrüttete Verhältnis zwischen Kanzlerin Merkel und 
Vertriebenen-Chefin Steinbach”, Der Spiegel, 25.01.2010. 
305 See: “Nach monatelangem Streit; Vertriebene bieten Verzicht Steinbachs an; Im Gegenzug soll sich 
die bundesregierung künftig bei der Besetzung des Stiftungsrats heraushalten”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
05.01.2010. 
306 Szarota presented the official letter to the author in January 2011. 
 226 
he felt he was being used as a “fig leaf” rather than as an expert. What convinced him 
of this assumption is the position of council chair being awarded to Hans Maier, a 
former CSU politician from Munich and political scientist, but who was also on the 
ZgV’s scientific council (Baring, 2010 Interview). Moreover, Helga Hirsch, a 
publicist, became the council’s vice-chair. A DHM worker (Anon. c 2010 Interview) 
suggested to the author that the Polish media’s pressure to “defend Poland’s interests” 
was probably too great a burden to bear and that this was the reason why Szarota left 
the council. Szarota evidence presented to the author, however, overwhelmingly 
supported Szarota’s version. The dilettante manner in which the museum managed 
this sensitive issue is further demonstrated by the fact that, besides Szarota, the Czech 
expert Kristina Kaiserová, the Hungarian Krisztián Ungvary and the publicist Helga 
Hirsch had left the council by March 2010, shedding a bad light on Manfred Kittel, 
the director of the foundation, and his staff. It took the DHM staff and the government 
another year to extend the scientific advisory council from nine to fifteen members. In 
January 2011, Polish experts Krzysztof Ruchniewicz and Piotr Madajczyk were 




This chapter explored the possible motives behind the launch of the permanent 
exhibition on expulsions, and it concludes that a combination of various reasons is 
likely behind it: the need for the BdV to adopt a strategy for survival as a political 
player in the Berlin Republic, that expellees are dying out; countering the SPD-Green 
coalition’s modernisation of the “subsidy system” which existed during Kohl’s 
governments and led to the diminished influence of the BdV; Steinbach’s personal 
ambitions and skills; as well the search for final recognition of the suffering of 
expellees, not only the loss of their Heimat, but also the hardships experienced during 
the process of integration into the FRG. The theoretical framework of Chapter I 
argued that the structure and the institutionalisation of bilateral relations determine the 
success that non-state actors have on foreign policy-making (Risse-Kappen, 1995). 
This chapter confirms this postulate. As explored in Chapter II, Germany’s political 
system is geared towards consensus rather than confrontation. Despite the SPD’s 
                                                 
307 See: http://www.dhm.de/sfvv/wissenschaftlicher_beraterkreis.html, accessed 7 February 2012. 
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insistence on a European project instead of a national museum, with the rise of the 
Grand Coalition in 2005 the SPD had to compromise on a Visible Sign which was 
later conceptualised into the Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation Foundation. For 
decades, all the presidents of the BdV have also been MPs, giving them access to 
policy-makers through their party affiliation and the knowledge of how to “play the 
game”, indicated by the increased subsidies under the 1982-98 CDU/CSU-FDP 
governments. This fits nicely into Saalfeld’s (1999: 44-45) analysis of interest groups’ 
influence on the Bundestag which takes place through maintenance of close links to 
political parties, participation in committee hearings and influence through informal 
contacts.  
The semi-sovereign (Katzenstein, 1987) structure that Germany imposed on 
itself after WWII also plays a significant role since, in the federal structure, elections 
in every single state are important. This allowed the BdV to find important political 
allies in the conservative south within the CDU and especially the CSU, when many 
expellees could not identify with the SPD after the launch of Ostpolitik in the 1960s. 
Cultural reasons also play a role in the SVFF’s planned creation of a 
permanent exhibition in Berlin, namely the shift from a Germans as perpetrators 
towards a Germans as victims discourse from the 1990s onwards. One should not 
automatically conclude that the expellees represented a powerful political lobby. 
Crucially, now the objectives of the German governments and the expellees are not 
congruent. Poland and Germany are not locked in their respective Cold War camps 
anymore, but pursue policies of reconciliation. The BdV wants a permanent 
exhibition, jeopardising reconciliation, the objective of all post-Cold War German 
governments, and yet the exhibition will be built. Once again, I would argue that 
Germany’s political structure (see above) is responsible for this, along with the 
CDU/CSU heeding its loyal supporters, and the fact that now the “Germans as 
perpetrators” and “Germans and victims” discourses coexist in Germany and the 
public is largely indifferent to the issue. 
In Poland, political elites have tried all means to hollow out the BdV’s 
advance. The main reason is the fear that Germany might attempt to rewrite history 
and reverse the victim-perpetrator roles, since any engagement with expulsions entails 
an engagement with expellers as well. The European Network Memory and 
Solidarity, a child of the SPD, took a very long time to materialise, due to its 
international approach, and it finally ground to a halt with the governmental changes 
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in Germany and Poland in 2005, not to be revived until 2009. Poland also tried to 
create an institution that would commemorate the victims of National Socialism and 
Communism under the auspices of the Council of Europe, but the motion failed. Also, 
the discourse focused on Steinbach, which seems to have helped her cause. In 
Miszczak’s words (2011 Interview) “Our mistake was to pay attention to her 
[Steinbach] because it gives birth to demons. Steinbach and our radicals like Radio 
Maryja need each other.” Due to the focus on her, Steinbach’s words were carefully 
weighed, in turn forcing policy-makers to take action in order to make the issue go 
away. Steinbach’s controversial remarks must be placed in that context. It is possible 
that she uses them as a tool to achieve her goals. This alone is too simplistic as an 
explanation. It seems that the quality of Polish-German relations contributed to the 
issue being so controversial, and that the reconciliation of the 1990s was too shallow, 
being filled with symbolism but without the engagement with painful issue which 
would lead to a joint “coming to terms with the past”. This thesis concurs with 
Mildeberger’s  (2002: 731) assessment that Poland and Germany started to talk about 
a shared Europe, but not about each other.308 What supports this view is the 2005 PiS 























                                                 






This thesis attempted to uncover the influence of non-state actors on Polish-
German relations by examining foreign policy making towards Poland in Germany 
and vice versa. As discussed in Chapter I, this topic feeds into the debate about the 
influence of non-state actors on policy-making in general, or “governance”, a growing 
body of literature that emphasises that political decisions stem from a network of 
multiple vertically and horizontally acting governmental and non-state actors (e.g. 
Knoke 1996; Rhodes, 1997; Kjær, 2004). The approach chosen in this thesis has been 
interdisciplinary in nature, taking IR literature into consideration on the one hand and 
making use of FPA on the other. It has been argued that IR, by purely looking into the 
quality of inter-state relations, too often treats these relations as a result of policies 
emanating from the relevant governments, without considering the policies’ 
background. Hence, treating states as “black boxes” where policies simply seem to 
appear, does not sufficiently explain why specific policies emerge. In addition, IR 
loses ground to the humanities if, by analysing states using the “billiard ball model”, 
it does not take into account human action and human behaviour (Hudson, 2005). As 
Kindermann argues (1986: 75), “foreign policy is a product of international and 
national factors and the existent linkages between both factors.”309 I have, by 
examining the role of non-state actors in the context of Polish-German relations, made 
herewith a contribution to the study of the national factors which explain foreign 
relations. 
 
Therefore, the thesis’ main research question was: 
 
What is the influence of non-state actors on Polish-German relations? 
 
In Chapter I, I defined “influence” in broad terms as “affecting policy decisions” 
congruent with Dahl’s (1961) conceptualisation, which Lukes calls one-dimensional 
power. The focus is on “behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which 
there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy 
                                                 
309 Emphasis added. 
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preferences, revealed by political participation” (Lukes, 2004: 19).310 From there 
onwards, I established and assessed “a causal relation between the preferences of an 
actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself” (Nagel 1975: 29). As argued, it 
must be acknowledged that non-state actors may also be influential in policy making 
in an insidious way. Therefore, a final assessment that certain non-state actors are not 
influential because there is no apparent evidence might be premature for this thesis 
because the government can always make certain decisions to prevent conflict with 
silent non-state actors which have not voiced their preferences at all. However, this 
limitation is true for all investigations of this kind, unless researchers include this 
covert influence, or the so-called “two-dimensional power” (Lukes 2004). However, 
this is more difficult to operationalise precisely because the researcher often needs to 
detect issues (or actors) that have not entered the agenda and where no official 
documents exist. 
In order to research non-state actors’ influence or Lukes’ (2004) one-
dimensional power I argued that it is necessary to establish “causality between the 
preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself” (Nagel, 1975: 
29) which I did by using process-tracing. I used this qualitative method to avoid 
simply equating the correspondence of preference voicing with policy output as 
influence. Other methods, such as quantitative text analysis, for example, may 
establish many overlaps between certain non-state actors’ preferences and the final 
governmental decision without reflecting whether the policy-makers based their 
decisions on these preferences. Subsequently I argued that process-tracing is better 
suited to assess causality since it investigates each element of the causal chain (Zürn, 
1998: 640). Process-tracing allows an examination of: first, the process of preference 
voicing, i.e. the access to policy-makers, intentional transmission of information, and 
what tactics and resources were used; second, an analysis of behaviour alteration in 
response to that transmission by other non-state actors and the government; third, the 
evaluation of policy outcome against the individual preference voicing (Betsill and 
Corell, 2001: 74-78); and fourth, equifinality, i.e. considering alternative paths 
through which the outcome might have occurred (George and Bennett, 2005: 207). 
Next to establishing causality between specific non-state actors, the other 
problem relates to finding a satisfactory measurement of influence in order to assess 
                                                 
310 Emphasis in the original 
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the non-state actors’ role in specific policy-making. Following March (1955: 432-34) 
I argued that generally “there is lacking not only an immediately obvious unit of 
measurement, but even a generally feasible means of providing simple rankings”. As 
noted in Chapter I, besides the occurrence of covert influence, further problems that 
arise when trying to measure influence are different channels of influence; occurrence 
of counteracting lobbying; and the wielding of influence at different stages of the 
policy process (Dür 2008: 561-62). I also contributed with another problem not 
covered in much detail in the literature: how can the amount of time and resources 
that a non-state actor spends on lobbying - in order to achieve influence - be 
incorporated in a final assessment of whether the influence has been low or high? In 
other words, simply saying that a non-state actor’s influence is great on the basis that 
it was successful - if we compare the preference statements with the final policy-
decision - would not do justice to the complexities of the whole process. That is 
because a non-state actor might spend a vast quantity of resources and time to 
exercise some influence. Another non-state actor might have been similarly successful 
in terms of outcome but spent fewer resources on the lobbying process and achieved it 
quicker. This might be due to the underlying conditions that favour certain actors over 
other such as the domestic structures. This leads to the question how to assess which 
actor is more influential if we seek to deliver a comparative evaluation. Ultimately, 
perhaps this cannot be answered especially when researchers try to compare influence 
across different issues since different issues involve a different set of actors, lobbying 
strategies and resources used. I address this question once more further below by 
when I evaluate the three case studies. 
Consequently, the thesis does not chart influence with  a ‘yardstick’. Rather, it 
assesses the non-state actors’ influence as either high or low (but does not provide 
rankings) by examining whether and to what extent the respective non-state-actors’ 
preferences have materialised in the agenda setting and decision-taking stage of 
policy-making.  By examining actual results the thesis avoided the pitfall of 
identifying influence solely on the basis of evidence of access to policy-makers, 
lobbying activity and available and spent resources for such cause which does not 
necessarily lead to influence and only tells us how influence has been achieved 
(Betsill and Corell, 2001: 69-70).  
Process-tracing was used in three selected case studies which examined the 
influence of non-state actors on Polish-German relations: first, in Chapter IV, I 
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examined the role of non-state actors in Poland’s demands for restrictions on the free 
movement of capital during EU accession negotiations. Second, the role non-state 
actors in Germany’s policy decision to restrict its labour market until 1 May 2011 to 
the eight new member states from Central and Eastern Europe joining the EU in 2004, 
which was examined in Chapter VI. The transotional period was established and 
anchored in the Accession Treaty in a flexible 2+3+2 model which required Germany 
to review its labour market restrictions twice. Therefore, I also examined the two 
prolongations of this TP in 2006 and 2009 respectively. The third case study 
examined is the role non-state actors played in the process that led to the decision to 
build a permanent exhibition in Berlin depicting the flight and expulsion of Germans 
as a consequence of WWII, discussed in Chapter VII. By limiting the scope of 
analysis to three case studies, the thesis attempted to balance “width” implied in 
uncovering the influence of non-state actors on foreign policy-making in Poland and 
Germany in general with “depth”. A quantitative approach would not be able to claim 
depth of analysis and likely lack an investigation of the motivation behind the 
involved non-state actors’ actions. Neither would quantitative methods tell us 
anything about what strategies and tactics these actors used to materialise their 
preferences, nor would it acknowledge that different means and different actors are 
likely to be involved across different issues.  
That being said, as will be demonstrated, my findings do have broad relevance 
although the thesis can only add limited comparative value. That is because the small 
sample N=3 bears an important disadvantage: small N-studies do not allow us to 
generalize findings convincingly, especially since small N-studies are often biased 
towards conflicting decisions that have attained a high degree of media coverage 
(Dür, 2008: 564-65). As the three case studies confirm, all three issues generated 
considerable media coverage in both countries with one exception: the free movement 
of capital issue did not feature prominently in the German press.   
According to Sartori (1994: 23), case studies can only serve as a tool for 
comparison if a well-defined theoretical framework informs them. I followed this 
argumentation by using Risse-Kappen’s (1995) theoretical framework. His theory 
argues that the degree of influence non-state actors can have on policy decision 
depends on two variables: firstly, the domestic structures, and secondly, the 
institutionalisation of relations. Domestic structures provide the channels for non-
state actors to access policy-makers, and they determine the conditions for winning 
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coalitions. Risse-Kappen (1995: 6-7) argues that the more the state dominates the 
domestic structure, the more difficult it should be for non-state actors to penetrate the 
policy-making structure. Nevertheless, if a non-state actors manages to penetrate the 
structures, the influence might be great since the winning coalition will be rather 
small. In fragmented state structures with a well-developed civil society access of 
non-state actors to the policy-makers might be well-defined, but the ultimate 
influence of individual non-state actors might be low since winning coalitions will 
rather consist of multipe actors. Risse-Kappen’s (1995) other variable, international 
institutionalisation, refers to “specific issue-area” regulations as achieved through 
bilateral agreements, multilateral regimes, and/or international organizations. 
Consequently, I have developed three research questions that address Risse-
Kappen’s theory for the purpose of this thesis’ topic: 
 
1. What is the degree of institutionalisation in Polish-German relations? 
2a. What are the domestic structures of foreign policy-making in Germany? 
2b. What are the domestic structures of foreign policy-making in Poland? 
 
Questions 2a and 2b were both tackled in Chapter II and Question 1 was addressed in 
Chapter III. The purpose of the investigation was to analyse broadly both factors that 
determine non-state actors’ access to policy-makers in Poland and Germany thereby 
setting-up the stage for the subsequent three case studies.     
Chapter II has looked into the domestic structures in Germany and Poland 
using three levels of analysis: i) the official foreign policy apparatus; ii) civil society; 
and iii) the nature of the policy networks which link the two. The thesis has shown 
that the German official foreign policy apparatus is ambivalent in the sense that whilst 
foreign policy-making is officially concentrated in the foreign ministry and decisions 
are co-ordinated there, the Chancellor has plenty of influence in this area, as well as  
the capability of overriding the foreign ministry’s preferences. However, whilst it is 
true that the Chancellor has the key cards at his/her disposal and can completely 
dominate an issue, as for example Paterson (2010) regarding Merkel’s dominance of 
Europapolitik during the second Grand Coalition (2005-09), this does not mean that 
he/she can sacrifice crucial domestic interests in favour of his/her personal 
preferences. My investigation of the Schröder government seems to uphold these 
findings. This is suggested by Schröder’s interesting remark, “but actually I do not 
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want to [support Poland’s efforts to join the EU],” to Markus Meckel when flying to 
Warsaw for his first official visit, an incident discussed in Chapter IV,  which was in 
contrast to his actions. Meckel (2010 Interview) was not sure whether Schröder’s 
remark was a joke or not and his uncertainty about this, as well as the Chancellor’s 
failure to retract or clarify it at that moment points strongly to the possibility that he 
actually meant it.  Schröder may have preferred to concentrate on relations with 
Russia, knowing that close Polish-German ties would make it harder for him to foster 
Russian-German relations due to Poland’s difficult relationship with Russia.311 
Schröder developed a close friendship with Putin later in his tenure (the Schröders 
adopted two children from St Petersburg – Putin’s hometown) and he also strongly 
advocated the Nord Stream project, later becoming head of the shareholder committee 
on behalf of Gazprom. Despite all this, Schröder continued to support Poland’s EU 
ambitions. Two major reasons might serve as valid explanations. First, as seen in 
Chapter II, Germany’s structure allows only incremental policy change, and the path 
taken by previous governments was irreversible at that point. Second, as seen in 
Chapter IV, the economic interests of all the German economic players (especially the 
car industry in case of Poland), and the benefits of an expanding free and EU-
regulated market, far outweigh the Chancellor’s personal preferences and his 
capabilities. So far, literature has mostly emphasised the powers the Chancellor has in 
foreign policy-making in setting the parameters in all policy areas (see Chapter II). 
However, future research might perhaps distinguish between the formal and informal 
powers that are delineated by law and path-dependency that are vested with the 
institution, and personal preferences that a Chancellor is capable to actually pursue. 
Furthermore, as stated in Chapter II, the Chancellary and Foreign Ministry are 
always led by different parties, meaning there is often great potential for party-
political conflict and constant campaigning for electoral glory at federal and state 
level. This is a result of the proportional representation system which, together with 
federalism, was developed to force political consensus, as well as to prevent a 
recurrence of dictatorship. Hence, Germany’s “semi-sovereign” structure, as defined 
by Katzenstein (1987), is also present in her foreign policy-making, once again 
allowing only incremental policy changes. This can be clearly seen in the context of 
                                                 
311 The difficulties in Polish-Russian relations have been shown on numerous occasions in the new 
millennium. The Russian ban on Polish meat and the abundance of conspiracy theories in the Polish 
public debates which followed the Smolensk air disaster exemplify this. 
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Polish-German relations, in the fact that Brandt’s Ostpolitik was not jettisoned by the 
CDU/CSU-FDP government, but was ultimately pushed further, despite the 
conservatives’ abstention on ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties in 1971.  
The thesis assessed Germany’s civil society as strong in the sense that interest 
groups are rather concentrated, while there are no deep religious, class or ideological 
cleavages around which politics revolves. Furthermore, official forums for voicing the 
preferences of interest groups, anchored in the GGO and GOBReg, give society 
ample opportunity to influence the foreign policy-making process whenever the 
interests of any group are affected. 
Poland’s foreign policy-making apparatus has, like Germany’s, been identified 
as centralised, but due to the directly elected President – who therefore enjoys 
considerably more legitimacy – foreign policy-making has experienced power 
struggles between the Prime-Minister and the President in times of cohabitation, 
especially at the EU-level. One crucial post-1989 element in Polish politics has been 
the political rotation. Only one government, the PO-PSL coalition led by Donald Tusk 
has managed to be re-elected in 2011. These rotations together with the sudden 
changes of the policy-making structures, such as experienced in the MSZ – the Polish 
Foreign Ministry - in the past twenty years, has been identified as a substantial 
weakness in Polish politics by key policy-makers in Poland as my interview with 
Krzysztof Miszczak (2011), the Director of the Office of the Plenipotentiary of Prime 
Minister for International Dialogue, reveals. Interestingly, the Eastern neighbour 
seems to admire the continuity in the German political apparatus that leads to the 
incremental policy changes described above and, more extensively, in Chapter II. It is 
too early to tell whether Poland already has or will eventually consolidate their 
policy-making structures so as to allow more continuity in the policy choices. As 
Miszczak explained (see Chapter II) institutional memory is an important asset for the 
state achieved if policy experts are employed beyond the frequent cycles of four-years 
tenures. 
The communist period has left a significant legacy in Polish civil society, in 
the sense that the degree of organisation in unions and employers’ associations is not 
only comparatively lower than in Western democracies, but is also much more 
fragmented than in corporatist Germany. Moreover, anti-politics and facing the 
political elite in a confrontational manner has rather been the norm. Various original 
interviews carried out for this thesis have revealed that the confrontational style of co-
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operation does not only exist between the social partners - i.e. business and trade 
unions - and the government officials, but also between the social partners as well. 
This leads to few consensuses among the social partners and therefore seems to allow 
the government to dominate and dictate policy directions. However, in the rare case 
where consensus between the social partners is achieved, such as in the case of the 
anti-crisis law, the government seems to have no choice but to address and 
incorporate the social partners’ demands in its policy-making (as discussed in Chapter 
II, with reference to the Interview with Małgorzata Rusewicz from PKPP Lewiatan). 
In addition, forums for voicing policy preferences are relatively new, insufficiently 
anchored in the policy process and overshadowed by unofficial links. As a result, a 
culture of “accessing the policy makers via personal contacts and the back door” has 
developed and needs better regulation, as the lobbying legislation is currently (June 
2012) seen as insufficient since it mentions only sanctions in case of the law’s breach, 
but does not address any rights (see Chapter II). In the words of Soszka-Ogrodnik 
(2011 Interview) from AHK Polska:  
 
To date, in Poland, informal lobbying is still most effective, a lobbying 
based on the tradition that who has the possibilities of approaching the 
lawmaking source is effective. 
 
It is surprising that over twenty years after the end of Communism and almost 
ten years after joining the EU with all the rules and norms transfer the political culture 
and practices that were used in the Communist part are still dominant. This seems to 
be a case where the concept and argument of path-dependency has the upper hand 
over the rapidly growing Europeanization literature. In future research, this would be 
a worthy avenue to pursue.  
 
Chapter III analysed the institutionalisation of Polish-German relations 
thereby addressing Risse-Kappen’s (1995) second variable determining non-state 
actors’ access to policy-makers. The two most important bilateral treaties marking the 
end of the Cold War, which lifted Polish-German relations to a new level are the 
Border Treaty of 1990 and the Polish–German Treaty of Good Neighbourship and 
Friendly Cooperation of 1991. The border treaty was the final act in reaffirming the 
Oder-Neisse line, as necessitated by the 2+4 Treaty which made German re-
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unification possible. Even though the border treaty merely recognizes the border 
delineated by the two rivers and does not mention both states’ societies, it has had an 
enormous influence upon the Landsmannschaften and its umbrella organisation, the 
Federation of Expellees (BdV). That is because for over four decades the expellees 
had been fighting for a return of the German Ostgebiete to Germany, and with the re-
affirmation of the border, the last hopes of making this happen were destroyed. Kohl’s 
skilful manoeuvring has irreversibly locked the expellees within the norm parameters 
of Ostpolitik (Tewes, 2001: 59). Nevertheless, I showed that, at the time of the 
formulation of the treaty, the expellees’ influence was significant since the CDU/CSU 
relied on their votes. It is also important to see what the treaty does not contain: the 
contentious issue around compensation for the loss of properties following the flight 
and expulsion of Germans after Poland’s move westwards, and compensation 
payments to Poles who suffered from the Nazi regime. Whereas the latter was later 
resolved with the establishment of a fund by Germany, the former would resurface 
again in the new millennium when the Prussian Claims Society, whose members 
overlap with the BdV, started a lawsuit by 23 individuals against Poland for property 
restitution. Even though the European Court of Human Rights judged the case as 
inadmissible, this issue, which poisoned Polish-German relations for a long period in 
the new millennium, might arguably have been precluded by clearer legal 
codification. The omission of the painful issues that resurfaced later demonstrates 
why the analyses which had been so popular in the 1990s comparing Polish-German 
relations to the Franco-German case (see Chapter I) were somewhat premature. This 
policy of symbolism was later labelled as reconciliation kitsch (Versöhnungskitsch) 
(e.g. Hahn et al., 2008). However, one should bear in mind that reconciliation is not a 
linear process and that setbacks are possible as argued by Gardner Feldman (2012). 
The restitution issue connected with fears present in a wider circle of Polish society 
that Germans might want to either reclaim their lost land or demand significant 
compensation fed into much of the political debate surrounding Poland’s EU 
accession and also at the time when the BdV lobbied for a Centre Against Expulsions 
in Berlin (on the Polish side; and in the German and Polish media). Hence, 
understanding these wider implications of the border treaty was highly relevant for 
the case study dealing with the free movement of capital (Chapter IV) as well as the 
case study analysing the museum issue (Chapter VI). 
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The border treaty was also a prerequisite for the co-operation treaty that 
followed in 1991, since through the guarantee of the Oder-Neisse line certain topics 
which had been on the German agenda for over a decade, such the recognition of the 
German minority and bi-lingual place names in the Opole voivodeship, were suddenly 
made possible as my Interview with Wilhelm Höynck, the German chief negotiator of 
the co-operation treaty revealed. The co-operation treaty has introduced a completely 
different multi-layered dimension into Polish-German relations. On the inter-
governmental level, for the next few years, Germany became Poland’s prime advocate 
at the inter-governmental level for her ambitions to enter the EU. On the inter-societal 
level, relations have been institutionalised and contribute enormously to the daily 
practice of contacts between Poles and Germans solidifying non-governmental Polish-
German relations as my interview partners Krzysztof Miszczak and Eugeniusz Smolar 
revealed. This positive development proved helpful immediately after Poland’s EU 
accession when Law and Justice (PiS) led by the Kaczyński tried to instrumentalise 
fears of Germany for political ends and even tried to cut funds for the youth co-
operation programme. This met opposition in Poland and PiS did not succeed in 
cutting the budget for this purpose. Moreover, the analysis of the Sejm elections in 
2005 and 2007 show that in the former German Ostgebiete, support for PiS was much 
lower than in the rest of Poland. Again, as in the case of the border treaty, the issue of 
property loss was not addressed in the co-operation treaty.  
 
This preliminary general analysis of Poland’s and Germany’s domestic structures as 
well as the two states’ institutionalisation in Chapter II and Chapter III revealed 
possible access points of non-state actors for influencing foreign policy-making in 
both countries. The analysis also underlines why the following hypotheses were 
developed in Chapter I:  
  
H1: Non-state actors have a large degree of influence on foreign policy-
making in both countries. 
H2: German non-state actors are more successful in influencing the 
government on foreign policy decisions directed towards Poland than their 
Polish equivalents have in influencing the government on foreign policy 
decisions directed towards Germany. 
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H3: Non-state actors with business interests have the greatest impact on 




Chapter IV prepared the first two case studies and analysed the process of Poland’s 
2004 EU accession, thereby already engaging with H1 since this chapter showed once 
more how institutionalization of state relations provides more incentives for non-state 
actors to influence policy-making. More precisely, this chapter revealed that the 
process of Eastern Enlargement started as early as 1989, and, in the course, Poland 
was given a favourable Association Agreement. However, already by then, old 
member states only favoured a free market with Poland as long as it would not hurt 
their own sectors where Poland could have gained the most such as in agriculture, 
iron, steel and textiles. Germany was no exception here with a strong agricultural 
lobby and vital interest in the coal and steel industry of Saarland and North Rhine-
Westphalia. This foreshadowed the laborious EU accession negotiations which 
commenced later in 1998. I also analysed the possible motives for Germany’s 
continuous support for Poland’s EU accession. Three reasons stand out: a moral 
dimension and the desire for reconciliation, security and economic opportunities. 
Especially the last point concerns non-state actors interests the most since a 
prosperous neighbour could provide new business opportunities, thereby justifying 
the formulation of H3. Especially when we consider how German foreign direct 
investments to Poland significantly increased after Poland’s EU accession in 2004 one 
could retrospectively assume that many non-state actors with business interests should 
have pressured the German government to support Poland in the efforts to join the 
EU. That is because common EU membership provides important legal certainties for 
these actors, but also, the EU structural and cohesion funds help new member states’ 
economies to develop faster, thereby establishing new tariff-free markets. A country 
with over 38 million people (and consumers) ‘right next door’ clearly represented 
such an opportunity. Trade unions, on the other hand, and the German eastern Länder 
should be expected to demand labour mobility restrictions since it could lead to wage 
pressure and arguably higher unemployment rates in this region. However, as noted, a 
prospering neighbour also demands more goods and services helping to secure 
German jobs in the long run. Poland’s motivations to join the EU were connected to 
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overcoming the Cold War division by joining western structures, security and 
economic prosperity; an expectation shared by most of Poland’s population. Both 
states’ negotiation structures reveal that various access points for non-state actors’ 
preference voicing were created, notably at the ministerial and head of government 
levels. Poland’s negotiation structure was changed in 2001 affecting the negotiation 
style but also creating a different constellation possibly favouring a different set of 
non-state actors due to different parties being in power. That is also important, since 
the negotiation positions were passed to the parliament where parties had a great 
opportunity in commenting on these positions bringing them to the public and forcing 
a debate that would most likely lead into a confrontational style of dialogue as 
Chapter II has shown. Poland’s first chief negotiator Jan Kułakowski tried to involve 
as many actors as possible in the negotiation decisions trying to force consensuses 
that would back the government. As revealed by my interview with a representative 
form the trade union OPZZ, some non-state actors seem to have been favoured over 
others, especially when these actors were ideologically closer to the government.  
 
Chapter V analysed the transitional periods for the free movement of capital 
negotiated by Poland for EU accession in 2004. It paid attention to the role of non-
state actors in Poland and Germany during these negotiations predominantly focusing 
on Poland since, as it turned out, German interest groups paid little interest to this 
matter.  
 H1 has postulated that non-state actors have a large degree of influence on 
foreign policy-making in both countries. 
The entire Chapter V cannot falsify H1 since the EU is an institution that both 
countries aspired to share, a wish that would be fulfilled on 1 May 2004. During the 
negotiations for this common goal a plethora of non-state actors had the chance to 
influence their respective governments to maintain certain negotiation positions – in 
this case regarding the free movement of capital, or Chapter 4 of the aquis 
communautaire. In the case of Germany this was already common practice as codified 
in the German foreign policy-making structure seen in Chapter II of this thesis. The 
Commission urged Poland to establish dialogue with her respective social partners. 
Two distinct negotiation phases were identified. For the first period of negotiations, 
during the AWS-UW coalition, dialogue was indeed intensive, and chief negotiator 
Jan Kułakowski or the Task Sub-Groups of the Negotiation Team held frequent ad-
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hoc meetings with relevant social partners, professional groups, church 
representatives, academia and the media during the course of the accession 
negotiations (Polish Government, 2000: 56-60). Kułakowski even visited all sixteen 
new administrative divisions. It could be argued that the fact that Poland managed to 
distinguish between former German territories in the north and west of the country 
and the other voivodeships in the south and east when it comes to the length of time 
foreigners must lease agricultural land before they can purchase it (seven or three 
years respectively), may be a case of regions having a say in foreign policy-making. 
This would contradict the analysis in Chapter II where I show that regions are 
unimportant in Polish foreign policy-making. However, it should be borne in mind 
that this is a unique case that has not established a precedent in the strictest sense. 
That is because this case can be identified as foreign as well as domestic policy at the 
same time since if foreigners are allowed to purchase land in Poland it also concerns 
internal affairs. Also, the Commission insisted that social partners were included in 
the EU accession process to include the society. Therefore, in future research, one 
should also investigate a case where non-state actors could be involved when foreign 
policy is at stake in a more traditional sense such as, for example, the recent revival of 
the Weimar Triangle. Moreover, it must also be concluded that certain social partners 
were disfavoured when trying to voice their preferences to the government, especially 
interest groups that were not affiliated with the government, as the example of the 
SLD-affiliated trade union NSZZ Solidarność has shown. Also, during the second and 
final phase of negotiations under the SLD-PSL coalition, the new government 
position was presented over the heads of most non-state actors, precipitating an outcry 
from the opposition as well as farmers’ associations, to the bewilderment of the 
European Commission. In this context we should, once more, evaluate the quote from 
my Interview with Ewa Synowiec (2011) who said 
 
In my opinion […] during the meetings at the civil servant or even political level 
mostly the position outweighed ‘we will not enter the EU cheaply’ i.e. give too many 
concessions. It was clear that the question of land purchase was politically very 
sensitive, and for sure SLD did not want to allow to be accused that it is selling land 
to Germans because such slogans were in circulation. 
 
Two interesting things can be derived from this quote. First, one can interpret the 
general attitude of Polish politicians and civil servants towards the EU and Poland’s 
role in it. It seems that Poland at that time perceived the EU in realist terms, to use IR 
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language. If the leaders did not want to enter the EU “cheaply”, it means that either 
Poland perceived that it had something to lose and did not want to lose too much, or 
that the EU had to pay the right price for Poland to enter. This is not the perception of 
a win-win situation as more argued in the liberal tradition of IR, but rather of a win-
lose situation as interpreted by realists. Even though this seems a bit speculative, this 
kind of language, however, would also match my other interview quotes underlining 
the perception of Poland’s place in the world in more realist terms. For example, in 
Chapter II Krzysztof Miszczak (2011 Interview) is quoted with “Germany will only 
respect Poland as a serious partner when Poland’s level of economy will match 
Germany’s” and explaining the situation in Europe the Polish Prime Minister’s 
plenipotentiary explained: 
 
“[…] everybody fears Germany and Germany knows that because they are the 
strongest country in Europe because facts are facts and you cannot fight these. […] If 
you put a bear and next to it a chicken then the chicken will go around the bear.”  
 
The perception of power seems to occupy a significant role in Polish foreign policy 
thinking, and the means how to achieve power (strength of economy). Perhaps this 
reflects the dilemma of a new mid-size country within the EU with, on the one hand, 
ambitions to be a EU agenda-setter and leader, and, on the other hand, the knowledge 
that Poland still needs to catch up economically (at least as measured by per capita) to 
match the power of Germany, and the frustration that the traditional Franco-German 
axis is only hard to breach or join. 
The second issue that can be derived from the Synowiec quote is, arguably, 
the attitude of the then-ruling SLD-government towards civil society. She reveals that 
the SLD coalition insisted on long traditional periods for the land issue because it 
feared certain slogans that were in circulation such as that the government was selling 
out to the Germans. This shows that, on the one hand, this government did react to a 
general and strong pressure that was maintained high by the opposition, the media 
and opinion polls whilst individual positions of non-state actors were mostly ignored. 
This would be congruent with my analysis and findings of Chapter II where I 
researched the quality of the links between the government and non-state actors. 
There, Rusewicz (2011 Interview) from PKPP Lewiatan revealed that 
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[t]he governmental representatives very often do already have a position and they 
often insist that their position should be supported. Depending on who is closer to the 
position, the employers associations or the trade unions, in that way the talks are 
being conducted. Hence, there is no level of real dialogue.    
 
All evidence points to the fact that back in 2001 the government conducted the 
negotiations in a similar fashion. The government put a position on the table and all 
other interested actors had to follow suit. 
In that context, however, it must be said that the inclusion of other non-state 
actors in a new compromise position would most likely have led to further rigid and 
confrontational stances as the opposition has continuously demonstrated, once more 
confirming the analysis in Chapter II, where it was argued that civil society in Poland 
often pursues the tactics of anti-politics. 
  
As stated, the pressure on the government over the real estate question was 
immensely high throughout the entire period of negotiations, coming from parties in 
parliament, the media, public opinion and, above all, farmers and certain farmers’ 
associations. The latter group was able to exercise pressure on the PSL, in 
government from September 2001 until February 2003, since these associations and 
their members form the core of the PSL’s electorate. It is difficult to draw a definite 
conclusion about which non-state actors were the most successful in exercising 
influence on the government in the case of Poland, since all the aforementioned actors 
contributed directly or indirectly to this pressure, and in addition shared the same 
goal. What can be concluded with certainty is that, judging based on the final 
outcome in terms of the Polish government’s final positions as well as the final 
solution that was accepted by the EU, these pressure groups were very successful as 
Poland obtained the longest transitional period for the acquisition of agricultural land 
of the ten CEEC countries (including Bulgaria and Romania). Contributing to the 
argument is the fact that the Commission and the member states granted these 
transitional periods as they acknowledged that the Polish governments faced a 
difficult domestic situation. With respect to second homes, Poland obtained a five-
years TP, the same length obtained by most other states in the Eastern Enlargement. 
From this fact, one could deduce that the influence of Polish farmers’ is a significant 
force, not falsifying H3: Non-state actors with business interests have the greatest 
impact on foreign policy-making towards the other country. 
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 Comparing this issue with Germany is difficult since most German interest 
groups were, bluntly speaking, uninterested in the topic, including the DBV, the 
organisation representing the German farmers who were, according to the real or 
projected fears in Poland, supposed to buy up Polish land at the first opportunity. The 
only pressure group paying attention to the topic was the BDI, representing German 
industry. The point of contention was Poland’s application for a transitional period for 
the acquisition of real estate for investment purposes. This would have collided with 
the industry’s interests in investing in Poland. Ultimately, Poland dropped this 
demand, realising that such a practice would have significantly harmed Polish 
economic interests. Therefore, in Germany’s case the facts point towards not 
falsifying H3, but it cannot be quantified with certainty how influential the BDI was 
in pursuing the German government to defend German economic interests within EU 
structures, leading to the EU refusing this Polish demand. This is because the EU 
negotiates candidacies collectively and decisions are taken unanimously. Moreover, 
as Synowiec confirmed in my interview, restricting the acquisition of real estate for 
investment purposes would have harmed Poland’s interests as well so that German 
and Polish interests overlap in that instance. Hence, Chapter VI of this thesis, dealing 
with the free movement of labour, is a better case to test H3 because there Poland’s 
and Germany’s interests clash allowing for a more holistic comparison of the two 
state’s systems which H2 tries to uncover with the postulate: German non-state actors 
are more successful in influencing the government on foreign policy decisions 
directed towards Poland than their Polish equivalents have in influencing the 
government on foreign policy decisions directed towards Germany. 
 
Chapter VI then examined the free movement of labour issue during the accession 
negotiations as well as Germany’s decision to twice prolong the negotiated 
transitional period in 2006 and 2009 respectively. Unlike in the preceding chapter 
where it was shown that German non-state actors did not really pay much attention to 
the TPs in land acquisition, especially in regards to agricultural real estate, this issue 
provoked both, the interest of trade unions and business associations alike. Also 
Polish non-state actors also voiced their preferences as well. 
 Returning to H3 which postulates that non-state actors with business interests 
have the greatest impact on foreign policy-making towards the other country: The 
flexible 2+3+2 model which was achieved for the free movement of workers and 
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services in the construction industry, industrial cleaning and for interior decorators for 
Germany at the EU-15 level does not correspond to the different wishes of every 
single EU member state alone, but certainly demonstrates the influence of sectoral 
interests in Germany. The construction sector especially was very vociferous and 
successful in demands for a TP to protect its business. The German construction 
sector had benefited from Polish-German bilateral treaties for decades as they 
contained stipulations allowing Poles to work in Germany, and construction was by 
far the most popular sector among Poles back then. Very often the construction sector 
illegally employed Polish workers beyond the end of the migrant workers’ contracts, 
and had witnessed not only the skills but also the work ethic of the Polish workers. On 
the eve of Poland’s EU accession this sector panicked and wished to shield its 
territory from competition in the form of Polish companies providing services on 
German soil. The construction sector’s influence is reflected in Chancellor Schröder’s 
mention of it in his government policy statement in the Bundestag in January 2001, at 
the time when the Chancellor himself raised the issue publicly. The Chancellor had 
only in November 1999 announced a governmental package to rescue Germany’s 
biggest construction company, Philipp Holzmann, from insolvency. This was in line 
with the Chancellor’s strategy of presenting himself in the media as the saviour of 
German jobs, especially in the tabloid Bild-Zeitung, whose readership is primarily the 
blue-collar working class. The liberalisation of workers and services would, in that 
context, only contradict the Chancellor’s actions of stepping in to protect German 
jobs. With the demands for a TP the government effectively expressed doubts for an 
entirely laissez-faire run market economy. What aided the sector was the fact that 
their business was – following the initial boom after re-unification – particularly 
sluggish in the new Bundesländer, which could call for help from their respective 
Minister-Presidents, and it was the Bavarian CSU which was the first party to demand 
a transitional period in that area. The unions had been in favour of a TP from the start, 
but one cannot automatically draw the conclusion that they defeated the interests of 
the employers’ associations just because a TP was agreed. The flexible model, agreed 
at EU level, which could be revised effectively each year after the initial two years 
would pass, speaks rather the language of a compromise with the possibility of 
adjusting policy in favour of business whenever needed. This is underlined by the fact 
that in January 2009 the Grand Coalition answered the BDI’s calls for qualified 
labour by passing the Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz, allowing all citizens from 
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the new member states and their families to migrate to Germany as long as they could 
provide a university degree or earn more than €63,600 of the social security 
contribution ceiling. However, party politics and the electorate’s fears, which existed 
due to high unemployment rates in the unskilled and low wage sectors, also play a 
significant role in the accession negotiations as well as in the prolongations in 2006 
and 2009 respectively. This is demonstrated by the coalition agreement between the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD in 2005, which, four years in advance (!), agreed to seek the 
last prolongation despite not possibly knowing that far in advance whether the labour 
market would experience serious disturbances. The occurrence of serious disturbances 
at the labour market was a condition written into the 2+3+2 compromise, and it is 
surprising that the Commission itself did not raise its own doubts about the legitimacy 
of Germany’s 2009 decision. One can only speculate for the reasons which would 
make an excellent topic for a follow up research. Perhaps in the midst of the financial 
crisis the Commission did not want to provoke anti-EU sentiment in Germany 
knowing that Germany’s support would be needed during the crisis. Another reason 
might be that Germany somehow convinced the Commission and other member states 
not to pursue this matter.  
 This would perhaps be a case demonstrating how Germany is influential enough 
to see its own preferences turned into practice, or even dominate the EU altogether. In 
more academic parlance, perhaps this reflects Germany’s “reluctant hegemon” 
(Paterson 2011) role in the EU. Earlier literature (Paterson 1993) argued that due to 
Germany’s traumatic war experiences, Germany could not exercise leadership in the 
EU and in case where it did, it could only do it by offering joint leadership to France. 
This Franco-German sharing of leadership has been labeled as “co-operative 
hegemony” by Thomas Pedersen (1998). With the eurozone crisis Paterson (2011) 
argues that a tipping point has been reached where Germany assumes the role of a 
“reluctant hegemon” at a moment when resistance to German leadership in the EU 
fades without Germany actually seeking such a position. Perhaps Germany’s 2009 
unchallenged decision to prolong its transitional period for the free movement of 
labour is a first testing field for this “reluctant hegemony” concept. This is very 
speculative at the moment, but would make an excellent follow up study. In Chapter 
VI, however, I explored Poland’s motives not to challenge Germany openly. As 
Miszczak (2011 Interview) explained 
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Yes, that it is true [we did consider raising this issue in Brussels]. However for political 
reasons we refrained from such a step. […] You can gain a lot today for two, three 
weeks but the political raison d'être is different. We need Germany’s support in 
finance, CAP. We are not as developed in these areas. We also looked for France 
support. Politics has an element of concession. I give you something, you give me 
something in return […]. 
 
Poland simply did not want to antagonise a needed partner in the EU. Given that the 
PiS government (2005-2007) was characterised by antagonism against Germany the 
PO government sought not to worsen these relations but to create a more amicable 
atmosphere. That is also reflected in Tusk’s choice to appoint Bartoszewski to the 
post of secretary of state in the Office of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
and plenipotentiary for international affairs responsible for Polish-German relations as 
explained in Chapter II. Bartoszewski, an Auschwitz concentration camp survivor 
who gave a conciliatory speech to the Bundestag in 1995 to standing ovation where 
he condemned the expulsions of Germans during and after WWII, was clearly the best 
choice if improving Polish-German relations was the motive. 
 I have also presented evidence demonstrating that unlike during the accession 
negotiations when Polish trade unions and business association demanded the opening 
of borders for Polish migrant workers, after 2006 the situation changed and some 
business associations were worried with the situation that emerged. After May 2004 
an exodus of Poles to the British Isles occurred, leading to a shortage of skilled 
labour, especially in the construction sector and medical professions. Therefore, some 
sectors were clearly glad that this situation would not be aggravated with Germany 
also providing an additional target country for potential migration of skilled labour so 
close geographically. Some regions and cities in Poland even launched programmes 
to attract the migrants back. What clearly irritated Poland was the above-mentioned 
Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz since it was targeted at skilled labour whilst at the 
same time leaving the doors closed to unqualified workers. Miszczak and a 
representative from PKPP Lewiatan - who both expressed worries of a brain drain 
situation in Poland because some eastern Bundesländer such as Brandenburg have 
been actively courting Polish students and young recruits - confirmed this. It is 
difficult to draw any meaningful conclusion about the role of non-state actors in 
Poland when examining H3 for this topic. The unions and employers’ associations 
were both in favour of the liberalisation of the free movement of workers, and that has 
been the Polish government’s position since the UKIE’s 1997 national strategy. In the 
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end, Poland accepted the TPs in return for the meeting her demand that the acquisition 
of real estate by foreigners be restricted for 12 years. This seems to be a compromise 
on the highest level and since the domestic pressure was higher regarding the land 
issue the decision to strike a deal is understandable and rational if viewed from the 
government’s perspective. 
  
 The wide political party support in Germany for the 2009 decision is quite 
obvious. The SPD could not afford to risk further confrontation with her left wing or 
the unions after the difficult social reforms of “Agenda 2010”. The CDU under 
Angela Merkel exploited the SPD’s “neue Mitte” by moving left, avoiding 
confrontation with the SPD and presenting itself as more competent on questions of 
the economy. In that context it is hardly surprising that Merkel announced the desire 
to introduce a comprehensive minimum wage at the time of the TP’s expiry in May 
2011 undermining further the SPD’s traditional claims as a party fighting for the blue-
collar class. Additionally, labour mobility was perceived by the German public as a 
threat to attempts to bring down the already high unemployment rate of the time, as 
well as to the generous social benefit system. The latter was reformed through the 
above-mentioned painful measures (Agenda 2010) during the Red-Green coalition, 
leaving the SPD little room to allow the end of restrictive measures on the labour 
market without causing its electorate to be further alienated. Therefore, the CDU 
under Merkel seized the opportunity to present the party as a newly “social-
democratised” one in order to steal the votes of dissatisfied SPD supporters. The two 
prolongations of the transitional period agreed during the Grand Coalition are 
therefore not only the result of coalition politics, but calculated strategy. The final 
prolongation, in 2009, which was decided against the recommendation of the Foreign 
Office and most likely in contravention of the EU law allowing this to happen only in 
the case of serious disturbances to the labour market, must be seen in this light. The 
apparent “social-democratisation” of the CDU represents another important insight 
which should be further analysed in future research concerning the German 
conservative party. This would be especially suitable in the context of the concept of 
“catch-all-parties”, a label developed by Kirchheimer, that describes the erosion of 
traditional opposition parties and their de-ideologisation (Entideologisierung) 
(Kirchheimer, 1966). It seems that the CDU move to the left would support 
Kirchheimer’s thesis. If we consider other decisions of the CDU under Merkel such as 
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the phasing out of nuclear energy after the Fukushima MCA in 2011 right before the 
elections in Baden-Württemberg - clearly in order to not lose too many votes to the 
Green-party – one is inclined to ask what does the CDU under Merkel actually stand 
for and why? 
 Regarding the 2009 decision there is also another discovery worth mentioning. 
So far literature has argued that in case of a clash between ministries on issues 
concerning foreign relations the Foreign Office did usually prevail. As shown in 
Chapter II, all post-war governments have followed the primacy of foreign policy 
over departmental policy whenever the interests of the state as a whole were at stake, 
leaving the Foreign Office in charge of affairs. An especially illuminating case with 
relevance to this issue is the 1991 dispute between the Ministry of the Interior and the 
Foreign Office over who should be responsible for granting visas. In the end the latter 
ministry prevailed over the question of lifting visa requirements for Poles (Andrea 
and Kaiser, 2001: 42-46; 49-50). As seen in Chapter VI the Foreign Office was in 
favour of not prolonging the transitional period, as my anonymous Interview (2011) 
with a civil servant at the German embassy in Warsaw revealed. Other than all the 
main parties (for political reasons) the interior Ministry also preferred keeping the TP 
for as long as possible, to the frustration of Polish policy-makers who describe the 
German Interior Ministry as “damn conservative” (Miszczak 2011 Interview). It 
seems that if an issue is relevant enough to the public and, ultimately the electorate, 
the Foreign Office is not able to prevail if such a decision could influence electoral 
results. Of course, in a federal system where important elections take place every year 
the government will perhaps pay more attention to these decisions than in centralised 
states.    
 What is also interesting is the fact that some German Länder such as 
Brandenburg and regional trade unions such as DGB-Saxony also argued on behalf of 
their Polish counterparts wanting not to prolong the TP, even though the DGB as an 
umbrella organisation took a different position in 2009 and was clearly in favour of 
maintaining the TP. Although the regional DGBs and eastern Länder were not 
successful in realising their preferences, the fact that they include these considerations 
adds to the multi-layered approach of Polish-German relations, making them more 
solid, something which was unthinkable only twenty years ago. 
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Due to the decisions of the German and Polish governments that were taken under 
similar circumstances comparing the first case study with the second study now 
makes sense when considering H2 which supposes that German non-state actors are 
more successful in influencing the government on foreign policy decisions directed 
towards Poland than their Polish equivalents have in influencing the government on 
foreign policy decisions directed towards Germany. 
 Risse-Kappen argues (1995) that the more the state dominates the domestic 
structure, the more difficult it should be for non-state actors to penetrate the policy-
making structure. Nevertheless, if a non-state actor manages to penetrate the 
structures, the influence might be great since the winning coalition will be rather 
small. In fragmented state structures with a well-developed civil society access of 
non-state actors to the policy-makers might be well-defined, but the ultimate 
influence of individual non-state actors might be low since winning coalitions will 
rather consist of multipe actors. This theory seems to fit the comparison between the 
free movement of capital and the free movement of labour issue rather well. As 
demoonstrated, in Poland as a centralist state with a far less dveloped civil society due 
to its historical legacies, it is more difficult to not only to access policy-makers but to 
exercise enough influence on the government to see the voiced preferences turned 
into actual policy-decisions. In the case of the free movement of capital, the 
agricultural interests represented with the PSL party which effectively has a universal 
appeal to farmers and formed part of the government during the entire period, 
managed to get its wishes fullfilled: a very long TP for foreigners wanting to acquire 
agricultural land in Poland. Therefore, this may be an exemplifying case of what 
Risse-Kappen (1995) argues regarding cases where the state dominates the domestic 
structures. However, a wide societal consensus existed on this issue so that the theory 
should be tested on an issue where there is an open clash between the government and 
a non-state actor, or where there is an obvious clash of preferences among two or 
more non-state actors.  
 On the issue of free movement of labour,  it is possible to detect a constellation 
of opposing interests in Germany with the DGB always in favour of TPs for labour 
mobility whilst the employers’ associations were devided at first and by 2009 in 
favour of opening the market altogether. Germany’s ultimate policy decisions were 
always crafted in such a way to allow as much concessions to either side’s demands 
as long as they would not become an electoral topic at either the federal or state level. 
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Therefore, ultimately H2 cannot be falsified with certainty, and rather structural 
differences, it is the issue itself that determins wheteher a non-state actor can be 
successful in Poland as well as in Germany. This would be in line with Mahoney’s 
(2007) argument, which states that in the US and in the EU issue context is more 
influential as a determiant of lobbying success rather than structural factors. 
 What can also be said for the issue of free movement of labour, is that the 
employers’ associations were divided: some sectors, such as construction, wanted a 
TP whilst most other sectors wanted to see an immediate liberalisation of the market. 
This internal dispute was not only visible in the final position papers but also affected 
the strength of this interest group. In fact, this is a factor determining lobbying 
success identified bt Bachrach and Baratz (1962). This pattern is also mimicked at a 
more macro-level when governments negotiate on the interntaional stage as proposed 
by Putnam’s (1988) logic of two-level games. Especially in the EU when member 
states negotiate it makes a difference whether the government has domestic backing 
on the issue or whether the government is on its own. This is why the Polish 
government could achieve such a long TP for the free movement of capital in the first 
place. 
 
Chapter VII dealt with the process leading to the decision to establish a permanent 
exhibition in Berlin depicting the flight and expulsion of millions of Germans 
following WWII. The BdV, with Erika Steinbach as its president, launched the idea of 
a Centre Against Expulsions in Berlin in 2000. It was, as a non-state organisation with 
no primary economic interests, directly or indirectly successful in pressuring three 
different German governments to tackle the issue. Three reasons can serve as an 
explanation for this success: first, the structure of policy-making and the preferential 
access points to policy-makers which the BdV had, especially via the CDU/CSU; 
second, the quality of Polish-German relations, necessitating fast resolution of all 
contentious issues which might jeopardise reconciliation; and third, Germany’s 
acceptance of the “Germans as victims” discourse. 
This thesis has exploited extensively the possible motives behind the launch of 
the project and concludes that a combination of various reasons is likely behind it. 
Those include the need for the BdV to adopt a strategy for survival as a political 
player in the Berlin Republic, due to the fact that the contemporary and active 
expellees are dying out. Additionally, countering the SPD-Green coalition’s 
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modernisation of the “subsidy system” which existed during Kohl’s governments and 
led to the diminished influence of the BdV. This was supplemented by Steinbach’s 
personal ambitions and skills and the search for final recognition of the suffering of 
expellees, not only the loss of their Heimat, but also the hardships experienced during 
the process of integration into the FRG. The theoretical framework of Chapter I of 
this thesis has argued that the structure and the institutionalisation of bilateral 
relations determine the success that non-state actors have on foreign policy-making 
(Risse-Kappen, 1995). This chapter confirms this postulate. As explored in Chapter II, 
Germany’s political system is geared towards consensus rather than confrontation. 
Despite the SPD’s insistence on a European project instead of a national museum, 
with the rise of the Grand Coalition in 2005 the SPD had to compromise on a Visible 
Sign which was later conceptualised into the Flight, Expulsion, Reconciliation 
Foundation. For decades, all the presidents of the BdV have also been MPs, giving 
them access to policy-makers through their party affiliation and the knowledge of 
how to “play the game”, indicated by the increased subsidies under the 1982-98 
CDU/CSU-FDP governments. This fits well into Saalfeld’s (1999: 44-45) analysis of 
interest groups’ influence on the Bundestag: 
 
There are three principal ways in which interest groups attempt to influence 
deliberations and decision making in the Bundestag: (a) they maintain close links to 
political parties; inter alia they ensure that a number of officials are nominated as 
parliamentary candidates and, after their election., placed in the appropriate working 
groups of their parliamentary parties and, as a result, delegated to the relevant 
parliamentary committees (“internal lobby”); (b) formalised influence through, for 
example, participation in the Bundestag committee’s hearings; and (c) influence 
through informal contacts with members of the Bundestag. 
 
The semi-sovereign (Katzenstein, 1987) structure that Germany imposed on itself 
after WWII also plays a significant role since, in the federal structure, elections in 
every single state are important. This allowed the BdV to find important political 
allies in the conservative south within the CDU and especially the CSU, when many 
expellees could not identify with the SPD after the launch of Ostpolitik in the 1960s. 
The BdV’s strategy for pressuring the government, however, was to find allies across 
all parties, which has been partially successful. Not only did Steinbach manage to 
convince the influential SPD politicians Peter Glotz and Otto Schily to support her 
cause, but also attracted important personalities from society: intellectuals, 
businessmen, entertainers, athletes and others. Moreover, by seemingly 
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conceptualising the expulsions as part of a European phenomenon of 20th century 
ethnic cleansing, the BdV started to be perceived as an organisation that had genuine 
universal appeal – a shift from the “self-entertainment” of the past – adding credibility 
to the project in a Germany committed to European integration and naturally “fond of 
European ideas”. The BdV created its own ZgV foundation, which gave way to a 
travelling exhibition financed by private donations and subsidies from four CDU/CSU 
states and over 400 municipalities. Due to the Grand Coalition’s creation of the SFVV 
foundation, a bizarre situation has arisen in which two separate foundations are 
carrying out a similar task. For the BdV, the ZgV is an effective tool to “accompany 
the SFVV’s work critically” (Steinbach, 2010 Interview) and perhaps to pressure the 
SFVV to “exhibit the right things”; one wonders, though, whether an earlier 
concession by the SPD could have prevented this.  
It should not be forgotten, though, that cultural reasons also play a role in the 
SVFF’s planned creation of a permanent exhibition in Berlin. Although a strong 
“Germans as victims” discourse did exist in the 1950s and 1960s, it was embedded in 
the Cold War context. The Allies openly confronted the USSR and opened the border 
question as early as 1946-47, insisting that Germany continued to exist within its 
1937 borders (Ahonen, 2005: 5). In that context, the “Germans as victims discourse” 
was welcomed by the Allies and instrumentalised by practically all of Germany’s 
political parties, cultivating the principle of self-determination for the expellees and 
the objective of border revision. This led to a congruence of interests between 
political elites, parties and expellee organisations (Ahonen, 2005: 5). From this, one 
should not automatically conclude that the expellees represented a powerful political 
lobby. Rather, there was simply a concord of interests for about two decades. With the 
launch of the SPD’s Ostpolitik (in turn strongly influenced by détente), the “Germans 
as victims discourse” was overshadowed by the “Germans as perpetrators discourse” 
until the end of the Cold War. A sign of the overestimation of the power of the 
expellees lobby is the very fact that they could not prevent the 1970 Warsaw Treaty. 
After re-unification, the “Germans as victims discourse” became more accepted and 
German intellectuals dealt increasingly with topics such as the bombing of German 
cities during WWII and expulsions, seemingly going beyond the Historikerstreit of 
the 1980s. Also, the creation of memorial sites by various victim groups has become 
“fashionable” and various victim organisations do not want to be left out. This all 
legitimises the BdV’s project in the eyes of public opinion. Interestingly, the planned 
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exhibition would not change the public’s perception on the topic – something that the 
Wehrmachtsausstellung in the 1995-99 and 2001-04 achieved by destroying the myth 
of the “clean Wehrmacht” that was supposedly not involved in Nazi crimes – but 
rather would fit into an already existing discourse that expellees are also victims. The 
crucial observation here is that now the objectives of the German governments and 
the expellees are not congruent. Poland and Germany are not locked in their 
respective Cold War camps anymore, but pursue policies of reconciliation. The BdV 
wants a permanent exhibition, jeopardising reconciliation, the objective of all post-
Cold War German governments, and yet the exhibition will be built. Once again, this 
thesis argues that Germany’s political structure (as discussed above) is responsible for 
this, along with the CDU/CSU heeding its loyal supporters, and the fact that now the 
“Germans as perpetrators” and “Germans and victims” discourses coexist in Germany 
and the public is largely indifferent to the issue. 
In Poland, political elites have tried everything to hollow out the BdV’s 
advance. The main reason is the fear that Germany might attempt to rewrite history 
and reverse the victim-perpetrator roles, since any engagement with expulsions entails 
an engagement with expellers as well. The European Network Memory and 
Solidarity, a child of the SPD, took a very long time to materialise, due to its 
international approach, and it finally ground to a halt with the governmental changes 
in Germany and Poland in 2005, not to be revived until 2009. Poland also tried to 
create an institution that would commemorate the victims of National Socialism and 
Communism under the auspices of the Council of Europe, but the motion failed. Also, 
the discourse focused on Steinbach, which seems to have helped her cause. In 
Miszczak’s words (2011 Interview) “Our mistake was to pay attention to her 
[Steinbach] because it gives birth to demons. Steinbach and our radicals like Radio 
Maryja need each other.” Due to the focus on her, Steinbach’s words were carefully 
weighed, in turn forcing policy-makers to take action in order to make the issue go 
away. Steinbach’s numerous controversial remarks must be placed in that context. It 
is possible that she uses them as a tool to achieve her goals. This alone, however, 
would be too simplistic as an explanation. It seems that the quality of Polish-German 
relations contributed to the issue being so controversial, and that the reconciliation of 
the 1990s was too shallow, being filled with symbolism but without the solid 
engagement with painful issues which would lead to a joint “coming to terms with the 
past”. This thesis follows and concurs with Mildeberger’s (2002: 731) comment that 
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Poland and Germany started to talk about a shared Europe, but not about each 
other.312 What seems to support this thesis is the rise of Law and Justice in 2005 when 
Polish resentiment against Germany was openly displayed. Was this perhaps only 
made possible because Poland has now “got what it wanted”, while EU accession, and 
talking about a common Europe has become secondary? 
Applying H3 to Chapter VII of this thesis shows that non-state actors do not 
have to have business interests alone in order to influence foreign relations. It also 
shows that material resources are also not the only significant means in order to 
influence bi-lateral relations. H2 cannot be tested here since there was no equivalent 
Polish non-state actor involved in the process on this issue other than the parties. It is 
somewhat surprising that not even the Polish church, which enjoys a high standing in 
Poland to date, has not come forward on this topic. Given the prominent role the 
Catholic church played as a motor of Polish-German reconciliation in the 1960s as 
seen in Chapter I this is something that I did not expect. Chapter VII once more does 
not allow to falsify H1 since the BdV played a significant role in Germany’s foreign 
relations towards Poland. Unlike the first two case studies where the free movement 
of capital and the free movement of labour entered both governments’ agenda 
automatically through the EU accession negotiations and various private actors then 
submitted their position to their respective governments, here, the BdV managed to 
put an issue on the German government’s agenda and then tried to shape the final 
decision according to its own preferences. This makes it difficult to render a 
comparison between the free movement of labour and the Centre Against Expulsions 
issue especially if one would have to “measure” the influence of the non-state actors 
involved. As explained at the beginning simply saying that a non-state actor’s 
influence is great on the basis that it was successful if we compare the preference 
statements with the final policy-decision would not do the complexities of the whole 
process justice. That is because a non-state actor might spend a vast quantity of 
resources and time to exercise some influence. Another non-state actor might have 
been similarly successful in terms of outcome but spent fewer resources on the 
lobbying process and achieved it quicker. That is exactly the problem here. The BdV 
has been successful in putting the issue on the agenda, but then it took a very long 
                                                 
312 This, in turn, discredits the academic reconciliation literature that accompanied that process (see 
Chapter I) 
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time until finally the Grand Coalition found a compromise and the project went 
ahead. 
 
To summarise the case studies presented in Chapter V through Chapter VII, it can be 
said that Risse-Kappen’s (1995) theory that domestic structures and 
institutionalisation of bi-lateral relations are indeed significant variables that 
determine non-state actors’ influence in foreign policy-making. However, the issue 
context is an additional factor that plays a role. It seems that if an issue is 
controversial enough to provoke a reaction from the other state, then not even a great 
amount of material resources is necessary to shape the government’s agenda as 
demonstrated in Chapter VII. Therefore I propose this as a theory that would need to 
be tested in future research. 
 
This thesis also bears important significance for the discipline of international 
relations. Much of IR literature has focused on interdemocratic peace. i.e. the 
hypothesis that democracies rarely go to war with one another. Various approaches 
have been chosen to study this phenomenon: with statistics, case studies, and multi-
method approaches since the early 1960s (George and Bennett 2005: 37-59). 
Questions of war and peace are of course worthy their attention, but I suggest to focus 
more on how differently structured democracies is a crucial factor in shaping bi-
lateral relations. In this thesis, there are at least four examples that point to the notion 
that bi-lateral relations are influenced by the structural differences between states. In 
the Polish-German case it seems to affect relations negatively. I presented the first 
example in Chapter II where Markus Meckel (2010 Interview), the leader of the 
German-Polish parliamentary group (1994-2009), revealed that when he organized 
conferences on cross-border co-operation, Euroregions and Poland’s accession to the 
EU, where members of the German Länder parliaments and Bundestag, MEPs and 
members of the Polish Sejm, Senat and regional Sejmiks were incorporated, the Polish 
side often expressed concerns regarding overly strong regionalization or even 
federalization. The second example was revealed by Krzysztof Miszczak (2011 
Interview) who expressed dissatisfaction that in Germany the person responsible for 
Polish-German relation is a Minister of State, Cornelia Pieper whilst in Poland this is 
a Secretary of State located in the Chancellery of the Prime-Minister. Third, some 
German Länder would have like to see co-operation with their bordering 
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voivodeships in medical services. However, negotiations were very slow since in 
Poland Warsaw insisted on negotiating over this issue (see Chapter II). Fourth, since 
education policy in Germany lies exclusively within the Länder the federal 
government could not monitor the transposition of the Co-operation Treaty where it 
was agreed in Article 20 that Poles and people of Polish descent living in Germany 
should have the right to safeguard their ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity. Article 21 pledges that this identity should be protected and cultivated 
through necessary conditions such as education in the mother tongue, such provisions 
have not been established by the German authorities so far. In Poland the safeguard of 
the German culture in the Opole voivodeship has been much more extensively 
guarded. It would be interesting to see in future research whether this surprising 
discovery could be substantiated, for example on bi-lateral relations between two 
democracies with centralised government, or between two federal states. 
 Closely connected to this, I would argue that domestic structures are also a 
crucial variable in shaping the process of reconciliation. A leading scholar in 
econciliation studies identifies four variables that determine reconciliation: history, 
leadership, institutions, and the international context (Gardner Feldman 2012). 
Although she indirectly notes the impact domestic structures can have on 
reconciliation, she does not make it a separate variable. Her variable institutions 
entails not only joint institutions that states share such as the EU, but also the 
interaction between governments and societies. She categorizes societal actors 
according to their activities in relation to their home government as catalysts, 
complements, conduits, or competitors. However, whether and how societal actors 
influence concrete government policy depends to a large degree on the domestic 
structures since they pre-determine the relationship of the government to its society. 
As seen in this thesis, well-defined lobbying legislation not only legitimizes societal 
actors’ influence seeking, but also makes the process more transparent and makes it 
easier for those actors which do not have a lot of resources available to access policy-
makers. It becomes particularly instructive how much domestic structures matter 
when one compares different states who embarked on reconciliation efforts. I argue 
that a comparison between Germany and Japan would render interesting results (see 
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